Fighting (for) gender equality: the roles of social movements and power resources
Ruedi Epple and Sebastian Schief

Abstract
Social movement activists are highly interested in incorporating experiences of their forerunners into their own strategic considerations and decisions. They examine whether previously implemented strategies have been successful or not and seek to understand why social movements have succeeded or failed to result in change. In this regard, the context in which social movements emerge and operate must be considered. As well, activists must determine whether countermovements exist and, if so, what strategies the latter have implemented that may thwart or further their own goals. This article discusses these issues by analyzing the interaction between the social movements for and against gender equality, using the example of the struggle between the women’s rights movement and its countermovements to establish or remove Offices for Gender Equality (OGEs) in Switzerland. Based on the results of a Coincidence Analysis (CNA), it is shown how this conflict has shaped the political balance of power in Switzerland, and, in turn, how political structures and processes have been modified. The implications of our findings for social movements are discussed.

Keywords: gender equality, social movements, Switzerland, coincidence analysis

Introduction
Zita Küng, a former secretary of the Swiss Women’s Rights Organization (Organisation für die Sache der Frau, OFRA) has recently stated that the women’s rights issues need a new boost (Avanzino, 2015). During the 1970s, the OFRA was one of the major organizations involved in the feminist movements in Switzerland (Küng 1979). Zita Küng’s opinion is not unusual. Many young women in Switzerland and elsewhere agree wholeheartedly. Michèle Roten, for example, belongs to a new feminist generation in Switzerland (Roten 2011a, 2011b). In other European countries, representatives of a new feminism (e.g., Anne Wizorek in Germany and Laurie Penny in the UK) have called for renewed

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discussions on sexism, gender equality, and gender issues in general (Fargahi 2015; Landolt 2015).

The statements of younger and older representatives and supporters of feminism reflect that the progress of achieving gender equality in Europe in the 21st century has been slow. Even though the women’s rights movement has been able to accomplish various major political goals, recent debates indicate that the implementation of practices to achieve gender equality still leaves room for improvement.

A few facts with respect to the situation in Switzerland illustrate this point. First, the proportion of female executive managers in Switzerland is still below the European average (Kohli 2012). Second, an unexplainable, gender-related discrepancy in pay still exists (Bundesamt für Statistik, BfS, 2012; Kobler 2015). Third, the division of work, whether it be paid labor or related to unpaid housework, family care, or voluntary community activities, is still heavily gendered (Epple, Kersten, Nollert, and Schief 2014, Epple, Kersten, Nollert, and Schief 2015; Gasser, Kersten, Nollert, and Schief 2015).

The static implementation of only formally accepted gender equality has been accompanied by conflicts that have tested already achieved progress. For example, the right to an abortion within the first three months of pregnancy was challenged by a popular petition (Volksinitiative) in Switzerland. Although the petition did not call for abolishing the existing law, it sought to make the funding of elected abortions a private issue. This, however, would have resulted in abortions becoming a privilege of wealthy women once again (Bundesrat 2012; Föhn 2011).

Comparable political developments can be observed all over Europe. In some countries, gender equality has been assigned a high priority and actively promoted. In others, the call to promote or take action in favor of gender equality has been rejected. In fact, some countries have even pursued reforms to hinder it (Kriszsán et al. 2009).

We postulate that social change emerges from conflicts between social movements, as is reflected in the case of our study on the development of gender equality. This conflict has neither abated in Europe overall, and especially not in Switzerland. Indeed, the issue of gender equality in Switzerland remains highly controversial and disputed.

In this contribution, we analyze the conflicts related to gender equality by way of example in Switzerland, namely, as they emerged in the development of the Swiss Federal Offices for Gender Equality (hereafter: OGEs). These offices were established in several of Switzerland’s 26 subregions (cantons) in the last quarter of the twentieth century. The OGEs have been vitally important for the women’s rights movement and gender equality issues in Switzerland. During the 1970s and 1980s, they were a central institutional heritage within the women’s rights movement. Since then, they have become symbols of the institutionalization of the women’s rights movement. Today, the offices have the
important task of ensuring that the constitutional mandate of gender equality is put into practice (Scheidegger 2008).

The struggle to achieve gender equality in Switzerland is hallmarked, for example, by the fact that not every canton has implemented an OGE. In addition, there have been various and repeated political attempts to retrench the offices, either by closing them, privatizing them, reducing their funding, reorganizing them or by overwhelming them with new demands and duties. The political forces driving such direct or indirect attacks on the OGEs are made up of individuals who are convinced that the offices are not or no longer necessary. In their opinion, the aim of gender equality has been more or less accomplished (Epple 2012; Interessengemeinschaft Antifeminismus 2011).

We hypothesize that the fights for and against the OGEs reflect the political balance of power in the field of gender equality. The fights against the offices have led the above-mentioned feminists to conclude that new efforts are necessary to uphold and improve gender equality. In our analysis, we first address the question of if and when a new type of social movement appeared in the field of gender equality (Hutter and Kriesi 2013; Kriesi 1996). Secondly, we examine whether any countermovements opposed to the women’s rights movement have been able to change the balance of power of the social movements to the disadvantage of gender equality. Because Switzerland is a confederation of relatively autonomous yet still rather homogeneous subregions (cantons) with different configurations, it represents a suitable example to conduct our comparative analysis.

In the following, we first outline the major theoretical concepts we have drawn upon to develop our research questions. We then present our research hypotheses underlying our analysis, the data and methods used, and our empirical findings. In the last section, we state and discuss our conclusion.

**Concepts**

In order to better understand how the conflict related to the OGEs is linked to the changes in the balance of power, we first describe the conceptual pillars of political systems, namely, polities, politics and policies. Then, because a major driver of social change emerges from the conflict between social movements and their countermovements, we describe the different movements related to our research question and how they have led to social change. Finally, we explain the concept of state feminism in order to understand the processes of state intervention for the sake of gender equality.

**Policy, politics, and polity**

Policy, politics, and polity are three terms used to describe the three most important underlying dimensions of political science (Prittwitz and Wegrich 1994). Policy refers to content of ideas, goals, or any related plans of action that are adopted or implemented by an individual or social group, such as formal
political programs or lines of arguments. Politics refers to the actual processes, procedures, activities, and affairs involved in managing states, governments, or organized social groups. For example, politics is concerned with assessing, debating, or promoting opinion, and typically leads to political decisions. Polity refers to organized political systems. It includes, for example, governmental organizations and institutions, the rule of law, codes of practice, and the political culture of an entity.

Social movements and social change

According to Cox and Nilsen (Cox and Nilsen 2014; Nilsen and Cox 2013), social change is an outcome of conflicts between social movements originating from the top and the bottom levels of society. Movements from the bottom give voice to the demands of groups possessing little power or authority within a larger society. Movements from the top stem from and are aimed to promote the interests of elite members of society. Typically, the latter attempt to protect their privileges that may be at the heart of demands underlying movements from the bottom. The cycle of protests of the so-called new social movements (NSM) during the late 1960s can be interpreted as marking a phase of social movements that aggressively promoted social change in line with interests rooted from the bottom (Giugni 1999). However, at the beginning of the 1990s, this bottom-rooted phase of protests was replaced by another period dominated by the social movements from the top. Pushed by these movements, a neoliberal conversion of society took place during that period (Nilsen and Cox 2013). Yet, social movements from the bottom remained active during this period and used their remaining power to influence the social developments (Epple and Schär 2015).

The alter-globalization (global justice) and the national-conservative movements represent two major social movements that influenced social change emerging during this period (Hutter and Kriesi 2013; Kriesi 1996). They defined the political scope in the phase of neoliberal societal conversion, a social change triggered from the elites of the society (Brand and Wissen 2003). Kriesi (2001) has shown how the social movements described above can be differentiated according to inclusion and exclusion dimensions of conflict. In contrast to new social movements, the influence of the national-conservative movements is not restricted to the arena of protest; instead, the actors exploit an institutional arena to pursue their goals. Hutter and Kriesi (2013) label this phenomenon as the paradox of the populist right. They believe that national-conservative movements, grounded in political institutions dominated by political elites, mobilize their activities predominantly within these institutional arenas in order to distance themselves from the political left. Moreover, their activities are in line with an ideological affinity to authority, law, and order (Hutter 2012; Hutter and Kriesi 2013).

Social movements operate in a field of force (Nilsen and Cox 2013, p. 71; Roseberry 1996, pp. 75-76). The field of force is defined by different political
actors, their resources, and the public support they receive. Politics are always based on conflicts and the balance of power. The field of force creates a balance of power within public politics (Wissel 2010). Social movements may create alliances with political parties (Rucht 2004) or become parties themselves over time (e.g., the Green Party).

Politics are influenced by social movements, too. Switzerland’s underlying political system consists of federal and centralist elements that are influenced by representative and direct democratic factors. These elements are based on the balance of power as it existed in the 19th century. The institutional compromise of the 19th century was functional even though the political balance of power changed. It has therefore survived until today (Epple 1988, Vatter 2014). The balance of power influences policies as well. Switzerland’s social policy, for example, has been influenced by diverse political paradigms, programs, and powers (Studer 1998).

We can now incorporate these general considerations in our analysis of the mechanisms underlying the balance of power with respect to gender equality. As in other European countries, the women’s rights movement in Switzerland had its second wave during the cycle of protests of the new social movements. Political actors had to acknowledge the demands of gender equality (politics). Because countermovements were stronger at that time (Hardmeier 1997), the women’s rights movement was then able to achieve previously unreachable goals (Banaszak 1996). In 1971, Switzerland introduced women’s suffrage. Only some years later, an article on gender equality was written into Switzerland’s federal constitution. The gender equality article was retained in the constitution after its renewal in 1999 (Rielle 2010a, 2010b). Moreover, most of the cantons implemented offices for gender equality (OGE) during the last quarter of the twentieth century (polities) (Scheidegger 2008). The altered balance of power also led to a change in policies. A majority of the voting population voted in favor of the right to abortion within the first three months of the pregnancy (Rielle 2010c). Social policy reforms made some concessions to address the demands of the women’s rights movement (Studer 2012). Since the 1990s, however, countermovements against the women’s rights movement (e.g., the national-conservative movements and the anti-feminist movement) have been gaining ground.

According to Jessop (2007) and Hay (2002), social movements are strategic-relational actors. They relate to actions of other powers and to contexts within the fights that take place. The existing geographical and temporal contexts are a result of former fights. The former balance of power is, so to speak, inscribed into the actual context. As such, the contexts are selective and offer actors with diverse strategies a variety of opportunities for action (Jessop 2004). As Tilly and Goodin (2006) have pointed out, context is a highly relevant factor in political analysis, and this applies here, too. In our research, the contexts were the cantons, each of which demonstrated an affinity or adversity to gender equality (Bühler, Brun, and Steinmann 2001).
Major changes in the balance of power happen during cycles of protest. They lead to concessions, adjustments, and compromises between social movements and their allies with respect to the triad of politics, polities and policies. As well, there are ceasefire lines (Nilsen and Cox 2013, p. 81) or social fixes (Sum and Jessop 2013, pp. 246-250). Certainly, a ceasefire can be broken or terminated. Moreover, social fixes settle social and political conflicts only provisionally (and not permanently) because some political forces may be excluded or left behind, or the societal circumstances prevailing at the time of the implementation of the ceasefire change. New crises may arise; new conflicts may erupt (Nilsen and Cox 2013; Sum and Jessop 2013). If a countermovement should develop, even a backlash is possible (Mansbridge and Shames 2008).

**State feminism**

Our research is affiliated with research on state feminism. State feminism defines the relationship between the women’s rights movement and the Swiss Offices for Gender Equality (OGEs). According to McBride and Mazur (1995) the starting point of the research on state feminism was grounded in the common skepticism that evolved during the second wave of the women’s rights movement about “policy machinery for the advancement of women” (pp. 2-3) and “feminism from above” (p. 10). A major reference of research on state feminism and the OGEs is linked to the Research Networks on Gender Politics and the State (RNGS) (Mazur and McBride 2006; McBride and Mazur 2013; RNGS 2010). The network’s research rejects the view that the state is a monolithic entity dominated by men. Instead, the RNGS defines the state as “the site or location of a variety of internally differentiated structures and processes” (McBride and Mazur 1995, p. 11). The state’s heterogeneity left room for the women’s rights movement to access state institutions to campaign for gender equality within a setting that was adverse to gender equality.

In a nutshell, research on state feminism has shown that the women’s rights movement has succeeded in resolving several conflicts concerning gender equality. Substantial reforms have been developed, and actors have established themselves in this policy field (dual response) (McBride and Mazur 2010, pp. 242-250). The skepticism in the beginning stages of the women’s rights movement has not been borne out (Outshoorn 2010). In this regard, Banszak (2010) states that reforms have been generated by femocrats of the policy machineries for gender equality as well as by feminists working in other state sectors. A connection between movement and state must exist for these reforms to be successful.

The circumstances underlying the push to achieve gender equality have changed over the last twenty years, for example, as can be seen in neoliberal reconfigurations of the welfare state (Banszak, Beckwith, and Rucht 2003) or the re-orientation of gender equality policy on diversity and gender

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2 An Australian term for female government officials who advocate feminist policies.
mainstreaming (Kantola and Outshoorn 2007). With respect to gender equality, these changes represent ambivalent outcomes (Outshoorn and Kantola 2007). In some countries, women’s rights movements were weakened and countermovements evolved (Outshoorn and Kantola 2007). A particularly strong development of this kind took place in Australia (Sawer 2007). Owing to changes in the balance of power, state feminism has been weakened in some countries. However, the prevalence of such cases is outnumbered by those in which women’s rights movement and state feminism gained support (Outshoorn and Kantola 2007).

Policy analyses on state feminism have generated contradictory findings regarding the balance of power. On the one hand, some case studies have found that countermovements have had an impact (Outshoorn and Kantola 2007; Sawer 2007). On the other hand, some scholars have claimed that the strength or weakness of countermovements has had no impact on state feminism (McBride and Mazur 2010).

We think that such discrepancies can be explained, at least in part, by a failure to take into account the balance of power, in general, and the strength of the countermovements in particular. We agree with Goertz and Mazur (2008) that it is important to examine a negation, absence, or the opposite of a basic concept (Goertz and Mazur 2008). As such, we have incorporated this approach into our considerations by symmetrically scrutinizing the women’s rights movement and the countermovements. In other words, we have analyzed strengths and weaknesses of both sides as well as the outcomes or lack thereof.

State feminism is effective if the women’s rights movement and the OGEs are operative and effect changes together (Goertz and Mazur 2008). The research in the field of gender equality has been enriched by inquiries focusing on the political balance of power (Wissel 2010), which, in turn, has influenced politics, policies and polities. The change of perspective has conceptual and methodological consequences.

Switzerland has not been part of the research network on state feminism. Instead, research on OGEs has had a different focus. Scheidegger (2008), for example, conducted a qualitative comparative analysis (QCA) to show that a shift of power in favor of the women’s rights movement within the cantonal executive bodies in combination with a progressive order of sexes lead to an implementation of an OGE. Cantons with good financial situations also represented a more favorable precondition for establishing OGEs. A definite implementation of OGE, an active gender equality policy, and a durable representation of women in the cantonal executive bodies were the preconditions necessary to continue and sustain OGE operations (Scheidegger 2008). Scheidegger’s research is important for our purpose in light of the extensive data collected. Moreover, we adapted the configurational comparative method used by Scheidegger. According to Seitz (2010), the cantonal political culture has had a major impact on conflicts related to the OGEs. Therefore, for
our research, we also incorporated the concept of political culture as a context variable and used Seitz’s data for our analyses.

In our research, we have drawn from knowledge generated by analyses of social movements related to the struggle for or against OGEs. For example, Schulz, Schmitter, and Kiani (2014) conducted a meta-analysis of research on the women’s rights movement since the year 1968. Epple’s (2012) overview of the movements in the field of gender equality showed that efforts to achieve gender equality had been consistently met with resistance, the type of which changed over time: In the beginning of the struggle for women’s suffrage, resistance was publicly organized (Hardmeier 1997). Later, in the 1960s and 1970s, resistance could be characterized as a loosely organized and decentralized counterdevelopment (Rucht 1991). Only in the last couple of years have the political powers working against gender equality started to organize themselves again. Nowadays, the women’s rights movement and state feminism must contend with national-conservative movements, an anti-feminist movement, and a critical men’s movement (Epple 2012). These political powers are a vivid and organized expression of the countermovements seeking to bridle women’s rights movement activities.

**Model and hypotheses**

Starting from the concepts presented above, we postulate that the implementation of OGEs as well as their retrenchment are a result of conflicts between social movements and a shift within the political balance of power. In contrast to Cox and Nilsen, we do not use the directional terms *movement from above* and *movement from below* but prefer to use the broader terms *social movements* and *countermovements*. As such, we regard the implementation and the retrenchment of OGEs as outcomes of the balance of power between the women’s rights movement and its countermovements (i.e., national-conservative movements and an anti-feminist movement).

For our model, we took into consideration that the balance of power is influenced not only by the conflict between the women’s right movement and its countermovements but also by the contexts in which they are embedded. The balance of power is, therefore, a social mechanism (M) that linked to context (CON) and outcome (OUT) (Mahoney 2001; Mayntz 2004; Pawson 2000). The social mechanism is not to be understood as a deterministic connection that automatically proceeds from context to outcome. In contrast, because the outcome is influenced by historical-concrete movements (W) and their countermovements (C) as strategic-relational actors, the outcome might be different – depending on strategy and strength – in comparable contexts.3

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3 For methodological reasons, we needed to test the effects of C in step one and of W in step two. Because Switzerland has only 26 cantons, we also had to address the problem of limited empirical diversity (Berg-Schlosser and De Meur 2009). For further explanations, see the methodical appendix.
We tested and specified the model (Figure 1) in two steps. In a first step, we analyzed the implementation of OGEs (IMP) and the influence of the women’s rights movement (W) for the cut-off year 1995 (Figure 2, model specification 1). In a second step, we analyzed the retrenchment of the OGEs (RET) influenced by the countermovements for the cut-off year of 2007 (Figure 2, model specification 2). The selection of these cut-off years are in line with the existing research on state feminism. The period between 1995 and 2005 is said to be the decade where OGEs underwent major changes (Kantola and Outshoorn 2007).

**Figure 1: Basic model**

![Figure 1: Basic model](image)

*Note:* The implementation or retrenchment of the offices for gender equality are a result of the balance of power. The balance of power is influenced by the women’s rights movement (W) and its countermovements (C). They are both influenced by other powers and by the context (CON). The balance of power mediates as a social mechanism (M) between context and outcome (OUT).^4^

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^4 According to QCA conventions, the existence of a factor is designated by upper casing, whereas its absence is designated by lower casing.
Figure 2: Model specification

Note: Although the models for 1995 and 2007 are comparable in their basic structure, they differ with respect to the factors related to the strength of the movement. Moreover, the social mechanism of the balance of power is separated into corresponding factors (see description of strength of movements above). Of course, context influences the factors W and C as well as the remaining factors related to a movement’s strength.

Based on these considerations, we developed the following hypotheses: Our first hypothesis (H1) is that the implementation of the OGE was a result of the change of the balance of power in favor of the women’s rights movement. Our second hypothesis (H2) is that OGE was a result of the change of the balance of power in favor of the countermovements.

Hypothesis 1 is in line with the academic literature on state feminism, because it explains the implementation of a policy machinery for the advancement of women as a reaction to strong and active women’s rights movements as well as international endeavors (McBride and Mazur 2013). Because the consensus of the existing research on this relationship externally validates our model regarding the implementation of OGEs, we incorporated it in Hypothesis 2.

Because the women’s rights movement as well as the countermovements are strategic-relational actors (Hay 2002; Jessop 2007), they are influenced not only by their rivals but also by the context. Therefore, the context assumes a very significant role in our model. It is known, for example, that a canton’s political culture concerning gender equality is also very important (Seitz 2003). Voting behavior concerning gender equality mirrors voters’ historical memories (Seitz 2014). To expand the range of our hypotheses, we assumed that the influence of the women’s rights movement existed in contexts with an affinity to gender equality (H3), while the influence of the countermovements would be found mostly within contexts that were adverse to gender equality (H4).
Using the same basic model for the women’s rights movement and for the countermovements, for our fifth hypothesis (H5), we postulated that the new type of social movements (Hutter and Kriesi 2013; Kriesi 1996) has followed the same mechanisms as the movements of the 1970s and 1980s. Recent research on the movements of the new cycle of protest has shown that the new type of social movements has followed a different mechanism. The political line of conflict has been positioned between inclusion and exclusion. The involved actors did not restrict themselves to the arena of protest but used the institutional arena. This is a major difference in comparison to the so-called new social movements (Hutter 2012; Hutter and Kriesi 2013). Hence, Hypothesis 5 is not in line with these recent claims in the literature. A new type of movement as understood by Kriesi could only be found if our model were well suited to explain the power of the women’s rights movement and the implementation of the OGE, but less suited to explain the power of the countermovements and the retrenchment of the OGE.

Methods

An essential characteristic of our basic model is its chain-like structure. Because we expected that the outcomes implementation (IMP) and retrenchment (RET) of the OGE could not be explained by mutually independent causes but rather by causally interconnected factors, we could not use the qualitative comparative analysis (QCA) for our data analysis. The QCA is better suited for analyses of structures with exactly one outcome and mutually independent causes (Baumgartner 2013, 2014). We therefore decided to apply the new statistical method of Coincidence Analysis (CNA) because it has no restrictions concerning the analysis of causal chains. CNA is a Boolean method of causal data analysis (Baumgartner 2009a, 2009b) that is related to the commonly used method QCA (Ragin 1987, 2008; Rihoux and Ragin 2009; Schneider and Wagemann 2012). Like QCA, CNA searches for minimally sufficient configurations for outcomes. CNA analyzes the same kind of configurational data as QCA (see, for example, Tables 6 and 7) and starts from the same underlying theory of causality (Gasser and Epple 2013; Mackie 1974).5 Our factors and their operationalization are listed in Table 1.

5 For further description of the methods and operationalizations of the indicators, see the appendix.
**Table 1. Factors and operationalization**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Shortcut*</th>
<th>Factor</th>
<th>Operationalization</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>POL or pol</td>
<td>Gender equality favorable or adverse context</td>
<td>Regional acceptance rates of gender equality issues in corresponding referenda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PER or per</td>
<td>Periphery or centrality of a context</td>
<td>Index based on the contrasts between rural and urban regions and on the contrasts between Protestant and Catholic regions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LAT or lat</td>
<td>Italian/French-speaking or German-speaking context</td>
<td>Affiliation of a canton with a language culture</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WPO or wpo</td>
<td>Political potential of the women’s rights movement</td>
<td>Index of support of gender equality within the female electorate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPO or cpo</td>
<td>Political potential of the countermovement</td>
<td>Index on decline of gender equality within the male electorate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WIN or win</td>
<td>Intersection between the women’s rights movement and the state</td>
<td>Index estimating the amount of allied female parliamentarians and employees of the cantonal administration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIN or cin</td>
<td>Intersection between the countermovement and the state</td>
<td>Index estimating the amount of allied male parliamentarians and employees of the cantonal administration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WAA or waa</td>
<td>Course of action of the women’s rights movement</td>
<td>Index based on women’s rights movement activist events</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAA or caa</td>
<td>Course of action of the countermovement</td>
<td>Index based on parliamentary initiatives and on signatures in support of popular petitions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IMP or imp</td>
<td>Implementation or no implementation of offices for gender equality (OGE)</td>
<td>Cantons that implemented an OGE in 1995 or later or did not implement OGE at all</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RET or ret</td>
<td>Offices for Gender Equality retrenched or not retrenched</td>
<td>Cantons that abolished, privatized, reorganized, or financially restrained the OGE or cantons without these restrictions</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* According to QCA conventions, the existence of a factor is designated by upper casing, whereas its absence is designated by lower casing.
Results

The results are presented in two steps. First, we present the analysis for the implementation of the OGE. In order to enable a comparison, we also provide the analysis of the non-implementation of OGE. Second, we present the results of analyses of the retrenchment and the non-retrenchment of the OGEs. For both steps, we first discuss the underlying empirical model and its quality. The model's quality is defined by three indicators: 1. the existence of combinations of factors explaining the outcome and indirect factors (solution formulas) leading to the outcome, and the parameters of fitness, 2. the consistency score, and 3. the coverage score. Then we provide our results from both steps of our hypothesis testing.

Implementation (IMP) of OGEs in 1995

The CNA for the implementation of OGE (Table 2) found combinations of factors directly explaining the outcome IMP as well as indirectly through the strength of the women's rights movement, as measured by three factors (WPO, WAA, and WIN). With consistency scores of the solutions between 0.75 and 1.0, the minimum requirements were satisfied. The coverage scores were also good, which indicates that the model includes the most relevant causal factors.

Table 2. Results: Implementation of OGEs in 1995

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Complex Solution Formulas (csf)</th>
<th>Out</th>
<th>Con</th>
<th>Cov</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>S1: WAA + per + POL ↔ WPO</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.94</td>
<td>1.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S2: WIN<em>WPO</em>per + WPO*PER ↔ WAA</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.75</td>
<td>1.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S3: WAA<em>per + wpo</em>per + lat<em>POL + PER</em>POL ↔ WIN</td>
<td></td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>0.91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S4: WIN*wpo + WAA + LAT + POL ↔ IMP</td>
<td></td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>0.93</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: OGE implementation (out: IMP) is conditional on four equifinal paths (see row S4): First, it is influenced by two gender equality-favorable contexts, featuring high acceptance rates of gender equality-related issues (POL) and the Italian or French language culture (LAT). Moreover, it is influenced by the women's rights movement expressed by either aggressive action (WAA) or a major intersection between the movement and the state (WIN*wpo). The influence of the intersection is connected to the absence of political potential (pol). The solution formula for OGE implementation reached a perfect consistency score (Con) of 1.0, which means that all cantons with the described path implemented an OGE. The coverage score (Cov) is acceptably high (0.93), but it also points to the fact that our solution formula was not valid in all cantons that implemented an OGE.

The CNA for the non-implementation of OGE (imp) (Table 3) also shows acceptable coverage and consistency scores for both the outcome imp and the
weakness of the women’s rights movement (win, wpo, waa). The scores ranged between 0.8 and 1.0 and, hence, were slightly better and more balanced than those of the analysis of the implementation (IMP). The consistency and coverage scores of the model for the implementation (IMP) and the non-implementation (imp) confirm the quality of the models.6

**Table 3. Results: Non-implementation of OGEs in 1995**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Complex Solution Formulas (csf)</th>
<th>Out</th>
<th>Con</th>
<th>Cov</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>S1: win<em>waa</em>PER ↔ wpo</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>0.91</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S2: win*per + wpo ↔ waa</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>0.82</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S3: LAT<em>waa</em>per + PER*pol ↔ win</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>0.87</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S4: lat<em>win</em>waa + WIN<em>waa</em>WPO*pol ↔ imp</td>
<td>0.92</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Hypothesis 1:** The implementation of the OGE is a result of the change of the balance of power in favor of the women’s rights movement.

The results presented in Table 2 (see row S4) show that four different paths were found that could explain the implementation of OGEs (IMP). Two of them point to the influence of contexts that are favorable to gender equality, namely, high regional acceptance rates of gender equality issues (POL) and an Italian- or French-speaking language culture (LAT). The other paths related the outcome to the strength of the women’s rights movement, that is, the movement’s aggressive courses of action (WAA) and the large intersection between the state and the movement (WIN*wpo). The influence of WIN was connected to the absence of a political potential of the women’s rights movement (wpo). It seems that political potential is not necessary for the impact of the intersection.7

These results are in line with Hypothesis 1. There is an impact of the women’s rights movement on the implementation of OGEs. Based on our analyses, we can state that it was the aggressive course of action of the movement (WAA) that exerted an influence on the implementation of OGEs. It was an influencing factor in three out of five cantons, and the single influencing factor in one out of...
five cantons (Berne, St. Gallen, and Luzern). In two out of five cases, it appeared together with other contextual conditions.\textsuperscript{8}

The second path explaining the influence of the women's right movement was of minor relevance: Only the results for the canton of Argovia (Aargau) showed that the implementation of an OGE was a result of a big intersection of the movement and the state. There was no direct impact of the third factor, the political potential of the movement (WPO). No path was found leading to the implementation of OGE including WPO.

\textit{Hypothesis 3: The influence of the women's rights movement exists mostly in contexts with an affinity to gender equality}

The results of our analyses do not contradict the third hypothesis. A high regional acceptance rate of gender equality issues (POL) as well as a French- or Italian-speaking language culture (LAT) constitutes a good precondition for the implementation of OGEs (IMP). In most cantons, the conditions mentioned above existed in parallel with an \textit{aggressive} course of action in the women’s rights movement. In a few cantons, (e.g., Basel-Landschaft or Valais), POL and LAT were sufficient conditions for IMP. We did not expect this result, because our theoretical model assumed that contextual conditions would always influence the outcome through the balance of power.

Contextual conditions work not only on the implementation of OGE but also on the factors accounting for the strength of the women’s rights movement. Paths leading to a big intersection between the state and the movement (WIN) (see row S3 of Table 2), a high political potential of the movement (WPO) (see row S1 of Table 2), or an \textit{aggressive} course of action (WAA) (see row S2 of Table 2) are primarily instantiated in central contexts (per) or in contexts with a high regional acceptance rate of gender equality issues (POL). These paths show the expected causal chains leading from the contexts via the impact of the women’s rights movement on the balance of power to the implementation of OGE.

Contrary to Hypothesis 3, these chains were found to exist within contexts advocating gender equality (per, POL, LAT) as well as in those marked by adversity to gender equality (PER). Thus, strong political potential may lead to an \textit{aggressive} course of action of the women’s rights movement within a peripheral context (WPO*PER) (see row S2 of Table 2). This was true for the cantons Luzern, Fribourg, and St. Gallen. In St. Gallen and Luzern, the movement’s \textit{aggressive} course of action was the decisive factor for the implementation of OGEs. A different constellation emerged for the cantons Fribourg and Jura. In these cantons, the high regional acceptance rates of gender equality issues (PER*POL) led to the large intersection between the women’s rights movement and the state (WIN) (see row S3 of Table 2).

\textsuperscript{8} Technically speaking, the implementation of the OGE is overdetermined. Each of the factors alone would have been sufficient for the implementation.
Non-implementation (imp) of OGEs in 1995
The CNA for the analysis of the non-implementation of OGE (imp) also revealed an interplay between contextual conditions and a weak women’s rights movement (Table 3). The results do not contradict Hypotheses 1 and 3. A comparatively large and closed group of ten cantons located in eastern and central Switzerland did not implement OGEs. These cantons are exclusively German-speaking (lat), and they exhibited a low regional acceptance rate of gender equality issues (pol) (see row S4 of Table 3). Under circumstances like these, the women’s rights movement could only rarely gain ground, as was the case in the above-mentioned cantons of Luzern and St. Gallen. There, political potential and the preconditions for aggressive courses of action of the movement were lacking. An intersection could not be established between the state and the movement. In Luzern and St. Gallen, an intersection has still not been established, which points to the importance of aggressive courses of action in those contexts.⁹

In summary, contextual and movement specific factors had an impact on the implementation or non-implementation of OGEs. Cantons having a high regional acceptance rate of gender equality issues, a French- or Italian-speaking language culture, and/or a strong women’s rights movement showing aggressive courses of action facilitated the implementation of OGEs. Aggressive courses of action were especially important where there were difficult structural circumstances for the OGEs. In some cantons, despite a weak women’s rights movement, the contextual circumstances in favor of implementing an OGE led to the latter being implemented. In those cases, factors that were not integrated in our model (e.g., the influence of the media or neighboring cantons) may have had an impact.

Retrenchment (RET) of OGEs in 2007
The CNA for the retrenchment of OGEs revealed combinations of factors that directly explained the outcome OGE retrenchment (RET). As well, the CNA indirectly explained the outcomes via two out of three factors for the strength of the countermovements (CPO, CAA) (Table 4). However, the solution formula for the strong backing of the women’s rights movement within the political bodies and the administration (CIN) was only weakly supported (see row S3 of Table 4). Although the required consistency score was reached, the coverage score of 0.6 was not sufficient. Thus, the quality of the empirical model for the retrenchment of OGE was worse than that for the implementation of OGE.¹⁰

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⁹ As is the case for the implementation of OGEs in parts of the cantons favoring gender equality, the non-implementation of OGEs is overdetermined in the cantons described above.

¹⁰ As was the case for the implementation of OGEs, we were unable to find unambiguous solutions for every factor. For CAA, the CNA revealed two solution formulas that fared equally
Table 4. Results: Retrenchment of OGEs in 2007

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Complex Solution Formulas(csf)</th>
<th>Out</th>
<th>Con</th>
<th>Cov</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>S1: pol</td>
<td>← CPO</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>1.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S2: cin<em>LAT</em>per + pol<em>per + CIN</em>lat*POL</td>
<td>← CAA</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>0.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S3: cww<em>LAT</em>per + CAA<em>lat</em>per</td>
<td>← CIN</td>
<td>0.83</td>
<td>0.63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S4: CIN<em>caa + lat</em>per + LAT*pol</td>
<td>← RET</td>
<td>0.90</td>
<td>0.82</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The weaknesses of the solution formulas were even more prominent in the case of the control test for the non-retrenchment of OGEs (Table 5). Here, we could only find a solution formula for the lack of an aggressive course of action of the countermovements. All other results were either redundant (see row S1 of Table 5) or failed to attain sufficient coverage scores (see row S3 and S4 of Table 5). The control test for the non-retrenchment of OGEs pointed to the weaknesses of our theoretical model of the analysis of the countermovements. The low coverage scores suggested that we may have failed to incorporate important factors related to the retrenchment of OGEs.

Table 5. Results: Non-retrenchment of OGEs in 2007

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Complex Solution Formulas (csf)</th>
<th>Out</th>
<th>Con</th>
<th>Cov</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>S1: POL</td>
<td>← cpo</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>1.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S2: LAT<em>CIN + lat</em>cin*POL + PER</td>
<td>← caa</td>
<td>0.82</td>
<td>1.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S3: LAT<em>CAA + lat</em>caa<em>POL + LAT</em>PER</td>
<td>← cin</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>0.64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S4: lat<em>cin</em>PER + CAA*PER</td>
<td>← ret</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>0.50</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The results for the analysis of the retrenchment of the OGE were not as robust as those for the implementation of OGEs. Nevertheless, because the consistency and coverage values were sufficient, we could interpret the solution formulas for the outcome RET (see row S4 of Table 4) and the factors political potential (CPO) (see row S1 of Table 4) and aggressive course of action (CAA) (see row S2 of Table 4). Therefore, we cautiously employed the solution formulas to test the hypotheses.

Hypothesis 5: The ‘new type of social movements’ has followed the same mechanisms as the movements of the 1970s and 1980s.

well with respect to the fit parameters consistency and coverage. For theoretical reasons, we selected one of the solutions.
We used our basic model for the women’s rights movement and the implementation of OGEs for the analyses of countermovements and the retrenchment of OGEs. Thus, we were able to test Hypothesis 5, which postulates that our model is valid for both kinds of movements. Compared to the results for the women’s rights movement, our theoretical model was found to be less valid for the countermovements. We therefore rejected Hypothesis 5.

This finding supports Hutter’s and Kriesi’s (2013) idea that we were dealing with a new type of movement. As such, our basic model explaining the women’s rights movement of the 1980s and 1990s does not seem to be suitable for describing these new types of movements.

**Hypothesis 2: The retrenchment of the OGE is a result of the change of the balance of power in favor of the countermovements**

The model for the retrenchment of the OGE featured three paths leading to retrenchment (RET) (see row S4 of Table 4). Two of them reflected the effects of contextual influence, and the third reflected the influence effects of countermovements on the balance of power. The latter showed that the large intersection between the countermovements and the state in combination with non-aggressive courses of action of the countermovements led to OGE retrenchment (CIN*caa). Other factors related to the strength of the countermovements did not exert a direct impact.

In light of our results, we can accept Hypothesis 2, which states that countermovements influence the balance of power and are thus linked to OGE retrenchment. However, the results of our analysis also showed that the influence of countermovements is different from that exerted by the women’s rights movement. Whereas the key aspect of the women’s rights movement was an aggressive course of action, the intersection with the state was the cardinal aspect for the countermovements. This finding is also in line with Hutter and Kriesi’s (2013) statement that the new type of movement uses the institutional arena more than the arena of protest. The path leading from the influence of a countermovement to OGE retrenchment via the institutional arena was only the second most important one. The influence of context was more important.

**Hypothesis 4: The influence of countermovements is to be found mostly within contexts that are adverse to gender equality.**

The solution formula for the retrenchment of OGEs showed two paths with contextual influences (see row S4 of Table 4). The combination of German-speaking regions in a nonperipheral context (lat*per) as well as French- and Italian-speaking regions with a low regional acceptance rate of gender equality issues (LAT*pol) led to OGE retrenchment. The first path was found to exist for the cantons Zürich, Bern, Zug, Basel, and Argovia (Aargau). The configuration of the second path was only evident in the canton of Valais (Wallis).
This result is surprising and contradicts Hypothesis 4, which stated that countermovements and the retrenchment of OGEs were more likely to be found in contexts adverse to gender equality. The only finding in line with this hypothesis is the low regional acceptance rate of gender equality issues in the canton of Valais. Other than that, the fact that the most important path of the retrenchment of the OGE was valid for non-peripheral cantons is clearly contradictory to our expectations.

Likewise, the finding of an indirect contextual influence of countermovements’ aggressive courses of action and the intersection between the movements and the state were surprising and contradictory to our expectations (see rows S2, S3 of table 4). It appears that the influence of the central (per) context is far greater than of the peripheral one (PER). Within those indirect paths to OGE retrenchment, we found both a low (pol) and a high regional acceptance of voting templates on gender equality issues (POL).

The results concerning the contextual influence on the strength of the countermovements and OGE retrenchment are clearly contradictory to hypothesis 4, stating that retrenchment of an OGE was more likely to occur in contexts adverse to gender equality than in those advocating gender equality. Since the analysis of OGE retrenchment was based only on cantons that had an OGE, these results cannot be explained by the non-existence of OGE within cantons marked by adversity to gender equality.

A key to understanding the results can be found in the analysis of the political potential of the countermovements (see row S1 of Table 4). Political potential (CPO) was neither part of the paths leading to the outcome OGE retrenchment, nor did it influence the strength of the countermovements. Political potential was a completely isolated factor in our analysis. It was perfectly determined by a low regional acceptance rate of gender equality issues (pol). There were neither causal connections between political potential and aggressive courses of action (see row S2 of Table 4), nor between potential and OGE retrenchment (see row S4 of Table 4). In other words, in contexts where countermovements had a strong political potential, aggressive courses of action were not pursued to retrench the OGE. On the contrary, OGEs were retrenched within contexts that were actually unfavorable for the countermovements. This is once more a clear sign that the development and effects of the countermovements followed a different course than that exhibited by the women’s rights movement.

Non-retrenchment (ret) of the OGE in 2007

The cross-check test for OGE non-retrenchment (Table 5) generated partly acceptable consistency and coverage scores, thus supporting the results described above. On the one hand, there was a connection between a context favoring gender equality and low political potential of the countermovements (see row S1 of Table 5). On the other hand, countermovements aggressive courses of action did exist in contexts adverse to and in favor of gender equality (see row S2 of Table 5).
Conclusion

The starting point of our research was the hypothesis that social change is driven by conflicts between social movements and their countermovements. The political balance of power is influenced by those conflicts, leading to political changes within certain contextual circumstances. Here we tested this hypothesis by analyzing the roles of the women’s rights movement and its countermovements, using the example of the conflicts about the implementation of Offices for Gender Equality (OGE) in Switzerland.

We found that movements and countermovements struggled with each other, responding as strategic-relational actors to their contexts. By influencing the balance of power, they were responsible for the implementation or retrenchment of an OGE. More specifically, we found that the implementation of an OGE was spurred on by actions of the women’s rights movement or by favorable contextual circumstances. The women’s rights movement was especially important in those contexts where the circumstances were rather adverse to gender equality. Thus, OGE retrenchment and implementation was influenced by the context and the movements.

Our basic assumption was linked to the question of whether we could find a new type of movement emerging within the conflict about OGEs. The results clearly showed that these movements existed. First, the results of our analysis showed that the basic theoretical model more adequately explained the influence of the women’s rights movement on OGE implementation than it explained the influence of the countermovements on OGE retrenchment. Secondly, we understand the countermovements to be part of national-conservative movements, sharing the political paradox of the political right. The question of gender equality is one of several questions within the national-conservative context. Countermovements often exploit taboo-breaking in order to create media resonance. This type of action is often exhibited by populist movements dominating national-conservative cycles of movements (Decker 2006; Kemper 2011; Ociepka 2005; Priester 2012).

The women’s rights movement and its countermovements have differed widely from one another not only in terms of their respective aims but with respect to the approaches they take and the strategies they have used. In our analysis, it appears that the aim of the countermovements was obviously not to achieve political aims by using a high political potential. If that had been the case, OGEs would have been retrenched in cantons where those movements had a high political potential. The fact that OGE retrenchment took place exactly where this precondition was not satisfied suggests that the countermovements adopted political strategies that differed from those used by the women’s rights movement.

For the countermovements, success in achieving political goals did not appear to be as decisively important as attracting and driving public attention by intentionally breaking a taboo within unfavorable political circumstances for the
countermovement. A countermovement’s aim may be, to achieve electoral success; alternatively, it may be to advocate and gain support for a counterhegemonic project. Especially in contexts where gender equality is advocated and supported, countermovements’ aggressive courses of action may be provocative enough to attract the media’s attention, which is an important aspect of the strategy implemented by these movements. If the countermovements want to advance a counterhegemonic project, they must begin to be active in areas where the women’s rights movement has reached a dominant-hegemonic position. The bundling of power within the contexts adverse to gender equality is left to the media.

Our findings showed that the women’s rights movement, as typified in the 1970s and 1980s, and the countermovements, belonging to a new type of movement described by Kriesi (1996), followed a different pattern. The latter are situated on the right side of the political spectrum; they prefer to operate in institutionalized political arenas and apply methods typical for populist movements, for example, breaking taboos (Meyer 2002; 2003; Schröder and Mildenberger 2012).

The results indicated that a suitable explanation model for the countermovements needs to integrate other factors not incorporated into our basic model. A possible improvement of the theoretical model of OGE retrenchment would be to include, in addition to the context and the strength of the countermovements, fiscal policy indicators and the role of the media.

Our findings have several strategic implications for understanding social movements resulting. First, a social movement cannot solely rely on lobbying within state institutions. In our case, the major changes in the political balance of power leading to the implementation of an OGE were related to a women’s rights movement taking aggressive courses of action outside the state institutions. An institutionally anchored state feminism depends on a non-institutionalized women’s rights movement to undertake aggressive actions. This is exactly how the need for a new boost in the women’s rights question mentioned at the beginning of this article should be understood.

Second, the women’s rights movement must deal with a loosely organized and decentralized countermovement as well as political powers that embrace a new political logic that is in line with a new cycle of movements. We think that the standstill in the progress of achieving gender equality can be better explained by the national-conservative cycle of protest than by the countermovements’ attacks on the OGE. At the time of this writing, the topic of gender politics is not – with a few exemptions – at the top of the agenda of the movements dominating the actual cycle. However, it is warranted to assume that the question of gender equality will become more salient if countermovements continue to gain political influence. The activities of anti-feminist fractions of these movements have demonstrated what may happen if the national-conservative movements focus more intensely on the question of gender equality. The retrenchment of OGEs will not only create attention but it will also test the ceasefire lines previously acknowledged by the women’s rights
movement and the countermovements. Instead of assigning state feminism the responsibility to protect and uphold the accomplishments made in realm of gender equality, it should be explicitly commissioned with the task of developing and implementing policy that will push gender equality forward. This would curtail stagnation in the efforts to promote gender equality as well as prevent setbacks to progress that has already been achieved.
Methodological Appendix

As mentioned in the article, we used the Coincidence Analysis (CNA), a new method related to the Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA). The advantage of using the CNA is that it permits an analysis of causal chains. Because CNA is a rather new method, in this appendix we describe the method in more detail and explain how different factors were operationalized and which data and resources were used.

The QCA eliminates redundant elements from solution formulas (i.e., causal models) on the basis of the so-called “Quine-McCluskey optimization” (Quine 1959). This optimization algorithm was developed for the purpose of simplifying the syntactic expression of Boolean functions as required by, for instance, mathematical logic or electric circuit theory. It was not developed for causal data analysis (Baumgartner 2014). In contrast, CNA implements an optimization algorithm that has been tailored for the causal analysis of configurational data. The difference between the two methods has far-reaching consequences for the maximal complexity of the causal structures that can be revealed\(^{11}\).

Operationalization and data

In our study, the choice of data was bound to our specified research models. Because we had a limited number of cases (26 cantons), we selected six conditions and one outcome. Three conditions concerned the context; we assumed that the conditions in these contexts remained stable during the period from 1995 to 2007. The other conditions measured the power of the women’s rights movement and the power of the countermovements, respectively.

Conditions of context

A first contextual condition was measured by the regional (cantonal) acceptance rates of gender equality issues as assessed by corresponding referenda in Switzerland (POL or pol) (Hermann 2006), a measure also used in a gender equality atlas for Switzerland (Bühler, Brun, and Steinmann 2001). This indicator was based on the results from cantonal referenda spanning 50 years (from 1959 to 2004). Based on the handbook of Swiss confederation popular votes (Linder, Bolliger, and Riele 2010), we used an analysis of results of the referenda on gender equality, women’s right to physical integrity, retirement age for women, and maternity insurance (Epple 2012b). The analysis revealed that the aggregate positions of the cantons concerning gender equality had not changed very much compared to the Swiss average over 50 years. However, it also revealed that popular opinions in the cantons differed with respect to

\(^{11}\) For a detailed description of the methodological and procedural details of the CNA see (Baumgartner 2009a, 2009b, 2013).
whether gender equality or social policy issues were to be voted on. Differences emerged, for example, between the language regions of Switzerland and between more rural and more urban cantons. For our purposes, we used an index that combined the scales of gender equality and social policy votes (Epple 2012b).12

The second contextual condition corresponded to an index measuring the degree of periphery or centrality of a context. The index was based on the contrasts between rural and urban regions as well as confessional contrasts (PER or per) (Bolliger 2007). The contrast between rural and urban regions was drawn on the basis of the extent of urbanization prevailing in 2006 (Meili, Diener, Herzog, de Meuron, and Schmid 2006). The proportions of Catholics and of people working in agriculture and forestry contributed a historical dimension or path dependency to the index (Mahoney and Schensul 2006; Tilly 2006). The peripheral, predominantly Catholic and agricultural cantons were opposed to the predominantly Protestant, industrial, and urban cantons of the center (Wecker 2014). Our index measured a peripheral social structure which was dominated by a milieu dominated by Catholic and rural traditions. According to Seitz (2014), the Catholic tradition has been replaced by a national-conservative one. This replacement should not be misunderstood as a weakening of the impact of Catholic or rural traditions; the impact e.g., within the voting of rural and urban cantons can still be found.

The differentiation between more rural and more urban contexts seems to be a plausible one. Our center vs. periphery distinction is compatible with that described by Hermann Heye, and Leuthold 2005, although it was created differently. According to our index, the German-speaking cantons of the eastern and central regions of Switzerland are peripheral and voting behaviors in these regions share commonalities. According to our index, the French-speaking cantons Fribourg, Valais, and Jura are also peripheral. However, due to the diverse political cultures existing within the different language cultures of Switzerland, the voting behaviors in French-speaking cantons do not always match those in German-speaking cantons. Nevertheless, because of their position within the French-speaking part of Switzerland, they nevertheless can be interpreted as periphery: Fribourg and Valais are rural, Catholic cantons, have big German-speaking minorities and border on German-speaking Switzerland. The canton of Jura has a history of being periphery, as it was a part of the majoritarian German-speaking canton of Bern for a long time (Schwander 1971).

The third contextual condition measured the affiliation of a canton to a language culture (LAT or lat)13 (Gal 2006). It is a well-known phenomenon in gender studies and political science that the opinion on gender equality in the French-

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12 This and all other indexes were tested for reliability (Cronbach’s alpha), using the average of z-standardized values.

13 We decided to add the bilingual cantons of Fribourg and Valais (Wallis) as well as the Italian-speaking canton Ticino (Tessin) to the French-speaking part of Switzerland.
speaking part of Switzerland differs very much from the one in the German-speaking part (Bühler et al. 2001; Kriesi 1996b; Seitz 2014). The three contextual conditions presented so far had a different impact on the women’s rights movement and its countermovements.

Hermann et al. (2005) have pointed out that differentiations on the cantonal level, like the ones we created with the contextual conditions, should not be strict. Because the conflict about OGEs took place at a cantonal level, we had to analyze the contexts on that level. We were aware of the restrictions connected to that choice and took this into account in interpreting the results of our analysis.

**Strength of movements**

The strength of the women’s rights movement and the countermovements were measured by their political potential, the intersection between the movements and the state, and their courses of action. The concept of intersection is based on the concept of state feminism, as developed by Banaszak (2010). Her research on the women’s rights movement in the US showed the importance of the intersection between women inside and outside of political organizations and formal administrative institutions. We assumed that such an intersection would exist for the countermovements as well.

The political potentials of the women’s rights movement and the countermovements were measured by an index on support or decline of gender equality within the female and male electorate (WPO/wpo and CPO/cpo). For that reason, the Swiss Electoral Studies (SELECTS) data sets for the national elections from 1995 and 2007 were used to calculate the proportions of men and women who supported issues that are more traditionalist or modernist, respectively. We assumed that the positions of persons on issues related to topics about issues such as equal opportunities for foreigners and Swiss nationals, the preservation of traditions, the Swiss army, and law and order could be used as an indicator for their position concerning gender equality (Epple 2013; Longchamp, Imfeld, Tschöpe, Müller, Rochat, and Schwab 2015).

The strength of the intersection between the state and the women’s rights movement and its countermovements was measured by an index estimating the combined amount of allied parliamentarians and employees of the cantonal administration (WIN/win and CIN/cin). We used information and data generated from the Swiss federal establishment census (1995, 2007) as well as data on the seating of the cantonal parliaments (1995, 2007). The index included the number of women occupying seats of political parties demonstrating an affinity to gender equality (the Green Party and the Social Democratic Party) or the number of seats of men occupying gender equality adverse parties (national-conservative parties). In cases where data on cantonal election results were lacking, we used the federal election results. In the case of Appenzell-Innerrhoden, we needed to estimate the numbers due to a lack of both data sets. The index also took into account the aforementioned political
potential, which was based on an estimation of the relative proportions of male and female employees of the cantonal administrations.

The index on the intersection between the state and the movements is a proxy variable. We include the toeholds of the movements within the parliaments and the cantonal administrations. In the case of the women’s rights movement, the index includes factors used by the literature on state feminism, like proximity to the political left or to the OGE (Mazur and McBride 2006). Our index builds on a wider perspective which assumes that the intersection between the state and the movements is not only based on parliamentarians and the policy machinery for the advancement of women (McBride and Mazur 1995) but also on supporters within cantonal administrations. We estimated the strength of the support within the cantonal administrations. The estimation assumed that a movement’s political potential was also represented within the administration. In the case of the analysis of OGE implementation, we expected that this measure would slightly overestimate the political potential of the women’s right movement and slightly underestimate the political potential of the countermovements.

The estimation of the political potential and the intersection equalized gender and attitudes towards gender equality. We were fully aware of the fact that this was a rough indicator, and, as such, that it might not acknowledge the populations of male voters who advocated gender equality or female voters who did not advocate gender equality. In order to rectify this bias, we decided to include only those voters who had expressed strong attitudes toward gender equality. Only voters who answered all questions with “yes” or “no”, respectively, are included. We therefore measured the amount of people on both ends of the political spectrum. We assumed that this measurement would be appropriate for estimating the relative strength of a movement within a canton. Between the two extremes, there were many different constellations of gender and positions about gender equality. We therefore hoped to follow the zone guidelines of Goertz and Mazur as much as possible (Goertz and Mazur 2008).

The aggressive actions of the women’s rights movement and of the countermovements (WAA/waa and CAA/caa) were estimated by their activities and parliamentary initiatives. In the case of the women’s rights movement, we drew from data on activist and activation events (Giugni 1999; Kriesi, Levy, Ganguillet, and Zwicky 1981). For the countermovements, we drew from the data summarized by Scheidegger (2008) and Seitz (2010). Moreover, we considered the number of collected signatures in support of certain popular petitions as an indicator of action (Institute of Political Science at the University of Bern 2011). For methodological reasons, we were unable to take activation events of the countermovements into account.14

14 Although we had data on the countermovements’ activation events (Giugni 1999; Hutter and Giugni 2009), the activation events pertaining to gender equality were very rare. Moreover, the methods of data collection changed over time. In particular, important information about the
The three indicators above measured the respective abilities of the women’s rights movement and of the countermovements to influence the balance of power. If a movement was able to rely on all three measures, the influence was substantial. This would be the case, for example, if the countermovements had a high political potential within the electorate (CPO), relied on a strong backing within the political bodies and the administration (CIN), and took aggressive action (CAA). The influence of the women’s rights movement would be low if there was a lack of political potential (wpo), a weak backing within political bodies and the administration (win), and no aggressive action (waa). Combinations of factors indicated intermediate strength.

All indicators concerning the movements were taken from measurements at two points in time (1995 and 2007). We interpreted the year 1995 as being the turning point between OGE implementation and OGE retrenchment. The year 2007 was also a turning point, as has been borne out in research on state feminism (Kantola and Outshoorn 2007). 1995 followed the peak of the women’s rights movement in Switzerland, the culmination of which was marked by the women’s strike of June 14th 1991 (Schulz, Schmitter and Kiani 2014: 219). Therefore, the strength of the women’s rights movement was measured rather conservatively. The cycles of protest in the 1970s and 1980s had already waned. The women’s rights movement still did comparatively well (Hutter and Giugni 2009). Measuring the strength of the countermovements in 2007 tended to generate underestimates of strength because the cycle of protest of the countermovements had not reached a zenith by 2007 (Hutter 2012, 2012b; Hutter and Kriesi 2013).

Outcomes

Our analysis was based on two outcomes:

1. The model for 1995 explained the implementation of OGEs. The outcome implementation OGE (IMP) was true for all cantons having an OGE in 1995. All cantons that implemented OGE later or not at all lacked this outcome (imp) (Scheidegger 2008).

2. The model for 2007 explained the retrenchment of OGEs. The outcome OGE retrenchment (RET) was true for all cantons that abolished, privatized, reorganized, or financially restrained the OGE. Cantons without those restrictions lacked this outcome (ret) (Seitz 2010).

Dichotomization

When we conducted our analysis, the CNA had thus far been constrained to analyzing dichotomized data. Therefore, the data needed to be dichotomized, locations of countermovements’ activation events was not reliable (as verified by Swen Hutter, personal communication, April 25, 2013; see also Barranco and Wisler 1999).
which obviously resulted in a loss of information.\textsuperscript{15} With the exception of POL, IMP, and RET, whose values were determined qualitatively, all factors were dichotomized by using the weighted Swiss mean. This procedure was adequate because the cantonal as well as the national level had influenced the implementation or the retrenchment of OGEs (Baumgartner and Epple 2014). Because the constitutional mandate of gender equality was mandatory for all cantons, the reasons for the differences between the cantons had to be explained by the deviations of the cantons from the national context. Therefore, we measured the deviation of the cantons from the national mean. Our goal was to find local explanations as defined by Amenta and Poulsen (1994).

A dichotomization based on the national mean was in danger of arbitrarily separating cantons which deviated only slightly from one another, simply because they happened to be located on different sides of the national mean. Following the newer developments in QCA research, we double-checked for such arbitrary separations in our data. Whenever this occurred, we shifted the cutoff to the next bigger gap (Rihoux and De Meur 2009).

### Data processing

We conducted our CNA using the open source software R (Ambuehl et al 2015). In light of our theoretical model and its specifications, we treated the context factors POL, PER, and LAT as exogenous factors within the analysis of IMP. The other factors were assembled in a set $S = \{WPO, WIN, WAA, IMP\}$ of endogenous factors or potential outcomes. Moreover, we presupposed a causal ordering according to which IMP could not be a cause of WPO, WIN, and WAA (Baumgartner and Thiem 2015a). Our data did not allow for modeling any of the factors in $S$ with perfect coverage or consistency scores. For that reason, we searched for solution formulas with the maximal coverage and consistency scores afforded by the data (i.e., for optimal solution formulas). To this end, we successively lowered the threshold scores for consistency and coverage until CNA delivered solutions – making sure that the consistency score never fell below 0.75. In this manner, we found Boolean solution formulas with the highest possible consistency and coverage scores for every element of $S$.

The causal modeling of configurational data is not always unambiguous, and often there is more than one model with identical consistency and coverage scores for a given data set (Baumgartner and Thiem 2015b). Unfortunately though, QCA research has not addressed the issue of model ambiguities. Instead, authors using QCA typically select a model featuring a minimal amount of alternative causes that best fits their theoretical expectations. In case of our data, we also encountered model ambiguities, which are made transparent within the analyses. In the main test, we only presented those models that came closest to our theoretical expectations or were preferable for pragmatic reasons.

\textsuperscript{15} Although the CNA is comparable with a QCA crisp set analysis, a fuzzy set CNA is not yet available.
For the calculation of the empirical model of OGE retrenchment, we proceeded in the same manner.

Following the usual practice of QCA research, in particular including the so-called negation guideline of Goertz and Mazur (2008), we performed an additional CNA for the outcomes of non-implementation and the non-retrenchment of OGEs (Rihoux and De Meur 2009).

These analyses of the negative outcomes were based on a theoretical model that resulted from the model for the positive outcomes provided in Figure 2 (see article) after negating the ultimate outcomes and all factors that appeared as intermediate links in causal chains leading to the positive outcomes. The generation of models for negative outcomes allowed for conclusions on dependencies between the factors under scrutiny that could not be drawn from the models for the positive outcomes alone.

Table 6: Truth Table Implementation 1995

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Zürich, Basel-Stadt
Bern
Luzern, St. Gallen
Uri, Schwyz, Obwalden, Nidwalden, Glarus, Appenzell Inner- and Ausserrhoden, Graubünden, Thurgau
Zug
Freiburg
Solothurn
Basel-Landschaft
Schaffhausen
Aargau
Tessin
Waadt, Neuenburg, Genf
Wallis
Jura
Table 7: Truth Table Retrenchment 2007

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**About the authors**

Ruedi Epple is a lecturer in social sciences at the Division of Sociology, Social Policy and Social Work of the University of Fribourg, Switzerland. He obtained his Ph.D (1987) at the University of Frankfurt, Germany. His main research interests include the political system of Switzerland, social movements, and social work history.