From dams to democracy: framing processes and political opportunities in Chile’s Patagonia Without Dams movement

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Abstract

This article traces the development of Chile’s emblematic Patagonia Sin Represas (Patagonia Without Dams) movement, known for its nearly decade-long, and ultimately successful, resistance to the controversial HidroAysén dam project. We draw on political process theory and frame analysis to examine how the movement grew from a small community struggle in an isolated part of Patagonia into the country’s largest environmental social movement. We argue that movement actors achieved widespread support for Patagonia Without Dams by strategically reframing the issue in response to key political opportunities, shifting from a primarily environmental and anti-dam frame to a master frame of social justice and democracy. By framing the controversial hydroelectric project as an issue of historical and structural injustice within Chile’s neoliberal economic governance structures, movement actors were able to resonate with broader audiences and build a robust alliance structure. Ultimately, the master frame of democracy allowed for frame bridging with key allies and actors in the mass protests of 2011 and in contemporary movements for constitutional reform.

Keywords: social movements, dams, Chile, framing, democracy, political opportunity

Introduction

On June 10, 2014, the Chilean Patagonia Without Dams movement celebrated an unprecedented victory in its nearly decade-long struggle against the multi-billion dollar HidroAysén dam project. A specially appointed presidential committee halted the project by revoking the highly controversial approval of its Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA). The original approval of the EIA in May 2011 had sent hundreds of thousands of people into the streets in protest all across Chile, a scale of mobilization then unprecedented since the end of the Pinochet dictatorship. But it was a long and carefully orchestrated process that carried the movement to such heights and finally defeated the project.

Resistance to the dam project started small, originating in the remote region of Aysén in Chilean Patagonia. Announced in 2005, the HidroAysén project proposed to dam the Baker and Pascua rivers and build a 2,000 kilometer long transmission line to carry energy north to Chile’s large cities and booming mining industry. This project threatened the local movement for an alternative
A model of regional development that valued the region as “Reserva de Vida” (a reserve for life). Ayseninos began to mobilize in opposition to HidroAysén, drawing on networks of local groups and NGOs that had been formed in past movements to defend the region from extractive development.

In 2007, more than one hundred Ayseninos, many in traditional Patagonian gaucho attire, marched on horseback into the regional capital with signs calling for a “Patagonia Sin Represas” (Patagonia Without Dams) – a slogan that would become the namesake of the growing resistance movement. By 2009, the Patagonia Without Dams (PWD) movement stretched far beyond Aysén, supported by a network of community groups and NGOs from all over the country and around the world. By 2010, national polls showed more than half of Chileans were against the HidroAysén project, a disapproval rating that grew to 74% after the controversial approval of the EIA that sent hundreds of thousands of protesters into the streets all over Chile in 2011.

In this article, we discuss how the PWD movement, despite its origin in an isolated region of Chile and despite facing a powerful transnational corporation, successfully bridged across socio-spatial and political divides to achieve mass support and recognition. As we will show, PWD strategically used framing tactics in the struggle against the HidroAysén project to appeal to audiences at different scales and to shape and respond to key political opportunities over time. It was the universal environmental and anti-dam framing of “rivers and rights” (Braun and Dreiling 2014) that initially resonated with international organizations and garnered financial support for the PWD campaign. However, in order to mobilize a more diverse range of actors against the dam project within Chile, the campaign engaged key political opportunities (McAdam 1999) with frame bridging strategies (Benford and Snow 2000) to reframe the dam project as a manifestation of an unjust model of development that affected all Chileans in their daily lives.

Growing discontent with neoliberal governance in Chile provided fertile ground upon which the Patagonia Without Dams movement cultivated resistance to the HidroAysén dam project. In analyzing the Patagonia Without Dams movement, we bring political process theory into conversation with our framing analysis in order to capture the dynamic interplay between the movement and the broader political context. Our analysis highlights four key political opportunities, which we argue were crucial moments in which movement actors shifted frames to build resonance among diverse actors across different scales. Activists successfully built alliances through frame bridging strategies that connected the seemingly local concerns of Patagonians to transnational anti-dam movements and longstanding concerns about democracy shared by large numbers of Chileans across the country. This broad-based mobilization ultimately led to elite fracturing on the issue that created openings for broader movements for social change.

We argue that the Patagonia Without Dams movement achieved widespread support by successfully responding to political opportunities ripe for frame amplification and bridging, ultimately framing the controversial hydroelectric
project as a symbol of systemic injustice within Chile’s environmental laws and governance. Moving beyond a traditional environmental framing, the master frame of social justice and democracy resonated with a broader audience with shared critiques of Chilean elites and transnational corporations. This allowed for frame bridging between the PWD movement and the subsequent Student Movement and Aysén Movement, key allies and actors in the mass protests of 2011 and in contemporary movements for constitutional reform.

Ultimately, the case of the Patagonia Without Dams movement in Chile allows us to explore how resistance movements emerging from seemingly narrow place-specific struggles may catalyze broad-based social mobilization. For activists, this case demonstrates the importance of frame bridging strategies that respond to, and shape, political opportunities. For social movement theorists, the case highlights the potential to draw political process theory into conversation with framing analysis, highlighting the importance of the dynamic interplay between framing processes and political opportunities while also signaling the need for more attention to scale and translation within social movement analysis.

**Literature review and theoretical framework**

Understanding social movements has been at the heart of a robust, cross-disciplinary literature that includes several well-defined approaches, including resource mobilization, framing, and political process theory. We draw from each of these theories in our analysis, highlighting the dynamic interplay between framing processes and political opportunity structures in order to understand how the Patagonia Without Dams movement expanded into the national and transnational spheres.

Social movements are built upon complex organizational structures or social movement organizations (SMOs). Resource mobilization theorists argue that the structure of the SMO, its resources (both labor and financial), leadership, mobilization, and linkages are critical to the potential success of movement campaigns (McCarthy and Zald 1977). Often, movements are articulated through various levels of coalition-building among SMOs in the effort to “mobilize diverse constituents into a common framework of identity and action” (Bandy 2004, 416). The union of diverse actors within, between, and across linkages promotes the exchange of information and ability to “mobilize information strategically to help create new issues and categories” (Keck and Sikkink 1999, 89).

Building on resource mobilization theory’s emphasis on structure and resources, framing theory helps us understand how movement actors formulate and communicate information. Social movement organizations use framing to communicate their main concerns in ways that appeal to different audiences (Benford and Snow 2000). Framing is “the process by which individuals and groups identify, interpret, and express social and political grievances,” packaging and presenting them for different audiences and aims (Taylor 2000,
511). Framing also inherently creates the possibility of prompting “counterframing” on the part of opposition actors in a struggle to win public approval (Benford and Snow 2000, 625).

One of the main challenges for any movement is to gain attention and to inspire support and participation among diverse populations across local, national, and international levels. On every level, social movements aim to achieve frame alignment, such that individual interests, values, and beliefs complement and correspond with those of a social movement (Snow et. al. 1986). A shift of public interest to an issue can signal frame resonance, when people relate to the movement’s message because of the credibility, centrality and commensurability of the framing (Benford and Snow 2000).

Various frames can be used simultaneously within a movement or across movements through the tactic of frame bridging, “the linkage of two or more ideologically congruent but structurally unconnected frames regarding a particular issue or problem” (Benford and Snow 2000, 624). Frame bridging is a tool social movement actors use to maintain frame resonance even as they shift from one place or scale to another. In some cases, though actors engage with many different frames, “a new primary framework gains ascendance over others and comes to function as a kind of master frame that interprets events and experiences in a new key” (Snow et. al. 1986, 475).

While frame analysis is an effective tool for tracing shifts in social movement messaging over time, it is, on its own, insufficient for understanding why and with what logic these shifts take place. Framing processes do not take place in a vacuum. Rather, they shape and are shaped by the broader historical and socio-political context in which social movements are embedded (Braun and Dreiling 2010). In order to capture these complex relationships, we draw on the idea of political opportunity structures from political process theory to trace the connections between the political field and the interpretive and alliance-building power of framing.

Political process theory emphasizes the “dynamic relationship among activists, their political environment, and elites who work to counter the movement’s progress” (Friesen 2014, 83). Changes in the political context may open or close opportunities (perceived or actual) for effective challenges to the status quo (McAdam 1999). These changes may be spurred by overt societal crises, such as war, famine, or pandemic, or by more subtle shifts in the political alignments among elites or the presence of new domestic or international allies. Political opportunity structures encompass elements of the socio-political context that encourage collective action as a means for addressing grievances (c.f. Putnam 2000; Tarrow 2005). As social movements work to build frames that resonate across the local, national, and transnational levels, they face the challenge of identifying the political opportunities at the intersection of these diverse political contexts.

In trying to understand the relationship between the local and transnational spheres of struggle, Tsing’s (2005) concept of “traveling packages” is helpful in
highlighting the tensions inherent in the translation that must take place as frames are transferred from one context to another. Traveling packages may include ideas, slogans, or images that center abstract and universal principles, such as global environmentalism or democracy, that are taken up at the local level and become “marked by the culture and politics of particular moments of alliance and intervention” (Tsing 2005: 238). Tsing argues that allegories of international activism and collaboration rely on the use of universals, which in fact can reflect the “inequalities of global geopolitics even as they promote rhetorics of equality” (Tsing 2005: 238). This concept provides insight into the challenges that social movements face as they reconcile the benefits of adopting broad master frames with the frictions that this may produce at the local level (Braun and Dreiling 2014).

In this article, we use frame analysis in conjuncture with analysis of political opportunity structures in order to understand how the Patagonia Without Dams movement expanded into the national and transnational spheres. This approach allows us to capture the complexity of the movement’s transformation within the historical and socio-political context of Chile, while also drawing out broader lessons relevant for other social movements. We focus on how movement actors employed framing tactics to raise awareness and build coalitions in response to key political opportunities in the course of the struggle over HidroAysén. Our analysis highlights the emergence of a master frame of democracy under which PWD activists were able to build alliances with a broad range of other contemporary movements that resonated with that theme. We show how this frame bridging was a strategic response to political opportunity structures that enabled PWD to translate its message across national and transnational spheres and to build broad coalitions for political change.

**Methodology**

This research takes a case study approach (Berg and Lune 2011) that uses primary and secondary materials to inform a contemporary and historical analysis of the Patagonia Without Dams movement. The first author collected much of this article’s source materials while living and researching in southern Chile over six and a half months. In June-July 2012, she traveled to the region of Aysén and Santiago to meet with PWD movement leaders and partner organizations (n=15) who facilitated access to documents generated by the movement. These documents were the core focus of our thematic analysis, which tracked shifts in movement strategy, discourse, and target audience over time. A large number of the sources collected during fieldwork were originally in Spanish, and were translated by the first author for use in this research.

We analyzed materials by first situating them within a chronology of the HidroAysén conflict and then identifying patterns and themes (Berg and Lune 2011) within the framing rhetoric being used by the PWD movement, project proponents, and the media over time. While the focus of the content analysis was on the PWD movement and its campaigns, triangulating this analysis with
content analysis of media coverage and the HidroAysén campaign allowed us to trace the dynamic interplay between these different arenas (Rohlinger 2015). We documented shifts in framing within and across campaigns and outreach events, noting the central organizing themes, such as environmental justice or livelihood concerns, at each stage of the movement. Through this process, we were able to trace the way these early frames were increasingly subsumed under and integrated within a broader message about democracy. By considering the results of this frame analysis within the broader contemporary political context, we were able to see the political opportunity structures that produced this master frame of social justice and democracy.

Referencing quotes from public statements and declarations made about the ongoing dam conflict and related issues of democracy, we are careful to present them as only that. To give a sense of the general public opinion and the extent to which it aligned with the PWD movement, we rely on a number of national surveys and polls. By triangulating the data from movement actors and organizations with contextual information from national news sources, polls, and historical analysis of social mobilization in Chile, we are able to construct a deeper, multilayered understanding of the sociopolitical context. By identifying key political opportunities within this context, we can see how the PWD movement was able to use the master frame of democracy to build broad frame resonance, mobilizing Chileans in nation-wide opposition to the seemingly local mega-dam project in isolated Patagonia.

Background

Dictatorship and incomplete democracy in Chile

Contemporary political opportunity structures in Chile, along with the possibilities they open for frame resonance and bridging across diverse constituencies, must be understood within the country’s history of political authoritarianism and cycles of contention in the struggle over democracy. The history of mobilization for democracy in response to repressive politics is an important socio-political backdrop against which contemporary mobilizations take place.

General Augusto Pinochet came to power in 1973 after a violent coup d'état against socialist president Salvador Allende. The nearly two-decade long military regime that followed would transform Chile in many ways, characterized by intense political repression and rapid economic restructuring, codified into a new Constitution enacted in 1980. With the introduction of ultra-liberal free-market policies (Klein 2007), unbridled extractive industry and export agriculture spurred a period of economic growth that led some to praise Pinochet for bringing order and prosperity. For millions of Chileans, however, the military regime was a period of fear and repression amidst detentions and disappearances of civilians suspected of socialist leanings or participation in political resistance to the military regime (Constable and Valenzuela 1991).
During the 1980s, the calls for “Socialism Now” that had been used by leftist movements prior to the 1970s were pushed underground by the repressive Pinochet regime, and transformed into the more inclusive “Democracy Now” (Noonan 1995, 106). This master frame of the “return to democracy” was successfully used to mobilize against the Pinochet dictatorship (ibid), bringing together a diverse group of actors with a common vision under the banner of the “prodemocracy movement” (Adams 2002, 29). This social mobilization culminated in the popular campaigns for the “No” vote in the plebiscite to determine whether Pinochet would remain in power.

In 1988, 56% of Chileans voted against Pinochet, though he would remain head of the army until 1998 and then a senator-for-life. In 1990, President Aylwin was elected in the first democratic elections in 19 years, marking the beginning of Chile’s long transition to democracy. The transition back to political democracy was neither fast nor easy, however, and few substantial constitutional changes were made in the years following the dictatorship (Garretón 2003; Salazar 2009).

Several scholars assert that Chile’s transition to democracy was never fully accomplished (Paley 2001; Garretón 2003; Salazar 2009), hindered by “authoritarian enclaves” that remained embedded in Chile’s system of governance (Garretón 2003). Julia Paley (2001) argues that the return to political democracy legitimized the neoliberal system and its international investors, and, at the same time, demobilized what had been an active civil society demanding democracy and participation. Much of the international community applauded the reintegration of basic democratic processes, soon embracing Chile as a leader in Latin American free-market economics. Under the new center-Left government, any protests or efforts to make demands and call for justice were frowned upon as undermining the national project of promoting democracy (Paley 2001).

In the last decade, a new wave of social mobilization has surged into the political arena in Chile as communities stand up against the injustices of Pinochet-era neoliberal policies. Patagonia Without Dams was at the forefront of this wave, and is often referenced as marking a before and an after in recent social movement activity in Chile. Drawing on Chile’s history of social mobilization, the PWD movement revitalized the master frame of democracy by emphasizing the lack of space for social democracy and participation within the system of neoliberal policies that had been put in place under the military regime. Framing the dam project as the result of neoliberal policies that favored private economic interests while limiting state accountability, PWD movement actors were able to situate their concerns about the dam project within much broader concerns about democracy.

Chilean water and hydropower conflicts

“The fight over water is a war that the communities and companies confront against the apparent neutrality of the government – a government that many
feel disappointed and cheated the citizens, associating itself with economic powers that have installed a concept of society that puts a price on everything, but doesn’t put a value on anything.” (Segura 2008, 15)

As part of the military regime’s economic restructuring during the 1980s, Chile adopted a market-led system of water management, which has been the subject of much debate both in Chile and internationally. The 1980 Constitution formally recognizes water as a public good; however, under the 1981 Water Code, private rights to water use are allocated permanently and free of charge by Chile’s National Water Directorate (Dirección General de Aguas, henceforth DGA). These rights are treated as freely transferable commodities that can be bought, sold, transferred, or mortgaged (Bauer 1998, 2009).

While the 1981 Water Code has been effective at stimulating agriculture, mining, hydropower development and expansion of sanitation services (Hearne and Donoso 2005), the market-based system “tends to leave a sort of decision-making vacuum, which is typically filled by those interests with more political influence and the resources to act on their own behalf” (Bauer 1998, 125). Lacking institutional capacity to ensure distribution of the system’s costs and benefits (Bauer 2010), the system produces a pronounced disparity among water users in terms of access to resources and decision-making (Bauer 2004, 2009; Budds 2004). Hydropower development has been particularly contentious (Bauer 2009), exacerbated by the fact that the courts are “zealous protectors of the institutional construction of private property, and are inclined to favor hydroelectric interests” (Prieto and Bauer 2012, 143).

During the final weeks of the military regime, the Spanish electricity corporation Endesa S.A. and its subsidiary Endesa Chile (formerly owned by the state, but privatized in 1987) were granted 98% of the non-consumptive water rights for the Aysén region (Prieto and Bauer 2012), home to a large portion of the world’s fresh water reserves. As promised by the 1981 Water Code, these rights were granted permanently at no cost to the company, despite the enormous power and wealth entailed by that ownership. Today, Endesa boasts being the largest private multinational electricity enterprise in Latin America (Endesa 2011). However, Endesa’s monopoly on water rights and audacious repertoire of large hydroelectric dam projects has not gone unnoticed – or unchallenged.

Endesa’s Ralco dam project sparked controversy in the 1990s and faced resistance from the Pehuenche indigenous communities along the Bio-Bío River in south-central Chile (Aylwin 2002). The Ralco project was ultimately completed in 2004, and “stands tall as a symbol of the betrayal of the democratic promise” (Carruthers and Rodriguez 2009: 8). This case was fresh in many Chileans’ minds when Endesa announced their next big project, HidroAysén, the following year.
HidroAysén: solution to an energy crisis?

The HidroAysén project, first announced in 2005, proposed the construction of five dams on the Baker and Pascua rivers of the Aysén region (Figure 1). The project was promoted by the company as the “clean, renewable, and Chilean” solution to Chile’s growing “energy crisis.” HidroAysén represented a joint venture shared 51% by Endesa Chile, a subsidiary of the Spanish company Endesa (now owned by the Italian company Enel), and 49% by Colbún, the Chilean company owned by the wealthy Matte and Angelini families (HidroAysén 2011). The dams were to generate 2,750 megawatts of installed capacity and 18,430 GWh of annual energy production, aiming to provide about 20% of the projected energy needs for the central electricity system by 2025 (HidroAysén 2011).

Promotional materials claimed that HidroAysén would be “one of the most efficient dams in the world,” boasting 3.12 GWh of energy produced per hectare flooded by HidroAysén, as compared to 0.60 GWh produced by Belo Monte in
Brazil (Figure 2) (HidroAysén 2011). However, perhaps the most controversial part of the project was the 2,000 km transmission line that was introduced as a separate project in 2009, bumping the total cost of the project from $500 million to $3 billion (Segura 2010), later rising to an estimated $10 billion in 2013 (Nelson 2012). The fact that these two inextricably connected parts of the HidroAysén project were assessed as separate projects with separate impacts would become a major complaint of the Patagonia Without Dams movement.

![Figure 2: HidroAysén campaign graphic comparing the dam project to others around South America by Gigawatt hours per year and hectares inundated represented by the size of the blue water droplet (HidroAysén 2011)](image)

**The Patagonia Without Dams movement**

We now turn to a discussion of the mobilization of the PWD movement, starting with the roots of the resistance to large development projects in the remote region of Aysén. Tracing the development of the movement from this local context, we then highlight four key political opportunities that shaped and were shaped by the framing processes of the Patagonia Without Dams movement as
it expanded across the nation: 1) the formation of a local movement against the HidroAysén project from 2005 to 2007, based on the idea of protecting Aysén as a Reserva de Vida; 2) the struggle over content and process of the Environmental Impact Assessment in 2008 and 2009, which ultimately shifted focus from environmental concerns to issues of governance and democracy; 3) the growing discontent with government that exploded into mass mobilization following the May 2011 Supreme Court ruling that upheld the HidroAysén’s EIA process; and 4) the legal battles and elite fracturing that ensued, ultimately ended in a court ruling that overturned the May 2011 decision and halted the HidroAysén project in June 2014.

The roots of resistance: Defending Aysén, a reserve of life
Aysén communities were on the defensive long before the HidroAysén project was ever announced, aware that the region’s wealth of natural resources and powerful rivers was widely coveted. A 1972 article in the Santiago Press announced, “the local public opinion is determined to defend under all circumstances the territory of the Baker river, where 50% of the country’s hydroelectric potential is found, according to the Endesa company” (Segura 2008, 7). In 1990, the mayor declared the region a “reserva de vida” – a reserve of life (Segura 2008, 6), a concept that would take hold in the region and provide the backbone for the local resistance to HidroAysén.

In 2001, the concept of Aysén as a Reserve of Life became the centerpiece of a community resistance movement against the Alumysa project, a proposed aluminum smelter that would be powered by five dams and three hydroelectric power plants (Segura 2008). Local actors in Aysén formed organizations and coalitions like the Citizen Committee for the Defense of Aysén as a Reserve of Life, backed by national environmental NGOs like CODEFF, Chile Sustentable, Ecosistemas and some 15 others. An “Alliance for Aysén as a Reserve of Life” was formed in collaboration with many of these national NGOs, as well as international NGOs such as Greenpeace. The concept of the “reserve of life” resonated with the conservation values of these national and international environmental organizations, as well as with local livelihood concerns, thus expanding and fortifying the resistance movement.

The Alumysa project was halted in August 2003 due to pressure from the “No Alumysa” movement, which positioned Aysén as a Reserve of Life as a sustainable community-based alternative to extractive private-industry-driven development (Segura 2008). In addition to setting an important precedent for community resistance based on this alternative model of regional development, the No Alumysa campaign forged key organizational structures and alliances between local actors and Chilean and international NGOs, relationships that would later be essential to the expansion of the Patagonia Without Dams movement.

Today, visitors are greeted by a sign stating, “Welcome to the Region of Aysén, Reserve of Life” (Segura 2008). Patricio Segura, who participated in the
creation and promotion of the regional development model, expressed, “It’s been two decades of non-stop work at all levels that has accomplished transforming what started out as a slogan into what is now recognized as the concept of society that permeates all action taken at the regional level” (Segura 2008, 2). This model of regional development established a set of community values and a vision of the future that acted as a framework for evaluation of all subsequent development projects. It was against this vision of Aysén as a Reserve of Life that the HidroAysén dam project would have to compete.

**Opportunity 1: Building opposition through the networks of Aysén as a Reserve of Life**

In response to the initial proposal of HidroAysén in 2005, groups that had been involved in the Alumysa struggle formed the Citizen Coalition for Aysén Reserve of Life (Citizen Coalition ARL) and began holding informational meetings and workshops about the implications of the dam projects and the potential avenues for resistance. The formation of the Citizen Coalition ARL was an important political opportunity in that it allowed activists to tap into a rich advocacy network between local and international organizations. In 2006, the coalition made a public declaration of their opposition to the project:

> We have come to the conclusion that this mega-project is not compatible with the model of sustainable development of the Aysén region and Patagonia, nor with the vision of the future established by the majority of its population...[the project] does not only imply the truly violent destruction of the river system, but also presents a threat to all forms of life in the river basin as well as the lifestyle, wellbeing, and vision that those of us who inhabit this land have of integral development, now and in the future for our communities, in the environmental as well as cultural, social and economic spheres. (Segura 2010, 357)

Other local groups, such as the Autonomous Collective for Patagonia, the Defenders of the Spirit of Patagonia, and the Jovenes Tehuelches, also began mobilizing against the dam project. All of them would come together under the banner of Patagonia Without Dams in the iconic horseback march to Coyhaique in 2007. Media coverage of the march conveyed a romantic image of the movement as a struggle to maintain the pristine environment and traditional Patagonian way of life, an image that would be used along with the slogan “Patagonia Without Dams” in publicity campaigns aiming to build support for the movement across the country and around the world.

The part of this framing that was focused on preservation resonated with international environmental groups, enabling the Citizen Coalition ARL to reactivate their ties to the networks that had supported previous environmental struggles in the area, such as the Alumysa conflict. The resistance movement expanded in 2007 with the creation of the Patagonia Defense Council (PDC), bringing together more than 70 organizations, primarily environmental in
focus, from all over Chile and internationally. That same year, the PDC launched a nationwide publicity campaign with funding and support from international environmental NGOs like International Rivers and the Tompkins-funded Conservación Patagonica.

It is important to note that some of the local opposition groups, such as Jovenes Tehuelches, actively distanced themselves from the PDC because of a perception that it was beholden to these international funders, seen by some as yet another form of interventionism in their region. These groups continued to mobilize in solidarity under the banner of Patagonia Without Dams, but did not subscribe to the growing list of PDC members. These events demonstrate how convergence among different groups in common cause is not necessarily smooth or complete. Tsing (2005) suggests this might be best understood as an alignment of positions at a particular point in time and context to create a shared voice, albeit with tradeoffs and costs associated with the uneven privilege that influences the reframing of issues to resonate with national and transnational audiences (c.f. Braun and Dreiling 2014).

The PDC’s Patagonia Without Dams campaign set out to counter the dominant image of HidroAysén as the solution to Chile’s energy crisis. Its initial publicity materials featured the slogan “Patagonia Without Dams” against a background of beautiful views of dramatic Patagonian landscapes obstructed by superimposed transmission lines (PDC 2011). Other images were paired with messages such as “Destruction...It’s not a solution!” (Figure 3, left panel) (PDC 2011).

This initial framing was consistent with coordinated opposition to large dams in the international environmental and anti-dam movements (Conca 2006). The universal frame thus functioned as a “traveling activist package” that challenged extractive development agendas as coercive, environmentally destructive, and imperialistic (Tsing 2005: 230). Internationally, and among national environmental NGOs, PWD had effectively amplified its concerns about preservation. Among the general Chilean public, however, HidroAysén was largely seen as a regional concern. The challenge for PWD was to engage this universal traveling package of extractive development in ways that would resonate more broadly across the nation.

**Opportunity 2: Environmental Impact Assessment and the struggle for democratic process**

In addition to expanding publicity and outreach, the PWD movement had branches working on the technical and legal front, especially focused on carefully monitoring the Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) of the HidroAysén dam project. The EIA process was a key political opportunity in that it opened a space for formal documentation of citizen concerns about the project, while also sparking debate about the need for more accountability within this process.
The formal Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) citizen observation period opened in 2008, and Ayseninos and PWD groups rallied around the opportunity to express their concerns about the project. In November 2008, hundreds of people marched through Coyhaique to the office of the Regional Environmental Commission to submit a compilation of 2,000 technical observations and more than 10,300 citizen observations (El Divisadero 2008). Concerns focused on the impact that the flooding of the project site would have on the unique ecosystems and pristine beauty of Aysén, as well as on the local economy, lifestyle, and social fabric that would be further interrupted by the construction process and influx of workers.

Controversy erupted when the superintendent overseeing the evaluation of the EIA was accused of insufficient review of the public comments, “undemocratic” decision-making, and a lack of transparency (El Diario 2008, 1). The PDC framed the situation as “betraying and violating the Citizen Participation process” and stated in an open letter to the President:

This situation puts our democracy in question, it undermines the trust we have in our democratic institutions, it injures our country’s image, and it affects our dignity as citizens. (PDC 2010, 35)

While the struggle over accountability for the socio-economic and environmental impacts of HidroAysén resonated regionally within Patagonia, the controversy over the government’s handling of the EIA process highlighted longstanding historical concerns about governance in Chile.

In addition to the discontent with the EIA for the dam, there was frustration about the legal separation of the dam and the transmission line, the assessment of the latter being left for a later time. PWD groups argued that this compartmentalization of the EIA process masked the cumulative consequences of the project and made approval of each part of the project more likely. This concern over process was later addressed by legal reform efforts, but only after HidroAysén slipped through this loophole.

Throughout the battle over HidroAysén, the EIA would remain a central point of conflict between the resistance movement, the project authorities, and the state. This mounting tension was reflected in the way movement actors shifted from emphasizing mostly regional concerns about dam impacts to using a master frame of democracy and justice that would resonate nationally. This can be seen in the previous quote from the PDC, as well as in the language of the Patagonia Without Dams documentary that it released in 2009: “the choice between HidroAysén and a Patagonia free from dams is, at the end of the day, a decision for the development of all of Chile” (PDC 2009). These new framing strategies fused transnational traveling activist packages about exploitative development with national concerns about politics and would be central to the publicity battles between PWD and HidroAysén in 2009-2010.
Framing and counterframing: The publicity battle

By 2009, the HidroAysén conflict had grown substantially and was starting to make waves throughout Chile and abroad. The movement expanded to Spain and Italy, where civil society groups attacked HidroAysén at its source by confronting the Spanish corporation Endesa and the Italian consortium Enel that owned the majority of the investment. In Chile, the PDC was investing more money than ever in the national PWD publicity campaign, putting up billboards and publishing full-page ads in national newspapers. Many of the early themes focused on the negative impacts on the region of Aysén, on the value of Aysén as a Reserve of Life, and on the invaluable ecosystems of the area (PDC 2010). These themes reflected the local concerns that had been raised in the EIA process, which resonated with transnational anti-dam rhetoric, while at the same time pointing to the shortcomings of the EIA process in addressing these issues.

In response to the growing media attention, HidroAysén invested about one million dollars in a new publicity campaign of its own, titled “Let’s talk energy!” that aimed to “counteract the environmentalist campaign” (Marticorena 2009, 3). One of the directors of the Italian energy consortium, Enersis (owner of Endesa), expressed the need to mirror the movement’s tactics, stating, “until now, we hadn’t considered it necessary to go to a more general public, but today we believe that we should start to focus on a more massive and national audience to make the project more visible” (Marticorena 2009, 2). Backed by the public relations giant, Burson Marsteller, the new publicity campaign promoted discussion and education about the project through outreach and presentations at the regional level and TV advertisements at the national level.

In the Aysén region, HidroAysén’s promotional presentations, especially those at local schools, were widely criticized as propaganda by local movement actors:

> It calls our attention to the fact that instead of responding to citizen observations of the Environmental Impact Statement, HidroAysén continues promoting its project and buying up the citizens… completely avoiding the environmental laws that require that they respond to the thousands of citizen comments that were presented in November of 2008. (Patagonia Defense Council Communications 2009, 2)

On a national level HidroAysén publicized the project through short television commercials that depicted the impending energy crisis with dramatic electrical blackouts in ill-fated situations. One such ad shows the electricity go out in an operating room mid-surgery when a pizza delivery boy rings the doorbell next door. Another shows a soccer stadium black out just before a goal when a woman turns on a hair dryer at home. Each ad concludes, “If Chile does not double its energy starting today, in 10 years it will only function halfway…no energy source on its own is sufficient…a favor de la corriente... HidroAysén,” which roughly translates to “in favor of the current” allowing multiple
interpretations alluding to the electrical current, the flow of water, and the up-to-date or current trends (YouTube 2010). These commercials were later called “HidroAysén’s Campaign of Terror” by the Patagonia Without Dams campaign (PDC 2010, 55).

The challenge for the PWD campaign was to maintain momentum and prove the existence of alternative solutions to the crisis that HidroAysén had exposed. This was the intention of the PDC’s weekly publication of full-page newspaper inserts. Each week they presented approximately ten new reasons to oppose HidroAysén, and one of the first was titled “Why the dams are not necessary,” sharing the results of an academic study by Hall et al. (2009) analyzing the potential to replace HidroAysén with renewable energy (PDC 2010, 17).

The PDC increasingly focused its informational inserts on the structural injustices embodied in the project, thus bridging between the more universal anti-dam frames and the growing national concerns about democracy. The inserts started condemning Endesa and Colbún’s consolidation of energy and water monopolies, their failure to comply with existing environmental laws, and their collusion with the government. One insert summed up the new message of the campaign, calling HidroAysén the perfect example of “business for few and the ruin of many” (Figure 3, right panel) (PDC 2010, 29). Pointing out the undemocratic management of the HidroAysén project, especially in disregarding citizen comments and appeals during the EIA consultation process, the PDC marked and translated the anti-dam traveling activist package into local cultural and political terms, framing the dam project as a “setback” to achieving “increased and improved democracy” in Chile (24).
Figure 3: The changing message of Patagonia Without Dams (PDC 2011). Left: “Destruction is Not The Solution!” Right: “9 Reasons Why HidroAysén is Business for Few and the Ruin of Many.”

Opportunity 3: Growing discontent with “government run by businessmen”

With the election of right-wing president Sebastian Piñera in March 2010, the PWD campaign immediately intensified pressure on the government to take a stance against the HidroAysén project. The campaign published open letters to Piñera, urging him to “rectify the irregularities that have been presented in the EIA, rebuilding citizen trust,” and demanding that he “see to the unconditional and comprehensive fulfillment of the laws of the republic” (PDC 2010, 38). The letter implored the president to “see to the good of the nation, rather than the corporate interests” and to reject the dam project “as has been advised by 11 public service institutions in the evaluation of the EIA and as expressed by the citizenry” (38).

The new government gave no reply, but the movement judged the government’s position later that month when it accepted a $10 million contribution from Endesa for post-earthquake reconstruction (El Mostrador 2010, 1). The
campaign declared that Endesa was making inappropriate donations and engaging in “false philanthropy” in order to win support (PDC 2010, 48). A subsequent newspaper insert declared:

The HidroAysén project is predatory in the environmental aspect, inequitable in the social aspect, and monopolistic in the financial aspect...a true reflection of a model of development through which corporations try to govern the country (PDC 2010, 53).

Having effectively reframed and amplified its critique of the HidroAysén project as a threat to democracy, the PWD movement was rapidly gaining popularity. The movement had a growing presence in social media, with 68,000 followers on its primary Facebook page and thousands more on its 120 additional pages that had been created unofficially by individuals outside the PDC (PDC 2010, 31). A growing number of academics, politicians, and celebrities were voicing their opposition to the project. Polls showed that national opposition to HidroAysén was steadily growing, rising from 46% in December 2009 to 62% in May 2011 (CERC 2011, 29). An even larger percentage (79%) expressed disapproval about how the government had dealt with HidroAysén, regardless of respondents’ personal politics on the issue (Vitrina Ambiental 2010).

Growing frustration with the government reached far beyond the issue of HidroAysén, pointing to deeper discontent regarding the model of development in Chile. A May 2011 national survey documented that 65% felt they had not received benefits from Chile’s economic growth, and 64% felt they had a “government run by businessmen” (CERC 2011, 37). Only 11% of Chileans felt they could trust their government and institutions (CERC 2011). This context of broad discontent in Chile provided a key political opportunity, fertile ground for the Patagonia Without Dams activists’ calls for a more equitable and participatory democracy. Their critiques of the state and neoliberal politics resonated with the lived experiences of people struggling with similar issues in the education and health care systems. In the budding Student Movement, particularly, this resonance would allow for alliance building during a period of mass mobilization.

**Mass mobilization for social justice**

May 2011 was a month of devastating loss and also great triumph for the Patagonia Without Dams movement. On May 9, HidroAysén’s EIA was approved by the Environmental Assessment Commission in Coyhaique. But triumph came in the citizen response to that decision. In Santiago and other cities all over Chile, thousands of people took to the streets to denounce the decision, prompting the New York Times to call it “a surprising national movement” (Barrionuevo 2011a, 1). Public opinion polls corroborated the apparent victory of Patagonia Without Dams in the publicity battle: 74% of
Chileans opposed the decision to approve the HidroAysén project, with majority opposition reflected across all sociopolitical strata (La Tercera 2011).

The protests escalated throughout the month, reaching an unprecedented peak in participation on May 20 when an estimated 50,000-90,000 people marched through the Santiago streets protesting the decision to approve the dams (International Rivers 2011). The magnitude of these protests, some of the largest demonstrations since the end of the military regime, was completely unexpected, even for leaders of the PWD movement who suddenly found themselves at the forefront of what had “snowballed into one of the greatest environmental movements in history” (Hartman 2011, 1). The PDC released a campaign ad that showed a picture of the mass protests with the heading, “Chile has decided: Patagonia Without Dams!” (PDC 2011).

On June 20, 2011, the movement won another impressive and unusual victory. The PDC’s small team of environmental lawyers achieved a ruling from the Puerto Montt Appeals Court that paralyzed the HidroAysén project until further review of the EIA (Barrionuevo 2011b). It was a very hopeful moment for the movement and temporarily eased the tension surrounding the dam conflict. The moment of triumph was followed by a relative lull in Patagonia Without Dams activity, as attention shifted to the growing Student Movement.

The first national strike for education took place just three days after the mass protests in response to the approval of HidroAysén. Participation in student movement marches regularly reached 500,000 people from May to September of 2011, a period soon deemed “the winter of discontent” (McIntyre 2012, 26). Though the PWD movement was no longer at center stage, the student protests regularly included Patagonia Without Dams signs and banners. These demonstrations of solidarity express an underlying resonance and frame bridging between two different movements who both framed their struggles as responses to the government prioritizing private economic interests over the interests of its citizens.

**Opportunity 4: Legal battles and elite fracturing**

In October 2011, the Puerto Montt Appeals Court ruled in favor of HidroAysén, rejecting the appeals submitted in June by the PDC’s lawyers. The PDC legal team immediately announced a decision to appeal the decision in the Supreme Court, declaring to the media, “we believe our legal arguments demonstrate that the decision taken by the Environmental Evaluation Committee violates constitutional guarantees and is completely illegal” (Salinas 2011, 1). In April 2012, the court upheld the approval of the multi-billion dollar HidroAysén project, leaving the approval of the EIA for the transmission line as the last barrier to its construction. Though unsuccessful, PDC’s legal actions functioned to amplify PWD’s framing of HidroAysén as undemocratic, as well as its critique of the state facilitating exploitative development by transnational corporations.
Despite its legal victories, HidroAysén had been stalled for more than five years due to the EIA and litigation processes and the project’s legitimacy had been significantly undermined by the PWD movement. The companies endorsing the project began to show signs of doubt about the viability of the investment. In June 2012, Colbún, the Chilean stakeholder in HidroAysén, voluntarily suspended the EIA for the transmission line due to “the inexistence of a consensus on a national energy policy” (Concha 2012, 1). Negotiations later continued, but HidroAysén officials remained wary. In April 2013, the CEO of Enel was quoted in the Wall Street Journal saying, “We will continue to support HidroAysén as long as the government supports it on a national and local level; if this is not the case, we will invest elsewhere” (El Mostrador 2013, 1).

The surge of social mobilization and protest in May 2011 had signaled an important shift in Chilean civil society toward contesting Chile’s neoliberal model of development (Pulgar 2011). Referring to the period of mass mobilization as “the revolution of 2011,” Claudio Pulgar claims that it produced a “generation of new citizens” concerned about the system of governance and interested in deepening democracy (Pulgar 2011, 3). Similarly, the PDC applauded the increased empowerment of social actors who no longer accept being “objects or spectators of political and economic decisions” (PDC 2013, 1). Patagonia Without Dams garnered widespread support by framing the HidroAysén issue as “symboliz[ing] Chile’s current model of development, and, with it, what we do not want as a country” (Segura 2013, 1). The PWD movement, the Student Movement, and other social movements all contributed to “pulling together the different causes and reinforcing each other” (Pulgar 2011, 2). By using a master frame of democracy, PWD achieved frame resonance with these other movements, bridging with their constituents, and building a broad coalition for political change.

From dams to democracy

Having framed the 2012 Supreme Court decision as a failure of the legislative and judicial system to function in favor of the majority, PWD leaders turned their attention to constitutional reform. They proposed the creation of a popular constituent assembly, a citizen-led initiative to promote and participate in the creation of a new Constitution. Constituent assemblies have been discussed by some Chilean scholars as a process of reconciliation between citizens and the political system, a chance to mend Chile’s “incomplete democracy” (Garretón 2003). That PWD leadership was involved in promoting and organizing this process speaks to the movement’s broad frame bridging and alliances with other movements for social justice.

In September 2012, the executive chief of staff of the Patagonia Defense Council organized the Social Summit for a New Chile, bringing together social leaders from diverse movements and initiatives (La Tercera 2012). The objective was to create “a new sociopolitical project that comes from the citizenry” and one that “answers to the social demands of the last two years of protest” (Rivera 2012, 1).
Though much of this work was centered in Santiago, PWD movement leaders from the Aysén region also expressed their support for constitutional change:

> The current Constitution does not represent us because it imposes a State that does not assume responsibility for the common good, and moreover excludes important social sectors which creates an evident lack of trust in all the institutions. (Vicariato Apostólico de Aysén 2011, 50)

Signs of further fracturing among elites came as several high-profile political leaders in Chile soon echoed the call for constitutional change. In her presidential election campaign, socialist Michelle Bachelet grabbed the attention of the media when she stated, “I believe it is necessary to propose a new Constitution” (Fernández 2013, 25). She emphasized the urgency of addressing the issues that lie at the heart of the discontent and protest, which she said reflected the call for “a more democratic society with more sustainable development...a different model of development” (14). She referenced the transformation of the Chilean constituency that is now “more aware of their rights and more demanding...a representative democracy is no longer enough as they want one that is much more participatory, where their voice can be heard” (10).

Upon her reelection and taking office in March of 2014, Bachelet tasked her Committee of Environmental Ministers with reevaluating HidroAysén’s EIA approval. On June 10, 2014, the committee announced that they were revoking the approval, sparking cries of victory from the Patagonia Without Dams movement and threats of an appeal from HidroAysén. As recently as June 2017, the Enel has been fighting the government over its refusal to grant it additional water rights (Cárdenas 2017). HidroAysén is not currently included in Enel’s portfolio, though the corporation has publicly expressed its intention to keep fighting to move forward with the project (ibid).

The victory against HidroAysén does not in any way secure a Patagonia without dams, nor does it signal a definite policy shift away from promoting dams. In Aysén, the PWD movement is now fighting the Energía Austral dam project on the Cuervo River and recognizes that these will not be the last battles. But the struggle against HidroAysén leaves a lasting legacy, with Patagonia Without Dams having become a broader symbol of resistance to unjust and undemocratic development projects. Campaigns in other parts of the country regularly invoke the PWD movement (“Ñuble Without Dams,” “Panguipulli Without Dams”) and adopt similar frame bridging techniques, in addition to drawing inspiration from PWD’s diverse resistance tactics, professionalized movement organizations, and strong local and international networks.
Conclusion

In this article, we have traced the shifting frames used by the Patagonia Without Dams movement as it shaped and was shaped by emerging political opportunities during a period of social transformation in Chile. In the early years of the campaign, PWD was built upon the solidarity network of Aysén as a Reserve of Life, a platform that resonated with the environmental preservation principles and anti-dam goals of international environmental organizations that were willing to lend financial and networking support. In order to expand the movement at the national level, however, movement actors reframed the issue in response to political opportunities that gave resonance to broad social justice and democracy frames.

Activists shifted the message towards a master frame of democracy when the movement encountered limited opportunity for meaningful participation in the Environmental Impact Assessment process. Using legal and communication strategies, such as well-publicized lawsuits about the EIA process, activists amplified this frame and raised public consciousness about the struggle over HidroAysén. Movement actors strategically utilized political opportunities to translate local concerns about Patagonian ecosystems and livelihoods to ones of democracy and governance that resonated across a broad range of social groups and organizations at the national level. PWD was thus able to mobilize a strong, diverse, and widely supported movement that collectively and directly petitioned the government of Chile to address the injustices of the neoliberal model of development. Consequently, when the government decided to approve HidroAysén in spite of nationwide and international opposition, hundreds of thousands of Chileans responded in mass protest.

The master frame of democracy allowed for frame bridging with other struggles for social justice, such as the Student Movement and citizen-led proposals for constitutional reform. Frame resonance sustained interest in the issue over many years of campaigning until the Chilean government finally took action in 2014 to halt the project. Patagonia Without Dams and its framing of dam projects as an issue of democracy continues to resonate in Patagonia and beyond, as the focus shifts away from HidroAysén to a number of other controversial development projects all over Chile.

The case of the Patagonia Without Dams movement in Chile demonstrates the ability of resistance movements with narrowly focused intent to frame their issues to resonate broadly and build alliances across scales. This framing is born from the political context, with activists shifting and amplifying frames via frame bridging strategies that respond to, and shape, political opportunity structures. The development of the Patagonia Without Dams movement highlights this dynamic interplay, with lessons for social movement scholars and activists alike.

In the realm of social movement theory, Patagonia Without Dams captures the rich potential for studying the relationship between political opportunity structures and framing tactics. But it also demands careful attention to scale.
and translation, an area that would benefit greatly from further scholarship. As Tsing (2005) found in her analysis of struggles over dams and forests in Indonesia, we find tension between the local livelihood concerns and the universal environmental and anti-dam framing used to build alliances transnationally. Yet, movement activists were able to bridge frames to find common ground through the master frame of democracy by emphasizing concerns about process that had wide resonance within Chile and transnationally.

For activists, Patagonia Without Dams provides insight into the power of a broad master frame to bridge across diverse interests and, paired with strategic use of dynamic legal and communication strategies in response to political opportunities, to garner widespread mobilization. It demonstrates the opportunities, and also the tensions, that spring from efforts to translate the core messages of a movement as it pushes to new scales and their associated political contexts. As the national campaign came to focus on the failed promises of the state and elites, activists in PWD were able to translate and bridge frames by building connections to shared critiques of undemocratic processes and neoliberal politics. These shifts in framing were paired with legal opportunities that could both highlight these problems of governance and serve to challenge them. By bridging shared concerns across movements and leveraging key political opportunities, environmental movements can spark more meaningful and inclusive dialog about the complex relationship between seemingly disparate topics like dams and democracy.

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