

## **A 21<sup>st</sup> century “repertoire”: affective and urban mobilization dynamics of the Gezi Commune**

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### **Abstract**

*This paper presents a deeper first-hand understanding of the post-2010 collective action forms by proposing “repertoire” as an analytical tool. In doing so, it primarily aims to bring a critical perspective on normative and culture-focused approaches to the 21<sup>st</sup>-century activism that tend to take various aspects of mobilization processes for granted. By questioning how participants “remember” their movements from a critical insider point of view and relying on an ethnographic analysis of Istanbul’s Gezi Park protests of 2013, this paper also sheds light on the ways in which the protest repertoires are adopted and performed in demonstration spaces wherein they are first applied as well.*

**Keywords:** #occupygezi, occupy movements, Gezi, repertoire, commune, Paris Commune, memory, affect, neoliberal metropolis, mobilization,

*“Could one speak of a statement if a voice had not articulated it, if a surface did not bear its signs, if it had not become embodied in a sense-perceptible element, and if it had not left some trace –if only for an instant—in someone’s memory or in some space?” (Foucault 1972).*

This paper presents a deeper first-hand understanding of the post-2010 collective action forms by proposing “repertoire” as an analytical tool. In doing so, it primarily aims to bring a critical perspective on normative and culture-focused approaches to the 21<sup>st</sup>-century activism that tend to take many aspects of mobilization processes for granted. By questioning how participants “remember” their movements from a critical insider point of view and relying on an ethnographic analysis of Istanbul’s Gezi Park protests of 2013, this paper also sheds light on the ways in which the popular protest repertoires are adopted and performed in demonstration spaces wherein they are first applied as well.

New forms of sustained mobilization patterns of the 21<sup>st</sup> century characteristically include heterogeneous crowds that are mobilized with

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affective sensoria, along with an inclination to occupy the symbolically strategic sites in the neoliberal metropolis. Segmented multitudes temporarily taking control of public spaces of global cities, I suggest, is a distinctive peculiarity of the 21<sup>st</sup>-century social protest “repertoire.” And I characterize this new modular form of social protest as the *commune repertoire* because, as will be shown below, the common grievances, emotions and particularly memories of the Turkish protesters frame the Gezi uprising of 2013 around the nostalgic imaginary of 1871 uprising in Paris rather than contemporary exemplary cases, which would be more comparable to the incident itself.

Since its debut scholars, as well as activists on the ground, have put forward different interpretations regarding the pros and cons of this protest form what is commonly known as the “occupy” strategy. While some critiques, which are more inclined to rely on mainstream sociological analysis, draw attention to its short lifespan and the apathy among “occupiers” regarding practical social and political gains, other discussions, especially those leaning toward more autonomous-activist based approaches, point out that the power of occupation comes from its peculiar anarchistic nature. The latter camp suggests that the action in and on itself provides the dissident multitudes with both a common physical site and shared opposition rhetoric by identifying the public with the common people instead of the state. They also add that the shared space and the common cause protestors embrace simultaneously enable the occupiers to forge new social relations alternative to state hegemony in these short-breathed resistance enclaves. What all these critiques have in common is their emphasis on the fact that the “occupation” of public spaces has become one of the most widespread protest tactics on a global scale following the 2008 financial crises and the Arab Spring (Aslanidis, 2016, p. 301,311; Calhoun, 2013, p. 5; Farro and Lustiger-Thaler, 2014; Gibson, 2013, pp. 342–343; Iranzo and Farné, 2013; Ross, 2015, p. 15; Tejerina et al., 2013, p. 378,382).

Without a doubt, the occupation practices, which were actually used pretty often in Italian factories and American university campuses in the 1960s and 1970s in micro contexts, did not arrive in the contemporary world protest stage out of the blue. It has been noted in several studies that the so-called Arab Spring actually wove the different threads of the anti-globalization struggles of the early 2000s and their daily occupy strategies into a new and distinct form, enduringly seen in Cairo (Kamrava, 2014, p. 66; Leveille, 2017, p. 100; Shihade et al., 2012, p. 5; Velut, 2015, p. 37) by staging a successful occupy performance in episodic forms that lasted about over a year. It can, therefore, be argued that Madrid, London, and Zuccotti Park in Lower Manhattan respectively attempted to take their anti-globalization struggle one step further with the excitement heightened by the fall of a Middle Eastern dictatorial regime against all the odds in the early 2010s. I would further argue that defiant demonstrators in Kyiv’s Independence Square (Euromaidan) and the streets of Hong-Kong in 2014 attempted to emulate the same collective performance despite the peculiar characteristics of their own political ecosystems. Last year, Hongkongers smartly shifted the site of action from streets and squares to strategic transportation hubs and commercial zones following the controversial

extradition bill of 2019 as if paying homage to the Seattle’s WTO protests. Thus, the occupy strategy and its derivations have reached a point wherein they can be observed at multiple sites of the global protest scene within a particular time frame regardless of the nature of local regime space, be it liberal-democratic, authoritarian or semi-authoritarian like Turkey, Ukraine Hong-Kong. In this regard, it would not be entirely wrong to suggest occupy has become a major component of a single “cycle of contention” (Tarrow, 1993). A global contention that takes place between the agents of neoliberal globalization, that is authoritarian or pseudo-liberal political state apparatuses, and multitudes mostly made by precariat classes that are reflexively jumping off from the bottom, in the way Hardt and Negri depicted in their meticulous historical analyses (Hardt and Negri, 2005, 2000). But is it literally accurate to characterize this mobilization strategy as occupy form both an empirical and normative perspective, as well as the collective action groups that perform it as multitudes, crowds, or as occupy movements as if they are entirely different from their antecedents?

## Theory

Without a doubt, the occupy movements display different features from the working-class movements of the past centuries, as well as they differentiate from the new social movements of the past decades in terms of class composition and site of action. While new social movements were more male, white-middle class-oriented and peculiar to Western Europe and North America, today’s occupiers are socially more diverse and their life-world is defined by the dynamics that transcend the boundaries of the nation-state (Day, 2005, p. 102). Nonetheless, most scholars also point out that the occupy movements share certain characteristics with new social movements in terms of addressing a wide range of social, political, and cultural issues that cannot be reduced to a single line of conflict. The diversification of motivational reasons has led scholars leaning to this position to emphasize the “intersectional” systems of political and social injustices in the immediate aftermath of occupiers’ retreat with a nuanced terminology accordingly. (Collins and Bilge, 2016, pp. 136–158; Özkırmılı, 2014, p. 3; Tejerina et al., 2013, pp. 384–385). Through the prism of intersectionality, the scholars of this canon suggest that each group involved in the “movement”, be it feminists, communists, anarchists, environmentalists or the LGBTQ community, come to the site of occupation with their own specific ideological agenda, as well as social and cultural grievances peculiar to their own subject positioning in the social cosmos. In search of common themes that can depict these different groups and identities in the same picture, the intersectionality approaches understandably direct the attention to sort of an empty signifier, a common denominator that takes the form of a dictatorial regime or global financial actors, as well as to the political, social and economic injustices that these power nodes cause. Collective identities which shape the mobilization agendas have, therefore, naturally been highlighted in a processual framework in these accounts from a culturalist

perspective, which comes along with a strong normative critique of global political economy (Aslanidis, 2016, p. 301; Bamyeh and Hanafi, 2015, p. 344; Gitlin, 2013, pp. 4–14; Smaldone, 2015).

I share a certain amount of sympathy with these culturalist and normative-based analyses, most of which are usually articulated from an exciting critical activist-academic perspective. I would nonetheless argue that since they have inclinations toward relying on participant-observation methodologies and negating meta-theories, these narrations which just seem to be celebrating the state of being together on a semantic ground are deprived of directing formulated, refined and precise answers to the question of why these previously disconnected actors and groups come together under a common protest scheme. More importantly, since researchers and participants share the same lifeworld to a certain extent, that is the lifeworld of activism, these culturalist-activist based approaches take many questionable and researchable dimensions of occupy movements for granted. First and foremost, they do not thoroughly investigate how protesters themselves give meaning to their own positionality within the cycle of global contention. Do occupiers really think and imagine the protest tactic they use on the ground as the occupy strategy? Are they truly emulating this protest form after seeing its successful performances in other parts of the world? What kind of associations and analogies they use to express their own occupy encampment? In this regard, I would argue that approaching the post-2010 protest scenery in and through repertoire will enable us to answer such questions, thereby providing the researcher with a narrative potential to generate analyses alternative to critical cultural accounts and normative critiques. The repertoire manages to accomplish such a theoretical feat because it forces the researcher to pinpoint the place of imaginations, perceptions, emotions, and particularly memories (Beinin and Vairel, 2013, p. 15) of protesters within a grand protest cycle.

The concept of repertoire is a fairly complex and open-ended analytical tool. Charles Tilly considered one of the leading scholars in the field and the creator of the concept, defines the repertoire as “learned” and “shared” “cultural creations” that express the recurrent patterns of socio-political mobilization within a limited set of alternatives (Tilly, 2015, pp. 42–43, 2008, p. 121, 2008, p. 390, 1993, pp. 264–265). This is not to say, nonetheless, that we may characterize all the repetitive protest forms as repertoires. Repertoires should be “contagious” elements and one way or another they have to be transmitted across the different nodes of a *politically* connected protest stage (usually a nation-state for Tilly). This transmission process usually becomes possible by various telecommunication means such as pamphlets, brochures as well as more contemporary mediums like media (Tilly, 2005, p. 13, 1978, p. 158; Tilly and Tarrow, 2015, p. 188).

Tilly suggests that generally a successful, “innovative” and “improvisational” performance made by a small group of protesters, as happened in the case of Black counter sit-ins the Southern United States before the rise of civil rights movements, motivates and inspires other dissidents who share more or less

similar grievances and political concerns to stage a similar resistance (Tilly, 2010, pp. 34–35, 2008, p. 68; Traugott, 1995, p. 44). Right after a successful innovation sets an example and “impress” others, Tilly points out that the protest performance becomes more open to adaptation and modulation through “word of mouth” (Tilly, 2010, p. 41) in addition to telecommunication means.

Despite highlighting the role of media channels and discourse in the diffusion processes of protest forms, Tilly acknowledges that “exactly how people draw on contentious repertoires remains a controversial variable” (Tilly, 2010, p. 34–35). As a scholar who likes looking at big temporal intervals with historical sociology lenses Tilly understandably refrains from clearly specifying the dialogical cultural mechanisms by which the protest repertoires diffuse in a political milieu he calls “regime space” (Tilly, 2010, p. 39), which for him is usually in a state of flux because of state-making processes and arising/demising opportunities<sup>2</sup>. To animate these cultural aspects of the protest action he makes use of metaphorical expressions such as “jazz” (Tilly, 2010, pp. 34–35, 1993, pp. 264–265; Tilly and Tarrow, 2015, p. 183) and metaphysical human practices like rituals (Tilly, 1978, p. 158; Tilly and Tilly, 2013, pp. 33–37). “Like their theatrical counterparts, repertoires of collective action...designate interaction among pair or larger sets of actors” he adds on such analogies to emphasize the intersubjectively performed elements of social mobilization (Tilly, 1993, p. 265).

As seen, Tilly’s regime-repertoire model is fairly complex since it navigates analytical terrain that lies between culture and structure. Perhaps it is through this multi-vectored conceptual framework that Tilly masterfully succeeds to conceptualize human acts amid protest action along with structural and political ingredients despite he never had the chance to make first-hand observations in an activist manner on the ground. Nonetheless, Tilly himself and the school of thought he represents, that is, the political process theories, have received a fair amount of criticisms for overlooking “emotions,” as well as micro-mobilizations dynamics because of the so-called “structural bias” (Goodwin and Jasper, James M., 2004) in their analyses. Against such critiques, Tilly responded by explaining that the main contours of his models “spanned the entire range from

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<sup>2</sup> Like many of his generations, Tilly utilized the epistemological and methodological understanding of historical sociology, which was the rising scholarly trend back in the late 1960s and 1970s (Smith, 1991), to observe the transition of social protest repertoires from more parochial forms to national ones (Tilly and Tilly, 2013, pp. 390–392). Within this longitudinal approach, for Tilly, it is generally through “improvisational performances” (Tilly, 2010, p. 34; Tilly and Tarrow, 2015, p. 188)<sup>2</sup> that a social protest repertoire diffuse to other relevant protest settings, and all the innovations and improvisational protest tactics at micro-level crystalize as a result of democratic openings in what he calls “regime space” (Tilly, 2010, p. 25, 2008, pp. 4–12) at the macro level. Tilly’s regime space is quite a Machiavellian and dynamic political arena that constantly oscillates under state-making and national market processes in temporality. Because of the dynamic nature of the political ecosystem, “opportunities” rise and demise in a constant fashion for dissident actors to make social and political gains (Tilly, 2010, p. 211, 1978, pp. 8,223–234; Tilly and Tarrow, 2015, p. 45). Therefore dissidents constantly modify the repertoires in an “unceasing” fashion with a formula, which blends rational aspirations for politics/social rights with spontaneously developed cultural modifications, in the course of action (Tilly, 1978, pp. 7–8; Tilly and Tarrow, 2015, p. 158; Tilly and Tilly, 2013, p. 390).

individual interactions to whole revolutions...no single unit of observation has priority” (Tilly, 2010, p. 46).

I think what causes problems in Tilly’s model is not the intense structural-political focal point he utilizes but his persistence in seeing and placing the repertoires within the nation-state context. Since he built his entire model on historical evidence extracted from the French revolutions and democratic demands made by the common people in industrializing Britain and its colonies across the Atlantic, he is understandably more inclined to cook the repertoire within the container of the emerging nation-state of the 19<sup>th</sup> and 20<sup>th</sup> centuries. Yet with a little touch of discourse and media analyses, recent studies have salvaged the concept from the dark depths of the nation-state by shedding light on the cultural transmission mechanisms Tilly was hesitant to his finger on. In such more contemporary analyses, repertoires appear to be gas particulates not only oscillating within the nebula of the nation-state which is caught in the push-pull forces caused by structural and political processes, but they are more depicted as solid molecules that are capable of independently moving across a global spatiotemporally via dramatic live footages, images, and public discourses. Michael Biggs’ meticulous media analysis that demonstrates how the suicide protests spread across the world following the death of a Vietnamese monk who set himself on fire in front of cameras to protest the pro-Western government policies, for instance, show us the ways in which protest repertoires can be transmitted via press and communication means independent of national-political structures. And I would argue his study constitutes a perfect example for understanding the repertoire outside of national political milieu besides a few similar studies (Andrews and Biggs, 2006; Biggs, 2013; Braun, 2011; Koopmans and Olzak, 2004; Myers, 2000).

In his later studies, Tilly himself also acknowledged the power of telecommunication means in a visually wired world (W. Tennant 2013, 121) yet interestingly still in relation to national democratic demands and politics rather than the concept of repertoire itself. “Today, mass media have made the performances of social movement—especially their demonstrations—so visible through the world that dissidents in nondemocratic regimes often emulate their forms” he once noted (Tilly, 2010, p. 186; Tilly and Tarrow, 2015, p. 30)<sup>3</sup> with a euro-centric approach right before the aftershocks of the Arab Spring shook Continental Europe and North America.

Without a doubt, the rise of smartphone technologies and mobile computing have carried the interactive world Tilly acknowledged one step further. These new pocket-sized gadgets not only seem to have accelerated and amplified

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<sup>3</sup> Tilly exemplified the transitional connections of social mobilization by addressing how the Rose Revolution in Georgia was triggered by an American documentary followed by the dissidents who were in close touch with Serbian activists. What should be noted in this context is the fact that the documentaries showing the fall of a long-lasting dictatorship regime in Egypt by cross-class and cross-cultural alliance set the motion of a new form social protest form, but in a reverse way, that is, from the so-called Orient to the Occident, as I pointed out in the introductory section.

mobilization processes on the ground but also remarkably allow protesters on the far corners of the world to communicate with one another even outside the channels of mass media and transnational activist networks in a direct and instant way. Perhaps more than ever, I would argue, social protest repertoires have become more open to emulation, adaptation, and modulation on a global scale than Tilly could ever imagine. As a result, it is not surprising to see an exponential increase in studies that discuss the role of social media with respect to mobilization activities and changing nature of transnational activist connections especially following the reverberations of the Arab Spring (Cole, 2014; Gerbaudo, 2012; Olorunnisola and Martin, 2013; Shaked, 2017; Trottier and Fuchs, 2015; Tufekci, 2017). Given that each millisecond of eventful protests can be recorded and globally shared via new communication technologies, digital matrixes and global news sources, one can indeed assume that dramatic scenes displaying the successful performance of occupation in Tahrir Square offers, on a global platform, a model for protesters who took to the streets and gathered in public spaces of other global cities (Tejerina et al., 2013, p. 384).

## **Methodology**

With precisely this assumption and problematic in mind, in the late spring of 2014, I conducted ethnographic field research on one of the most recent examples of the 21<sup>st</sup>-century movements, that is the so-called #occupygezi, to throw light on the transmission mechanisms of what I first imagined as the occupy repertoire then. In other words, through an ethnographic exploration of this unique protest event in Turkey's history, I questioned whether demonstrators in Istanbul adopted today's most prevalent global protest strategy, which seemed to be diffusing from one corner of the world to another, to their own protest culture and political eco-system via new media technologies. More specifically, I investigated if the Turkish protestors truly draw inspiration from the visuals of Tahrir Square, the Occupy movement of New York, or other similar eventful protests before taking to the streets. If so, what was the source lying beneath this transmission mechanism? I would argue that such an inquiry was definitely necessary from a Tillean methodological point of view, given that his “repeated calls for empirical modification or falsification” with respect to the basic transmission mechanisms of the repertoire have not been sufficiently answered (Biggs, 2013, p. 407; Tilly, 2008, p. xiv). Besides this main area of inquiry while continuing my fieldwork another key question had preoccupied me as well: was the decision to participate in Gezi given in a more rational manner or emerged more in response to emotional motivational reasons that surfaced in the course of action? In a nutshell, I pitted emotions/culture against structures/politics in order to provide a few empirical evidence for the most contemporary decisions in social movements studies as well.

The ethnographic investigation, which approximately lasted over two years, mostly involved semi-structured one-on-one interviews carried out with the

participants who were drawn from different socio-cultural backgrounds and activist-political groups, which represent the complex multiplicity the occupy movements reflected on the world protest stage. Thus, the general profile of Gezi participants was spanning an entire cultural and political spectrum as well. The majority of the participants who accepted to speak to me under the conditions of Turkey’s volatile political climate during these times were from a precarious class background with no regular job or social insurance except one protester who was a laborer in the private construction sector. One participant declared himself to be a “conservative entrepreneur at heart” in the same sector.<sup>4</sup> In this regard, it should be noted that Gezi included not only subjectivities from the left-leaning groups such as environmentalists, Marxists, LGBTQ members, anarchists, feminists, progressive Islamists, but also socially conservative pro-government and government-allied ultranationalists. Nonetheless, studies that immediately came out following the afterglow of Gezi overlooked the presence of such right-wing subjectivities because of ideological as well as statistical reasons.<sup>5</sup>

In order not to pollute or taint the claim to objectivity and to channel all the voices of subjectivities in the repertoire, I conducted semi-structured interviews with 17 participants (approximately two members from each group and subjectivity) who were recruited via a two-stage snowballing technique. The first key group of interviews involved prominent public and well-known leader figures in their activist and political circles who acted as the gatekeeper for the second group interviewees. The second group involved relatively younger participants with independent roles in their groups, social settings, and organizations. Overall, interviewees came from a higher-education background except a few who seemed to be critical of the possibilities that education institutions could offer to people in the age of information. I commenced the

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<sup>4</sup> The interviewees were not specifically asked about their class orientation to avoid the unequal power relations that could surface between the researcher and participants. They were asked to introduce themselves and encouraged to talk about “their past before Gezi.” Since issues of social class are expressed in cultural and ideological means in Turkey, the interviewees preferred to define their identities according to the political ideology of the activist groups they were affiliated with. Some of them also mentioned their family background and ethnic ties while introducing themselves, even so, the social class was not specifically emphasized in the first place. This is not to say that that Gezi was a movement driven entirely middle or upper-middle groups or working-class segments did not involve in it at all. In a world where the number of citizens who are absent from the protection of social insurance systems is structurally increasing because of the general tendency in the labor market and economic transformations, it would be a futile attempt to map out the class composition of this incident. As I have noted before and debates in social movement literature indicate, new social movements and the Occupy movements differentiate from the working-class movements of early capitalism since their struggles cannot be reduced to a single line of conflict.

<sup>5</sup> In this article, I have particularly chosen to include analyses elicited from such conservative participants to paint a clearer picture of the protest scene in Istanbul because I would argue these protesters displaying liminal characteristics may be thought as better empirical channels to dig deeper into the core dynamics at play in micro mobilization processes. Participants with different ideological visions and cultural orientations also enable me to perform my role as critical insider.



ethnography with ideologically the most distant and challenging group for me, that is the nationalist youth organization called the Turkish Youth Unity (TGB).

I myself had also actively participated in the incident beginning from its embryonic occupation phase along with environmentalist groups. I attended many public forums and the meetings of Gezi (June) Unity Movement’s quorum series, which lasted almost over two years after Gezi till the winter of 2016. Nonetheless, as I suggested above, I strived to position myself as a “critical insider” (Graeber, 2009, p. 12)<sup>6</sup> throughout whole this process. To accomplish this ethical activist methodology, besides playing the role of devil’s advocate during the interviews the data I collected was filtered through epistemological matrices derived from memory studies (Bornat, 2013; Brown and Reavey, 2013; Fivush, 2013; Kansteiner, 2002; Keightley, 2010; Radstone, 2016; Roediger and Wertsch, 2008; Taylor, 2003) and critical approaches to narrative analysis techniques, which encourage the researcher to use his/her emotions as investigative tools during both transcription and data collection processes (Arditti et al., 2010; Hubbard et al., 2001; Kleinman and Copp, 1993). As a result of this methodological combination, I focused on consciously and/or unconsciously included and/or excluded metaphorical expressions, as well as common or clashing accounts that surfaced during the dialogical exchanges of the interviews (Keightley, 2010, pp. 57-58,64). I then made use of the expressions and accounts that compelled me to see the incident in a different light from the perspective of my own lifeworld in the panorama of Gezi. Thus, I must confess I went out in the field to disprove my own theoretical projections on the incident and set a common-knowledge production process in motion, which would eventually lead to a narrative reflecting the motivational factors of all the diverse subjectivities involved in Gezi.

The interview questions that would provide answers for the two main research questions I mentioned above were particularly structured in a very abstract and open-ended manner in order not to contaminate the remembering processes and means for the interviewees. With vague questions such as “what does Gezi remind you of?”, “what was the last protest event you remember before Gezi” or “what things came to your mind during the mobilization night” I tried to open enough space for the interviewees to shape their own narratives and memories, thereby contributing to the common knowledge production process as much as possible. On the other hand, the follow-up questions that were posed toward the end of the interviews purposefully brought up a couple of the tangible incidents such as the Tahrir Square, the occupy movements of the Global North, or more local-oriented protest events that took place before the Gezi Commune. Such questions also specifically reminded the interviewees of main mobilization factors such as class issues, increasing authoritarian tendencies in Turkey in the

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<sup>6</sup>David Graber defines critical insider as activist ethnographer "whose ultimate purpose is to further the goals" of the movement s/he is part of. For him, social movements are made up of participants with different social and ideological backgrounds, and maintaining solidarity in such diverse mobilization settings requires self-reflexive lenses directed at the ethnographer's own privileged subjectivity, as well as other participant's political views and subject positioning.

context of arising/closing political opportunities and emotional aspects of mobilization as well. Based on the answers given to all of these questions, the common denominator that brings all the interviewees together, I would argue, take shape around three important facts: first, the theatre protests as a matter of urban commons that occurred a couple of months before Gezi, second the red woman, one of the iconic images of the mobilization night, and lastly the Paris Commune and communal way of life as an example of utopic, nostalgic representation, which transcends the boundaries of contemporary temporality and consciousness as affect.

### **“Transformative events”**

At the outset, the Istanbul protests emerged in response to the latest installment of the Justice and Development Party's (AKP) neo-Ottomanist urban renewal scheme, which proposed the restitution of a 19<sup>th</sup>-century Ottoman artillery. This seemingly historical revitalization project reflexively created public outrage since it would have served as a façade for privatizing Taksim Square and constructing yet another new five-star hotel and shopping mall, which significantly threatened to destroy Gezi Park (Gürcan, 2014, pp. 73–80; Harmanşah, 2014, pp. 126–127; Özkırmı, 2014, p. 2; Tuğal, 2013, pp. 152–153). In conjunction with independent environmentalist activists, various groups from a local grassroots organization called the Taksim Solidarity (TD) set up a small encampment inside the park to halt the construction process.

By the night of May 31<sup>st</sup>, 2013, the struggle for a sustainable urban life spread to other parts of Istanbul as well as to other major cities in the country, thereby evolving into nation-wide civil disobedience over a night. On the afternoon of June 1<sup>st</sup>, people from all walks of life amplified the intensity of the small environmentalist occupation, as a result causing it to expand in size and scope rapidly. The rapidly increasing crowd, both inside and outside of the park, carried out a nearly 24-hours of active struggle against security forces, who gradually withdrew from the square following the Istanbul governor's instructions. The state's decision to back down revealed the unpreparedness of its security apparatus to what I characterize as the commune repertoire, which was a performance unique to Istanbul's urban space as opposed to other metropolitan areas of Turkey. Thus, Gezi had reverberated across the whole country, yet it only managed to morph into a commune in Istanbul.

In the following two weeks, the demonstrators transformed the small encampment that was initially set up by the environmentalists into a self-sustaining and experimental protest enclave, as happened in the other previous episodes of the repertoire. With its library, collectively organized dinners and cleaning activities, mass yoga sessions, free food courts, botanic garden, solar ovens, infirmary, radio station, and daily press, the protest space conjured up a communal way of life within a metropolis, which was wrecked by three decades of neoliberal policies (Kolluoglu, 2018, p. 32). The park itself subsequently became an emotional point of reference that kept drawing other demonstrators

and by-standards in from a multitude of social and cultural backgrounds. Statistical projections estimated that almost 16 (3,5 million) percent of Istanbul's population (15 million) temporarily visited or participated in what is popularly known as the Gezi events (Yörük and Yüksel, 2014, p. 15). No one could have imagined that the small environmentalist encampment would form in Taksim's Gezi Park, much less it would ignite a cycle of protests throughout the country and lead to a commune in the city's ever whirling spatiality.

I first asked whether my participants were involved in any protest event prior to Gezi to analyze how the small picketing event culminated in a mass uprising. In this way, I aimed to explore how and why demonstrators from various socio-cultural backgrounds and political affiliations simultaneously took to the streets in solidarity unprecedented in Turkey's protest culture. Based on the answers provided, I then asked the interviewees to describe the demonstration, sit-in, picketing event, vigil, political campaign, or rally they participated in before the commune. My intention behind this inquiry was to examine whether any sort of “transformative event” (Tilly and Tarrow, 2015, p. 183) built up to the rapid and instantaneous collective action of the 31 May night. In other words, I tested Tilly's model on an empirical ground.

Fourteen out of the seventeen interviewees told me they either actively participated in or closely monitored two protest events before the commune. The first protest incident the interviewees recalled was the International Labour Day gatherings, which was organized in the same square between the years of 2011 and 2013. The second case was the *Emek* Theater demonstrations. *Emek*, roughly translated as labor, was more of a micro-scale picketing event. In this incident, local dwellers confronted another privatization project targeting urban commons in the Taksim area. And I would argue that the theater protesters were particularly significant considering they erupted just a couple of weeks before Gezi.

Subsequently, I inquired had the participants “observed,” or “witnessed” anything “unusual” or “uncommon” in these both key turning points leading up to the commune. In other words, I looked at whether they came across any modulation, improvising performance, or innovation in the local protest repertoire pool from a Tillean perspective. Those who were actively present or followed the incidents via mainstream and social media channels told me they noticed a different “momentum,” “social texture,” and “crowd” in the course of events. Thus, contrary to my expectations, they told me that they observed a transformation in the social composition of performers, rather than a change or innovation in the forms or nature of collective action itself.

One LGBTQ individual who went out into Taksim Square for Labour Day celebrations in 2012 describes the scenes he witnessed as follows: “I could not see the thing that we may call the traditional left in 2012. That May 1 coincided with the student pact that was emerging against the AKP. There were many anarchists, black colors, rainbow flags, visible feminist organizations. That was a difference for me.” In a similar fashion, a young member of the ultra-nationalist youth organization verified his statement. “There were more

independent protesters than organizations” he recounted when he was asked to articulate his “feelings” and “thoughts” about his last demonstration before Gezi.

The last demonstration the TGB member participated in was the May Day gathering of 2013 in Taksim Square. That year the government authorities decided to cancel the celebrations that they let back in 2011. Up until then, the Turkish state had closed the site for all kinds of public gatherings following the May Day massacre of 1977, where right-wing contra-guerrilla organizations opened fire over a crowd gathered that year (“Turkish police, May Day protesters clash in Istanbul,” 2013, p. 1). In other words, the Taksim Square had remained a no man’s land over almost 30 years before the liberal vein of the AKP announced the site was open to gatherings in 2011. In the following two years, the site brought the cultural movements of Turkey together with unions in the new millennium. The statements that were given by the two diametrically opposed subjectivities (one LGBTQ individual one young proud nationalist) verify how cultural movements tried to articulate themselves upon the working-class movements under the conditions of the flexible labor market. Thus, unions, Marxist-Leninist party fractions, and syndicalist organizations were not only actors in the 21<sup>st</sup> century May Day gatherings as it used to be back in the 1970s. Interestingly, this heterogeneous, independent young activist profile mixing laborers with precarious classes showed up for *Emek* theater as well.

Similar to Gezi Park, in the early spring of 2013, the municipality announced a project that included the demolishment of the old historic theater hall, which was designed in the art deco style by a Levantine architecture in 1884. This urban renewal project was proposing to turn the non-profit theatre hall into a shopping venue, which generated considerable public disapproval in early April 2013 (Letsch, 2013). The spreading news captured the attention of young, left-leaning, and precariat middle-classes, including art curators, environmentalists, and the LGBTQ people who were living in the near vicinity. These young segments of the society were far more inclined to turn the area surrounding the theater (İstiklal Avenue) into an aestheticized space of resistance against global capitalism, rather than a profit-oriented venue. Interestingly, *Emek* also became a matter of concern for nationalist youths who are more sensitive about protecting “Turkey’s secular values” and sovereignty against the “imperialism” of the West. Another young member of the TGB surprisingly told me the *Emek* protests were among the last demonstration he attended. When I directed a volley of probing questions concerning his motivation, he pointed to the “operational logic of capitalism” and vehemently explained how this “mindset” could “devour national treasures like *Emek*.”

When asked about “memories” from her last “protest experience,” another protester, who introduced herself as a feminist socialist and film studies student, made the following comment: “Almost everyone was there. I noticed that there was more of a cosmopolitan crowd both in *Emek* and during the last May 1 celebration in 2013.” As if echoing this student’s sentiments, an environmentalist activist described the protester profile of the theater picketing

as follows: “Most of the people there were independent, they were just ordinary people, local dwellers and arts people living in the neighborhood, maybe a few from outside (other neighborhoods).”

The privatization of Emek theater hall epitomizes the three-decade neoliberal urban policies to which Istanbul has been left exposed. Today’s Istanbul can be thought as the product of what Çağlar Keyder refers to as the “new urban coalition,” which encompasses the city government, sub-state actors, and the conservative Islamic bourgeoisie, which crystallized in the aftermath of political Islam’s first victory in the municipal elections of 1994 (Keyder, 2010). This coalition took a more overt Islamic tone following the AKP’s rise in the national elections in the early 2000s especially in terms of reconfiguration processes of urban space. However, their ultimate goal, that is Islamising and globalizing the city, were diametrically opposed to the urban visions of new middle classes who were yearning for a cosmopolitan and sustainable city.

In this regard, I would suggest that the lifestyles of those deviating from orthodox Islamic norms, values, and the aesthetic and market understanding that the AKP represents, manifested themselves in both events, which is the theater and Labour Day celebrations. In a way, the Labour Day gatherings may also be viewed as an attempt to reclaim public spaces because there were many groups and movement members who will probably never grasp to chance to get unionized but cares more about the city they live in. Ultimately, in both incidents, I would argue that we are looking at a segmented crowd mostly made up of new urban, precariat middle classes that challenged what Ariel Salzman characterizes as “Islamopolis,” which she characterizes as a distorted, post-modern version of cosmopolitan Ottoman urban life (Salzman, 2012, pp. 68–71, 86).<sup>7</sup> Hence, the post-modern Islamic urbanity and the segmented crowds that took shape against it constitute the two main pillars on which the transformative events leading to the mobilization night were based on.

## **The mobilization night**

On several counts, the mobilization process of Gezi may be likened to the uprisings that occurred in both Tunisia and Egypt, behind which simmering in social media is counted among the most important triggering forces. The scenes showing the forceful evictions of the environmentalist protesters and the TD members from the park created outrage to a significant extent among Turkish demonstrators just as it happened after Mohammad Bouazizi’s self-immolation

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<sup>7</sup> Salzman, in fact, stretches the appearance of this multi-layered crowd back to the assassination of Armenian-Turkish in 2007. In this regard, she points to the funeral cortège that involved not only ethnically Armenian Turks, but also new urban middle classes as well as other minorities of the Ottoman past. She discusses the unexpected rise of this multi-ethnic and cross-class multitude in the context of the cosmopolitan historicity of Istanbul’s urban space nonetheless urges to “reflect on the varied motivations and emotions” of them from a more empirical point of view. My own field research findings, as suggested above, show us that this layer of the new urban middle-class composition is in a growing tendency.

incident spread throughout digital matrixes. On the night of May 31<sup>st</sup>, there was a similar surge of digital images and snapshots that went viral on social media. In particular, [an image of a young graduate student, also known as the red woman](#) (Benjamin Seel, 2013), became extremely popular online, which later on emerged as one of the iconographies of the commune.

The majority of my interviewees addressed this image throughout our discussions without me giving them any clue or reminder. The interviewees did not include political, social rights or class issues among factors the culminating to the uprising, even though I specifically asked whether they would view the AKP’s decision to lift the ban on Labour Day celebrations in the square as a “window of opportunity.” Rather than such political matters and constitutional rights, most of the interviewees lined up the “asymmetrical use of force” by police, “unjust violence,” and dramatic images they came across on social media as motivational reasons.

One of the interviewees, who introduced himself as an AKP supporter and an “Erdogan sympathizer,” pointed to the snapshot of the red woman and described it as the most “memorable moment left from Gezi.” He stated, “The red woman, she had a very strong stance in there. Images like that really made me thought there was a matter of injustice in the park, which is why my wife and I decided to go down there.” Another participant, who was affiliated with various anarchist organizations and also an employee in the construction sector, told me he first encountered the image of the red women on his cell phone while he was working. He stated, “After that, I made up my mind to go Taksim as soon as I finish off work.” As an anarchist Kurd, he used an interesting metaphor to express his “feelings” and “opinions” regarding the red woman. He shared, “I felt the whole country was under invasion. It was as if the public emerged as enemy...how could they do that to this girl I kept mumbling myself.”

The women of Gezi, who actively struggled on the frontlines throughout the mobilization night, inspired not only the dissident Kurdish laborer but also the young Islamist entrepreneur, revealing yet another pair of socially and ideologically contrasting subjectivities and intersecting motivating forces in the same picture. Another interviewee, who declared his allegiance to the Pan-Turkist ideology and its political actor the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP), said to me: “I was impressed by ordinary people’s bravery during the insurrection night, especially that of women. They did not seem to possess extraordinary talents and skills, like heroic characters we see in the films...the courage they showed just impressed me. That is how I found myself amid the crowds trying to reach the park.”

Another interviewee, who was a socialist growing up in “a secular family environment”<sup>8</sup>, also underlined the significant role the female protesters took

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<sup>8</sup> In the Turkish political jargon such a statement corresponds to sympathy felt for the founding party of the Turkish Republic, the Republican People’s Party, which channels the voices of secular opposition in the political platform since the 1940s against parties representing liberal and vernacular/Islamic conservative values.

on during the mobilization night. She included the red woman among the most “unforgettable moments and scenes” of the uprising night without any reminder. She recounted, “The gas gun pointed at that girl’s face. That frame, its *memory* still haunts me.”

Of course, the red woman was neither the only social media heroine of the night nor was it the only morally shocking incident that reverberated across the affective domains of dissidents. When asked to recall memories, my other interviewees recounted many similar events and dramatic scenes they witnessed either first-hand or on saw social media<sup>9</sup>. The anecdotes they narrated, which forced the boundaries of my own theoretical projections, included the stories of elders and old-school protesters in about their “seventies,” “brave LGBTQ members” physically confronting security forces, and also environmentalists who locked themselves to the top of swaying trees following the night assault. Overall, most of the commentaries on such dramatic events, I suggest, highlighted the “heroic acts” of women in particular and explained how such brave initiatives encouraged and motivated male and personal involvement in the uprising.

In this regard, I would argue that the red woman can be considered the embodiment of many other morally shocking dramatic incidents, which slipped off the radar of social media that night. Expressed differently, I imagine its aestheticized effect, that is, the contrasting effect of her red dress disappearing into her pale white skin which evokes the spirit of the Turkish flag in a compositional sense, as the incarnation of a common denominator. And through this common affective circuit, the heterogeneous crowds that previously gathered around the urban commons and transformative events like the May Day celebrations horizontally managed to mobilize without a leadership figure and organizational structure in a true anarchistic sense.

Without a doubt, the affective sensoria the red women created cannot even be compared to Mohammed Bouazizi’s self-immolation. Ultimately, the latter caused the life of a poor street vendor in a country where the wealth gap is much greater. Yet the exercise of violence on a young woman’s body, I would suggest, woke up the young Turks of the new millennium who were alleged to be apolitical. The red woman created a spillover effect in digital publicity because she morphed into a simulacrum, thereby emerging as an inter-subjective or interactively experienced truth in its own right. The fragility of the female body arose as an accentuated reality that warped and slowed down the accelerated spatiotemporally of postmodernity. As a result, it created incentives for an already atomized segment including even relatively obedient conservative and nationalist groups to connect to the moment from a politically decontextualized point of view. The aesthetics of the image depicted the violence as if it was almost stationary, like a frozen timeframe that was reaching beyond space and

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<sup>9</sup> See e.g. <https://t24.com.tr/haber/gezinin-sapanli-teyzesi-tahliye-edildi,733829> and <https://t24.com.tr/haber/taksimde-tazyikli-suya-karsi-kipirdamadan-durdu,231113>

time configurations during which it was recorded.<sup>10</sup> It was as if the composition of the static body, the pale skin, and its stark contrast to the red dress, opened onto infinite possibilities. By creating “a powerful indetermination” in everyday routine and also simultaneously establishing an “affective intensity,” (Bartelson and Murphie, 2010), the image weaved the moment itself into previous contentious episodes, including Emek and the Labour Day protests. The affective intensity the red woman created, I would even argue, reached as far as many other “unjust”<sup>11</sup> events that had hitherto taken place in Asia Minor’s history.

A historical approach to social protest, in fact, shows us that iconography, motifs, and representations of woman body are associated with the abstract idealization of “liberty” during uprisings like Gezi, and it is very common to see this type of female images in times of revolutionary situations and socio-political turbulences. In the 1840s of France, images showing women fighting on barricades, for instance, circulated widely in pamphlets and brochures as reoccurring revolutionary symbols, which animated the dissident segments to rebel against the absolutist regime of Napoléon. Sexualized iconography of women motivated the Parisians, who gathered around common causes and the images depicting the notion of “liberating Paris.” Womanhood in a sense was associated with the image of “free motherland” (a very clichéd metaphoric imagination in official nationalist narrations, especially in the context of third world nationalisms) in these depictions, which usually portray the crowds gathering for the sake of the common cause they believe in. (D. Harvey 2004, 4,280-285).

Interestingly, memories of the second stage of the Gezi occupation did not appear to be very distant from the city of Paris en route to the Commune of 1871. The Pan-Turkish participant's observations on the late hours of the rebellion were as follows: "Unlike other demonstrations organized by the left, you know where you usually see people only raising left fists, this was without organization. This is a historical moment I told myself as I followed what other protesters were doing. Taksim was engulfed in flames." When asked to describe what those scenes reminded him of, interestingly, and immediately he said, "the French Revolution." He said this with a determined and self-assured tone in his voice as if there was no place for more contemporary exemplary cases like Tahrir and the Occupy movements in North America.

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<sup>10</sup> I would argue that the snapshot showing Alan Kurdi's on the Aegean coast of Turkey had a strikingly similar effect on the Western world, especially in Canada concerning the Syrian civil war and migration policies.

<sup>11</sup> I would suggest that the entrepreneur 's comments and his word choice about the red woman might serve to reinforce the argument I am presenting here. He suggested Gezi became a matter of justice for him after seeing the images of the red woman. In case I had directed probing questions to clarify what he meant by "injustice" he would probably have referred to the freedom for veiling protests organized in Taksim in the early 2000s. In this regard, it would not be entirely wrong to suggest that the red woman revitalized the memories of these repertoires organized by socially conservative feminists in his imagination.



As I noted above, I would not anticipate such a response given my own theoretical projections on the mobilization factors that draw the main contours of “occupy” repertoire. As a communitarian leaning toward the Pan-Turkist political tradition, which takes its inspiration from the mythical spatiotemporally of Central Asia, rather than the Western political culture. I would expect this proud young nationalist to associate the dramatic scenes he saw with a contentious episode recorded in the history of Turkey’s protest culture, or perhaps one that involves his own party organization, or at the very least with Egypt’s Tahrir revolution, which falls somewhere near the outer edge of Turkey’s political and cultural landscape. Nonetheless, as a subjectivity that is proud of his national history and Islamic heritage, the last hours of the mobilization night paradoxically revived the political imaginaries of the French Revolution in his lifeworld. And he was not the only interviewee framing the first days of the second occupation phase around similar distinct historically analogous events and metaphoric expressions, which were alluding to the revolutionary situations of the past century in world history.

### **The Paris Commune on the horizons of the park**

Following the affective intensity that brought the fragmented young Turks closer to one another, the encampment in Gezi Park was restored along with larger crowds following the police’s gradual retreat from the square on the afternoon of June 1<sup>st</sup>. This second occupation move continued into the second week of June 2013. Throughout the two-week commune experience, the protesters turned the park into a utopian space by forming small and large-scaled platforms where they put the direct-democracy principles into action, staged ritualistic art performances, organized counter-cultural activities. Above all, the tents and space per se allowed communitarians from all walks of life to get in touch with one another. Despite ongoing clashes with security forces in near vicinities, floor discussions, music gigs, political tirades, and soapboxes one by one blossomed around the tents of each collective and individual group pitched in the park. Formerly antagonized political and social identities such as the nationalist-secularists and Kurds, Islamists and feminists, LGBTQ people, and soccer fans shared the same space for almost two weeks. And furthermore, they slept in the camp mattresses as the police forces assaulted the borders of the commune.

By reminding such colorful and dramatic scenes Gezi engraved in Turkey’s social memory, I asked the interviewees to visualize the first day of “occupation” and then requested them to articulate their “opinions,” “thoughts,” and “feelings” over the very first scene” they themselves remember from a chronological point of view. I then asked them to associate the “the very first image they recall” with “anything” that flashes in their minds. Considering that memories regarding the mobilization night often verified the culturalist camp and produced a limited narration of the incident itself, my intention behind this memory exploration I suggest was to see to what extent the roots of the repertoire performed in the park could be viewed in the global protest climate

that the post-Arab spring brought with itself. In other words, I questioned whether the post-2010 global protest scenery inspired the Gezi protesters on the ground, be it via social media or mainstream media channels, or any sorts of means of new computing and media technologies. Did they really adapt the occupy strategy to their own protest environment?

Against my expectations, neither the contemporary cases of Egypt, Tunisia, nor the examples of Occupy movements in the global north came up in their recounts. Similar to the Pan-Turkist communard's commentaries, other participants primarily mentioned the Commune of 1871, or other similar historically analogous events like the Spanish Civil War, which lies in the distant past of revolutionary situations of Europe. Following my probing questions, they similarly weaved such historical cases, in which we also see fragmented crowds with diverse social and cultural backgrounds coming together, into Situationist expressions like “utopian space,” “a space of hope,” “liberated zone” and “commune.” Just like the Pan-Turkist protester, the Kurdish anarchist entered the park in the early hours of dawn Taksim Square appeared to be literally a battle zone. The anarchist communard described the scene he came across as follows: "I barely remember my first moment in the park. I was all drained out. All the area was covered up with a thick cloud and burnt smell. Flaming fires around the square were lighting up the far corners of the park. It was like the Spanish Civil War." When I asked him to elaborate on what he specifically meant by that "comparison," he responded in a determined manner: "You know sort of a liberated zone."

Another environmentalist protester remarked on her very first day in the park as follows: "I was wondering how such a huge crowd fit into the park. But there was something out there organizing everything. I do not know what that was or how to describe it. I cannot find the words...perhaps a commune, like the Paris Commune maybe." One of the members of the TBG, who was mesmerized by the same chaotic scenery, shared similar sentiments and thoughts regarding his first-day experience in the square without state authority. "There were overwhelmingly too many colors. But I felt something new at the same time. I felt hope. I could have never imagined the left resisting through art and humor before...It was like a utopian space."

The AKP voter was also among the dissidents who immediately visited the park on June 1<sup>st</sup>. He went to the site of action along with his wife to deliver the food they cooked together for the communards. He recounted, “the first thing that I noticed when we were handing food round was that people were lining up to carry plastic water bottles to the park in chains. At that moment, I came to understand that the Turkish left was not just about people raising left fists in times of demonstration. A sense of thrilling excitement covered (boiled) up inside me as we kept on watching them. I actually realized a *petit* anarchist was lying inside me at that moment. That scene enabled me to see what a commune life would actually be like. It showed me how it really looked like there.”

### **In lieu of conclusion: “mnemonic community”**

Methodologically and ontologically speaking, “memories are at their most collective when they transcend the time and space of the event’s original occurrence” (Kansteiner, 2002, p. 189). Remembering is a “mediated” process (Fivush, 2013, pp. 15–17) and memories often expand upon their own ontological existence through mediums such as images, written or oral metaphoric expressions, as well as grander collective memories or narratives. “Means of representation” that facilitate the act of remembering, the “physical and cultural proximity” to analogues events and their “subsequent rationalization and memorialization” do not have to entirely overlap with the actual event that occurred before people’s eyes. Hence, people may “embrace” memories of the medium events “that occurred in unfamiliar and historically distance cultural contexts” to “reconstruct” the real event after its happening (Kansteiner, 2002, p. 190). The more temporally distant the medium event is, the more the memory of the event being remembered becomes collective, thereby representing the lifeworld of a particular “mnemonic community” on common ground. (Keightley and Pickering, 2012).<sup>12</sup>

In light of this critical approach to oral history and the empirical findings I presented above, I argue that it was the political imaginary of the Paris Commune, its symbolic representation, as well as distant memories of other similar historical revolutionary situations in the past century that inspired the communards in Istanbul, rather than the contemporary post-2010 protest scenery. In other words, the Gezi participants collectively and retrospectively reconstructed the core meaning of their own performance by articulating a yearning for the Paris Commune and its symbolic derivations in a nostalgic way. Once again, I want to emphasize that I am neither arguing that the Istanbul communards consciously adopted the genesis of commune repertoire to their own protest eco-system nor the symbolic representations of the French revolutions were back in their mind before they decided to take on the Turkish state. They used the symbolic meaning of these events to reconstruct the past and their collective identity.

As narrated above, the Istanbul protests exactly crystalized in parallel to the transformative events of the International Labor Day celebrations and the theater demonstrations; the watershed moments that relayed and reflected the grievances mainly revolving around urban commons. These two key turning points then weaved themselves into morally shocking incidents and affective mimics (Gibbs, 2010), especially those triggered by female protesters in the course of action, all of which created the necessary emotional intensity that led to the mobilization night. Hence, I would shortly suggest that the fusion of urban commons with women’s affects were articulated through the nostalgic representation of the Paris Commune in the words of the Turkish communards.

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<sup>12</sup> Holocaust remembrance by different young generations of Jewish communities around the world and the reproduction of Jewish identity in contemporary societies through that mean perfectly exemplifies the ways in which mnemonic community come into existence.

One might argue that such a finding is not surprising at all given the overall Marxist-anarchist orientations of the interviewees and Gezi participants in general. But given the fact that even the conservative and ultranationalist communards used the Commune to shape their narratives I do not see any methodological and ontological reason not to characterize this protest form as the commune repertoire, at least in the Turkish context.

The term I coined at the end of this long common knowledge production process constitutes contrary evidence to the conceptual approaches that frame Gezi as another offshoot of the Occupy movement or as the ramification of the Arab Spring, as the expression of "Turkish summer" exemplifies. The commune repertoire also urges the scholars of social movements to check whether they use the expression of "occupy" in its place from a methodological and literal perspective. As a matter of fact, the responses I received for the probing questions at the end of interviews verified the accuracy of the commune repertoire for characterizing today's social movements.

Toward the end of the interviews, I reminded the participants of the various dramatic scenes of the Arab Spring, including the live footage of Mohammed Bouazizi whose self-immolation sparked waves of protest in a political geography reaching from the Maghreb to the Levant. Additionally, I directed their attention to various examples of occupy movements in the global north, such as the case of Zuccotti Park and Madrid. In particular, I pointed out how "similar types of people" in these separate “movements” communicated with one another outside the channels of diplomacy via social media despite distances (Shenker and Gabbatt, 2011). I specifically asked if they followed or monitored the performances by such similar crowds implementing “occupy strategy” via news sources or social media. Upon that, I also inquired whether they heard any comments about the Arab Spring or anti-globalization struggles in general during the two-week occupation experience.

The things communards articulated after the probing questions proved to me that Istanbul's commune repertoire was experienced, imagined, and performed in its own microcosm despite the support that came from global activists, intellectuals, and other protests that erupted more or less around the same times (Bevins, 2013).<sup>13</sup> In other words, the majority of the participants verified that other similar contemporary incidents did not spring to their mind neither before the mobilization night nor during the heydays of the commune. This was the situation for almost all the communards I interviewed except the Pan-Turkist communard who pointed out that as a young law student specializing in the field of human rights, he had an intellectual curiosity for “protest movements.” Upon my probing questions, he said that Gezi reminded him more

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<sup>13</sup> At its peak point, the Turkish commune repertoire became a source of inspiration for the newest social movements such that the protests in Brazil, which erupted as a reaction to the liberal government's increase in public transportation fees, culminated with a slogan shouting “the love is over here is Turkey.” Besides anti-globalization protesters that came from Europe, I also met two Brazilian activists who flew all the way from the southern hemisphere to give their support for Gezi.

of the 2005 suburban riots rather than “the Arab protests” in a determined manner.

The resonances of hyper-capitalism become far more dramatic in developing countries that go through authoritarian transformations like the whole Turkey is currently experiencing. In these countries, the accelerated time-space of configurations” of post-modernity that Harvey mentions (Harvey, 1992) would reach to such high levels that, I would argue, it could ultimately cause a severe social amnesia in the strictest sense. Under this type more vulnerable conditions, the political, and economic social crises that keep the publicity preoccupied melt into thin air before they ossify, as Marx once put it in regard to the dynamics of early capitalism. The volatility emerging from this unrestrained form of capitalism eventually cuts off the link between the reality of present and social memory. Understandably, this condition what I characterize as the neoliberal state of being peculiar to belated modern milieus in effect draws the attention away from the matters of global capitalism as well as anti-globalization struggles formed against it. In simple words, I would suggest that citizens in the global south have less time, resources as well as incentives to give meaning to their own struggles in a global context.

Perhaps Gezi protesters remained apathetic to the common trenches dug against global capitalism because of the neoliberal-Islamic vortex. They might have seen or heard about the Arab Spring before Gezi but that faded in memories because of the intensity of Turkey’s local economic and political landscape. Further research is required to fully understand and map the perception of Turkey’s new middle classes toward global activism and struggles. Yet, I would suggest that young Turks paid homage to another global struggle that occurred almost two centuries before while most of the other occupiers in the global north almost forgot about it (Lustiger-Thaler, 2014). They managed to re-invent a modern 21<sup>st</sup>-century version of the global repertoire performed in 1871. Thus, Istanbul’s commune was global in its own nostalgic cocoon.

In fact, striking parallels can be drawn between the genesis of the commune and Istanbul’s encampment through the prism of critical human geography in addition to memories. Many scholars suggest that besides the political and structural dynamics and international politics leading to Napoleon's dictatorship, re-shuffling of city space, urban renewal initiatives, and the social segregation that came along with such penetrations into urban space can be counted among the main factors that led to the seventy-two days of the occupation of a significant portion of the *arrondissements* in Paris. Similarly to today's occupy movements, sort of heterogeneous crowd, a mix of crafts populations, and working-class segments took control of the city for a period of time as a result. (Gould, 1995, pp. 1-4,6; Harvey, 2012, pp. 7-10, 2004, pp. 1-20).

I also drew the attention to similar urban transformations in neoliberalizing and Islamizing urban space of Istanbul above. As if verifying the place of the city as the epicenter of the multi-layered alliances, twelve out of the seventeen communards chose the expression of “lifestyle” when they were asked to

summarize the “overall agenda of the protests in one word.” Nonetheless, when they were given more time to define what “Gezi was about” retrospectively, each participant responded according to their positioning in the political and social panorama of Turkey. Hence, for an environmentalist, the commune was more about protecting trees and ensuring the environmental sustainability of the park. Whereas secular-nationalists (TGB) framed it as the uprising and “awakening” of a secular society, as a resistance effort against a neoliberal Islamic government threatening the values of “enlightened” of the country. For an LGBTQ individual, the space inside the park carried a symbolic historical meaning since it is one of the first cruising ground, and still taking on that role for the community. Similarly, for the Turkish communists and socialists, Gezi signified the resurrection of a new class-consciousness in the age of neoliberalism. For transgender and feminist subjectivities, Gezi symbolized a resistance movement against the patriarchal state (*devlet baba*), which attempted to manipulate and abolish progressive abortion rights they won back in the 1980s. For ethnic and religious minorities like Kurds and Alevis, as my interviewees emphasized, the year of 2013 gave the secularist middle classes, who were living in the nostalgic legacy of Atatürk’s secularism and its safe institutional domains in the 1990s, the taste of their own medicine, that is the sense of being “the other.”

Without a doubt, the mobilization process of multi-layered protest crowds like Gezi involves a set of complex structural factors, forms of action, ideological derivations, and overlapping affective domains from an intersectional point of view. Nonetheless, as this article has pointed out, such heterogeneous protest crowds are more inclined to gather to protect urban commons and mobilize through affective intensities, particularly the affective resonances created by women in the course of action.<sup>14</sup> This article has also underlined that protesters in belated modern milieus retrospectively give meaning to their protest strategies in light of the political imaginaries of the past centuries’ revolutionary situations.

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<sup>14</sup> I closely followed the Lebanese protests of 2019 via different news sources, which channeled the voices of many participants from different ethnic, religious and ideological backgrounds. What was interesting is that, at least from my point of view, the Lebanese dissidents suggested that the civil unrest has escalated right after the privatization of a public space in Beirut’s coastline that restricted the access of city dwellers access to the sea in a significant way.

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