Migrant inclusion organization activity at the supranational level: examining two forms of domestic political opportunity structures[1]

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Abstract

This analysis focuses on explaining the national-level conditions that prompt migrant inclusion organizations to undertake activity that targets the European Union (EU). It compares broad and issue-specific political opportunity structures (POS) at the national level to help explain the domestic conditions that lead to EU-directed activity. Using data from an original survey of European migrant inclusion organizations, the analyses examine seven types of activity directed toward the EU, ranging from conventional lobbying to protest. The results show that at the national level, the broad POS helps explain the most frequently used EU-directed activities, and that groups are more likely to target the EU when the broad POS is open rather than closed. The results for the issue-specific POS, although mixed, also help to account for a range of supranational-level activities. In addition to demonstrating that the national environment is an important factor in explaining EU-directed activity, the findings can help movement practitioners by specifying which institutions to target, which activities to prioritize, and how to leverage domestic conditions to optimize EU-level influence.

Keywords: social movements, political opportunity structure, NGOs, protest, lobbying, European Union, migrant organizations

Introduction

Organizations in Europe that work on behalf of migrants and refugees have long been active in political activities that target the European Union (EU). For example, in December 1999, the European Commission issued COM(1999)638, its proposal for a Council[2] directive on the right to family reunification. In this

[1] Author's note: I wish to thank Robert Rohrschneider, Karen Rasler, Beate Sissenich, Tim Bartley, Derekh Cornwell, and two anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments and suggestions. In addition, I thank the United States Fulbright Program to the European Union, and the Commission for Educational Exchange between the United States of America, Belgium, and Luxembourg for funding and facilitating portions of this research.

[2] Council refers to the Council of Ministers, the primary decision making body of the European Union. Its functions are described in more detail in the section entitled "Migrant inclusion organizations and supranational activity."

case, migrant inclusion organizations[3] "were involved in the directive from the very beginning" (Brummer, 2008: 12), and many such groups, including Caritas, December 18, and GISTI, ultimately lobbied the European Parliament to bring an action requesting the annulment of the revised version of the directive before the Court of Justice of the European Union (Brummer, 2008: 16). In a more recent example, activists from many migrant and refugee rights groups from across Europe participated in the 2014 March for Freedom from Strasbourg to Brussels to promote freedom of movement and protest EU policies. Why did migrant inclusion groups from across Europe lobby and protest EU institutions instead of focusing their efforts on domestic issues with their own governments?

Like other social movement organizations, migrant inclusion organizations have many avenues for action. At the broadest level, groups can take action domestically, or they can choose to target the EU. How might the national political opportunity structure (POS) have influenced these organizations to take their claims to the supranational arena? Although it is clear that the EU itself provides opportunities that structure group action (Geddes, 1998, 2000b; Guiraudon 2000, 2003; Fella and Ruzza, 2012; Ucarer, 2014), it is less well-known which domestic-level factors prompt organizations to go beyond the national arena and target the EU. Accordingly, this study examines the domestic conditions under which migrant inclusion organizations will choose to bypass the national level and instead direct activity supranationally. Will they take their claims to the EU when faced with national constraints that essentially block their institutional access, as in Keck and Sikkink's (1998, 1999) boomerang model? In this study, I address such questions by examining the domestic opportunity structure, with the goal of comparing the relative explanatory power of two different forms of the POS: broad versus issue-specific. Whereas the *broad* POS is hypothesized to affect all movements in a similar fashion, the *issue-specific* POS represents the policy context as it relates to a specific movement (Berclaz and Giugni, 2005). As Giugni (2009) explains, a focus on issue-specific opportunities stems from criticism of the POS as it has traditionally been conceptualized (Gamson and Meyer, 1996; McAdam, 1996; Goodwin and Jasper, 2004), and has the potential to bring positive developments to the POS research tradition.

Many recent studies examine the European dimensions of migrant inclusion actors. Some research focuses on the connections between the EU and national opportunity structures in explaining movement activity (Fella and Ruzza, 2012), whereas other studies examine how the domestic environment leads to the Europeanization of contention (Monforte, 2014), or differentially impacts the

[3] In this paper, I use the phrase "migrant inclusion organization" as a general term that captures diverse elements of a movement working to address a range of issues on behalf of different constituents, including legal migrants, illegal migrants, and asylum seekers. Although these groups work toward different goals, they share the common theme of working to promote inclusion of their constituents within the existing or alternative legal and political frameworks of society. Moreover, they share an orientation toward assisting individuals who are neither from the specific state in which they currently reside, nor from other European Union member states.

type of claim being made (Monforte and Dufour, 2011, 2013). Other work in this area examines how differences in national policy contexts can impact the nature of migration-related policy output at the EU level (Ucarer, 2009), and analyzes EU-level opportunity structures and the conditions under which immigration and asylum organizations successfully impact supranational policy (Ucarer, 2014).

Although studies do examine the role of the national POS in shaping action directed at the EU, the POS is rarely conceptualized in a multidimensional way. For example, many studies tend to focus on a single variable, such as citizenship, even though other factors could potentially play a role (Ireland, 1994; Koopmans and Statham, 1999b, 1999c, 2001). As a result, it is unclear what relative role different dimensions of the national POS play (in both the broad and issue-specific forms) in prompting groups to take action at the EU level. This study attempts to address this shortcoming by cross-nationally and empirically comparing both broad and issue-specific forms of the POS in mobilizing group activity at the EU level across a range of conventional and challenging tactics, as measured by the Survey of European Migrant Inclusion Organizations (an original data source). The goals of this analysis are, therefore, to describe the supranational activity patterns of migrant inclusion groups across the EU in order to establish their activity repertoires at this level, and to analyze how both forms of the domestic POS influence and shape EU-directed activity.

Domestic political opportunity structures

Political opportunity structures can be conceptualized along two dimensions: broad and issue-specific. Most social movement research focuses the broad form, operationalizing it according to four sets of variables: the nature of existing cleavages in society; the formal institutional structure of the state; the information strategies of elites vis-à-vis their challengers; and power relations within the party system, or alliance structures (Kriesi et al., 1995). However, as Meyer and Minkoff (2004) have shown, the domestic POS can also be conceptualized according to its issue-specific form, which represents the national political-institutional environment specific to the movement in question. Thus, we can think of the issue-specific POS as the relevant national policy context in which the organization operates, and the broad POS as the macro institutional backdrop.[4]

Of course, domestic opportunity structures are not entirely independent of the supranational POS; in practice, these two are often interrelated. For instance, Meyer (2003: 22) argues that "[i]nternational and domestic elements of political opportunity are interrelated, exercising differential sway depending

[4] Although I acknowledge that the broad and issue-specific POS are not completely independent, they tend to be presented as such in the empirical work that seeks to test their impact on political activity. This is typically done in an effort to refine the POS concept to make it more movement-specific.

upon the nature of available openings." Indeed, the formulation of policy at the European level requires some degree of national policy change in order for member states to comply with the principles laid out (Risse-Kappen, Cowles, and Caporaso, 2001). At the same time, "the common overarching policy framework provided by the EU needs to be set against the backdrop of stark differences in terms of the national policy framework in which the directives have been implemented and in which anti-racist movements operate," (Fella and Ruzza, 2012: 1). That is, despite supranational policy developments, differences in national contexts do exist and are important to consider in understanding the mobilization of political action directed toward the EU. Different national contexts can influence the use of different strategies toward the EU, including whether it is used as an ally against restrictive national governments, or is itself pressured as part of a multilevel strategy of influence (Monforte, 2014). These approaches offer different interpretations of EU-directed activity, and suggest different processes by which the national POS influences it. Therefore, I argue that drawing an analytical distinction between the domestic and supranational POS enables us to sharpen our understanding of the nature of European-directed collective action by migrant inclusion groups. The following sections discuss both forms of the domestic POS, and put forth the hypotheses to be tested here.

The broad POS

Social movement research has shown that the broad aspects of the POS that Tarrow (1994) describes are important factors to consider in explaining movement activity. Migrant inclusion research often adopts a POS approach to explain political behavior within the movement (e.g., Danese, 1998; Geddes, 1998, 2000b; Guiraudon, 2001; Koopmans and Statham, 1999a, 2000b). The relative openness of the political system and the presence or absence of political allies are two aspects of the broad domestic POS that are likely important determinants of group activity. The following sections discuss each aspect in turn.

The degree of openness of a political system to the tactics and goals of a movement can be expected to influence tactic choice (Eisenger, 1973; Tarrow, 1989, 1994; Kitschelt, 1986). When the national political system is relatively open, groups can be expected to work within the established institutional structure, since more opportunities exist to take advantage of conventional participation channels. With greater access to the polity, we would expect groups to rely on lobbying activities to influence policy processes. In contrast, when a system is relatively closed, we would expect groups to use challenging tactics (Kitschelt, 1986; McAdam, 1982), or bypass the national arena and target the EU (Imig and Tarrow, 2001). Therefore, when conventional channels of influence are less available domestically, we would expect EU-directed activity by migrant inclusion organizations to become more likely.

The presence or absence of elite political allies is another important factor in explaining group behavior (Tilly, 1978; Tarrow, 1994). The structure of political opportunities is relatively more favorable when a group can rely on political allies to help achieve its policy objectives. Therefore, under such conditions, groups may be less likely to turn to the EU, and more likely to rely on conventional activities that target the nation-state. On the other hand, when political allies are absent from the national arena or are simply unresponsive, and avenues to influence become more constrained, groups become more likely to bypass the state entirely in favor of EU-directed action (Poloni-Staudinger, 2008). Previous research suggests that Left-leaning governments tend to be more receptive to social movement issues (Kriesi et. al., 1995; della Porta and Rucht, 1995), and multiparty systems increase the odds that an organization will find political allies in government (Lijphart, 1999; Dalton et. al., 2003).

The issue-specific POS

Gamson and Meyer have stated that "the concept of political opportunity structure is…in danger of becoming a sponge that soaks up every aspect of the social movement environment," (1996: 275). In part as a result of this criticism, there have been several attempts to refine the POS concept. Meyer and Minkoff (2004) illustrate one such example in their conceptualization of the POS into broader aspects of the political system versus "issue-specific" factors relevant to a particular movement. In essence, the issue-specific POS reflects those elements of the national political-institutional environment most likely to affect the movement in question. National citizenship, employment, asylum, naturalization, and anti-discrimination policies are examples of specific elements of the national policy context likely to affect the migrant inclusion movement, as these are major features of the national political system that have direct relevance to the constituents of migrant inclusion groups.

In essence, Meyer and Minkoff (2004) argue that national institutional openness can vary across social movement issues and constituencies. This idea is reflected in other research as well (Berclaz and Giugni, 2005; Koopmans et. al., 2005; Guigni et. al., 2009). This variance can differentially affect the likelihood of mobilization, depending on the movement. In other words, some movements may mobilize in response to certain aspects of system openness or closure, while these same aspects may be completely irrelevant for other movements. From an analytical standpoint, then, it becomes important to separate the broader aspects of domestic system openness from those specific to the migrant inclusion movement. Because it is more directly relevant to the movement, one would expect the domestic issue-specific POS to constitute a stronger factor in mobilizing activity compared to the broad POS. This brings about the first hypothesis:

H1: The domestic issue-specific POS is a stronger predictor of EU-directed activity by migrant inclusion organizations compared to the broad POS.

The following section will examine the structure of the EU in more detail. In so doing it will explain the domestic conditions under which migrant inclusion groups might be expected to turn their focus beyond the state and toward the EU.

Migrant inclusion organizations and supranational activity

Over the past few decades the migrant inclusion movement has developed and expanded throughout virtually every EU country. Although united under a common theme, migrant and refugee organizations work on a broad range of issues. As Guiraudon (2001) explains, the movement as a whole is extremely divided due to it consisting of many diverse groups with different (and often competing) agendas. Moreover, actors within the movement "do not necessarily have the material resources to operate at the European level," a factor which could impact their ability to use the EU as an alternative arena when national conditions are unfavorable (Guiraudon, 2001: 166).

The nation-state remains the dominant arena for immigration policy; as such, we would expect most activity to take place in the domestic arena. At the same time, the EU presents a unique and dynamic supranational governance structure that groups can use to influence policy. Among the most significant policymaking institutions are the Council of the European Union (the Council), the European Commission, and the European Parliament (EP) (Marks and McAdam, 1999). The Council comprises representatives of member state governments and, in most areas, it follows the ordinary legislative procedure (i.e., co-decision), whereby it shares legislative powers equally with the EP. As a result of important institutional changes that began with the Maastricht Treaty and continued through the Amsterdam Treaty and the Treaty of Lisbon (see Ucarer, 2013), many migration-related policy areas now fall under this procedure, including anti-discrimination, common immigration policy, and measures concerning a common asylum system (General Secretariat of the Council, 2011). The changing institutional structure of the EU creates incentives that affect how migrant inclusion groups advocate; for example, they can make claims immediately prior to Council negotiations, take part in activities organized by the Council Presidency, or report violations of rights and obligations and make formal requests directly to the Council Presidency. Yet the Council remains one of the most difficult institutions to influence, as it is relatively unreceptive to groups' claims.

The European Commission has also gained competencies as a result of institutional changes. Its role includes proposing and drafting legislation that is then debated within the EP and Council. Because the Commission also researches the feasibility of new migrant inclusion policies, it serves as an access point for groups seeking to provide expertise or engage in direct lobbying efforts. Since the movement represents a broad range of issues, groups have the option of lobbying numerous Directorates General, including Home Affairs; Employment, Social Affairs and Inclusion; and Education and Culture. The

Commission regularly consults with civil society groups in the policymaking process (European Commission, 2000), and relies on them to communicate sector-specific information (Niessen, 2002).

Groups may also be expected to turn to the European Parliament. The 2009 Lisbon Treaty increased the legislative powers of the EP such that, in nearly all policy areas, it has the power of co-decision with the Council. As individual members of the European Parliament (MEPs) can champion various causes, the EP is often a willing ally that has called for Europeanized immigration and asylum policies and for legislative action against racist and xenophobic discrimination (European Parliament, 1998). MEPs can influence the Commission in back-and-forth negotiations over drafts of proposed legislation, and garner support for various initiatives. Migrant inclusion groups have opportunities for influence by exercising their right of petition to the EP, and by engaging with members of specific thematic committees, such as the Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs, and the Employment and Social Affairs Committee.[5]

Overall, many avenues exist for these groups to act at the EU level, but the question remains under what domestic conditions they will do so. Participation in supranational activities can be particularly important when groups lack political opportunities within the nation-state. For example, Keck and Sikkink (1998, 1999) put forth a "boomerang effect" whereby groups that lack access to domestic political processes and institutions can use transnational cooperation as a way to bypass the nation-state. In the context of the EU, the implication is that groups turn to the EU when national opportunities are constrained in order to use it as an ally against unresponsive or restrictive national governments (della Porta and Caiani, 2007) – a strategy that Monforte (2014) terms "externalization." Some research has found that groups turn to the EU under conditions of a closed domestic political opportunity structure as a way of "out-manoeuvring" the state (Poloni-Staudinger, 2008: 546). This brings about the final hypothesis:

H2: A relatively closed national POS, in either broad or issue-specific form, is expected to increase EU-directed activity.

Because targeting the EU requires resources, migrant inclusion groups that lack material resources need to leverage the nonmaterial resources at their disposal, such as personnel, volunteers, expertise, and network connections, in order to direct their claims at a supranational target when national opportunities are blocked (Ucarer 2009; Fella and Ruzza, 2012; Monforte, 2014; Risse-Kappen, 2000). In addition to the relatively more enduring national laws and policies that I examine here, I acknowledge that specific events or instances of mistreatment can trigger changes in the POS that affect the activities of these organizations. For example, the recent series of migrant drowning incidents involving attempts to reach Italy, Greece, Malta, and Spanish territory in part

[5] http://www.europarl.europa.eu/committees/en/parliamentary-committees.html;jsessionid=1469BA70B3CDC9005D55C4A87112631C.node1

prompted the 2014 March for Freedom in which activists protested at the European Council summit to further push migration issues onto the EU's agenda. Although I focus on relatively more enduring national policies in this paper, analyzing more dynamic aspects of the POS is a worthy avenue for research – a theme that I revisit in the conclusion.

Data and methods

The Survey of European Migrant Inclusion Organizations

The Survey of European Migrant Inclusion Organizations is an original data source used to measure the dependent variables in this study (EU-level political activity). The survey questionnaire was completed by the directors of migrant inclusion organizations across Europe. Following the guidelines put forth by Klandermans and Smith (2002), several print and online directories were used to identify the population of relevant organizations across the EU that work on behalf of migrant and refugee issues,[6] and thus to construct the sample frame. The directories were compiled by actors within the movement itself, and are thus more likely to be both comprehensive and accurate, particularly with regard to smaller or more localized groups (Minkoff, 2002).[7] Each organization included is an established migrant or refugee organization located in an EU member state, and directly addresses issues specific to migrants and/or refugees from beyond the EU. One of the goals was to construct a diverse sample frame, so organizations working across different elements of the movement were included, as opposed to targeting a particular type of organization. Overall, 832 groups were identified that met the above criteria. Spanning twenty-five EU member states, the sample frame includes smaller and relatively resource-poor organizations, as well as larger groups and those with more resources at their disposal.

Each of these 832 organizations was contacted with a survey questionnaire.[8] The survey was administered to the directors of these organizations in two waves from September 2006-April 2007.[9] Of the 832 organizations contacted, a

[6] I used The European Directory of Migrant and Ethnic Minority Organisations (published for Joint Council for the Welfare of Immigrants by European Research Centre on Migration and Ethnic Relations), the European Address Book against Racism (ENAR; an online database of over 5,000 organizations compiled by United for Intercultural Action, a non-profit organization headquartered in the Netherlands that works for the rights of refugees and migrants), and the national directories compiled by the European Network against Racism (about 20-25% of groups on the ENAR listing were smaller, grassroots efforts which had only a street address. A mail questionnaire was sent to these groups.).

[7] Nonetheless, very small, short-lived organizations, as well as very radical protest groups, are likely to be underrepresented in these directories (Minkoff, 2002). Therefore, the results of the analysis may not be generalizable to these extreme factions of the movement.

[8] In other words, I administered a census of the relevant population.

[9] Wave 1 of the survey was administered by mail from September-December 2006. Wave 2 was administered by email and in person from February-April 2007. The response rate for the survey is about 20%.

completed questionnaire was obtained from 114 groups, and a partially completed questionnaire was obtained from 56 groups.[10] Because survey data captures a "snapshot" in time, it can provide information on which tactics the groups tended to rely on most heavily relative to others, but it cannot capture tactics used in response to a specific sequence of events over the time period in which it was administered. At the same time, survey data are still useful for testing initial hypotheses about general activity patterns during a "snapshot" in time. The data can provide initial evidence about the relative usefulness and influence of the issue-specific POS after controlling for other factors.

The questionnaire covered a variety of topics including the organizational characteristics of the group, resources, issues of primary concern, cooperative actions undertaken by the organization, and participation in a range of conventional and challenging activities that target various levels of governance. The goal of the survey was to determine groups' *general* patterns of activity, as opposed to tactics used in response to a particular event or as part of a specific campaign. The questions used to construct the dependent variables asked groups to think in general terms about the activities they use to influence policy and to indicate how frequently they use each one.[11]

Dependent variables

The dependent variables in this analysis capture EU-directed activity that spans both conventional (e.g., lobbying) and more challenging (e.g., protests) types. EU lobbying activity is operationalized as organizational activity that directly targets representatives from the following institutions: *the European Commission, European Parliament, Council of Ministers, European Economic and Social Committee,* and *Coreper*. That is, I define a conventional activity as EU-directed based on the group's self-reported direct contact with an official(s) from the given EU institution, regardless of where the contact took place.[12]

The more challenging activities are operationalized as the frequency of bringing *court cases before the Court of Justice of the European Union* and *protesting against the EU*. With regard to protests, again the target is conceptualized independently of the location, such that a group may protest the EU in Brussels or at home, provided that the EU is a direct target of claims-making.[13] In

[10] The full list of organizations from which complete data have been collected can be found in Table 1 in the Appendix. Missing data were excluded from the analyses.

[11] This question wording is consistent with that used in other studies seeking to assess groups' general activity patterns (e.g., Dalton et. al., 2003; Rohrschneider and Dalton, 2002).

[12] Although I assume that most lobbying takes place in Brussels, it is possible to capture, for example, contacts with EU officials that take place in specific member countries as well.

[13] The survey questions used to measure both conventional and challenging activities are as follows: "For each of the following activities, please indicate how frequently your organization uses the method." Groups were shown the following set of activities: (1) Contacts with officials of the European Commission, (2) Contacts with members of the European Parliament, (3) Contacts with officials of the Council of Ministers, (4) Contacts with members of the European

general, my approach focuses mainly on incidents of claims-making in which an EU institution is a direct, rather than indirect, target. As such, the analysis does not include all instances of claims-making involving the EU. For example, it excludes instances in which a group may make a claim against a national target about an issue that has a supranational dimension. Although these instances are part of what we would consider European collective action, due to their complexity, they are much more difficult to measure and capture consistently using a survey methodology. Because the surveys were self-administered by groups, I aimed to capture relatively clear instances in which a claim was directed toward a specific EU institution. This approach also had the benefit of allowing me to separate claims by institution, as opposed to aggregating all claims at the level of the EU.

Overall, this repertoire of activity spans seven types directed at various EU-level actors and institutions. To allow for a clear analytic separation of the factors that encourage substantial usage of an activity (versus activities that may be used only marginally), each dependent variable is coded dichotomously to capture "high" versus "low" participation in that particular activity.[14] The results will show which factors increase the odds of participating substantially in a given activity versus using an activity only infrequently.

Independent variables

The issue-specific POS is one of the primary independent variables of interest in this study, and several sources were used to measure it. Data from the European Civic Citizenship and Inclusion Index are used to measure *the national policy context specific to migrants and refugees*. It compares a range of country-level indicators grouped into five primary policy areas: labor market inclusion, long-term residence, family reunification, naturalization, and anti-discrimination. Within each policy area, each country is rated on the following four criteria: eligibility/scope of policy, conditions/remedies, integration measures, and the extent to which the policy is rights-associated. Higher scores reflect policies that would be considered more favorable to migrants.[15]

Giugni (2009) argues that objective opportunities can exist but fail to be perceived as such, or may otherwise be ignored by groups. Therefore, *perceptions* of opportunities can also be important determinants of group activity (Kurzman, 1996; Banaszak, 1996; Gamson and Meyer, 1996; McAdam

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Economic and Social Committee, (5) Contacts with members of Coreper, (6) Legal recourse to the European Court of Justice, and (7) Demonstrations or protests that target the EU.

[14] The survey questions that measured participation in the given activities were presented to groups on a 4-point scale: often, sometimes, rarely, and never. To achieve more meaningful separation between these categories, I coded each dependent variable as "High" (often + sometimes) versus "Low" (rarely + never) participation.

[15] I use an index variable composed of each of these five policy areas due to the presence of multicollinearity between policy areas.

et. al., 1996). To account for this, the analyses include a *subjective measure of the issue-specific POS*, measured by survey questions that ask groups to rate their country's relative openness or stringency in terms of its current immigration, citizenship, asylum, and employment laws. Higher scores indicate more open issue-specific policy perceptions.[16]

The broad POS is also measured. *System openness to the tactics and goals of a movement* is operationalized as the country's competitiveness of participation (the extent to which non-elites can access institutional channels of political expression, measured by Polity IV data), and whether the country has a federal versus centralized system (measured by Polity III data)[17]. In addition, *the presence or absence of political allies* is operationalized as a Leftist chief executive or government,[18] and the number of political parties (measured by the Database of Political Institutions). Finally, data from the survey were used to measure group identity and resources, which are included to control for the possible effects of organizational issue priorities and resources on the decision to engage in supranational activity.[19]

Models

The models of group activity will be used to determine how the broad and issue-specific national POS shapes participation in activities directed toward the EU. Given the dichotomous nature of the dependent variables, I estimated a separate binary logistic regression model for each of the EU-directed activities. In total, there are seven separate models of EU activity. This permits an evaluation of how the issue-specific and broad POS may differentially affect each type of EU-directed activity. The unit of analysis is the migrant inclusion

[16] An index variable is employed in the model due to the presence of multicollinearity between these policy areas.

[17] Polity IV data captures country regime trends over time. See the Polity IV Project: Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions, 1800-2013 (Principal Investigator: Monty G. Marshall; http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm). Polity III data captures indicators on regime type and political authority over time. (Principal Investigators: Keith Jaggers and Ted Robert Gurr; http://www.icpsr.umich.edu/icpsrweb/ICPSR/studies/6695 or ICPSR 6695).

[18] The multivariate analyses use only the measure of a Leftist government (as opposed to the chief executive) due to the presence of multicollinearity between the variables.

[19] Group identity was measured by the following survey question: "Here is a list of issues that may be affecting migrants and/or refugees throughout the European Union. Could you indicate how important each issue is to the activities and political concerns of your group?" Organizations were presented with a list of 17 issue areas. Subsequent factor analysis of these issue areas revealed three distinct dimensions of organizational identity: service provision focus, political/legal focus, and refugee-specific focus. Each of these variables is included in the statistical analyses to control for the effects of group identity on activity. Resources were measured by survey questions that asked groups to report the following information: annual budget, age of the organization, number of volunteers and full-time staff, and whether or not the organization had received a grant from the European Commission to implement a particular project. These variables are also included in the models to control for the possible effects of resources on the ability to act at the supranational level.

organization; the countries provide the background for the activity of these groups. Robust standard errors are used in each of the models, and regional control variables are included to account for any unobserved regional effects across Europe.[20] The following section discusses the results of the analyses.

Results

Organizational characteristics, issue priorities, and repertoires of action

The organizations included in the analytical sample vary on a number of characteristics. Table 1 displays descriptive information on a range of resource and group identity variables.[21] The average group is approximately 23 years old and has over 4,000 members. The average group has approximately 6 full-time employees and 18 volunteers. There is also variance in terms of the issues that groups focus on. Finally, the mean organization does not focus on any specific ethnicity, gender, or age, reflecting a focus on a broad class of migrants and refugees.[22]

[20] This helps to guard against omitted variable bias and adds regional fixed effects to the models.

[21] See Table 2 in the Appendix for national differences in group membership.

[22] I use the term "migrant inclusion organization" as a general umbrella term, which captures a great diversity of interests. I acknowledge that the movement is composed of organizations working on behalf of very different interests, such as legal migrants, asylum seekers, and illegal migrants. Although national and EU-level policy contexts and opportunities for influence undoubtedly differ across these different factions of the movement, sample size restrictions preclude a separate analysis of each. Thus, the sample is pooled to capture how different national policy contexts shape action in the aggregate. Nonetheless, to help parse out some of these differences, I have included dummy variables in the models to capture whether the organization works on behalf of the following groups: asylum-seekers, migrants seeking political and/or legal rights, and migrants seeking services or health care. I discuss this in the independent variables section. A worthwhile future project would involve comparing these different factions of the movement to better understand how the national policy context produces different opportunities and constraints among organizations working on behalf of these different constituents.

Table 1: Descriptive statistics of the analytical sample of European migrant and refugee organizations

Variable	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min.	Max.
No. groups	114	57.5	33.05	1	114
Year founded	114	1990	12.46	1932	2004
Membership	114	4,302	27,104	0	250,00
Full-time staff	113	6.07	12.18	1	90
Part-time staff	112	3.63	6.59	0	50
No. volunteers	113	17.87	61.28	0	500
Income (in Euros)	96	1,141.36	3,419.49	0	119,00
Income trend	112	1.68	0.77	1	3
EU grant	114	1.53	0.57	1	3
Service Provision	114	0.52	0.32	0	1
Political/Legal	113	0.39	0.3	0	1
Refugee-Specific	114	0.46	0.4	0	1
Group focus	112	1.68	0.73	1	3
Group target	112	1.31	0.75	1	4

Note: The Income variable is scaled by dividing the group's income by 1000. The Income Trend variable is coded 1 if income increased over the past year, 2 if it decreased, and 3 if it kept pace with inflation. The EU Grant variable is coded 1 if the group received funds from the EU, 2 if it did not, and 3 if future funds are expected. The Group Focus variable is coded as follows: 1=primary focus is migrants/refugees, 2=primary focus is migrants/refugees and other groups, 3=primary focus is other disadvantaged groups but migrants/refugees are included. The Group Target variable is coded as follows: 1=all migrants/refugees, 2=migrants/refugees of a particular nationality/ethnicity, 3=women migrants/refugees, 4=young migrants/refugees.

Table 2 provides details concerning the issue orientation of the groups in the sample. Approximately three-fifths (61%) of groups report improving tolerance and fighting discrimination as their top priority. In addition, over one-third of the sample focuses mainly on improving the general legal rights of migrants, and asylum procedures (35% and 31%, respectively). A sizeable percentage of groups claim education, employment, and health care as their main priorities with regard to the migrants they serve. Among those issues with the lowest priority are voting in national and European elections. Overall, groups focus their efforts on a variety of issues affecting migrants and refugees. Much of their

discourse concerns service provision and care, as well as attempts to secure legal, political, and work-related rights for migrants and/or refugees.

Table 2: Issue orientations

Issue Area	% Highest Priority
Improving society's tolerance/fighting discrimination	61%
Improving general legal rights	35%
Improving asylum procedures	31%
Improving education/access to education	28%
Assistance with finding employment	27%
Health care provision	22%
Access to housing	18%
Facilitating labor market inclusion (visas, work permits)	17%
Psychological/counseling services	16%
Learning the national language and customs	14%
Improving access to citizenship	14%
Facilitating fee movement	12%
Voting in local elections	10%
Promotion of European citizenship	10%
Voting in national elections	4%
Voting in European elections	4%

Note: N=114 organizations. Figures sum to greater than 100 due to groups being able to select multiple issue priorities.

In addition to their dominant issue priorities, the survey captured groups' repertoires of political action, as reported in Table 3. These organizations engage in a diverse range of tactics that span different arenas, with most activity taking place domestically. The most commonly used tactic involves using the media (80%) to spread awareness and mobilize support. In addition, groups regularly engage in a variety of national-level lobbying activities, including

contacting the local government (72%), holding formal and informal meetings with national civil servants and ministers (67% and 66%, respectively), contacting national political parties (60%) and parliament (58%), and participating in government commissions and advisory committees (46%). Although most of their reported tactics are conventional in nature, more contentious forms of activity are also routinely employed by a sizeable proportion of groups, including nationally-directed protests (47%) and judicial action (37%).

Table 3: Activity repertoires of migrant inclusion organizations

National Level	**% of Organizations**
Media contacts	80%
Contacts with local government	72%
Formal meetings with civil servants/ministers	67%
Informal contacts with civil servants/ministers	66%
Contacts with political parties	60%
Contacts with parliament	58%
Protests aimed at national government	47%
Participate in government commissions/advisory committees	46%
Judicial action	37%
Supranational and International Level	
Contact Member(s) of European Parliament	43%
Contact European Commission	40%
Contacts with the United Nations	26%
Protests aimed at EU	15%
Contact European Economic and Social Committee	13%
Contact Council of Ministers	13%
Contact COREPER	5%
Judicial action in ECJ	4%

Note: N=114 organizations. Figures indicate the percentage of organizations using the given activity often or sometimes.

Outside of the national arena, the most common activities involve contacts with some of the main EU institutions, including the European Parliament (43%) and Commission (40%), as well as interactions with the United Nations (26%).[23] The activities of these groups at the supranational level will be investigated in the following section.

Descriptive patterns of supranational activity

Table 4 illustrates the percentage of both conventional and more challenging political activities that target the EU. [24] The two most common activities are interacting with the European Commission (40%) and lobbying the European Parliament (43%). When it comes to lobbying the other EU institutions, however, the numbers drop off dramatically. For example, only 13% of all migrant inclusion organizations regularly attempt to influence the Council of Ministers, only 13% regularly interact with the European Economic and Social Committee, and only 5% interact with Coreper.

[23] It should be noted that the EU is not the only target of action on issues relating to migrant and refugee inclusion. International organizations such as the UN and the International Labour Organization are also targets.

[24] Table 2 displays rather large standard deviations due to the diversity of organizations in the national-level samples. Within a given country, there is a wide spread in terms of mean membership figures.

Table 4: Supranational-level political activity: frequency of participation by migrant inclusion organizations

Activity	% Often	% Sometimes	% Rarely	% Never
Conventional				
Contact European Commission	15	25	20	40
Contact Member(s) of European Parliament	10	33	25	32
Contact Council of Ministers	2	11	15	72
Contact European Economic and Social Committee	2	11	15	72
Contact COREPER	1	4	11	84
Challenging				
Protests aimed at EU	4	11	16	69
Judicial action in ECJ	1	3	16	80

Note: N=114. Figures are percentages of groups that reported utilizing the given activity to address their primary issues of concern.

Table 4 also shows that 15% of organizations regularly engage in protests against the EU, whether in Brussels or at home.[25] This figure may be expected to increase as the EU develops its common immigration policy and asylum system. Although survey data cannot shed light on protest over time, other research has found that protests in response to EU policies and institutions have increased over time (Imig and Tarrow, 2001; Monforte, 2009, 2014). Finally, only 4% of

[25] This figure would undoubtedly be greater if we were to include protests for which the EU is the source, but the target is the state. Nonetheless, it still permits an analysis of the impact of the POS.

all groups surveyed regularly seek to bring court cases before the Court of Justice of the European Union.[26]

Overall, the descriptive data confirm that the majority of EU-directed activities are conventional in nature. This largely affirms the literature that finds the EU policy process more receptive to institutional lobbying than protest (Marks and McAdam, 1999; Imig and Tarrow, 2001), with the Commission and EP being the most active targets. Yet, it would be misleading to say that these groups never protest the EU. Although the nature of their supranational activism leans toward lobbying, there is still a place for more direct actions in their repertoires. At the EU level, migrant inclusion groups' repertoires reflect a combination of tactical lobbying interspersed with instances of confrontational action.

The POS and supranational activity

This section will focus predominantly on the two most widely used EU activities, lobbying the Commission and EP. Hypothesis 1 stated that the domestic issue-specific POS would be a stronger predictor of EU activity compared to the broad POS. Table 5 shows that for many of the most commonly used EU-directed activities it is actually the *broad* POS variables that have the bigger impact, while the issue-specific POS variables perform less well in explaining these activities. For example, the *policy perceptions index* variable – one of the issue-specific POS indicators in Table 5 – shows that when groups assess their national immigration and asylum laws as relatively open, they are 83% more likely to target the Commission ($p<.10$). Yet, the impact is not as strong relative to the broad POS.[27] Two indicators of the broad POS – a *Left-leaning government* and a *greater number of political parties* – strongly increase the likelihood that groups will target the Commission. Where Leftist governments are in power, the odds of lobbying the Commission increase by a factor of 2.22 ($p<.10$), and in states where there are more political parties, the odds increase by a factor of 2.17 ($p<.10$). On the other hand, the *policy context index* (an issue-specific POS indicator) is not a significant predictor of Commission-directed action after controlling for the broad POS.

[26] The organizations that do report using this tactic are focused almost exclusively on refugee and asylum issues.

[27] At the EU level, the issue-specific perceptions findings deserve special mention, as they play a particularly significant role in influencing action directed toward the European Commission, Council, and Economic and Social Committee. Given the lack of influence that the *actual* domestic issue-specific POS displays, an argument can be made in favor of testing what Meyer and Minkoff (2004) refer to as a "signal" model. This will be discussed further in the Conclusions section.

Table 5: Multivariate results: POS and supranational-level activity

Predictor	European Commission	European Parliament	Council of Ministers	EESC	Coreper	Protests	European Court of Justice
Broad POS							
Competitiveness of participation	---	---	---	---	---	---	---
Federal system	1.57	0.89	0.83	0.76	0.08**	0.77	1.55*
	(0.86)	(0.27)	(0.33)	(0.21)	(0.09)	(0.25)	(0.46)
Left government	2.22*	0.86	0.39**	0.77	0.11**	0.88	2.40**
	(1.23)	(0.34)	(0.22)	(0.26)	(0.14)	(0.43)	(1.09)
Number of political parties	2.17*	1.99**	1.80	2.62***	0.73	1.02	1.46
	(1.12)	(0.63)	(0.86)	(0.93)	(0.45)	(0.24)	(0.51)
Issue-Specific POS							
Policy context index	0.22	0.26	1.10	0.05**	1.47***	1.54	1.04
	(0.44)	(0.43)	(1.99)	(0.07)	(1.19)	(2.12)	(1.58)
Policy perceptions index	1.83*	1.18	1.87***	1.82**	0.05***	0.95	1.19
	(0.69)	(0.32)	(0.49)	(0.60)	(0.06)	(0.24)	(0.40)
Identity							
Service provision	0.96	1.15	1.51	0.57*	1.57	1.14	1.23
	(0.38)	(0.37)	(0.82)	(0.20)	(1.06)	(0.37)	(0.39)
Political/legal rights	---	---	0.54*	1.80*	---	1.60**	---
			(0.21)	(0.70)		(0.46)	
Refugee-specific	0.70	1.21	---	---	9.59**	---	2.37***
	(0.22)	(0.37)			(2.61)		(0.88)
Resources							
EU grant	0.95	0.81	1.53	1.14	---	0.85	0.97
	(0.43)	(0.25)	(0.56)	(0.38)		(0.26)	(0.29)
Full-time staff	1.52	0.97	1.36	1.61*	3.37*	---	---
	(0.69)	(0.30)	(0.67)	(0.51)	(2.76)		
Volunteers	---	---	---	---	---	0.86	1.31
						(0.19)	(0.35)
Age of organization	---	---	---	---	---	0.93	0.84
						(0.27)	(0.26)
Budget	0.87	1.05	0.84	---	0.15***	---	---
	(0.52)	(0.38)	(0.32)		(0.08)		
F=	20.76***	10.37***	16.65***	19.43***	18.15**	12.55***	19.69***

N of organizations=	110	112	111	111	112	111	112

Note: Table entries are odds ratios from binary logistic regression, where the categories are 0=low participation in the given activity (never + rarely), 1=high participation (often + sometimes). These are interpreted as the degree to which odds of participating "frequently" versus "infrequently" increase or decrease along with changes in the independent variables. Odds ratios greater than 1 represent positive effects, less than 1 represent negative effects. "---" = unable to be calculated. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***p<.01, **p<.05, *p<.10.

The role of the broad POS is further highlighted in examining activity targeting the EP. In states with *more political parties*, the odds of contacting the EP increase by a factor of 1.99 (p<.05). In contrast, neither of the issue-specific POS indices in Table 5 are significant predictors of lobbying the EP. As with the Commission, the domestic issue-specific POS does not appear to play a significant role in mobilizing group action targeting MEPs.

In examining the less frequent types of EU activity, the issue-specific POS variables are significant but inconsistent in explaining two types of action: lobbying the Council, and lobbying Coreper, a non-decision making body composed of permanent representatives from each member state that prepares the work of the Council. The *policy perceptions index* (an issue-specific POS indicator) in Table 5 shows that groups are 87% (p<.01) more likely to turn to the Council when they view national immigration and asylum laws as relatively open. Although the strength of this relationship is strong, it is not in the expected direction. On the other hand, groups become approximately 60% (p<.05) less likely to turn to the Council when the *Left is in power* (an indicator of an open broad POS), which one would expect. A similar pattern emerges in examining Coreper. When the broad POS is open in the form of a federal system and a Left-leaning government, groups are 92% (p<.05) and 89% (p<.05) less likely to target Coreper, respectively. This relationship is substantiated by the *policy perceptions index* (an issue-specific POS indicator); where groups perceive migration and asylum policies as more open, they are 95% (p<.01) less likely to target Coreper. Yet, the more objective indicator of the issue-specific POS has the opposite effect. The policy context index variable shows that where national migration and asylum policies are objectively more open, groups are 47% more likely to target Coreper (p<.01). Although the results for the broad POS indicators are consistent across the Council and Coreper, the issue-specific POS appears to play a more mixed role in mobilizing action aimed at these traditionally less accessible institutions, depending upon whether we examine the objective or subjective measure.

A similar pattern can be seen in how the issue-specific indicators predict action aimed at the European Economic and Social Committee (EESC), a consultative body that acts as a bridge between civil society and EU institutions by providing

a formal platform for interest groups to share their positions on EU policy issues.[28] Where groups perceive the issue-specific POS to be more open, they are 82% ($p<.05$) more likely to contact the EESC. On the other hand, where the more objective policy context index is more open, they become 95% ($p<.05$) less like to do so. Here again, the broad POS offers the strongest predictor, as the odds of contacting the EESC increase by a factor of 2.62 ($p<.01$) where groups are based in states with more political parties (an indicator of an open broad POS).

Finally, in examining the more challenging activities of protest and court action, neither of the issue-specific predictors are significant determinants of EU-directed activity. The broad POS indicators also fail to reach statistical significance in predicting EU-directed protest, but they perform better at explaining court cases. For example, the odds of bringing cases before the Court of Justice of the European Union increase by factor of 1.55 ($p<.10$) and 2.40 ($p<.05$) where groups are based in a federal system and where the Left is in power, respectively.

On the whole, the issue-specific POS indicators are either weaker compared to the broad POS in terms of magnitude of effect or statistical significance, or their effects are inconsistent within a given EU institution when it comes to mobilizing action. Overall, the broad POS indicators better explain EU-directed action. Although the issue-specific POS has been shown to play a significant role in structuring migration-related claims making at the domestic level (Berclaz and Giugni, 2005; Koopmans et. al., 2005; Meyer and Minkoff, 2004), it appears to explain supranational activity less well.

Hypothesis 2 stated that groups would be more likely to engage in EU-directed activity when the national broad or issue-specific POS is relatively closed, in an attempt to use the EU as an alternative arena under unfavorable national conditions. When it comes to lobbying the Commission and EP, the results suggest the opposite. In other words, when the national broad POS is *open*, the odds of lobbying these institutions *increase*. More specifically, where groups have access to national political allies in the form of a Left leaning government, and where there are a greater number of political parties, the odds of contacting the Commission increase by a factor of 2.22 ($p<.10$), and 2.17 ($p<.10$), respectively. Similarly, groups based in countries with a greater number of political parties are 99% ($p<.05$) more likely to lobby the EP. This positive relationship between an open POS and EU-directed action also holds when we examine the issue-specific POS, as perceptions of more favorable national migrant- and refugee-specific policies increase the odds of lobbying the Commission by 83% ($p<.10$).

When we examine the lesser-used EU activities, the results are slightly more mixed. In examining activity that targets the Council, for example, groups are 61% ($p<.05$) *less* likely to do so when the Left is in power (an indicator of an open broad POS), but they are also 87% ($p<.01$) *more* likely to do so when they

[28] See http://www.eesc.europa.eu/?i=portal.en.about-the-committee.

perceive national migrant- and refugee-related policies as relatively favorable (an indicator of an open issue-specific POS). Although an open broad POS depresses this activity, an open issue-specific POS encourages it. In this case, the broad aspects of the POS are "relativized or to some extent even counteracted by the more specific opportunity structures of the migration and ethnic relations field…," (Koopmans et. al., 2005: 20). Importantly, the importance of field-specific opportunities in prompting Council-directed action would be overlooked by limiting the conceptual lens to the broad POS. This finding verifies claims to conceptualize the POS by taking into account the characteristics of specific issue sectors.

Similar to lobbying the Commission and EP, groups are more likely to turn to the EESC under conditions of national openness, rather than when the broad POS is closed. They are over twice as likely to target this particular EU body where there are a greater number of political parties at the national level (2.62, $p<.01$). The issue-specific results are mixed, but there is some support for the argument that groups are more likely to turn to the EESC when national issue-specific policies are perceived as relatively open (1.82, $p<.05$).

When we look at the more challenging act of bringing court cases before the Court of Justice of the European Union, again it is an open broad POS at the national level that encourages this activity. Groups in a federal versus centralized system are 55% ($p<.10$) more likely to bring a court case, and where there is a Left-leaning government, groups are over twice as likely to do so (2.40, $p<.05$). The issue-specific POS is not a statistically significant predictor in attempting to bring court cases to the European level.

Overall, in looking across all types of EU-directed activity, the results show that migrant and refugee groups are generally more active at the EU level when the national issue-specific POS is relatively *open*. This finding also holds for the broad POS when we look at the most commonly used activities of targeting the Commission and EP, as well as certain less frequent targets of action such as the EESC and Court of Justice. Further, it applies across both conventional and more challenging tactics. This suggests that, when domestic conditions are favorable, these groups are better able to access the necessary support and resources to take their claims to the EU. Taken together, the evidence does not lend strong support for processes that would be consistent with a purported boomerang effect. If groups were using these supranational institutions as alternative arenas under unfavorable national-level conditions, one would expect to see more negative relationships between the POS predictors in Table 5 and EU-directed activity. We would also expect to see a negative correlation between overall national and supranational activity levels, yet in examining this relationship, the Pearson's r is positive at 0.37 ($p<.001$).[29] Further, only 1% of groups in the sample simultaneously demonstrate low participation in national

[29] That is, if we combine all forms of national activity from the survey into an additive index and do the same with supranational activity, the correlation is positive. The correlations between the national activity index and lobbying the European Commission and the European Parliament, the two most frequently used EU activities, are also positive (0.26 and 0.36, respectively).

activities and high participation in EU-directed activities; one would expect this figure to be greater if they were indeed using the EU to bypass the nation-state.

When it comes to EU-directed activity (and particularly activity that targets the Commission and EP), the results are more consistent with the argument that migrant and refugee groups appear to use the EU as a *supplemental*, rather than *alternative*, arena to the national level. The survey data show that almost one half (47%) of the sample engages in activity across both levels. What can we make of this? First, it underscores the multilevel policy space that increasingly characterizes immigration and asylum policymaking in the EU (Buckel, 2007). As others have argued, this process is both multilevel and polycentric (Monforte, 2014: 6), as it involves both the European and national levels, and it involves various actors across these levels that do not necessarily have the same interests.

Secondly, it shows that taking claims to the EU level may actually be easier for groups based in an *open* national POS, "where social movements tend to rely on more formalized repertoires of collective actions and have more resources," (Monforte, 2014: 16). The fact that migrant inclusion groups do not appear to consistently mobilize and target the EU when national opportunities are closed may also be a reflection of the fragmented nature of the movement (Guiraudon, 2001). Some studies have demonstrated that well-organized movements Europeanize their actions according to different processes compared to more fragmented movements (Imig and Tarrow, 2001; Guiraudon, 2001; della Porta and Caiani, 2007). Organizations operating in well-organized movements, for example, are better able to pool their resources; as a result, they are better able to take their claims to the EU level (Monforte, 2014). As migrant inclusion organizations operate within a fragmented movement, they may tend to rely more on transnational organizations, or European organizations based in Brussels, to facilitate EU-directed action (Ucarer, 2009). To the extent that they connect national organizations with EU institutions, Brussels-based umbrella groups, such as the European Network against Racism, facilitate the lobbying process for their members (Monforte, 2014; Geddes, 2000b; Guiraudon, 2001). Groups may be more likely to take advantage of this in the context of an open domestic POS, when the focus on national policy change is less pressing. Rather than targeting the EU when the domestic POS is closed as a means of triggering a "boomerang effect" to influence national policies (a strategy which would suggest that groups see the EU as a more powerful ally that can be used against national governments), groups in an open POS may target the EU for different reasons, perhaps attempting to influence the emerging supranational immigration regime as such, as part of a multilevel strategy. This strategy reflects Monforte's (2014: 9) idea of "multilevel social movements," which seek to pressure "both European and national institutions through the construction of multilevel campaigns," typically coordinated by a Brussels-based umbrella organization.

As Tarrow (1998) has suggested, the factors that prompt groups to be active in local and national politics can also extend to international activity. Moreover,

the findings underscore the continued strength of national politics relative to the EU in this policy sector. An open domestic POS may provide strength to a relatively weak movement, as groups that win concessions at the national level under an open POS are perhaps more encouraged to influence EU policymaking. Under an open POS, groups may believe that they have the necessary domestic support to take their claims to the EU, increasing their chances of success. In this regard, groups may be attempting to transmit favorable national conditions to the EU level. As discussed further in the Conclusions section, the specific mechanisms that lead these organizations to increase EU-directed activity when the national POS is open should be investigated further.

Conclusions

The purpose of this analysis was to shed greater light on how the domestic POS– in both its broad and issue-specific form – shapes the political activity choices of European migrant inclusion organizations at the supranational level. The results showed that an *open broad* domestic POS is a strong determinant of the most widely used EU activities, while the domestic issue-specific POS is a weaker predictor in these cases. At the same, in examining the full range of EU-directed activities, the domestic issue-specific POS becomes an important factor to consider in explaining overall movement activity at the EU level. Placing more conceptual attention on issue-specific opportunities can help create a better understanding of the range of factors that mobilize action within the migrant inclusion movement.

This study did not find strong evidence to suggest that these groups use the EU as an alternative arena to the nation-state, as studies of other social movements have found (Poloni-Staudinger, 2008; della Porta and Caiani, 2007). Rather, they appear to turn to the EU when the national POS is relatively *open* and, hence, more *favorable* to their goals. This may indicate that they use the EU as part of a multilevel strategy, consistent with Monforte's (2014) idea of multilevel social movements. Under a closed POS, groups may turn more attention and effort to the domestic level, or it may simply be too difficult and costly to act at the EU level when the national environment is unfavorable. Under such circumstances, activists can take advantage of transnational organizations (such as PICUM, the Platform for Undocumented Migrants) to help them overcome resource or political constraints. These transnational "brokers" that help connect national and supranational spaces can be particularly important for practitioners working in the "highest profile" policy sectors that are most threatening to the state (Kriesi et. al., 1995), including those working on behalf of refugees and undocumented populations. Studying the ways in which these transnational organizations represent the interests of their national member organizations is an important line of research in this area, particularly in the context of a fragmented movement reflecting diverse issue priorities and competing agendas.

The processes that lead groups to turn to the EU should be analyzed over time, as groups can be expected to build on concessions they win at home, perhaps choosing to target the EU after they have achieved some degree of success. Although this question cannot be answered with this study's research design, an important topic of future research would be to further analyze the dynamic processes that prompt groups to turn to the EU when domestic conditions are favorable, and how their repertoires of action change over time with changes in the national POS.

This study focused on how well the national POS can explain activity choices at the EU level, but the EU itself presents multiple avenues for influence (Geddes 1995, 1998, 2000b; Guiraudon 2003). A worthy avenue for future research would be to conceptualize and model the issue-specific POS of the EU as it compares to that of the nation-state in explaining repertoires of action. In addition to assessing their relative independent influence on activity, future research should examine how the POS of these two levels interact, since in many ways national and EU opportunity structures are related. Finally, it would be worthwhile to undertake a more explicit cross-national comparison of movement organizations to better understand how different types of organizations respond differently to both the national and supranational POS, which would require a larger sample size than that of this study.

These findings can help movement practitioners in several ways. First, they shed light on where practitioners are likely to find cooperative political allies outside of their own nation-states. The institutional environment of the EU is such that it encourages active participation by organizations in the policymaking process (Imig and Tarrow, 2001). For practitioners with expertise in a particular movement sector, this can translate into the ability to forge important alliances within the Commission or EP.

Perhaps more importantly, the results highlight how practitioners can strategically use the EU as part of a broad and multilevel repertoire of action. The results showed that movement activists (at least in part) focus their efforts across both levels of governance. Given the cost of acting beyond the state, the fragmented nature of the movement, and heavy workloads, practitioners may be better positioned to influence EU policy when they work cooperatively with similar organizations across borders and divide key functions among different segments of the movement, which can be facilitated by a centralized umbrella organization based in Brussels. In sum, the results can help shed light on how to overcome some of the difficulties of operating within a divided movement.

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Appendix 1

European Migrant and Refugee Groups, by Country

Group	Year Founded	Membership	Approximate 2004 Budget (in thousands of Euros)
Austria			
Interkulturelles Zentrum	1987	60	810
Verein fur Zivilcourage und Anti-Rassismus-Arbeit	1999	70	400
Caritas Refugee Service Vienna	2003	15	-
Fair Play VIDC	1997	7	200
Bruno Kreisky Foundation for Human Rights	1976	N.A.	17,500
Megaphon	1995	120	200
Auslander Integrationsbeirat	1996	12	-
N=7			
Belgium			
Le Monde des Possibles	2001	563	40
Mentor Escale	1997	10	250
Migration Policy Group	1995	N.A.	1,000
L'Olivier	1996	30	48
Anti-Poverty Network	1990	26	1,100
Universal Embassy	2001	30	-
Vluchtelingenwerk Vlaanderen	1987	15	19,000
Jesuit Refugee Services	1980	80	250
CRACPE	1997	70	3
Caritas	1974	48	1,000
Church's Commission for Migrants in Europe	1964	21	340
N=11			
Denmark			
Akelin	1995	69	0
Euro-Mediterranean Network for Human Rights	1997	80	800
N=2			
Finland			
EU Migrant Artists' Network	1997	195	20
Refugee Advice Centre	1988	-	-
Finnish League for Human Rights	1979	500	300
N=3			
France			
-	1982	8	-
Femmes de la Terre	1992	-	-
Forum Refugies	1982	100	9,575.06
Centre d'Information et d'Etudes sur les Migrations Internationales (CIEMI)	1973	45	200

Reseau pour l'Autonomie Juridique des Femmes Immigrees (RAJFIR)	1998	50	0
Service National de la Pastorale des Migrants	1972	1,000	70
N=6			
Germany			
Initiative Schwarze Menschen in Deutschland	1999	60	3.6
ARIC Berlin	1993	20	90
Forum Menschenrechte	1994	45	56
Aktion Courage	1992	200	-
Informationsverbund Asyl	1998	8	-
Anti-Fascist League	1946	150	5
Internationale Liga fur Menschenrechte	1997	400	-
SOS Rassismus	1983	250	50
N=8			
Greece			
Research and Support Center for Victims of Maltreatment and Social Exclusion (CVME)	1994	22	60
Antigone Center	1995	8	80
Neolaia Synaspismou	1994	2,000	200
N=3			
Ireland			
African Refugee Network	1997	263	63
Anti-Poverty Network	1990	300	200
National Consultative Committee on Racism and Interculturalism (NCCRI)	1998	-	-
Mercy Justice Office	2000	1,000	170
Union of Students in Ireland	1959	250,000	400
Refugee Information Service	1998	-	300
Nasc: Irish Immigrant Support Centre	2000	200	50
Irish Refugee Council	1992	200	500
Vincentian Refugee Centre	1999	620	177.78
N=9			
Italy			
-	1990	200	-
I Nostri Diritti	1997	20	-
European Coordination for Foreigners' Right to Family Life	1994	50	25
Comitato per I Diritti Civili	1982	9	-
Trama di Terre	1997	150	130
N=5			
Luxembourg			
Service Refugie Caritas	1932	15	-
Commission Luxembourgeoise Justice et Paix	1971	16	5
Centre de Documentation sue les Migrations Humaines	1996	18	100
N=3			

Netherlands			
Discriminatie Meldpunt Tumba	2000	N.A.	-
Steunpunt Minderheden Overijssel (SMO)	1995	26	1,700
Stichting Train	1990	N.A.	170
Bureau Discriminatiezaken Utrecht	1985	N.A.	160
Stichting Alleenstaande Minderjarige Asielzoekers Humanitas (SAMAH)	1999	N.A.	350
RADAR Rotterdam	1983	-	300
Meldpunt Discriminatie Amsterdam	1996	N.A.	280
Stichting Vluchtelingen in de Knel	1996	N.A.	162.5
Stichting Vluchtelingenwerk Utrecht	1976	750	-
Landelijk Bureau ter Bestreiding van Rassendiscriminatie (LBR)	1985	28	1,300
Dutch Refugee Foundation	1976	130,000	12,000
Stichting Vluchtelingenwerk Midden Gelderland	1985	450	1,000
Palet	1997	N.A.	2,800
N=13			
Portugal			
Associacao dos Emigrantes de Tame	1999	340	13.88
Liga de Amizade Internacional	1984	4,000	29.226
Intercooperacao e Desenvolvimento (INDE)	1988	29	-
N=3			
Spain			
Caritas Diocesana	1985	5	135
Medicos del Mundo	1990	75,125	16,623.48
N=2			
Sweden			
Immigrantinstitutet	1973	5	1,653.49
FARR	1988	750	33.276
Afrikagrupperna	1974	2,300	-
Svenska Fredskommitten	1949	1,500	44.355
Filmdays against Racism	1993	80	85.858
N=5			
UK			
North of England Refugee Service Limited	1989	45	2,836.17
Joint Council for the Welfare of Immigrants	1967	1,000	1,205.37
-	1995	100	-
Minorities of Europe (MOE)	1995	200	28.362
European Multicultural Foundation	1996	170	11.323
Manchester Refugee Support Network	1996	13	194.278
National Association of British Arabs	2001	120	-
No One is Illegal	2003	10	-
Student Action for Refugees (STAR)	1994	4,000	142.625
Asylum Aid	1997	60	128.337
Racial Equality Council	1994	80	87.523

Birmingham Race Action Partnership	1999	N.A.	707.662
Refugee Survival Trust	1996	25	101.709
The Runnymede Trust	1968	N.A.	424.675
Positive Action in Housing (PAIH)	1997	250	4,370.31
Bar Human Rights Committee of England and Wales	1991	80	-
The Voice of Congo	2004	12	-
COMPAS-ESRC Centre on Migration, Policy and Society	2003	800	1,017.24
Scottish Human Rights Centre	1970	600	103.372
N=19			
Hungary			
International Law Research and Human Rights Monitoring Centre	2003	16	61.619
Utilapu Halozat	1993	80	32.863
Unity Movement Foundation	1998	6	11.175
Roma Participation Program	1997	N.A.	1028.594
N=4			
Czech Republic			
Dzeno Association	1994	125	0
Ecumenical Network for Youth Action	1995	4,000	300
MKC	1999	-	245.862
N=3			
Estonia			
Non-Estonians' Integration Foundation	1998	N.A.	1,597.79
People to People Estonia	1993	100	0.12782
Estonian Refugee Council	2000	12	38.347
Legal Information Centre for Human Rights (LICHR)	1994	16	0.0975
NGO Youth Union	2001	431	1.917
N=5			
Cyprus			
Apanemi Information and Support Centre	2004	150	80.413
N=1			
Malta			
Euro-Mediterranean Youth Platform	2003	3,100	200
Jesuit Refugee Service	1980	N.A.	-
N=2			

Note: "-" denotes missing data. Missing data were excluded from the analyses. "N.A." denotes "not applicable."

Appendix 2

National Differences in Membership of Migrant and Refugee Groups

Country	Membership	No. Groups	Mean membership	Std. Dev.
Austria	284	7	40.6	44.3
Belgium	893	11	81.2	161.7
Denmark	149	2	74.5	7.8
Finland	695	3	231.7	252
France	1,203	6	200.5	393.3
Germany	1,133	8	141.6	136.6
Greece	2,030	3	676.7	1146.1
Ireland	252,583	9	28064.8	83226.3
Italy	429	5	85.8	84.7
Luxembourg	49	3	16.3	1.5
Netherlands	131,254	13	10096.5	36027.3
Portugal	4,369	3	1456.3	2208.4
Spain	75,130	2	37565	53117.9
Sweden	4,635	5	927	976.3
UK	7,565	19	398.2	917.8
Hungary	102	4	25.5	36.9
Czech Rep.	4,125	3	1375	2274.2
Estonia	559	5	111.8	182.8
Cyprus	150	1	150	.
Malta	3,100	2	1550	2192