Protest and public relations: The reinvention of the US Army School of the Americas

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Abstract

While much knowledge has been generated on how social movements framing strategies affect mobilization, we know much less about how targeted institutions utilize those movement strategies for institutional regeneration. In this study, I have traced archived documentation of the former U.S. Army School of the Americas’ response to movement to close down the institution’s foreign military training in Latin America. I examine the development of how movement claims shaped institutional strategy and I outline the SOA’s stages of closure and reopening of a new, more public affairs-savvy institution. I explore the strengths and limitations of framing and counterframing strategies and provide some suggestions for movement strategists.

Protest and public relations: the reinvention of the US Army School of the Americas

Each November, thousands of protesters gather outside the gates of the US military base at Ft. Benning, Georgia. They protest a foreign military training institute housed within, formerly known as the US Army School of the Americas. This institution, now known as the Western hemisphere Institute for Security and Cooperation (hereafter WHINSEC), is charged by protesters to carry on a legacy of neo-imperialist diplomacy through the US funded foreign military training of Latin American high-ranking officers. While the current institute claims to be a military leader in human rights instruction, the former School of the Americas was closed on contentious ground, of which the movement to close the School of the Americas was a leading force. WHINSEC, like the old SOA, retains a reputation for being a “School of Assassins” and teaching torture tactics through Cold War Psychological Operations courses. Here I discuss the closing of the former School of the Americas in response to the intensive critical framing of the movement to close the SOA. I explore both the successes and the unexpected twists and turns taken in the framing and counterframing battle between a social movement and its targeted institution.

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response to movement claims and outline their stages of closure and reopening in a new, more public affairs-savvy institution. I explore the strengths and limitations of framing and counterframing strategies and provide some suggestions for movement strategists.

The birth and death of the US Army School of the Americas

The US Army School of the Americas (USARSA) was a foreign military training institute created in 1946 in Fort Amador, Panama during the intense ideological conflict of the Cold War. Through US-subsidized Spanish language instruction, USARSA aimed to share US military skills and facilitate networking, diplomacy, and hemispheric military cooperation between the US and Latin American countries. The curriculum initially included counter-insurgency and civil engineering, and both US and Latin American students attended. In the 1950s and 1960s, the student body became overwhelmingly Latin American as the school discontinued the engineering classes to focus on military strategy and command courses geared toward US Army Jungle Operations addressing counter-communist and insurgency efforts in the region. And the school became a network for US-Latin American diplomacy with upper-level Latin American officers who could claim graduation from the US Army’s premier Latin American institution acquiring regional prestige (a prestige that continued to grow with the school’s move to the US, see Gill 2004).

In 1984, following a treaty between the US and Panama mandating the administrative transfer of the then US-military base, Fort Gulick, to Panama, the school made what was meant to be a temporary move to Fort Benning, Georgia. The school assessed its options for a permanent location at this time and altered its mission based on the perceived growing threat of “neo-Guevarism” (Cuban-exported communism) throughout Latin America, adding technically focused courses to manage field operations. During its early years in the US, the school concentrated on building up the student body, expanding the faculty base, and making the case for increased funding to support these efforts. USARSA presented itself to the Department of Defense (DoD) as the US Army’s most valuable foreign military initiative in Latin America as the only institution to provide US military training in Spanish. The school’s administration argued that this approach opened economic and cultural access to Latin American diplomacy in ways not possible through other US Army institutions.

Despite its best efforts to gain legitimacy on the grounds of professional excellence, the USARSA earned a negative reputation at the launch of the longest-running protest movement against US intervention in Latin America, the movement to close the School of the Americas. The movement, still in operation, first targeted the institution in 1987 after links were made between the USARSA training and a 1980 El Salvadoran massacre of four US churchwomen. Multiple links between the school and other atrocities were uncovered by School of the Americas Watch (SOAWatch), an organization established to advance the movement’s claims and investigate crimes.
committed by USARSA graduates (see Hodge and Cooper 2005; Nepstad 2000). In 1989, a US congressional investigation began to scour the course materials for advocating methods of torture against insurgents. A decade of criticism against the school ensued. The School of the Americas formally closed on December 15, 2000, following the FY2001 defense authorization bill. This bill also created the Western Hemisphere Institute for Security and Cooperation (WHINSEC), which opened in the USARSA’s place in 2001.

WHINSEC currently trains military students from 11 different countries (sometimes including US and Canadian students) and operates on an $8.4 million budget. The organization’s website prominently displays its leadership in human rights and claims a commitment to transparent operations and democratic relations throughout the hemisphere. Colombia remains WHINSEC’s biggest client. The protest movement continues to uncover links between the legacy of training at the SOA and WHINSEC and human rights abuses such as those surrounding the Colombian drug war and other paramilitary operations in Latin America.

SOAWatch claims the establishment of WHINSEC is little more than a cosmetic makeover for the School of the Americas, informally dubbed the “School of the Assassins” (see Donnelly 2000, Pallmeyer 2001, SOAWatch 1998). The protest movement pursues a three-pronged strategy: lobbying Congress to close the school, lobbying Latin American nations to withdraw their students from its training program, and protesting annually at the institution’s gates on the November anniversary of the Jesuit massacre in El Salvador. The movement’s success includes Argentina, Costa Rica, Bolivia, Ecuador, Uruguay, and Venezuela withdrawing from the school, and tens of thousands protesting at the gates of the SOA/WHINSEC each year. The protest weekend is an annual vigil for human rights activists and something of a combined movements pilgrimage and networking conference. It incorporates a rally with often high-profile speakers and artists and a street market, a solemn vigil “funeral” march, and a weekend-long series of workshops to mobilize around global human rights issues. The SOAWatch agenda and mounting claims against WHINSEC can be reviewed on its website (http://www.soaw.org/; see also McCoy 2005).

Red carpet to reinvention

My first visit to WHINSEC was intended as a straightforward, contact-making visit. I planned to conduct fieldwork on the contentious interaction between the movement and this target of the then-30-year crusade to close the US Army foreign military training school. The movement has invested judicious effort into empirically proving the links between the school’s instruction and torture tactics used by its graduates against countless Latin Americans from the 1970s to today. I was interested in studying the process of framing and counterframing between the two opponents, and each organization’s argument development in reaction to the accusations and position of the other.
What I thought would be a “meet-and-greet” session to make the institute more amenable to the idea of me studying these interactions, however, turned into a red carpet reception—the entire leadership rearranged their schedules to accommodate my visit. With only a day’s notice, the public affairs officer had scheduled me for a full-day tour and in-depth, one-on-one meetings with the institute’s leaders, instructors, and administrators. I met with the instructors of human rights and democracy, international law, theology and “just war theory,” a former graduate and institute archivist, the institute’s captain and director, the director of curricula, and I had several debriefing meetings with the public affairs officer throughout the day. For me, this was “serendipitous” data collection about the institute’s interest in making a good impression. I certainly had not expected my first stop at the institute to be a whirlwind day conducting a full roster of high-profile interviews.

As I sat in my hotel room that night, I felt perplexed about what had just happened. Not only had my attempt to make introductory contact become six hours of formal interviews, but I was a first-year graduate student. Given my humble credentials, I had not expected that by merely appearing at this major military institution for a research paper, I would be treated as an honored foreign diplomat. Several weeks after my red-carpet reception, I was permitted to have an in-depth phone interview with a commanding field-instructor in Guatemala, where many of the confirmed atrocities occurred. Later I was also given a phone interview with the former director and commander of WHINSEC who had since moved onto another appointment at the Pentagon. Even given my novice perspective, it seemed too easy to gain access to the institution.

Another intriguing aspect of the visit was that each of the school’s representatives avidly insisted that WHINSEC was a completely different institution than the SOA, claiming the SOA’s legacy was unfairly attributed to WHINSEC. My objective—I plainly told them from the start—was not to study the legacy of torture or WHINSEC’s culpability in the many assassinations and massacres of which they had been accused. Instead, I wanted to study the discursive interaction between WHINSEC and the protest movement. More generally, I sought to understand how two political opponents respond to the other’s accusations and how this discourse shapes organizational identity and position relative to each other.

Understanding my purpose—different from that for which the officials were well-prepared—put them somewhat at ease as conversation moved away from the institution’s responsibility for the alleged atrocities. On the other hand, as the discussion focused on interactions between the two groups, it became clear that though the institute sought to portray an image of civility, diplomacy, transparency, and openness to dialogue, information on the transition between the USARSA and WHINSEC was not forthcoming. I was repeatedly told by everyone throughout the day that they could not discuss anything of the old School of the Americas; this was a new and entirely different institution. To gather information about the SOA, I was told that I must visit the National Security Archives which housed the former institution’s documents. In fact, this
was repeated to me by many of those who were former administrators of the SOA.

Through observation and interviews, I spent three years studying the discursive battle between the movement to close the SOA and the subsequent WHINSEC. At the end of this study, I published an article discussing how the dynamics of framing and counterframing and the packaging and counter-packaging of institutional identities and objectives work to restructure the moral boundaries of contention that so often define the outcome of any institution’s or movement’s public legitimacy (Gallo-Cruz 2012). What was unique about this particular interaction, I explained, was that the opponent’s strategy was not to directly counter the protesters’ claims. Rather, they worked to discursively agree with their opponents on a general level to position the targeted institution (themselves) within the boundaries of legitimacy that the protest movement had so skillfully defined. After analyzing the current dynamics of this oppositional discourse, I headed to the National Security Archives to determine whether I could find anything out about the former institution and its closing that would provide a new perspective on this discursive process.

In this article, I explore the events leading up to the closing of the School of the Americas. To generate a deeper understanding of the promises and pitfalls of discursive conflict, that part of social movements work that scholars refer to as framing and counterframing, I outline the three-stage institutional transformation of the US Army School of the Americas in response to the mounting social movement pressure which effectively shut down the old institution. I delineate these stages as: 1) Organizational anxiety—the institution’s realization of a disconnect between private and public classifications, 2) Organizational panic—the scramble for institutional legitimacy, and 3) Strategic institutional reinvention- the recreation of a new institution designed for political immunity against protesters’ claims. I review these stages in the institution’s history in response to mounting movement pressure, and I evaluate the strategic structure of the document entitled, “School of the Americas Reinvention Plan” (National Security Archives 1999). I explain how sociological research demonstrates—and the Reinvention Plan affirms—that organizations are deeply cultural beings following shifts in the broader culture in which they are embedded. I then explore the implications for movement strategists who may have to contend with institutional reinvention based on the themes scaffolding their claims against those institutions.

Building on prior research on the conflict between the movement to close the School of the Americas and WHINSEC which now stands in its place, this discussion generates several new insights about how that conflict came to its current stalemate First, I introduce in some detail the School of the Americas Reinvention Plan, a piece of empirical evidence previously undiscovered by the movement to close the School of the Americas. This plan explicitly outlines the institutional reinvention and counterframing strategy of the former SOA. Next, where framing scholars tend to focus on how framing shapes solidarity within the movement, I examine the effects of framing strategies on the targeted
institution’s counterframing. In turn, I consider how counterframing shapes mobilization through institutional reinvention, not discussed in movement scholarship. I refer and add to findings from my investigation of the current debate between protesters and WHINSEC to explain how the movement’s framing and the institution’s counterframing led to the development of WHINSEC as a politically reinvented USARSA. Finally, I explore the strategic implications of these findings on movement framing. I argue that the Reinvention of the School of the Americas demonstrates that, in the short run, protest framing strategists should consider the potential for a target institution’s use of general discursive agreement to have a negative impact on the movement’s progress. Movement strategists should develop concrete frames highlighting contradictions in the distinctions between commonly shared general values and distinctive policy interpretations. In the long run, movement strategists should envision the success of how their framing efforts work toward “cognitive liberation,” or the collective realization that the targeted behavior is unjust and should be changed through collective action (see McAdam, 2013), and the deeper ideological work that feeds into other forms of resistance and solidarity.

To learn about the SOA’s demise and its legacy in WHINSEC, I extensively researched the USARSA collection at the US National Security Archives. I began this inquiry with two rough claims, and a general, open-ended question in mind. First, there was WHINSEC’s argument that the old School of the Americas had been completely laid to rest. WHINSEC’s officials claimed it was a wholly new institution, with a new objective, curricula, and no formal links to the SOA, nullifying all allegations of the former school’s culpability. Then, there was SOAWatch’s claim that WHINSEC was nothing more than an organizational attempt to “WHISC” away the past (protesters coined this term in an early protest banner to play on the institution’s first acronym, “WHISC,” quickly prompting the institution to expand its acronym to WHINSEC). In addition to these contradictory claims, my broader analytical objective was to understand how both sides’ orientations to disparaging discourse may direct the outcome of conflict and structural changes undertaken by targeted institutions.

**Movement pressure and “organizational anxiety”**

In the organizational management world, the term “organizational anxiety” denotes the typically internal and conflictual collective sentiments that lead organizations to question their identity, organizational strategies, and future. This research aims to treat organizations as unique social actors, akin to individuals experiencing a psychological crisis. That is, where organizations face the possibility of ceasing to exist, they engage in struggles similar to those of individuals facing death. The literature provides steps for effectively addressing “threats” to organizational health and survival (Baruch and Lambert 2007).

A sociological understanding of organizational anxiety shares the view of the organization as a common social actor experiencing a crisis in identity, vision,
and—potentially—structure (DiMaggio and Powell 1983). Sociological institutional theories view organizations as deeply cultural creatures, however, for which threats to organizational stability are not rooted in rational, internal, assessments of “real problems”, but emerge from sociological shifts in organizational legitimacy (Powell and DiMaggio 1991). These internal shifts follow broader, social contextual shifts in which institutions are embedded. Thus, conceptualizations of organizational changes often refer to how an organization is cognitively positioned among a constellation of other social institutions and authorities (Clemens and Cook 1999).

A classic text in the cultural theory of institutions is Mary Douglas’ *How Institutions Think* (1986). Douglas develops this theoretical treatise on the institution as a cultural, social actor to outline the ritualistic ways in which institutions, including formal organizations like USARSA, owe their loyalties to sacred cultural systems in a larger sociological environment, like the ideal of American-exported democracy. Douglas outlines and explains some typological forms of institutional behavior. These include grounding in the social-cultural context in which an institution operates, social control of the institution’s behavior by both positive sanctions (socialization within that broader social context) and negative sanctions (threats to the institution by external authorities), how institutions form and reshape their identities in response to changing moral landscapes, and the analogies of “sacred” and “profane” on which they are founded and continuously recreated. All of these qualities could be found in USARSA’s paper trail in the National Security Archives.

In fact, USARSA was so fundamentally changed by the movement which came to redirect the sociological field in which it operated that reference to the unavailability of the infamous psychological “torture” manuals characterized the impact of the legacy of these manuals in shaping reinvention. I was repeatedly told by officials of the new school that if I did go to the National Security Archives, I would not view the manuals that sealed the symbolic delegitimation of its training; they were classified. When I finally arrived at the Archives, I was given a series of bright yellow notices indicating that I would not have access to these manuals, and several of the archival clerks reminded me that they were unavailable. I took note of these cautions, sociologically interesting to me because I was there to look for the institution’s movement-driven “cognitive changes” including how its identity responded to the social movement. The eradication-of-the-torture-manual badge certainly seemed to be one of these changes.

In my opinion, both congressional and activist researchers did an effective job of judging these psychological operation manuals to be inappropriate for foreign military training. I was impressed, however, by how formative the legacy of this tarnished reputation had been in redefining the institution. First, I found a clear break from institutional business-as-usual to a heightened sense of anxiety over the threat of institutional death just when movement frames gained widespread resonance, sparking US public concern and outrage. Until the early 1990s, the school’s organizational history was routine. Beyond the mundane, everyday
details of the financial operations, curricular materials, networking notes, and records of graduations, ceremonies, organizational milestones, etc., the school’s biggest concern in its early US years was for additional funding (not because it was struggling but because of a desire to expand). The only conflict I could find was the case of a secretary purportedly dismissed for damaging a typewriter. The institution was in its growth phase (and Douglas argues that in early institutionalization, survival means growth).

While USARSA’s earliest opposition began soon after its opening in Panama in the 1950s, conflicts in its external environment did not affect the school’s identity or mission (on the inside) for several decades. Its early organizational histories detail the suspicious reception on the part of the Latin American left as coming from “communists, leftists, and nationalists who view[ed] it as an imperialistic ‘Yankee Beachhead’ in Latin America” (Ormsbee Jr. 1984). This early account notes that Panamanian newspapers accused the school of serving as a training ground for dictators and characterized it as an “academy of torture” (Ormsbee Jr. 1984). Critics targeted an early course that was explicitly designed to derail communist mobilization. Even newswires in the USSR condemned the school’s attack on communist mobilization. All that mattered to the institution during this early phase, however, was maintaining good standing in Latin American military circles. This positive reputation in Latin America continued through the early 1980s. The school’s own assessments during this period grouped together anything appearing to oppose democracy in Latin America as “leftist” ideology—communism, socialism, and other forms of insurgency. The criticism bore no importance to USARSA’s own assessment of organizational health because it did not care whether or not anyone criticized it for trying to combat communism.

Daily operations at Ft. Benning remained stable even as a few national news pieces criticized the school’s involvement in Latin American atrocities. In 1987, a handful of activists protested the school’s link to the 1980 murder of the four US churchwomen in El Salvador. Even before the first US critique of the school, USARSA’s 1989 institutional assessment report lists a long roster of DoD, Army, and civilian expectations it had to address to become a premier Spanish-instruction school. The biggest concern, the report concluded, was that the institution’s charter must clearly spell out its mission to make explicit its valuable and unique contribution and to ensure legal viability. Only in a side note does the report mention that some recent bad press had “confused the locals.”

The institution’s public standing took a sharp turn in 1990, after a congressional report found that USARSA graduates committed the 1989 El Salvadoran murder of six Jesuits, their housekeeper, and her daughter. Following this discovery, the school endured persistent negative press that influenced its standing within the local community and the DoD, as well as boosting the rapidly growing social movement protest outside its gates. An internally drafted school history, which attempts to recast the school’s “half century of professionalism” (dated at its closing), notes a shift in the school’s focus from its “US reconsolidation period,”
and clearly documents efforts to ramp up the school’s presence as a respectable US Army institution, to a “post-Cold War era” in 1990 (Leuer 2000). A careful examination of the school’s own archival reckoning of its public identity throughout this period of heightened organizational anxiety illustrates how movement pressure fueled its panic and eventual reinvention.

**Panic and the scramble for institutional legitimacy**

Through the lens of institutional transformation, we can more fully understand the sociological foundations of how organizational anxiety emerges and develops into organizational panic. This panic prompts a scramble for the legitimacy and approval needed for survival, which can lead to institutional transformations benefitting or inhibiting movement objectives.

After 1990, the school became consumed with organizational anxiety over its public reputation, its professional standing within the DoD based on that reputation, and the unremitting condemnation of its graduates’ culpability in the torture and assassination of a growing roster of victims. Mary Douglas describes these institutional crises as mirroring personal, psychological crises of conflicts between public and personal classifications. Douglas explains that, like individuals, institutions experiencing crises have two options for responding to such discrepancies: They can disagree with the public and hold to their own classification (leading to a state of deviance), or they can uphold the worth of the public classification “but know that he or she is incapable of meeting the expected standards” (Douglas 1986: 98), which leads to another form of deviance. In his seminal work on suicide, Durkheim explains that individuals deal with these discrepancies by ending their lives (and as Douglas also notes, institutions make “life or death decisions” in the same regard). The study of counter-movements considered here, however, points to a third option, which is the strategic contestation of those classification discrepancies through a process movement scholars refer to as “counterframing.” In the case of the US Army School of the Americas, this effort resulted in perhaps the most extreme form of counterframing—institutional reinvention. Douglas describes institutional forgetting as a strategic process of holding to an institution’s own classification against contrary evidence that this classification may be inaccurate. In this case, the School of the Americas both actively shifted its classification to align with a public counter-ideal (e.g., by promoting values of transparency and diplomacy) and worked to erase its connection to the deviant image of the former institution (e.g., by restricting access to the psychological “torture” manuals).

Counterframing is the strategic response to framing, or, in social activism, the development of interpretive arguments about a particular social actor, behavior, or policy that directly or indirectly counters the opponent’s arguments. Developing such interpretive platforms to defend the accused institution can be key to the course of debate between opponents, because frames (and counterframes) define what issues to scrutinize and how. Counterframes not only contest the substantive claims presented by dissenters, but the very terms
on which the debate should ensue. In the case of the SOA’s reinvention, we can trace how the institution’s counterframing followed the process steps Douglas outlines in *How Institutions Think* (1986). Specifically, the institution acts in accordance with shifts in the broader context in which it is embedded, enacting changes that are structured by the positive and negative sanctions of both supporters and opponents, repositioning itself among favorable moral themes, and ultimately recreating a more favorable public identity based on widely held analogies of good and bad institutions.

First, as the context of foreign military training shifted, the SOA was also called into question. The first sign of scrambling for organizational legitimacy surfaced in early 1990 when the US Army School of the Americas dropped the “US Army” from its title and continued simply as “the School of the Americas.” This modification was a response to the hot-off-the-press discovery that a US Army school had trained those responsible for the 1989 massacre of American humanitarians in El Salvador, the 1980 brutal rape, torture, and massacre of four US churchwomen, and the slaughter of the now-famous Archbishop Oscar Romero who was targeted because of his tireless advocacy for the poor in El Salvador.

Once the Army rejected an association with the SOA, the institution sought a new legitimate institutional protectorate under which to operate. The institution appealed to various military branches, including those directed toward Latin American nations and general branches of the US military, such as the Navy and Air Force). As well as addressing the question of its legitimacy within the US defense structure, the SOA began to actively worry about its partnerships with other foreign defense institutions. In 1992, the institute’s director, Colonel Alvarez, embarked on a series of diplomatic trips throughout Latin America to try to maintain a Latin American student population. His efforts drew the school’s first Chilean students, but course enrollments suffered in the years to come. The SOA also revised its curriculum. In 1993, it added courses on international human rights law, even as its compliance with such law was being called into question by congressional lobbyists working to cut the school’s funding.

The scrambling became more pointedly directed by the increasingly negative sanctions placed on the institution. Upon the first draft and vote of an amendment to close the school, the SOA established an Interagency Task Force to directly lobby congressmen to oppose the protest group. Already support was declining rapidly in Congress, the public, and client nations. Pressure on the Army due to its association with the school prompted the formation of a special public affairs office to deal with SOA criticism in 1995. By this point, the school was desperately inviting congressmen to visit and discuss its programs’ validity and worth. After another contentious congressional debate and vote on the floor in 1996, Secretary of the Army Togo West Jr. declared the SOA’s Interagency Task Force an illegal lobbying operation and ordered it to disband. At that time, Congress also was investigating the SOA’s purported “torture manuals”.
The SOA continued its fight for legitimate jurisdiction as an institution fulfilling general Army and DoD objectives. The school proudly claimed in early 1996 that it could prove how 32 of its courses addressed one or more of the DoD’s strategic objectives in Latin America. The school developed peace operations and democratic sustainment courses, achieving what it considered an “updated validation of its worth in the US foreign policy arena” (Leuer 2000: 22). Despite these efforts, 1996 continued to be a bad year for the SOA’s institutional legitimacy and over 10,000 protesters now marched at its gates annually.

In June 1996, a presidential intelligence oversight board reported the use of SOA intelligence manuals in Central America and issued a three-part investigation into the role the school’s training played in Central American atrocities. When questioned about its support for the SOA, the Army was reluctant to issue any answer; by 1997, SOA officials claimed the Army had issued a “gag-order” (Leuer 2000: 24). The school’s officials fought legislative attempts to close the SOA in 1996, 1997, and 1998. Desperate to regain Army approval and avoid becoming “the US Army’s sacrificial lamb to appease the critics of the US policy of containment of communism in Latin America”, the school’s leadership restored “US Army” to the school’s name to try to “recover with the public its intimate association with the US Army” (Leuer 2000: 24).

In 1998, USARSA experienced another change in commander when a public affairs expert, Colonel Glenn Weidner, assumed leadership. Weidner had a reputation for significant “interagency work” through Harvard’s Weatherhead Center for International Affairs. He immediately implemented a two-pronged strategy of direct dialogic engagement about the merits of USARSA training and programs with both the protest movement organizers and the general public. He spearheaded the organization’s internal revision to emphasize and incorporate human rights themes. The school hosted numerous congressional delegations to publicize favorable information about its programs, and even sought and received official Army certification that its training was consistent with US values and the general military training curricula. Despite this last ditch effort, the House of Representatives voted 230-197 in favor of closing the school in early 1999. The last act of scrambling for institutional survival culminated in the drafting of the Reinvention Plan.

**Reinventing the US Army School of the Americas**

WHINSEC emerged from the Reinvention Plan. The school’s curricular director had held the same position within both institutions. One of the most interesting points he made was that he believed the protest movement improved the organization. He went so far as to call Father Roy Bourgeois, the Catholic priest who initiated and continues to lead the mobilization against the school, the “father of WHINSEC.” In my earlier article detailing this research, I noted that WHINSEC’s public affairs officer was also incredibly forthcoming about the organization’s explicit strategic affairs agenda and even gave me a copy of the document entitled, *WHINSEC’s Strategic Communications Plan*. This plan
systematically outlines a series of “talking points” that the organization should follow to effectively reframe its identity in a way that denies accusations made by the protest movement. Referring back to the Reinvention Plan which preceded WHINSEC’s creation, however, details how the former institution passed through several stages of panic and scrambling to redefine itself. It is now evident how this new strategic communications document begins with a continuation of the organizational panic and scramble for legitimacy that characterized the entire 1990s for the SOA. The report’s talking points strive to demonstrate the new institution’s position under the jurisdiction of the Army, the DoD, and in accordance with international human rights law. The second bundle of “themes” in the document (which has been posted online by SOAWatch at http://www.soaw.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=1035) begins with the statement that “WHINSEC is different from USARSA” in a number of ways that may be articulated through strategic discourse.

The SOA’s reinvention depended directly on the analogies of good and evil redefined in the wider context in which the protest movement became so influential. In my research examining the ongoing debate between WHINSEC and its opponents, the movement to close the School of the Americas/WHINSEC, I identified three principal protest frames that attack the legitimacy of the school. These are that the school contributed to a legacy of impunity for its crimes against innocent Latin American protesters and civilians, that it continues to operate under secrecy, and that it fosters an agenda of military-driven neoimperialism in Latin America. My analysis of WHINSEC’s counterframing efforts reveals that its counterframing strategy has been neither to change the terms of the debate nor deny the relevance of the principal themes of the movement’s criticism. Rather, WHINSEC employs a strategy of discursive alignment within the positive counters of those frames, claiming to be an institution that promotes humanitarian aid and democratic beneficence in the region, embraces transparency and judicial oversight of its programs, and ensures security through military coordination and cooperation (Gallo-Cruz 2012). These counterframing efforts exemplify the institutional orientation toward analogies between what had become considered morally sacred (e.g., objectives promoting democracy and human rights) and profane (e.g., objectives that violate these values) (Douglas 1986).

The Reinvention Plan laid the groundwork for this new institution, strategically designed to counter opposition, exemplifying the final link between organizational anxiety, panic, and the creation of a protest-resistant identity. Figure 1 depicts the cover for the printed and bound “School of the Americas Reinvention Plan,” which was drafted in 1999 when Congress stipulated that under no condition could it continue to fund an organization with the name School of the Americas. The former SOA officials decided to create a new

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2 Because the movement asserts that WHINSEC is an organizational continuation of the old US Army School of the Americas, it maintains its mission as closing “the SOA/WHINSEC” rather than just “WHINSEC.”
institution “with no political baggage or controversial history” that could fulfill all the same objectives as the original (Leuer 2000: 27).

Movement activists especially should take note of the Reinvention Plan because it points to a crucial juncture at which protest effectiveness may steer institutions away from the “death decisions” they may make in defying contender claims and toward an alternative type of renewed “life” decision forged in part by protesters’ successful framing efforts (Douglas 1986). Figure 2 depicts a PowerPoint slide entitled, “The School of the Americas Reinvention Information Campaign Plan.” This presentation illustrates how the foreign military training institute reinvention should target a diverse range of informed supporters and opponents including Congress, human rights groups, other governments of the Western Hemisphere, “Interagency Influencers,” and religious organizations. It also suggests re-socializing members of the previous institution into this new, strategically-devised classification. This resocialization would entail reframing the institution’s identity in relation to senior officers, soldiers, civilian staff, family members, and the array of DoD officials directly connected with the school. The document advises the new institution’s creators to “conduct an aggressive campaign to leverage communication strategies and products to inform and educate internal and external audiences about the
excellence of the new school as a DoD institution and its importance in supporting US foreign policy objectives.” (National Security Archives 1999)

On the back of one of these PowerPoint slides, a handwritten note cautions presenters to be “careful” to avoid “the notion of the campaign as manipulative”; the note instructs that a savvy “packaging of the issue” will be key to its success. The new institution would effectively receive the complete reallocation of all resources slated for the SOA through an institutional reinvention that included a Board of Visitors oversight, an annual curricular review by other branches of the Army, a revamped curriculum that emphasizes human rights and other forms of democracy-building (changes already made at the SOA), and new networking initiatives to bring in faculty with new, politically legitimate expertise. To finalize the full public and symbolic identity-break from the old institution, the plan mandates that the closure of USARSA requires: 1) All students to graduate and depart, 2) An appropriate military closing ceremony, 3) Retirement of the USARSA name and school code, 4) Files and institute website materials to be sent to the Military History Institute, and 5) Storage of all USARSA memorabilia.

Figure 2. The School of the Americas Reinvention Information Campaign

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The next step of the plan, “Establish New Institution,” explains that with new legislation passed, the new institution should include: 1) A new DoD directive in place to legitimate the new institution’s mission, 2) A new motto, school colors, and crest, 3) New signs, printing, and stationery, 4) An opening ceremony organized as a “high profile media event,” 5) Permanently deleting commando, artillery, cavalry, intelligence, and “psyops” (psychological operations) courses and replacing them with international law, disaster relief, inspector general, counter drugs, and information operations courses, 6) The development of a “civilian track,” 7) An expanded focus beyond the Peruvian-Ecuadorian case in the border patrol course, and 8) Adding intelligence oversight training. To make the institute presentable to a critical public, the plan advocates completing a “100% scrub of the curriculum,” developing an International Fellows program, acquiring a new school code, providing market training to recruiters, and highlighting curricular changes in new course numbers.

The plan also devises a new organizational structure that extends power and oversight to people with international and public affairs expertise. This model is contrasted in a side-by-side comparison with the old organizational structure, a conventional, hierarchical army chain of internal command. The plan concludes with an ambitious multi-million dollar budget expansion, as well as a clear timeline for all interagency initiatives requiring completion to bring the new institution into formal existence.

The promises and pitfalls of framing

The movement to close the School of the Americas framing proved to be both incredibly beneficial and deleterious. On the one hand, the movement established a lasting symbolic identity among the general public for the US Army’s “School of Assassins” exposing its legacy in training paramilitaries, coups, and dictators. This exposure helped to make certain types of foreign military training unacceptable. On the other hand, the movement’s resonant themes of democracy and human rights have been used as a template for institutional reinvention that provided a political backdoor through which the old School of the Americas could develop into a new, better-funded institution.

This paradoxical outcome provides important insights for movement strategists when thinking about the role of framing. I argue that the birth and reinvention of the School of the Americas exhibits how framing is necessary but insufficient to movement strategy; greater attention should be focused on framing against institutional counterframing, as well as how framing fits into the overall ideological scheme of movement objectives. Where Douglas explains that institutions are sometimes called to make life or death decisions, movement framing strategists must consider how their frames may be coopted into forging life-regenerating paths for contested institutions.
Framing and counterframing strategies

Most research on framing done by social movements focuses on the links between framing and mobilization: Specifically, how do types of movement claims and the processes for developing these claims shape which constituents join or support the movement and in what ways they engage? Much less research exists on how framing processes lead to success in terms of broader social change. There are key insights from framing and mobilization literature and the study of framing and counterframing, however, that can illuminate how and why this movement’s efforts shaped the Reinvention of the SOA and its concurrent effects on the ongoing movement.

On one level, frames have to be general enough to be easily anchored in widely held social values, a process called “frame alignment” (Snow et. al. 1986; Benford and Snow, 2000; Zuo and Benford, 1995; Benford, 1993). On another level, frames will be contested by opponents and met with counterframes that either directly critique claim-makers’ arguments or put new themes on the argumentative table. These counterframes may work to shift attention away from initial, general claims or at least contest the movement’s entitlement to have their claims identified with general values. In this sense, more specific claims contribute to the success of framing and counterframing efforts in several ways.

Strong frames concretely diagnose the problem, offer a specific prognosis for change, based on the causal claims made between the targeted practice and the social problem at hand (Snow and Benford 1988), and motivate supporters to act with clearly defined tactical plans (Zuo and Benford 1995). Challengers’ counterframes may therefore attempt to demobilize opponents and bolster their own public legitimacy by attacking the logics of diagnostic framing (Benford 1993; McCright and Dunlap 2000). Counterframes may also work to obscure the prognosis specifics in a way that garners counter-mobilization against claim-makers (Esacove 2004). Counterframes may further challenge the legitimacy of claims-makers’ tactics with the aim of derailing support for the claims-makers in a more peripheral form of attack (such as debates surrounding the use of violence versus nonviolence in a protest, see Ackerman and Kruegler 1994; Gregg 1939; Helvey 2004).

We see examples of each of these discursive maneuvers in the School of the Americas movement’s claims and the institutions’ counterclaims. The first identifiable movement framing success was the way in which the movement set the terms of the debate early on. The grounds on which the movement to close the School of the Americas based its claims were never contested by its opponents. USARSA could do nothing but enthusiastically agree with them that human rights, transparency, and democratic solidarity are essential American values that should never be violated by a US institution.

There was also some early success in linking general beliefs and values to specific policy initiatives in the process of diagnosis and prognosis. The movement’s framing tapped into general, widely held beliefs about human
rights and democracy. Specifically, the movement’s framing prescribed that an institution that can be empirically proven to have violated these values should be closed. The targeted institution could neither contest that abuses occurred at the hands of its graduates, nor that such abuses were shameful and wrong (Gill 2004; Hodge and Cooper 2005; Nelson-Pallmeyer 1997). Nevertheless, USARSA also skillfully counterframed.

USARSA first worked to shift attention away from concrete claims by engaging in an intensive rhetorical battle over whether it should be culpable for atrocities committed by students or for defense initiatives from higher-up institutions. USARSA then countered the movement’s claimed prognostic links between training and abuse through curricular revisions, boosting the institution’s professional identity, and—when that failed—devising a complete institutional reinvention to remove the empirical evidence necessary for prognostic framing. Reinvention became the final and most effective manner of counterframing the movement’s formidable critical frames against the SOA (at least enough to appease Congress).

Another way framers can anticipate and prepare for such counterframing strategies is to clearly demarcate “who’s in” and “who’s out” of their movement’s favorable moral boundaries (Silver 1997). In the “dialogic dance” of framing and counterframing (Esacove 2004) between the SOA/WHINSEC and the movement, the movement built up a strong support base. In addition to its historical foundation of clergy and religious supporters, this base expanded to include veterans, scholars, NGOs, politicians, and even a former instructor at the SOA who spoke out against the school on behalf of the movement. This framing established that those on the side of human rights were those who fought to directly invest in civil society and advocate for the poor and the just.

Agreeing with this positioning (if only because they were cornered into an organizational life or death situation), the SOA’s Reinvention Plan specifically addresses the need for recruiting active support from religious organizations, NGOs, and other citizens’ support groups. The new institution has also actively engaged the academic community, inviting scholars to open house discussions at the institute and elsewhere. Moreover, the targeted institution has worked to delegitimize its opponents by drawing attention to the honor that should be accorded to “those who have served our country” (although this is inaccurate and rather surreptitious as the movement attacks the outcome of training initiatives, not the willingness to serve). These continued efforts to distance WHINSEC from the SOA and pacify the ongoing movement against it symbolize the lingering anxiety of the new organization. The public affairs officer was the first person to contact me some years ago and enthusiastically point out that Father Roy, founder and key organizer in the movement, was facing excommunication from the Catholic Church following his attendance of a woman’s ordination. The officer was certain this loss of official legitimacy

3 Then commander- Colonel Weidner began this effort in the SOA’s final year.

4 Father Roy recounts his own story of this process in his recent book, Bourgeois 2014.
within the hierarchy of the Church would effectively demobilize the movement. Just as I complete this draft, years after my original research was completed, the same public affairs officer has contacted me again to assure me the institution was finally clearing public pressure against it writing,

I’m not sure if the reason is my brilliant(!) arguments, time passing, SOAW’s illogical premise, or all those and more, but the protest movement has faded to minor background noise. From a high of around 15,000 in 2006, the numbers were around 1300 last November, and that may have been a generous count. Mr. Roy (he got excommunicated and defrocked because of his efforts to ordain women as priests) doesn’t seem to get as many speaking engagements as in past years, but he still lived (sic) in his gate-side apartment. The SOAW website reflects efforts on all sorts of issues that don’t involve "SOA." (Personal communication 2015).

And he included a brochure of an updated history on WHINSEC.

In this sense, the primary counterframing strategy of the SOA/WHINSEC can be identified as a general discursive agreement with the broader values of the movement (democracy and human rights), and a more targeted “frame-shifting” strategy in concrete policy claims about the school’s content and identity. To achieve this “shifting,” counterframers employed a two-pronged approach. First, they worked on one level to shift the actual substance of institutional content and identity (not to the movement’s approval, but merely to realign that substance in a more general way with its own interpretations of democracy and human rights). Second, they worked discursively on another level to shift the attention of these debates toward dimensions the targeted institution thought would bolster their legitimacy (primarily its service to the military and now to delegitimize the movement as rightfully fizzling out).

One reactionary assessment of this transformation might be that the institution simply “coopted” the movement’s claims. In social movement analysis (and political analysis more generally), however, cooptation means the takeover of movement initiatives by a targeted institution that involves the active involvement of both the co-opters and the co-opted (Coy and Hedeen 2005). The SOA/WHINSEC neither wants to coopt the movement’s claims and its vision of a better form of hemispheric relations. Nor does the movement agree with any of the ways the SOA/WHINSEC has transformed itself into a democracy-promoting institution. Rather, WHINSEC has reengineered itself based on the broader themes of democracy and human rights which anchor the deep moral core from which the movement holds its ground. This points to a source of both the successes and limitations of the movement’s framing efforts.
Counterframing and institutional ideological work

Beyond establishing the terms of the debate over the old SOA, the movement has motivated hundreds of thousands of supporters, as well as several Latin American heads of state, to question the responsibility of an institution for the legacy of its participants. The annual vigil at SOA/WHINSEC’s gates serves as a movement “halfway house” (see Morris 1986), a central networking and training grounds for thousands of activists annually. Within this safe-space, activists build awareness of human rights issues and share skills in how to effectively advocate for those rights. The protest weekend has become a deeply symbolic place for holding vigils on behalf of the victims of human rights abuses. The vigil gives life to the legacy of those victims and to those whose lives are forever marked by the victims’ memory. Finally, the protest movement effectively established the links between WHINSEC and the SOA in public consciousness. A historical-news database search, for example, shows that every year throughout the 1990s there were 15-20 major national articles criticizing the School of the Americas. This number more than doubled in the 2000s, and these articles directly connected the old school to the new one.  

Yet, the targeted institution’s counterframing points to a number of ways in which reinvention has limited mobilization against the SOA/WHINSEC. The first limitation comes from the target organization’s linking general, resonant themes with concrete policy critiques and proposals for change. This means work involving frames that are at once diagnostic- identifying the problem with the institution, and prognostic- articulating how best to solve the problem. The second dimension consists of the more complex ideological work from which these framing tasks can effectively emerge, work that in this case taps into deeply held beliefs about democracy, human rights, foreign affairs, and the military. Together these two aspects of discursive work comprise strategies that can serve to mobilize public sympathy. These aspects also underscore the need for more carefully considering the socio-cultural context in which discourse shapes institutional transformation. Douglas’ two options for how institutions might respond to delegitimation both signify a type of public death for the institution. Here, a third option is shown through which the institution can be reborn. Movement strategists must take this third option into account in a professional world that increasingly invests in public image-engineering.

During a diplomatic exchange with Colonel Weidner of the former USARSA, Father Roy of SOAWatch suggested the funds spent on military training for young Latin Americans be invested in their professional education at some of our US colleges (Interview with Roy Bourgeois 2008). Weidner also told me of this in our phone interview. He claimed that he asked for regular college education funding for some of the students, “but no one would hear it” at the DoD (Interview with former Colonel Weidner 2008). This idea supports Father Roy’s cogent point, “democracy cannot be taught through the barrel of a gun.” SOAWatch has also repeatedly pointed out that Latin American countries use

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5 This search was conducted using LexisNexis and covered the years 1980 through 2010.
military training for conflicts within states rather than interstate ones. This brings to the fore serious questions about the role of the military in abuses of power.

The SOA/WHINSEC has instead pushed forward a prognosis for building up a culture of democracy through military honor by: 1) The repeated rhetorical emphasis given to the “honor” of those who have “served” through both the SOA and WHINSEC, 2) an annual counter-demonstration known as “God Bless Ft. Benning Day” in which the Army buses thousands of military families to downtown Columbus to enjoy an Army-sponsored event with high-profile speakers and fun family activities, and 3) in the counter-argument that visiting soldiers are notably receiving special education in US civil-military relations (Gallo-Cruz 2012).

Additionally, the reinvented institution has done little in the way of contesting movement claims of neoimperialism, but indirectly promotes the more positive sides of military diplomacy-secured capitalism (ibid). In fact, the colonel, during the closing years of the SOA was quite forthcoming in suggesting positive correlations between military engagement and direct foreign investment in Latin American countries that had an active relationship with the US Army training institute. He displayed a slide show on this relationship in some of his public talks at colleges and universities, for example, praising it as a positive incentive for more countries to send more students to the institute for military training (Trinity College debate, undated).

This is one point where the movement might make more targeted efforts in their framing of neoimperialist consequences, especially as the gap between rich and poor in these countries widens, and debts from foreign direct investments continue to climb. It is notable that when I questioned Colonel Weidner on the significance of this relationship in a later phone interview, he did not continue to praise that connection, instead charging private lenders with the responsibility for enormous debts caused by these investments. This shifting of his earlier prognostic framing calls into question the legitimacy of these claims. Is he now emphasizing the illegitimacy of the link between the military and private investments?

These prognostic discrepancies also call into question the relationship between framing and the deeper ideological work in which framing strategies are embedded. Social-movement scholars have recently begun to give greater attention to the need for distinction between framing and ideological processes, both fundamental to mobilization and movement outcomes but distinctive in their development and effects. Oliver and Johnston (2005) explain that framing evokes a cognitive process of linking background meanings to particular events or policies, but ideological work consists of shifts in the whole system of meanings that underpins the relationships movements call into question. They note that framing and ideological processes are intrinsically linked, but pose a significant strategic difference between “marketing and resonating versus education and thinking” (Oliver and Johnston 2005: 195). They explain that “while a framing effort may persuade someone that a particular issue can be
explained by an ideology, framing processes do not persuade people to adopt whole new ideologies. At best they may initiate the journey” (ibid).

This is an important and often overlooked consideration for movement strategists and one which defines how well institutions may “live or die” in a particular cultural context, in the sense to which Douglas refers. It is therefore crucial to be cognizant of linking concrete actions to resonant, general themes. At the same time, it is incredibly important to pinpoint where ideological divisions surrounding the rhetorical expression of those themes diverge. As Snow and Benford note, “ideologies are cultural resources tapped into to construct frames, thus they are simultaneously facilitating and constraining of the framing process” (2005: 209).

One of the counterclaims repeated during a WHINSEC open house tour and question-and-answer session I attended was that the movement was taking on foreign policy in Latin America more generally, whereas WHINSEC deferred these objectives to the DoD. The movement must now successfully navigate between its concrete initiatives to close the school and its broader objectives of challenging foreign military training. This discursive wall represents a limitation of the different ideologies undergirding framing and counterframing efforts. Is the military a tool for building democracy and securing human rights or not? Thus, the reinvention has successfully shifted the debate into deeper ideological territory, one that poses a greater policy change challenge—ending foreign military training—than simply closing one school. Westby explains with regard to this ideological dimension of framing that “ideologies may limit the range of strategic discourse in framing, but also... strategic discourse in framing may deviate from and even challenge movement ideology” (2005: 221). In other words, if movement framing does not anchor deeply enough into salient ideologies it can undermine the movement’s goals.

**Framing, necessary but insufficient**

To conclude, I emphasize that good framing is a necessary but insufficient aspect of movement strategy. Important lessons can be learned from the case of the Reinvented School of the Americas. First, there are the complex challenges of battling strategic counterframing. By embracing the main themes and core American values scaffolding the social justice initiatives of the movement, the Reinvented School of the Americas “blurred the lines of contention” (Gallo-Cruz 2012). This makes establishing contradictions between claims by the movement and their opponent (Nepstad 1997) a difficult discursive process. As a result, the movement carries a particular discursive responsibility to highlight the precise points where the targeted institution does not agree. In this sense, a more complex semiotic battle must occur in a way that can hold public attention while the meanings of master frames salient to both sides of the debate are distinguished and analyzed. This requires greater attention to areas where discursive disagreement remains more distinct, while remaining cognizant of the deeper cultural processes of “how institutions think” in life or death.
situations such as these and how framing and counterframing enters into such institutional thinking.

One way to prepare for defeating surface level changes is to scrutinize the counterframers’ link between diagnosis, prognosis, and tactical implementation. The movement has not overlooked the importance of this. It has pointed out, for example, that adding a hand-picked Board of Visitors for institutional oversight is not as open and transparent as monitoring the activities of graduates. WHINSEC continues to redact the names of its graduates even in response to SOAWatch Freedom of Information Act requests (Gallo-Cruz 2012).

There are a number of other empirical burden-of-proof avenues the movement could take. These include qualitatively assessing humanitarian outcomes in the areas served by WHINSEC graduates, conducting evaluations of economic equality in these areas, accessing other measures of democratic openness in WHINSEC-client countries, or surveying civilian groups on their relationships with militaries and paramilitaries. For pragmatic-strategic reasons, it should be noted that the events initially sparking US outrage over crimes committed by SOA graduates have one central feature: They are crimes against high-profile victims, specifically religious workers and US citizens. Documenting and emphasizing crimes against women and children, the elderly, and religious and international victims may be a key part of continued framing efforts for short-term results. This focus raises the issue of failing in the short term to address the integrity of all lives, namely the poor and marginalized of Latin America. It could be argued, however, that this strategy targets broader cultural changes that could serve to protect them in the long term, by scrutinizing the military’s role in perpetuating a culture of systemic violence.

Another important lesson is the need to more resolutely push beyond surface level debates in order to shift ideological commitments to human rights issues and specific policies. To close both this school and any new school that should (and actually has) developed in its place, is to argue that foreign military training is the fundamental problem (as opposed to the legacy and crimes of one particular school). If a great portion of the American public widely associates the general values of democracy and human rights with the need for military protection and alliances, this is where ideological work is needed to counteract the counterframing maneuver of reinvention. To suggest the cessation of all foreign military training in Latin America attacks the use of the military for protecting or expanding democracy.

Finally, movements that occur in an increasingly institutionalized context (where movement activity is both highly rationally planned and supervised by the state through permits, police accompaniment, etc.) must grapple with the loss of a crucial mechanism of protest and persuasion—the element of surprise. Surprise is often considered vital to protest effectiveness (see Sharp 2005), as targets plan for their own protection and strategic response (Kubik 1998). When targets are prepared for protest and persuasion and are well-versed in the frames of the movement, the potential to harness targets’ vulnerability is lost.
The industry for professionally counterframing movement criticism has become a highly rationalized and an increasingly lucrative business (Yaxley 2013). A Ragan’s Public Relations journal offers a series of steps all companies should take to prepare for protesters’ targeting, urging companies to be prepared and “control the narrative” (Working 2012). Bob (2005) has also noted that often the side with the savviest strategy for framing its claims convinces the public instead of the side presenting the most compelling case of greatest social ills.

It is therefore imperative that movements think clearly about the strategic supportive role framing plays in other dimensions of mobilization strategy. The Reinvention of the School of the Americas represents an increasingly common model of institutional reinvention in response to the public shaming of institutions instigated by protesters, one to which scholars should give greater attention. To point to other salient recent examples, the term “greenwashing” is now common parlance for the big-bucks rhetorical, institutional makeovers engineered in response to targeting by environmental groups. International news headlines detailed Nigeria’s efforts, including a 1.2 million dollar public relations contract to restore its image post-kidnapping crisis (Mnthali 2014). Bahrain also signed a 20 million dollar contract to restore its image following publicization of ongoing human rights abuses in the country (Kafai 2014). This money, if it were up to human rights activists, could be invested in civil society programs that expand the culture and institutions supporting human rights on the ground. Studies probing what otherwise would be successful framing maneuvers, however, show that even these are easily derailed when the opponent possesses more “hard” resources (Noy 2009).

Most social movements have significantly fewer economic resources than their opponents; how then can a movement effectively use framing? There are two ways I believe understanding the role of framing in any movement’s overall strategies and tactical base may be helpful. The first comes from the insights of nonviolent studies.

In the literature on nonviolent protest tactics, there are four general families of nonviolent tactics. These include acts of protest and persuasion (e.g., rallies, demonstrations or framing efforts through media work), nonviolent intervention (e.g., roadblocks or institutional occupations), noncooperation (e.g., general strikes or company boycotts), and alternative institution-building (on nonviolent tactics see Sharp 2005). While protest and persuasion (which involves framing) is an important part of the “cognitive liberation” process, it is, as demonstrated by the Reinvention of the School of the Americas, insufficient.

It is important to note, first, that some organizations move more quickly from organizational anxiety to transformation. In her in-depth study of conflict diamonds, Franziska Bieri (2010) examines “how NGOs cleaned up the diamond industry” through the establishment of a voluntary global agreement to greatly reduce participation in the violent, illicit diamond trade. Bieri recounts an interview with one industry official who stated that they did not want to go through the public shaming endured by the fur industry. Thus, they were quick to move into the Kimberley Process which established regulation and
oversight on diamond mining. However, it is equally important to note that the quick public transformation of a questionable practice does not necessarily indicate an ongoing, in-depth engagement with monitoring implementation. In fact, effective implementation of the Kimberley Process remains a concern (Amnesty International 2013). Similarly, SOAWatch’s complaints about the cosmetic makeover of USARSA demonstrate that the deeper movement goal of transforming US foreign military policy in Latin America also remains a grave concern.

In either of these cases, that movement framing affected organizational transformation is empirically evident. But deeper structural changes require targeted attacks on the structure of the social context that enables foreign military training to continue in a revamped form. This is where ideological work is more effectively expressed in varied forms of protest. How does one protest Plan Colombia, for example, which provides hundreds of millions of dollars of annual-aid to support anti-narcotics and terrorist efforts in the Colombian military? The growing literature on nonviolent studies shows that success lies not only in the strength of protest and persuasion, but also those efforts’ effects on mobilizing wide-scale noncooperation and intervention among the right body of constituents with the power and influence to effect real change.

The School of the Americas Reinvention Plan represents a historical shift in US military-training public relations, from the focus on managing the image of war in the media that was born of the televising of Vietnam (Hammond 1990; Hammond 1996) to one that “scrubs curricula” and plants upstanding public figures in important positions of new, designer institutions. WHINSEC represents one such makeover where counterframing and public affairs receive a healthy chunk of institutional planning and—as Figure 3 illustrates, a picture of WHINSEC’s mock-protest weekend preparations—preparing for public opposition becomes another rote task on the institution’s annual agenda.
Figure 3. WHINSEC staffers prepare a mock protest to get ready for protest weekend as reported in WHINSEC’s newsletter.

The combination of framing with other forms of noncooperation and intervention remain vital in this and other cases. Framers must learn to frame beyond the potential for counterframes and in accordance with other solid and promising strategies for noncooperation and intervention of the injustices they protest.

A second important point to consider is that framing efforts, and most strategic responses to counterframing efforts, including this extreme form of institutional reinvention, should include the envisioning of how the framing that has emerged from this particular movement will provide a discursive roadmap of where it hopes to go. Like the famed Highlander Folk School of the southern United States that served as a training grounds for decades of labor, civil rights, environmental and social welfare activists, the annual Close the School of the Americas vigil has, over the course of several decades, cultivated the resistance of a diverse range of human rights activists. One way of measuring framing success is to trace how the skills honed in this particular movement translate to the extension of democracy and human rights in other dynamic movements. To think beyond the closing of the SOA, the movement must more explicitly address the body from which the arm of WHINSEC extends: the legacy of foreign military training and armament in Latin America. The movement has ideas on how to do this, and framing has the potential to make these ideas grow.
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