Abstract
This article examines the ways in which people protest and who protests in Beirut, Lebanon through the study of the ‘trash protests’ in 2015. It aims to problematize the assumed universalism of the West’s theories of citizenship, personhood and social movements, through contextualized critical reflections of experiences beyond the familiar cases in North America and Western Europe that dominate knowledge production. In addition, it critiques the politically orientalist assumptions of the citizen in the Global South as incapable of constituting themselves politically and transcending primordial ties. It notes that this conception is predicated on notions that citizenship is a rational contractual relationship with the state, as opposed to an emotive one. Whilst there is a developing literature that recognizes the role of emotions in social movements (Jasper, 2011), this has largely focused on the role of emotion in political mobilization. Rather, I use interviews collected in 2016 with a range of protesters (members of NGOs, trash protest movements, artists, film-makers and other ‘activist’ members of the public to study knowledge production, via the performative and emotive acts in Beirut’s trash protests. These show that the dichotomies of rationality and emotionality collapse when there is a recognition that emotions are social, political and cultural practices (Ahmed, 2014).

Keywords
citizenship, emotion, protest, knowledge production, Lebanon, social change

Introduction
This article draws on research conducted in 2015/6, which aimed to examine the ways in which people protest, who is protesting, and their views on social change and knowledge production in Lebanon. At the time of starting my research, the so-called ‘trash protests’ were underway, having started in July 2015, which provided an ideal opportunity to explore these themes. In brief, the trash crisis and ensuing protests began when a landfill just south of the capital Beirut - the Naameh landfill, was closed as it had reached its capacity, and the government did not extend the contract of the private company, Sukleen, in charge of trash collection. No alternative landfill or trash collection company had been found. Trash soon started to pile up on the streets in Beirut and surrounding areas. The protests that followed were not only about a problem of waste management, but were an expression of people’s despair with political corruption, business interests and sectarianism. Individual activists, NGOs,
artists, and ordinary members from all social classes of the general public protested in a variety of creative and emotive ways, including cultural production, the use of social media, as well as hunger strikes, artistic interventions, political cartoons and political songs.

Through this research, I examine the inter-relationships between such ‘acts’ and the construction of alternative discourses and knowledge, where I propose that emotion plays an important role. In Western discourses, there is a history of ascribing negative characteristics to ‘emotion’, set up in contrast to ‘rationality’. Indeed, Enlightenment theories of natural rights constructed a logic of denying women human rights based on the premise that women lacked rationality, and similarly colonial and orientalist discourses have typically constructed their colonial subjects as lacking rationality and by extension – conceived to be less human (Said, 1978). Jasper (2011) has referred to this dualism between emotion and rationality in his critical review of the role of emotions in social movements over the last twenty years. Ahmed (2014) has also discussed how there is a dominant Western conception that emotions are ‘primitive’, with an implied hierarchy between cognition and emotion. She argues that it is critical to recognize that emotions are social, political and cultural practices, rather than thinking primarily in terms of an individual’s psychological state; as such it necessitates recognition of relations and dynamics of power, and the ‘public nature of emotion and the emotive nature of publics’ (Ahmed, 2014, p.14). Anthropology has contributed to conceiving of emotions as a public performance, and exploring how discourses of class, gender and race intersect with the politics of emotion (Athanasiou et al., 2008). Not only are emotions feminized and othered, but also are often presented as something undesirable to be controlled, with the expression or ‘leakage’ of emotion constructed as unintended consequences of this lack of control.

There has been over the last few decades what has been termed an ‘affective’ turn in theorizing in the social sciences and humanities. According to Massumi (1987), ‘affect’ refers to a state of being or an intense non-conscious experience beyond language, whilst their manifestation or interpretation corresponds to ‘emotion’. In human geography, Anderson and Smith (2001) refer to the ‘intractable silencing of emotions in social research and public life’ and hence the need for ‘recovery work that embraces embodied experience’ (Davidson and Bondi 2004). In her article, ‘Invoking affect’, Hemmings (2005) argues that this turn to affect enables an emphasis on the unexpected and places the body in theory. The focus on the body understands the body not as single or bounded, but as open to being affected and affecting others. Bodies are also seen therefore, in a relational sense, and also in terms of what they can do, and their intersectionalities, as gendered, racialised or classed bodies (Blackman et al., 2008). Hemmings (2005) proposes that the affective turn reflects a response to dissatisfaction with poststructuralists’ accounts of power as negatively hegemonic, and in contrast, illustrates a focus on interpersonal dynamics as constitutive of the subject (as opposed to social and institutional structures). In addition, the heightened focus on emotion and affect offers possibilities for increased engagement with memory, listening, attention and perception.
Kiwan, Emotive acts of citizenship

(Blackman and Venn, 2010). In thinking through what is meant by affect, this also invites us to think about affect and the body as a process, rather than reified as a ‘thing’ (ibid, 2010). Yet Hemmings (2005) warns of too easily embracing a celebratory illusion of ‘affective freedom’ over ‘social determinism’ as a means of transformation.

Similarly, over the last two decades, with a shift from structural to cultural theorisations of social movements, there has been an increased focus on emotion in the role of political mobilization (e.g. Galán, 2012; Gravante and Poma, 2016; Jasper, 2011; Van Stekelenburg et al, 2011; Woods et al, 2012). Reflecting on my research, I propose that whilst ‘emotion’ has been a focus of research in relation to political mobilization, it has not been systematically examined in relation to knowledge production, and in particular knowledge production pertaining to social movements. Boler’s ‘feminist politics of emotion’ has highlighted the importance of emotion in education, learning and knowledge production (Boler & Zembylas, 2016). Boler warns of the apoliticality of the ‘affective turn’, in contrast to earlier feminist work on emotion, arguing that the ‘gendered realities of emotion and the feminist scholarship that put emotion on the map’ is at risk of being erased, ‘adding another layer of misogyny into the histories of emotion’ (Boler & Zembylas, 2016). The empirical study of the lived realities of those ‘othered’ in the Global South is an important resource to theorizing on the role of emotions in knowledge production, further contributing to postcolonial critiques of social science knowledge, production and circulation (Appadurai, 2000; Bhambra, 2007; Connell, 2007; Santos, 2014).

The metaphor of knowledge as energy allows the conceptualization of knowledge as dynamic, whereby one form may be transformed into another (Bratianu and Orzea, 2009). Furthermore, the mind-body dualism dominant in Western intellectual thought is challenged in Eastern cultures, and relates to conceptualisations of knowledge as located within the individual, as opposed to external and separate (ibid, 2009). As such the affective turn is not only a response to poststructurealist social determinism but a postcolonial critique of Western constructions of knowledge and knowledge production, as well as a political feminist response, drawing from the political slogan ‘the personal is the political’, where for example, expressing anger is defined as a public political practice rather than an individual psychological response (Boler & Zembylas, 2016). Gregg and Seigworth (2010) similarly conceive of theorization of affect as the ‘politically engaged work’ of such groups marginalized in terms of gender, sexuality, disability, and those in the Global South. In the following section, I will contextualize this study with a brief historical background to Lebanon’s contemporary context, before outlining the methodology of the study and theoretical frameworks for the reflection on the findings.
Brief historical contextualization

To give a brief historical background to Lebanon’s modern sectarian context, Lebanon was under Ottoman rule until 1918, consisting of differentiated and independent religious communities. Under the Ottoman ‘millet’ system, these different ‘communities’ or sects did not constitute a nation, yet conducted affairs with one another through a form of a ‘social contract.’ It has been argued that these political identities should be understood not only in terms of a localized form of identification, nor solely in terms of foreign manipulation (Makdisi, 2000); rather, sectarianism must be contextualized as arising out of nineteenth-century Ottoman reform, and that it emerged as a practice where the various groups – Maronites, Druze, Europeans and Ottomans struggled to achieve the equality of the Druze and Maronite tribes in a modernizing Ottoman state. The French subsequently took control, establishing the ‘State of Greater Lebanon’, with the first modern Arab constitution drafted in 1926. In the 1930s, the Lebanese Syrian Unionists and also the Arab nationalist parties illustrated a change in attitudes towards the idea of a Greater Lebanon (Solh, 1988). After defeat by the Nazi forces in 1940, the Free French and British troops overthrew the pro-Vichy French in Syria and Lebanon (Traboulsi, 2007). Lebanon achieved independence from the French in 1943 and joined the League of Arab States and United Nations as a founding member in 1945.

The post World War II period, however, also witnessed heightened regional and national tensions. On April 9, 1948 Palestinian refugees entered the cities in the South of Lebanon with the establishment of the State of Israel. In Lebanon, the 450,000 registered Palestinian refugees (around ten percent of the Lebanese population) are distributed among twelve camps run by ‘The United Nations Relief and Works Agency’ (UNRWA) with now third generation Palestinians having no foreseeable route to legal citizenship, and living in violation of their civic, political, social and economic rights. The influx of mainly Sunni Palestinians has contributed to the changing demographics in Lebanon and perceived imbalances in power-sharing.

Lebanon entered a period of 16 years of civil war between 1975 and 1991, with the start being pinpointed to April 13, 1975, when Phalangists (right-wing Maronite Christians) attacked a bus carrying Palestinians through a Christian neighbourhood. The next day fighting erupted and spread, initially between Maronite and Palestinian forces (mainly from the Palestine Liberation Organization), then Leftist, pan-Arabist and Muslim Lebanese groups formed an alliance with the Palestinians, although alliances shifted over time. Foreign powers, such as Israel and Syria, also became involved in the war and fought alongside different factions. The Ta’if agreement (signed on 22 October, 1989 in Saudi Arabia by Lebanese parliamentarians) ultimately put an end to the civil war. While its vision to realize a ‘Third Republic’ in which political sectarianism would be renounced failed to gain approval, the agreement contributed towards modifying the balance of powers between the different sects (Traboulsi, 2007).

Contemporary Lebanon’s religious diversity is a defining characteristic in relation to its politics – what Faour (2007) describes as ‘a unique illustration of
the intimate connection between religion, demography, and politics’ (p.909). There are 18 recognized religious sects; in terms of political representation, this is organized broadly in relation to the three major sects of Maronite Christians, Sunni Muslims and Shiite Muslims. Maronite Christians constitute the largest Christian sect in Lebanon. It is also pertinent to highlight the emergence and role of Hezbollah as a powerful and significant non-state actor in Lebanon, and the development of its regional relationships with Syria and Iran. The assassination of former prime minister and businessman Rafic al-Hariri in 2005 led to large street protests against the Syrian regime and demands for the resignation of Prime Minister Karami who conceded. In response, a Shia-led demonstration took place on March 8, expressing solidarity with the Syrian regime. A larger crowd flooded the streets on March 14, including Sunnis, Christians and Druze, appealing for justice, independence and the ousting of Syria from Lebanon (Harris, 2012). The UN Security Council authorized an inquiry into the assassination of Hariri. On 26 April 2005, all Syrian forces and intelligence left Lebanon, and more murders and attempted assassinations followed. On June 29, 2011 the Special Tribunal for Lebanon officially indicted Hezbollah members for the murder of Hariri (ibid, 2012). The two political camps that emerged after the assassination of Hariri and the ousting of the Syrian army were both cross-sectarian: “March 14 allies looked to the West and conservative Arabs”, whilst “March 8 looked to the Syrian ruling clique and Iran and acquiesced in Hezbollah’s agenda” (Harris, 2012, p.275).

Since December 2010, there have been widespread revolts across the Arab world. The ongoing crisis in Syria, resulting in ‘one of the largest refugee exoduses in recent history with no end yet in sight’ (UNHCR, 2014, p.4), has had a significant impact on Lebanon, with estimates of over 1.5 million Syrian refugees in Lebanon, highly significant given Lebanon has a population of 4 million. Lebanon, thought to have evaded the ‘Arab Spring’ has witnessed its own protests starting in July 2015, as a result of the ‘trash crisis’.

**Methodological approach**

As noted in the introduction, I aim to explore who protests and how people protest, and the alternative knowledges and discourses produced in challenging dominant discourses. 30 individuals were interviewed in English or Arabic at the preference of the interviewees, ranging from members of established NGOs working in the fields of refugee rights and humanitarian assistance, women’s rights, LGBTQ rights, migrant worker rights, youth and political participation, members of the trash protests movements, as well as artists, film makers, and other ‘activist’ members of the public. Sampling was theoretically driven, with individuals identified through internet searches and networks of established NGOs working in the above-mentioned fields, whilst ‘activist’ members of the public, artists and film makers were identified through social media. Interview participants were contacted by email, and interviewed at a place of convenience to participants – either a public meeting place such as a coffee shop, the participants’ workplace or at my office at the American University of Beirut.
Interviews typically lasted from 45 minutes – 1 hour, and were recorded with participants’ consent. Recordings were transcribed, and all data held securely. Interview data was anonymised for all participants. The data was analysed drawing on principles of constructivist grounded theory (Bryant & Charmaz, 2007) in order to inductively develop theory, through the application of codes and categories to the data. Constructivist approaches to grounded theory recognise multiple perspectives and forms of knowledge, and challenges more positivist elements that lack reflexivity and researcher positionality (Charmas, 2011). In addition to the inductive and explorative nature of this research, collecting original empirical data, grounded theory has been advocated in particular as an approach in social justice research; there is also an iterative nature to the process where the data collection and analysis mutually inform one another (Charmaz, 2011).

I examine three inter-related themes emerging from the interview data in contributing to understandings of changing conceptions of citizenship. These include firstly exploring what is understood by the term, ‘social change’, interrogated in relation to Isin’s (2008, 2012) conception of ‘acts of citizenship’ whereby citizenship is understood not merely in terms of legal status or identity, but in relational terms where those who are socially and legally excluded, nevertheless constitute themselves politically through various ‘acts’. He describes these actors as enacting ‘political subjectivities’, where a whole range of types of rights (e.g. civil, economic, political, social, sexual, cultural) are claimed at different levels (eg. community, regional, national, transnational, international), at different ‘sites’ (e.g. ‘bodies, courts, streets, media, networks, borders’) and through different forms or ‘acts’ (e.g. blogging, organizing, protesting, resisting) (p.368). He argues that contemporary debates that conceptualize citizenship either in terms of a focus on ‘status’ (i.e. focus on immigration, naturalization, residence) or ‘practice’ (i.e. focus on education, integration, multiculturalism) do not sufficiently account for the new emerging ‘actors, sites and scales of citizenship...that complicate the ways in which citizenship is enacted’ (p.369). These ‘acts’ differ from the notion of ‘active citizenship’ common in the development and democracy promotion literature where international and/or national NGOs equip groups (typically youth, women or other marginalized groups) with skills for constructive participation in their communities and civil society. This conceptualization of citizenship recognizes the fluidity and relational nature of ‘power’, where power relations unfold in all social relations, rather than solely being conceived in terms of a finite resource from above (Foucault, 1991). Not only do these acts of citizenship ‘interrupt’ more routine forms of civic participation, but they also qualitatively differ in terms of their heightened affect and emotional import. Isin’s work on acts of citizenship therefore resonates with the ‘affective turn’, emphasizing the possibilities of social transformation through a focus on interpersonal dynamics.

A second theme examines ways of ‘acting’ by exploring discourses of ‘antisectarianism’ and ‘secularism’, and ‘politics’, ‘antipolitics’, and ‘counterpolitics’ which emerged in the interviews. This theme also includes the
use of violence by both protestors and the authorities; in addition, other acts include cultural production, the use of social media, as well as hunger strikes, artistic interventions, political cartoons and political songs. I explore the idea that learning or constructing new forms of ‘citizenship’, especially through ‘performed’ acts, are ‘emotional’, heightening alternative knowledges of ‘citizenship’. Learning and the production of knowledge through such performative and emotive acts are transformative and disrupt dominant pedagogies of citizenship.

The final theme, building on the second theme, continues to explore how learning and ‘knowledge’ is produced through ‘acts of citizenship’, and considers who is producing the knowledge, the relationships between the different ‘knowledge producers’, and the role of the university, research and academia in social change. The link between knowledge and power – the political theory of knowledge and its production, constructions of knowledge, and the marginalization of alternative knowledges are interrogated. This raises the question of how vulnerability relates to agency. From a Butlerian perspective, performativity is an account of agency. Linking the notion of ‘precarity’ – the political conditions whereby certain populations are at heightened risk of violence, injury or death – with performativity, she asks: ‘How does the unspeakable population speak and make its claims? What kind of disruption is this within the field of power? And how can such populations lay claim to what they require?’ (Butler, 2009, p.xiii).

Problematising and contextualising theory

It has been argued that the ‘Orient’ has been constructed as ‘those times and places where peoples have been unable to constitute themselves as political precisely because they have been unable to invent that identity the occident named as citizen’ (Isin, 2005, p.31). Isin refers to this as ‘political orientalism’, whereby in the West, the (male) citizen was constructed as rational, and capable of transcending primordial loyalties, in contrast to in the East. In ‘translating citizenship’, it is not only a question of examining the contextualisation of such theories and concepts in the Arab world; what is at stake is the process of constructing knowledge itself, and being aware of the power dynamics involved and the inequalities evident in ongoing processes of knowledge production. Carens (2004), a political philosopher, critically reflects on the relationship between theory and practice and its sociopolitical contextualization, where he makes a plea to his fellow (Western) political theorists, advocating for the use of actual ‘cases’ or examples in developing theory. He argues that whilst theories aim to provide an explanatory or clarifying role of a phenomenon, it is at a level of abstraction that can be disconnected from reality and ‘underspecified’, leading to interpretative disputes. Furthermore theories and concepts can ignore that moral reasoning can serve particular interests, for example, class, ethnicity or gender interests. In addition, it should be remembered that such theorising takes place in particular institutional contexts that privileges some over others. Moreover, ways of theorizing and constructing knowledge are
rooted in particular historical and sociopolitical traditions that may not be shared with others. His characterization of a contextual approach to theory is an attempt to address these concerns. As real cases are ‘messy’, they allow what he calls a ‘reflective disequilibrium’ between theory and practice – which he characterizes as ‘mutual unsettling’ in theory and practice by juxtaposing the two in an ‘ongoing dialectic’ (p.123). As such, any dissonance has the potential to challenge how we conceptualize a phenomenon, rather than merely illustrating that practice is not following theory. Carens’ approach also advocates a search for ‘cases’ that potentially challenge the theoretical position, as well as the consideration of a wide range of cases, especially ‘unfamiliar’ cases (Carens, 2004).

Carens’ recognition of the need to scrutinise concepts with assumed universality in more ‘challenging’ cases, or cases that are unfamiliar, implies a methodological stance of considering the ‘translatability’ of concepts and theories of citizenship typically developed from a Western frame of reference and socio-political context with its concomitant implicit assumptions – to other regional contexts. This enables a more explicit scrutiny of these concepts and theories. Indeed, public discourses on the applicability of ‘democracy’, ‘human rights’, and ‘citizenship’ are illustrative of these methodological debates.

Yet Carens could be critiqued in that, although representing progress, such a paradigm nevertheless operates with concepts and methods from Western academic discourses, and data from the Global South. Indeed, Connell (2014) argues that there is still the ‘fundamental problem’ that the Global South provides the data, but does not set the theoretical or research agendas, which is central in the larger social process of knowledge production. Within Western academic discourses – there is often an unquestioned assumption that theories, conceptions and debates are universal, both at the level of language, and at the level of concepts. Postcolonial critiques of citizenship have argued that the language and constructions of citizenship in Western academic discourses do no more than present particularist understandings of citizenship that masquerade as universal theories of citizenship. This would possibly suggest a project whereby there are separate knowledges – what Connell has called a ‘mosaic epistemology’. Yet she acknowledges the problem in such a position, and speaks of the ‘dilemma’ of two approaches to knowledge – mosaic epistemology or Northern ethnocentrism.

However, it could be argued that this is something of a false dichotomy. Some of the more radical theories of ‘colonising the mind’ (Dascal, 2007) pre-close the notion of an exchange of ideas, and tend to construct power as a finite resource positioned from above between the ‘powerful’ and the ‘powerless’. Such approaches do not recognize more Foucauldian understandings of power as relational, contested and contextualised, nor do they recognise different forms of agency in how knowledge is used, produced and reconstructed. Indeed, Connell (2014) notes, that in the field of gender, some of the most creative work in the South arises from the ‘critical appropriation of Northern ideas, in combination with ideas that come from radically different experiences’ (p.527).
In addition, it assumes a regionally if not methodologically nationalist approach to knowledge production; implicit in such theorisations is a notion of the ‘purity’ of a culture and its ideas, which does not account for the complexities of knowledge production, transfer and legitimisation.

Whilst these different forms of knowledge are inevitably ‘partial’ and are socially constructed, some forms of knowledge are perceived to hold more ‘power’ than others, and knowledge necessarily entails emotional content. Knowledge is, “never neutral, it never exists in an empiricist, objective relationship to the real. Knowledge is power...” (Fiske, 1989, p.149-50), embedded in social, cultural and political practices. Indeed, Apple (2000) asserts that what is perceived to be ‘legitimate’ knowledge corresponds to the views of the powerful in communities, with the most powerful tending to determine the nature and content of that knowledge. There is a marginalisation of the views and knowledge produced by the marginalised in society, what Spivak (1988) has called an ‘epistemic violence’ where the subaltern is silenced by both the colonial and indigenous patriarchal powers. As such, both feminist and postcolonial pedagogies are concerned with power relations in learning contexts, and attending to personal and emotional experiences that inform knowledge and learning (Boler & Zembylas, 2016; Giroux, 1983). In any particular national or regional context, we may witness competing forms of ‘knowledge’. Such knowledge may take the form of art, film, performance, graffiti, cartoons, blogs, social media, ‘acts of citizenship’ (such as protesting, hunger strikes etc), or in terms of alternative intellectual ideas or research. These emotive knowledge forms redefine issues creating alternative discourses and forms of public knowledge; this is an organic, and often unpredictable process of unfolding dynamics.

What is “social change”?

There is a substantial literature on social change from a range of disciplinary and interdisciplinary perspectives (e.g. Bayat, 1997; 2013; Coleman, 1990; Della Porta, 2005; 2009; Spivak, 1988; Szтомпка, 1994; Tilly 1986). ‘Social change’ is a contested concept with many different definitions, phenomena, levels of analysis and contexts, beyond the scope of this article to review. Broadly speaking, functionalist approaches see change as necessary and desirable as long as it is gradual over time, largely in order to preserve the status quo. In contrast, conflict theory conceives of social change as arising from social inequality and that protest is desirable and necessary in order to achieve social change. Social change can be broadly conceived in terms of both the notion of structure – including social, legal and political institutions, and also ways of living and thinking as reflected in language, beliefs, values, customs and lived practices. As such, social change deals with both the macro levels and micro levels, and the interaction between these levels. Non-governmental organisations can be categorized in terms of their approaches to social change at various levels of intervention: at the level of the individual, where programmes typically provide pastoral, psychosocial, or empowerment support for individuals; at the level of the living conditions of the targeted group, for
example, providing social, medical, humanitarian or legal assistance; at the level of institutional structures – advocating for policy change, and building the institutional capacity of the media, lawyers, or human rights advocates; or at the level of culture, raising public awareness of the issues relating to the group or issue at hand (Tayah, 2012). However, certain forms of civil society have been criticized as an extension of government, providing governmental services – thereby supplying rather than demanding change (Jeffrey & Staeheli, 2014).

On asking interviewees of their understandings of ‘social change’, there was a significant emphasis on the idea of social change as a process: “Change is a very slow process. In poetry or in descriptions of revolutions, they like to tell us that things happened in a day, but in a day a distinct moment occurs, but in reality many things have been built over the years, and several attempts made” (BB). This was contrasted with a focus on ‘outcome’, which linked to participants’ perceptions of whether the trash protests, or indeed any protest, campaign or social movement has been deemed to succeed or fail. According to another participant, a feminist activist and researcher:

The world wants to understand change as either black or white. There are moments, and it’s a non-ending process. Some people feel frustration since they want to reach the end-product...we can’t appreciate the process, while the process is what matters really. Even in Egypt people are wondering whether the revolution won or not, while it is not an exam but a life change process (NI).

This focus on the temporal aspects of social change is also emphasised in understandings of social change as ‘a way of living’, that what was important was the ‘activity of activism’, and the importance of conceiving of social change ‘not as a vocation but a way of life’. Social change and learning are mutually constitutive of one another, where learning is also a socio-temporal process, extending the conception beyond a construct of learning as an outcome of formal or non-formal education. New experiences and knowledge intertwine with already held understandings and perspectives, producing new transitional and transformative knowledges (Jeffrey & Staeheli, 2014).

We have witnessed something akin to a democracy promotion industry in the Arab world, where international and regional organisations, such as the UN and the EU, and foreign national governments of Europe and the United States have provided substantial amounts of funding to local and national NGOs working to promote particular democracy-related agendas, including promoting women’s rights, and youth civic participation for example. Whilst these may be construed as ‘top-down’ initiatives, these targeted groups are not merely passive recipients, but have their own agency and political subjectivities. Some critics have characterized such initiatives as reflecting the ‘pedagogical state’ (or NGO or international organizations) promoting a ‘pedagogy of citizenship’, reflecting a ‘neoliberal political rationality’ (Pykett, 2010, p.621). Such education or initiatives premised on the idea of imparting knowledge and skills to its
recipients - who are presumed to ‘lack knowledge’, are typically constructed as a form of ‘governmentality’ where the state or other governing institutions use pedagogical strategies to ‘govern’ citizens.

In contrast, these arguments have been critiqued in that they do not take account of the ‘distinctive nature of pedagogical power’ which enables critical debate (Pykett, 2010, p.623). Furthermore such constructions do not account for how knowledge is constructed, given affective meaning and acted upon. Jeffrey & Staeheli (2014) importantly note the embodied, felt, practised and relational nature of learning, and assert that learning is mediated through geographical place, other individuals and groups and everyday experiences. As such, the ‘outcomes’ of such learning cannot be predicted, as knowledge is not static but changes over place and time. Staeheli et al. (2014) have shown, for example, that youth participants of democracy promotion initiatives in Lebanon used their skills to promote a movement calling for civil marriage, a non-intended outcome of these initiatives. Such examples illustrate that power is always relational as opposed to something fixed that an institution holds from above. Relatedly, Hanafi (2012) talks of ‘reflexive individualism’, distinct from neoliberal conceptualizations of individualism ‘predicated on anti-patriarchal, anti-tribe, anti-community or anti-party sentiments’ (p.198). Hanafi (2012) explains that this is a form of political subjectivity different from that promoted by non-governmental organizations, where it is constructed through individual actions constantly negotiating with “the existing social structures in order to realize a (partial) emancipation from it” (p.203).

Interviewee participants’ characterizations articulate a construction of social change through learning and production of alternative knowledges as something ongoing rather than well-orchestrated time-delineated activities or outputs. Indeed, one participant compared Egypt’s Tahrir Square protests with the trash protests in Lebanon, noting that: “One particular difference (with Egypt): is the idea that the protest has a beginning and an end. Tol3et-Rî7etkon (You Stink) calling people to leave at a certain time...In Egypt, people were going in and out, no one asked them to leave and they stayed for long time” (BT). As such, these characterisations represent a critique of neoliberal, technicist and neutralised forms of ‘participation’ (Battacharya, 2012), where there is an emphasis on correct process, and ‘civility’. In addition, waste management approaches to the trash problem have also been critiqued as a more neutral, sanitizing and depoliticizing approach. For example, at the AUB, a group of professors set up a task force focusing on the ‘waste management problem’, which recommended such interventions as training municipalities in effective waste management techniques (AUB, 2015), avoiding engagement in the wider politics of the trash problem. ‘Practical knowledge’ – rational as opposed to emotive and political, is presented as the solution to the trash crisis, in contrast to activists’ characterizations of the trash crisis where trash became an emotionally-laden metaphor for all that is rotten in the relationship between citizens and the state.

In addition, social change is conceived as constitutive of the person in their
totality – their daily lives, rather than circumscribed as an activity carried out at a certain time. This holistic conception of social change relates further to the idea of social change as addressing a number of interlinked social justice issues, a point expressed by many of the participants. For many participants involved in the trash protests, the issue of concern is one of social justice, rather than a more narrowly defined technicist concern of waste management. As such, protesting a wide range of concerns follows logically from this:

As a youth organization and as an individual, we find ourselves concerned with most subjects: social causes related to the different domains of women’s right (domestic violence, right to pass on citizenship, civil marriage), or related to economics: those of limited income, increased cost of living, wages, social security etc, or political: media freedom or freedom of thought, or matters that are (procedurally) political.. like the electoral law, general movements, movement to overthrow the sectarian regime, the trash crisis movement, or movements against the extension of term in face of the different factions of the regime – 8th and 14th, or movement emphasizing the necessity of learning from the (civil) war, or the subject of the disappeared or kidnapped, issues relating to the struggle with Israel etc, to causes related to youth, like decreasing the age for elections...(BB).

Participants also gave a particular emphasis to the importance of changing attitudes and behaviours at the individual level, although at the same time acknowledging the integrated nature of social change with changes at the macro-level, such as changes in the law, and changes in political processes and institutions. According to one campaigner of LGBTQ issues, “social change is apparent when it occurs ...on the level of the individuals and that is seen in their attitudes and behaviour, things that affect social and individuals...the first thing that must occur is to have people understand..”(HT). She highlights as an example, the difficulty of LGBTQ individuals gaining employment, advocating that, “a first step in social change is the pattern of thought that translates into certain behaviour. Then this translates in institutional spaces. This should work in parallel with laws, and this work has to be as powerful as work on civil society” (HT).

In this example, the participant is highlighting the importance of changing how people think at the individual level. This model of social change is a dominant model in civil society NGOs, whereby there is a primary emphasis on changing attitudes and behaviours. This illustrates an implicit recognition of the importance of affect both in terms of its often negative role in the social reproduction of the patriarchal order, as well as its potential for challenging dominant discourses. For example, a recent Oxfam project on women’s participation and leadership in Lebanon, Jordan, and Erbil (Kurdistan) was premised on a model of social change whereby changes in individuals’ attitudes and behaviours leads to societal change (Kiwan et. al, 2016). Oxfam’s project ‘LANA’ aims to promote gender equality and women’s political participation by changing men’s and women’s attitudes with regards to gender roles and
understandings of citizenship. It is based on the ‘We Can’ approach, where recruited individuals act as ‘changemakers’ in their communities (Oxfam, 2014). The emphasis is thus on micro-level change, whilst acknowledging macro-level constraints such as religious discourses and practices, family and tribal constructions of gender roles, and political and legal institutions. What has been relatively less theorized is the link between changes at the level of individuals’ attitudes and behaviours and societal change; it is proposed that education or more broadly, the production of alternative knowledges - recognizing the role of emotion as social, cultural and political practices in this knowledge construction (Ahmed, 2014), is critically important in understanding social change, transforming change occurring at the level of the individual to wider societal change (Kiwan et al., 2016).

Indeed, participants discussed the role of knowledge in social change, whether in the form of art, film and other cultural productions, or in terms of intellectual ideas or research. ‘Representation connects meaning and language to culture’ (Hall, 1997), therefore artistic and other cultural representations help link certain issues to symbols, or give certain knowledge power or legitimacy over others in a certain historical, cultural context. This helps define issues, alternatives and how they are discussed. For example, one participant, a director of an NGO with a mission for promoting authentic music of the region, is also involved in promoting cultural activities at T-Marbouta – a café / restaurant in Hamra, which was opened in 2006, which frequently holds talks and other cultural / political activities. T-Marbouta also:

accommodated several groups’ meetings during the Summer protests, for instance, like ‘tol3et rihetkon’ twice, or ‘min haki; that held awareness campaigns on the ‘hirak’ and on civil rights and the swindling of public money. The 22 August movement also had meetings here several times. Besides unofficial meetings... we posted flyers in T-Marbouta (BB).

According to BB, there were also calls for people to demand their social, political and economic rights and participate in the protests, which led to some concern regarding T-Marbouta becoming politicised as opposed to more neutrally perceived cultural activities. However, “since T-Marbouta does cultural activities, it is concerned with everything, you cannot work on culture or art and be far from reality” (BB).

Participants also conceived of social change as redefining issues, in contrast to making explicit demands on the state. For one participant, she describes “engaging the public through live performances in urban issues”, given her interest in how “research is translated into public knowledge and becomes part of mainstream thinking”. She advocates “changing minds to realize change on the ground”, but ponders the issue of the “great disconnect between people who are active and those directly impacted” (BT). She further reflects that “we are part of the problem obviously, we are really segregated in terms of activist circles, artists, lawyers... and there is the rest of the people...We are always
trying, and I feel we failed so far, working with people who are affected and having the change from within and it has been very difficult” (BT). Yet DN conceives of marginality somewhat differently saying: “I say marginalized, but this is where we are living. This is not the minority... When you see them (Syrian refugee women) on the streets you don’t realize that they have a life, they have fun, they go to the hairdresser, nothing has changed except that things have crumbled around them.” This conception of marginalization does not separate the so-called middle-class or elite activists from the socially excluded, focusing rather on the ordinary lives that the legally excluded can live. For DN, her work in making documentaries contributes to social change through sensitizing the public to issues:

I am not going to say that (my films) have made a change, but I feel that something does happen after the Lebanese watch a film. (Name of film), for example, people went out, even my friends for example, ‘ohh its beautiful in Sri Lanka’ and I ask them you never ask her (the person who works at your house) ...so people start to think that yeah, you can have a relationship with someone who is living in your house, who is taking care of your children, so I do feel that you can slowly change... (DN).

“Acts” of citizenship: who, where and how?

The constructions of social change described above attest not only to a process over time, but also an organic, fluid and unpredictable unfolding of dynamics through ‘acts’. By ‘acts’, this refers to things that people do that constitute them politically as ‘citizens’, drawing on Isin’s (2008, 2012) ‘acts of citizenship’ where he has challenged traditional constructions of citizenship in terms of legal status or in terms of routine participation (e.g. voting or volunteering), arguing that this does not reflect the reality of the world we live in with so many people excluded from legal citizenship. To the contrary, those who are deemed to be socially and legally excluded, such as refugees and illegal immigrants can and do ‘act politically’, paradoxically constituting themselves as citizens (Kiwan, 2016). This ‘rupture’ from the routine is often emotive, demanding a form of ‘recognition’, rendering the silent and invisible by contrast, audible and visible. This forefronting of the ‘body’, performance, as well as interpersonal dynamics in Isin’s ‘acts of citizenship’ reflects such similar preoccupations in theorizing of emotion in the affective turn (Hemmings, 2005), with implicit optimism for transformative change and individual agency. Theorisations of citizenship have tended to neglect a consideration of the ‘emotional’ nature of citizenship and protest, which is clearly evident in participants’ understandings of social change and their activist commitments, where the ‘lived experience’ leads to affective learning, knowledge production and transformation.

In this section, I examine participants’ framings of their acts, which includes the constructs of sectarianism, secularism and inclusivity, and debates about politics, ‘anti-politics’ and ‘counter-politics’. In addition, I explore some of the types of ‘acts’ enacted by different actors, who these actors are, and the
reactions to them.

With the unfolding of the trash crisis in July 2015, there was a prompt civil society response, with the establishment of the first group, ‘You Stink’ which started to mobilise through social media and then street protests, including hunger strikes and storming the Ministry of the Environment. They called for government to hand over responsibility to local municipalities for waste management, for the resignation of the Environment Minister, Machnouk, and for parliamentary elections. The group, ‘We Want Accountability’, also established in July 2015, had as its long-term aim the removal of Lebanon’s sectarian political system. Other movements included ‘Akkar is not a Dumpster’ in response to the proposal to create a dump in the town of Akkar, and ‘People’s Court’ – made up of university students and professionals who used legal action to meet their aims of calling government to account (Daily Star, 2015a). You Stink illustrates a dominant approach of making demands on government, in contrast to We Want Accountability’s more holistic negation of the political status quo, and the People’s Court’s legalistic approach. On interviewing participants, what emerges is the anti-sectarian framing of the protest movement’s discourse dominant also in other protests and campaigns:

...the biggest concern ... is the issue of sectarianism. If one wants to fight corruption, it turns out its sectarian, if one wants to create a civil status law, you are faced with the sectarian barrier, if one wants to give rights to women, you are faced with the barrier of sectarianism. So sectarianism is being a tool for security against all the great numbers of demands and reforms one pushes for. So as an organization, we try to work on the issue of sectarianism. Now sectarianism we seek it through spreading awareness and try to work with youth in order not to let them develop any differentiation in their culture between a citizen and another according to their sect, religion (BB).

This is not to say that participants ascribe to a belief in sectarian identities per se, but rather conceive of sectarianism as a way of acting:

The biggest obstacle in the face of most of these campaigns is sectarianism...there is a clientalism that ties people tricking them and placing them in the illusion that they are beneficiaries from rulers. This distribution of privileges places people in the illusion that they are beneficiaries or prospect(ive) beneficiaries of this cliental relation, without realizing their inherent rights....The problem...is not only sectarian...sectarianism for them is a tool for investment (NB).

The importance of inclusivity was discussed by participants. For example, one participant explains why she was drawn to the group ‘Al Shaab Youreed’ (the People Want), which she describes as:
...a coalition between student groups, Socialist Forum, feminist groups and independent people. This group didn’t have internal contradictions, and was clear on refusing either 14 or 8 March [political camps], truly adopting ‘kilon ya3ne kilon’ (all of them means all of them). Moreover, it was the only party that involved students as well as non-Lebanese actors (Syrians and Palestinian) and even once took with them foreign workers. Of the Syrians who feared going down, were even helping behind the scenes and carried out debates (OB).

Yet the emotive divisiveness evident in discourse used to undermine and exclude those from lower socioeconomic classes was also discussed by interviewee participants: “The language used: the calling of some protestors ‘infiltrators’ by the You Stink movement. There was a rejection of an economic class of individuals that looked a particular way, that made people feel uncomfortable” (SN). This illustrates Hemmings’ (2005) caution of how emotion - rather than necessarily challenging the dominant social order - in fact works to reify the status quo. In contrast to some participants ascribing to the ‘kilon ya3ne kilon’ dismissal of all sectarian groups (‘all of them means all of them’), others found this to be divisive and exclusive, denying the people the right to various (sectarian) affiliations. Whilst inclusivity as a principle was generally lauded, the question of activists connecting to those not actively participating was considered: “we failed to reach out to the class that is more affected and poor” (PE), as well as concerns expressed of (activists’)“arrogant righteousness” (SN).

Furthermore, the exclusion of Palestinian and Syrian refugees from protests was an issue discussed by some interviewee participants. This exclusion occurs given these communities’ fear of being arrested and mistreated by the authorities, so involvement tended to be behind the scenes, in organizational or administrative roles. Yet in certain circumstances these excluded communities do make their presence known: “The domestic workers, migrant workers, even Syrians and Palestinitians...they came and declared that they have been excluded, and in declaring so they have created a space for them. It is a problem of discourse, of imagery presented” (SN).

A number of the participants raised the issue of the interlinked nature of agendas: “...the individual doesn’t limit himself in a certain space. A person working on women empowerment can work on sexual rights, a person working on changing law related to domestic workers can work on changing laws on other issues” (HT). Many of those interviewed had a history of activism across different domains, working for various NGOs with different agendas, often campaigning under a banner of “holistic justice and against compartmenting issues” (SN) for a wide range of marginalized groups.

The concept of what counts as ‘politics’, versus a notion of ‘anti-politics’ often emerged in discussion, where an anti-politics stance was equated with being against sectarianism and corruption. Individualism as opposed to being an NGO or political party was also a part of this conception. For example, Beirut Madiniti (Beirut My City), a highly educated group of declared non-sectarian
urban planners, lawyers, economists, professors, architects, and doctors ran in the municipal elections in May 2016. They drew up a programme to improve practical aspects of the city, such as traffic congestion and public transport, introducing green spaces, protecting Beirut’s heritage, and implementing a waste management solutions. Whilst they did not win in the elections, they made significant gains, and gained widespread support for their programme. However, a number of interviewee participants critiqued the approach of this group as ‘apolitical’, perceiving the acts of some groups to be too narrow, sanitized, non-confrontational and technicist, and aiming to successfully achieve a tangible outcome:

The role of NGOs in relation to politics was also considered, where there was a common view expressed that NGOs play an important role in working on single issues: “So now we have a civil society that is capable of taking one single issue and hitting hard with it and getting kind of a result” (NE).

Yet concerns about the technicist and ‘apolitical’ nature of NGOs was also considered to be a problem, as compartmentalizing issues was perceived to lead to a depoliticized and fragmented view, rather than a more holistic perspective. However, during the trash protests, some of the groups illustrated a move away from the more traditional single issues agenda, exhibiting features of traditional political groups: “That is the challenge and I think what happened last summer is exactly a step in that direction since for the first time you have activists who mostly have met through NGOs, suddenly met and formed political groups, Tol3et Rihetkon, Badna Nhaseb, Min ajl al jomhouriya...etc. all of those were youthful political groups, no one was interested in forming an NGO to find a solution for the garbage, they were all competing for political power”(NE).

Whilst apoliticality has generally been negatively framed in the literature, there are some more positive accounts of civil society ‘apoliticality’ in the Asian context, where it is seen as a response – usually under repressive regimes to addressing social problems and bringing about social change under these conditions (Heaton Shrestha & Adhikari, 2010). Here ethics is given primacy over politics, not merely that ‘apoliticality’ is avoiding the real issues.

This necessarily raises the question of what counts as ‘political’ – whether it
refers to political in the narrow sense of activities and institutions, or more broadly to power dynamics in society. Heaton Shrestha & Adhikari (2010) use the terms ‘antipolitical’ and ‘counterpolitical’ to nuance their analysis of civil society actions in the Nepalese context, where ‘antipolitics’ refers to economic and social life denying politics – or rather “a political project of rejecting politics” (ibid, 2010). They contrast this with ‘counterpolitics’ as resisting the logic of division and divisiveness, and it involves the engaging in relationships, dialogue and cooperation with the other. Politics on the other hand, is the “social divisive activity of formal political institutions in the pursuit of power” (ibid, 2010). If we now turn to the Lebanese context, this definition of politics is the common sense understanding typically held by many of the interviewee participants. Beirut Madiniti as such can be seen to be ‘counterpolitical’ with its relatively nonconfrontational and more dialogic approach or working with others regardless of their political positions. As such, it denies the possibility of opposition to its agenda, removing an ‘us’ and ‘them’ – through following a logically ethical agenda - doing ‘what is right’. The political and the counterpolitical are brought together through “acting in the sphere of formal politics while trying to performatively transform the public domain by banishing ‘politicality’ from it” (Heaton Shrestha & Adhikari, 2010, p.312). Those critiquing Beirut Madiniti instead take a position that what is needed over and above this is to explicitly reject the political status quo – an ‘antipolitical’ stance is a more antagonistic and holistic stance involving a ‘cleansing’ of politics (ibid, 2010).

The various performative acts enacted throughout the trash protests illustrate Isin’s ‘acts’ of citizenship. These emotive performances not only heighten the public’s attention to such acts – sometimes pejoratively referred to as ‘media stunts’, but also result in learning new ways of being a ‘citizen’ through creating alternative discourses and knowledge and rendering the previously invisible subject visible through this political constitution. For example, the highly publicized and emotionally divisive comments of Nicolas Chammas, head of Beirut’s commerce syndicate, that protestors were turning the up-market Downtown area in Beirut into an ‘Abu Rakussa’ (flea market held in the area historically), triggered an immediate response where Lebanese reclaimed the capital’s central district as an area for all citizens and not just the wealthy through the holding of street markets (Daily Star, 2015b). Drawing on both Isin’s acts of citizenship, and affective theories emphasising the importance of the body, this is an example of how ordinary people create a new knowledge of Downtown Beirut as an inclusive area for all, through the embodied performance of the formerly denigrated ‘Abu Rakussa’ market.

Other examples of emotive acts included the group, We Want Accountability disabling parking meters along the Corniche and demonstrating in and ‘occupying’ Zeitouney Bay, both perceived to be middle-upper class spaces in Beirut. Protesters also dumped trash outside the home of the Environment Minister on August 13th 2015 and went on hunger strike for two weeks in September 2015, setting up tents downtown in front of the Environment Ministry. The You Stink Campaign also organized a cleaning campaign where
volunteers bagged trash in October 2015. All these examples illustrate the central importance of the body performing emotive acts transforming dominant narratives.

Other acts included a range of artistic interventions, for example, the ‘Beirut Wall’, so dubbed in reference to the Berlin Wall which was erected on 24th August after the street protests of the 23rd August. This was mocked across social media, and in addition, the artist Philippe Farhat responded by painting pictures of people with their mouths taped shut with the names of the political parties on the tape (International Business Times, 2015). The slogan ‘your wall is low’ (connoting a double meaning of also ‘ethically’ low and questionable) was written on the concrete block. Cartoonists also expressed their anger, where one cartoon illustrates three different waste bins (‘political waste’, ‘terrorist waste’ and ‘sectarian waste’) (BBC News, 2015). Another act was the Lebanese singer Alla Zalzali writing and releasing a new song called ‘You Stink’ supporting anti-government protestors (Daily Star, 2015c), and another song entitled ‘All of them means all of them’ to refer to all the political parties being corrupt.

Violence, both physical and psychological, has marked the responses of the state to the protests, which have included arrests, political statements, and other containment techniques. In addition, governmental discourses to discredit the protests have included shaming and criminalizing protestors with drugs tests, or alleging that they are ‘foreign’ elements or ‘infiltrators’, including allegations of terrorism. The filing of lawsuits against defamation of character has also been a tactic. Discourses also represent protestors as violent and irresponsible, to which state responses have included police brutality and detainment. One protestor who was shot suffered full body paralysis, with many wounded and hospitalized. At least 250 people were arrested, with 54 referred to military court for trial - 10 of these being underage protestors. The protests subsequently lost momentum somewhat after the initial phase in the summer of 2015, with a relative shift to focusing on the technicalities of waste management. Discourses also illustrated exclusion by class, where discourses of violence were linked to those from lower socio-economic classes. Paradoxically, ‘the dysfunctional Lebanese state that was being condemned ...turned into a highly functional and efficient repressive machine’, illustrating features of authoritarian state resilience (Nayel & Moghnieh, 2015), coupled with the construction of emotionally loaded discourses aimed to trigger shame and fear in the protestors.

These examples illustrates the role of emotion being used by the state in social reproduction, as opposed to the transformatory ‘promise’ of the affective turn challenging the status quo (Hemmings, 2005). Similarly, we see the violence of the patriarchal order within society maintaining the social reproduction of oppressive gender relations. This can be illustrated in the following example, where a feminist activist from Sowt el Niswa, a group of writers, artists and feminists, describes the approach of their group as creating new knowledge opening discussion “inviting people to think about the links between the violence of a patriarchal order and the violence we see currently in the absence of electricity, water and minimal rights” (MN). Violence takes a variety of forms,
not only repression on the streets against protestors, but also “confrontation of masculine practices within group organisations that attempt to violate, silence, marginalize and exclude women within the meetings that prepare for demonstrations” (MI). She provides various examples of microaggressions in speech exchanges at these meetings, where microaggressions are dismissed with retorts of getting priorities straight: “it’s okay now, let it pass, are we going to overthrow the regime or monitor our tone?” (MI). Violence also is evident in the state’s accusations of indecency and immorality directed towards protestors, taking various forms, such as use of drugs, different forms of sexual practices, homosexuality and “thuggish” behaviour. A strategy of blaming the ‘violence’ of the movement, yet limiting this to certain categories of people is evident: “we see the intersection of the patriarchal regime’s masculinities, racism and classism” (SN), reflecting the intersectional nature of people’s lived exclusions: “Blaming the ‘moudaseen’ or ‘zu’ran’ (lower class thugs), members of the lower classes, or Syrians, Iraqi’s, Palestinians and Egyptians for riots, whilst speaking of other people as well-behaved, decent and respectful” (SN) illustrates a discourse of the national middle class citizen as morally upright and in control of their emotions, in contrast to the lower class emotionally volatile ‘sub-citizens’ and the ‘non-citizen’, outside of morality and citizenship.

Production of knowledge and pedagogy of social change and citizenship

In this final section, I explore the production of knowledge through ‘acts of citizenship’. I have proposed the important role that emotion plays in the power of alternative discourses produced through public ‘performative’ acts, and indeed, emotion itself can be conceptualised as knowledge (Bratianu & Orzea, 2009). A number of the interviewee participants talked about the importance of optimism and hope in their understandings of social change:

Pessimism is a luxury of the rich...we have to find a hope (SN).

I am not a pessimist, not because there is anything that leads me to be hopeful, but because if we are not optimistic we die. But there is nothing for us to be optimistic about. The situation in Lebanon is as it has always been, a pending situation, waiting (BB).

A lot of us felt a huge optimism after the trash crises, even when it began to die out. We felt the generational difference, up to the age of 25 I met some of the most inspirational people, especially outside Beirut. I am totally convinced that probably change will not come out of Beirut. I believe there is a very big hope for social change (BT).

What can be seen from these quotes is that these participants involved in their
various ways contributing to social change, either as independent activists, NGO members, artists or other members of the public, share an affective positive attitude of hopefulness, described by one interviewee as the importance of “the activity of activism” (SN). As such, it is the act of doing, its performativity, which creates hope through possibility. This does not mean that they envision that change is imminent, but rather, it reflects an individual commitment to an ongoing process, rather than expecting a ‘result’ or arriving at a particular moment in time. These conceptualisations resonate with the preoccupations of the affective – namely ‘affective freedom’ as opposed ‘social determinism’ (Hemming, 2005), and a concomitant understanding of social change as affected by individual and interpersonal agency, and the role of the embodied experience, the body as process in such anticipated social change within this understanding. This also relates to interviewees’ discussions of the perceived success or failure of the trash movement, and social movements in general, whereby interviewees tended to judge ‘success’ not in terms of particular outcomes, but in terms of process. In addition, through acting, it was recognized that this opened up possibilities of creating new discourses and knowledge: “The power we have in framing the narrative will determine our view of whether there has been a shift” (SN).

Perceptions of who the knowledge producers are in relation to social change and protest movements, and the nature of these new forms of knowledge were contested amongst interviewee participants. The question of the role of the university and research in social change was perceived to be important although the question of translatability is raised:

> I always sensed that there is a huge value in knowledge produced in universities... I am someone who believes in change. And I always had this question, as a researcher interested in urban issues: How can I translate this research into public knowledge and become a part of mainstream thinking ...change minds in order to realize change on ground”(BT).

The recognition of alternative producers of knowledge is also articulated: “In the past few years it (knowledge) has been taking place sometimes through architecture and sometimes through activism” (BT).

Others were more directly critical and sceptical of traditional academic knowledge arguing: “I believe those capable of change are not the intellectuals and those living in castles, but those of the suburbs and those marginalized since they are the most vulnerable and harmed from the regional and local systems and regime, that prevents them any chance of advancing. The hirak (movement) is a number of people and is very alive and diverse. So I believe a communication was realized. I personally developed a connection with the suburbs, a new knowledge and even commutes to the suburbs, friends, acquaintances” (BB). The university itself as an institution was critiqued as part of the problem of academic knowledge: “intellectuals do not have proposals.
Later we discovered that this is because the university does not prepare someone to make a proposal, it directs them to make a problematic” (NG). In contrast, this activist journalist and researcher argues for approaching the problem with a ‘proposal’ – a problem-solving approach and also expresses the “right of the normal citizen to philosophize”, asking why should this be restricted to academics, further arguing that “in liberating the black or women the university didn’t have any role, this used to come from society” (NG).

Formal education was also critiqued as didactic and inhibiting people’s critical abilities: “The problem with our education system is that it is based on memorizing, which means that the mind is excluded”(XO). A call for a holistic approach to learning, invoking the importance of the social and emotional learning is reflected here: “More than that, is giving people back humanity, which we are losing bit by bit. The human cannot be human without feeling and having compassion with the other”; in addition, the idea of knowledge constructed from below – by ordinary people is referred to: “Education is built from below, with respect for every difference among us, and its necessity” (XO), resonating with the idea of inclusive knowledge construction through the individual and performative acts people engage in, recognizing that social movements themselves produce knowledge. These conceptions reflect the partial nature of knowledge, and knowledge as emanating through acting and reflecting, and arguing for the importance of marginalized knowledges previously silenced. Some interviewees expressed concern with those who are silent advocating methodologically for listening to those who abstained from acting, and understanding what it means also to decide not to act:

There is a huge issue we face in Beirut, and that is that there is a great disconnect between people who are active and those directly impacted. We are part of the problem obviously, we are really segregated in terms of activist circles, artists, lawyers... and there is the rest of the people...We are always trying, and I feel we failed so far, working with people who are affected and having the change from within and it has been very difficult (BT).

Concluding thoughts

In this article, I have aimed to explore social change through a focus on the things that people do – ‘performative acts’, and a consideration of who the actors are in Lebanon. As I have reflected on in the introduction, it is important to problematize the assumed universalism of the West’s theories of citizenship, personhood and social movements, through contextualized critical reflections of experiences beyond the familiar cases in North America and Western Europe that dominate knowledge production. In addition, the politically orientalist assumptions of the citizen in the Global South as incapable of constituting themselves politically and transcending primordial ties - predicated on notions that citizenship is a rational contractual relationship with the state, is challenged. By focusing on the performative and emotive acts in the context of Beirut’s trash protests, I challenge, through original empirical evidence,
dichotomies of rationality and emotionality. Furthermore, it is important to recognise that emotions are social, political and cultural practices, rather than understanding emotion primarily in terms of an individual’s psychological state (Ahmed, 2014).

The protests engaged an extremely wide range of actors – from NGO representatives and unions, to individual activists, artists, and first time demonstrators – the ‘ordinary’ man and woman on the street. Whilst inclusive in the sense of drawing people from across all socioeconomic classes, both men and women, Lebanese nationals, Syrians, Palestinians and migrant workers, there was a public emotive discourse of socioeconomic, gendered and legal exclusivity. Drawing on the notion of Isin’s (2008; 2012) ‘acts’ of citizenship, I argue that through such performative emotive acts as have been witnessed - such as hunger strikes, holding flea markets in exclusive downtown Beirut (‘Abu Rakhussa’), street art, slogans, cartoons, music, occupying Zeitouney Bay, storming the Environment Ministry and blogs, these actors constitute themselves politically, rendering themselves visible and heard. These are necessarily embodied emotive performed acts, constructing new narratives and new knowledge. Interviewee participants emphasized a particular sociotemporal understanding of social change emphasizing process as opposed to outcome, and a holistic embodied lived experience of acting. These constructions of social change articulate a framing of learning and production of knowledge where through such performative acts, there is an enabling of often silenced voices, and the vocalization and raising awareness of issues. Challenges to sectarianism, ‘politics’, and ‘violence’, emerged through performative and emotive ‘acts’.

This highlights an important area for further work in understanding how emotion as a set of practices constitutes the production of new knowledges. The relationships between different producers of knowledge – intellectuals and researchers, public discourses of policymakers and the media, and civil society actors illustrate the partial nature of these different forms and content of knowledge. In addition, the role of powerful knowledge producers is interrogated – not only in terms of their contributions to social change, but in terms of considering the political theory of knowledge, as can be evidenced through the silencing of those voices being studied, where “the contestation over what counts as knowledge is just as implicated in the marginalization” (Ormond et al., 2006) – an epistemic violence of the marginalized (Spivak, 1988) - as wider sociopolitical processes and actors, such as the state, unjust laws or corrupt institutions. These acts of citizenship illustrate a response and a reclaiming of these actors’ political subjectivities and the production of new knowledges.

**Acknowledgements**

I would like to thank Ms. Mona Khneisser who provided research and interviewing assistance for this project.
References


Kiwan, Emotive acts of citizenship


Jeffrey, Alex and Lynn Staeheli 2014. “Learning Citizenship.” *YouCitizen*


About the author

Dina Kiwan is Associate Professor in the Department of Sociology, Anthropology and Media Studies, American University of Beirut, Lebanon; in 2015/6, she was the Centre for Lebanese Studies Fellow at St. Antony’s College, University of Oxford. Her research programme focuses on citizenship and inclusion, and is interdisciplinary and comparative in scope. Her interests centre around sociological and politico-philosophical examinations of inclusive citizenship through the lens of education policy, naturalization policy and migration policy, in particular in the context of pluralist / multicultural societies, and also societies in conflict. Her work engages with the inter-relationships between theory, research, policy and practice. Her interests in critical policy analysis are complemented by an interest in how those deemed to be ‘marginalised’ and vulnerable’ constitute themselves as political actors. Publications include Kiwan (2008). Education for Inclusive Citizenship (Routledge), and Kiwan, D. (ed). (2013) Naturalization Policies, Education and Citizenship: Multicultural and Multination Societies in International Perspective (Palgrave Macmillan). She has extensive and long-standing experience and networks in the UK and internationally, in the field of citizenship. Policy and consulting experience includes co-authoring the UNESCO curriculum framework for global citizenship education (2015), appointment to the UK’s Home Office ‘Life in the UK’ Advisory Group by Home Secretary, David Blunkett (2002); commissioned to co-author Diversity and Citizenship review for UK government’s Department of Education (2007); a member of experts’ advisory board for Carnegie Middle East Center ‘Education for Citizenship in Arab Countries’ research project, consulting the Lebanese government on teacher-training for religious diversity management, (2013) and regional manager for the Middle East for a large-scale research project on Democracy (Varieties of Democracy – V-Dem; 2013-ongoing).