Abstract

This essay examines media framing of the anti-globalisation movement (AGM) and AGM summit protests. The majority of the data this essay examines supports a view that insurgent social movements are still framed primarily within a deviant and violent frame, marginalizing and trivializing the movement and its adherents. The emphasis remains on spectacle, drama, confrontation, violence and deviance with classic media tactics of marginalisation, the reappearance of the folk devil and the threatening outsider (whether in the form of foreign agitators, anarchists, Korean farmers or German terrorists) and the use of racialised and sexualised frames to ‘other’ protesters. This emphasis was combined with a dismissive attitude to the movement’s deliberation and policy fora such as the World Social Forum (WSF). Some studies report national differences in AGM framing, while traditional explanatory factors – such as the political inclination of the media, organisational factors, nearness of location - continue to be of importance.

Introduction: media and movements

But this started when they herded us like cattle in a fence
Protesters getting’ restless without an exit
They threatened to arrest us, we pushed back and then
A hail of rubber bullets hit teens and old men...
They tried to blame it on the anarchists, garbage
I was there, I’ll tell you right now pigs started it
But they distort it in the news
‘Talkin’ about stompin’ down Niketown wearing their shoes

- Blue Scholars, Fifty thousand deep, Bayani, Rawkus Records, 2007

The treatment and presentation of social movements in the mainstream corporate media is important to social movements for a variety of reasons. Some

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1 Thanks are due to Alice Mattoni for comradely criticism of the first draft of this essay.
analysts present this in terms of agenda building, with social movements attempting to place issues on the social and political agenda through protest activity: ‘media portrayals of new social movements (NSMs) are critical to their success with their target groups. Ultimately the goal is to change policy. The argument is that by setting the agenda or by setting the way in which a story is framed one eventually gets desired social change. There is increasing evidence that shows how successful agenda-setting not only influences public opinion but also elite opinion, as well as elites’ perception of public opinion. This triple effect is the ultimate objective of anyone seeking media coverage’ (Miljan and Lee 2003: 6). Regarding globalisation and the anti-globalisation movement (AGM) ‘the way in which the WTO meetings, the officials involved, and the conflicts, both without and within the walls of the conference, are presented through the media will determine the public opinion formed on critical global issues’ (Goeddertz and Kraidy 2003: 81). This public opinion is what others term ‘common sense’, the accepted version, the hegemonic description of reality.

Media treatment is also important due to its effects on public mobilization: a comparison of German protest against INF [intermediate nuclear range forces] missiles, the Gulf war and the NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organisation) involvement in Bosnia concluded ‘media framing of issues can matter tremendously for social movements’ capacity to mobilize, and perhaps particularly for instrumental movements that focus primarily on policy issues rather than on sub-cultural identity or subcultures’ (Cooper 2002: 74). Finally media demonization and criminalization of movements can have an effect on movement activities and their policing: media frames are not only important for winning theoretical battles and reinforcing hegemonic versions of the social contract, they are also relevant to the battles on and for the streets. If movements are framed as deviant and criminal, it follows that repression is understandable, if not required. Newspapers stoke outrage, anticipate protester violence and cheerily support police violence. The media creation of an expectation of violence through anticipatory coverage that frames forthcoming protests as violent operates to chill dissent and protest, while pre-emptively legitimising police violence, surveillance and repression.

From the above it’s clear that the interaction between media and social movements is of major importance to understanding movement strategies, successes and failures. The AGM is an excellent subject for this, as its transnational nature facilitates the examination of media and movements at least transnationally, if not globally. This essay is an attempt to bring together in one place and review material in the English language on the treatment of the anti-globalisation movement (AGM) by the corporate mass media: it uses primarily academic sources, supplemented by material from activists and media fairness organisations. The definition of the AGM (or alterglobalisation or global justice movement) has been the subject of much controversy. For the purposes of this essay the AGM is the transnational social movement which grew in response to economic globalisation, originating in opposition to World Bank
and IMF (International Monetary Fund) policies of structural adjustment in peripheral countries and whose main manifestations have been mass mobilisations at the summits of international financial institutions (IFIs) and inter-governmental organisations (IGOs) and participation in a variety of global, regional and national social fora. While the AGM has overlapped with, and in the US for a period morphed into an anti-war movement, for reasons of space I will exclude consideration of the media treatment of anti-war activism. (Cushion 2004, 2007; Dardis 2006; Klein, Byerly and McEachern 2009). Similarly I will not deal with the development and use by the AGM of its own alternative media, aside from occasional comments which I may be unable to resist. Furthermore I will deal only with English-language contributions. Regrettably my lack of foreign language skills means I am unable to report on such work as Rucht and Teune (2008) and Rucht and Teune (n.d.) on the G-8 protests in the German media, Tartaglia and Greganti (2002) on the Italian media’s treatment of Genoa, Yla-Anttila (2006) on the SMASH ASEM (Asia Europe Meeting) demonstrations in the Finnish media, Salerno (2005) on Geneva 2003 or Yegres (2008). Furthermore, recent manifestations of the movement in the Occupy and indignados movement will not be considered, nor will the recent eruption of anti-austerity protests in Europe, again for reasons of space. My concern will be with the traditional forms of corporate mass media – newspapers and television: recent allegedly more democratic social media such as Twitter and Facebook will not be considered. Finally, I need to be clear what this essay does not do. While I have attempted to bring together as much of the literature as I could, this is not a literature survey: many of the papers under consideration, particularly those which have appeared in journals, make interventions in and contributions to a variety of theoretical debates and discussions. To deal adequately with that side of the literature would require a monograph: this essay will concentrate on attempting to bring together the empirical evidence presented in the literature, which will then be available for a wide variety of analyses.

Academic studies of media and protest

Academic attention to mass media is of reasonably recent vintage, with initial work appearing in the 1970s, while the subject received a major boost through the development of media and communications studies. A broad range of academic fields and disciplines have also shown interest in the subject, as shown by the journals in which some of the material this paper attempts to bring together appeared: as well as the expected media, communications, cultural studies and social movement journals, there are articles in anthropology, area studies, criminology, economics, geography, international relations, political science and sociology journals. A variety of approaches is obvious with explanatory or causal factors advanced varying from the macro scale, using systemic concepts such as hegemony (Gramsci), the public sphere (Habermas) and the spectacle (Debord), to the micro, citing journalistic routines, “news
values” and location among other factors. Early studies tended to the macro and were concerned with how mass media functioned to support and maintain capitalist social relations, as well as the media’s disciplinary functions, while later work tended towards the micro scale, with detailed and often technical analysis of media practices and functioning, analysis moved from concern over ownership to concern with the operations of the media. Thus critique moved from political to technical concerns, though these technical concerns could still be embedded in a critical international political economy. These strongly empirical micro approaches find explanations at the organisational level, emphasising the importance of journalistic routines, speedy production of copy, rapid turnover of news and short attention cycles. Other explanations can also be found at the newsroom level, including which reporters are assigned to protest stories: security correspondents, who often act as a conduit for police positions, are likely to provide different perspectives to those provided by reporters whose beat is politics or social issues. Other approaches look at sources used in media reports, finding official sources such as state and city officials, police officers and the like are favoured over civil society actors.

A trail-blazing analysis of the anti-Vietnam War demonstration in London on 27 October 1968 was produced by Halloran et al (1970). This work by researchers from the Centre for Mass Communication Research at the Leicester University found media reports did not involve ‘various interpretations focusing on different aspects of the same event, but with basically the same interpretation which focused on the same limited aspect – the issue of violence’ (Halloran et al 1970:301). Thus reporters had approached the demonstration with a pre-determined opinion of what the event was going to be and then searched for material that fulfilled this expectation, which material was then reported. Further early English work grew from the sociology of deviance then being developed by Cohen and others (Cohen and Young 1973), with an emphasis on media treatment of social problems and subculture and the creation of media panics and folk devils, a concept easily applied to protesters, while it also intersected with critical criminology (Glasgow University Media Group 1976, 1980). This was followed by an emphasis on the political economy of the media, associated with an international political economy looking at corporate monopolization of the mass media (Schiller 1981) and the imbalance between core and peripheral country control of the media (Mattelart 1979).

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2 As Rechitsky (2005) notes ‘much of this new scholarship is coming predominantly from critical media studies perspectives’ while older studies ‘were grounded in sociological theory’. There may be a parallel here with what has been described as the disappearance of capitalism as an explanatory factor in social movement studies (Goodwin n.d.).

3 This was concerned not just with national but also global media imbalances and was associated with a political project calling for a New International Information Order, of a similar nature to calls then prevalent for a NIEO (new international economic order) which, just like the NIEO also in demand at the time, failed to appear.
Among questions raised here were if the media is owned by conglomerates, with economic interests outside the media, how does the wider interests of the media owners impact on their reporting and editorial bias? The next move forward was the development in the USA by Herman and Chomsky of the Propaganda Model which argues dissenting voices and news are excluded by the use of five filters—media ownership, advertising, reliance on official sources, flak (pressure on media from governments and corporations) and anti-communism. However despite its broad applicability, the Propaganda Model has faced strong criticism (Robertson 2010) and is not popular with media academics.

A seminal text appeared in 1980 with Gitlin’s examination of media treatment of the Students for a Democratic Society (SDS) and the anti-Vietnam war movement. Gitlin’s empirical examination showed the media’s framing of the movement and its effects on the movement and the SDS.

Gitlin’s analysis of media treatment of the SDS identified the following framing devices:

The early framing devices involved:
- trivilization (making light of movement language, dress, age, style and goals);
- polarization (emphasising counterdemonstrations, and balancing the antiwar movement against ultra-Right and neo-Nazi groups as equivalent “extremists”)
- emphasis on internal dissension;
- marginalization (showing demonstrators to be deviant or unrepresentative);
- disparagement by numbers (under-counting);
- disparagement of the movement’s effectiveness. (Gitlin 1980:28-29, emphases in original).

These frames were joined later, following the adoption by parts of the movement of more militant tactics, by a further set of frames:

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4 One example is provided by the contentious NAFTA (North American Free Trade Agreement) 1993 debates in The Washington Post, which was ‘overwhelmingly supportive of the free trade act, with 63 feet worth of pro-NAFTA editorials and columns, compared to only 11 feet of anti-NAFTA commentary’ while 71% of expert sources in news coverage was pro-NAFTA, with 17% opposed. The paper failed to ‘disclose to its readers that its owners stood to make hundreds of millions in forgiven licensing fees from a rider attached to the treaty’ (Ackerman 2003, quoted in James 2002:17)

5 ‘In a sample of 3053 journal articles from 1988 to 2007, only 79 articles (2.6%) made any mention of the Propaganda Model, while in a survey of 48 media, communication and cultural studies textbooks widely used in higher education, only 11 (22.9%) considered the Propaganda Model and only four did so in any depth.’ (Robertson 2010). Despite this Robertson argues that the Propaganda Model remains widely applicable in a range of international contexts and is ‘an essential component in the media researcher’s toolbox’ (Robertson 2010).
-reliance on statements by government officials and other authorities;
-emphasis on the presence of Communists
-emphasis on the carrying of “Viet Cong” flags;
-emphasis on violence in demonstrations;
-delegitimizing use of quotation marks around terms like “peace march”;

considerable attention to right-wing opposition to the movement, especially from the administration and other politicians.’ (Gitlin 1980: 29, emphases in original)

What’s interesting about Gitlin’s work is that it is not solely concerned with the interactions between the movement and the media. Instead of such a narrow focus, their interaction is always considered within the evolving dynamic of not only the movement’s history but also of the national political situation. Thus while media and movement interactions are minutely scrutinised, that scrutiny always operates within a larger political context. This wider view may be contrasted with the narrower view of more recent (professional, technical) literature, which often ignores this wider context of the media/movement interaction it studies.

Gitlin’s work was seminal in the formation of the ‘protest paradigm’ concept, which Di Cicco (2010:136) summarises as follows:

“Protest paradigm” news coverage contains consistent patterns, beginning with criticism of protesters and protest groups –such as an emphasis on protesters’ unusual appearances and demonstration strategies and highlighting the presence of any so-called “extremists” present among them. Such coverage creates an image of demonstrators as fringe radicals. The protest paradigm also disparages specific protests by suggesting disunity among participants and using quotation marks for non-speech items (e.g. “animal rights”) to express journalistic scepticism. Another element of the protest paradigm is an emphasis on dramatic events and images such as violent conflict between protesters and police and other counter-normative actions. Further, public opinion is often invoked in coverage to marginalize protesters and protest goals. Finally, protest paradigm coverage tends to favor the perspectives of authorities over those of protesters, sometimes excluding protesters’ voices entirely.

Recent work by Boyle, McLeod and Armstrong (2012) on the protest paradigm in 13 newspapers from North America, East Asia and the Middle East shows the protest paradigm also operates internationally:

This finding reinforces the central tenet of the protest paradigm and shows that the application of this concept is not limited to a given region. That is, protesters across the world are more likely to receive critical treatment if they pose a threat to the status quo – particularly if their tactics are more extreme (Boyle, McLeod and Armstrong 2012: 13-14).
This paradigm has been supplemented recently by a ‘nuisance paradigm’. An analysis of 40 years of protest coverage in five US papers – *New York Times*, *Washington Post*, *Seattle Times*, *San Francisco Chronicle* and *LA Times* – found increasing coverage of protest as nuisance, with liberal protests more likely than conservative protests to be characterised as a nuisance. (Di Cicco 2010). Emphasising annoyances, inconveniences and interruptions caused by protest to daily life, ‘nuisance paradigm coverage dismisses the method of protests by suggesting that protests cause more trouble than they are worth. Thus, while the protest paradigm typically disparages specific protests or participants, the nuisance paradigm promotes a more negative view of protests in general through an emphasis on perceived bothersome effects that, to some extent, inhere in protest as a tactic. (Di Cicco 2010:136, emphasis in original).

Whether of a macro or micro orientation, most academic studies show mainstream media report on social movements in a biased fashion. Movements can be ignored or not reported on or, when they can’t be safely ignored and have to be reported on, disparaged as marginal, dismissed as ignorant and denounced as criminal. Two types of bias – selection bias –*what* gets reported and description bias –*how* it gets reported – have been identified. (Smith et al 2001: 1400). The existence of selection bias has been shown by those concerned over methodological issues in the study of social movement protest who problematise the use of newspaper data to create protest event databases (Herkenrath and Knoll 2011, Ortiz et al 2005), with Bagguley (2010:617) noting in relation to gender bias ‘many of the discussions of selection bias remain resolutely ungendered’.

To begin with selection bias, one basic method of looking at media treatment of the AGM is to examine the amount of coverage the movement has received. Here an example is provided by Make Poverty History (MPH)’s analysis of the media impact of its campaign in terms of ‘hits’. This simplistic attitude towards coverage is not confined to reformists: regarding the anti-Atlantica protests in Halifax, Canada in July 2007, organiser Pierre Blaire of the Anti-Capitalist Coalition said ‘We’re pretty excited about what happened. We think it was a huge success, especially judging from the international media coverage it got’

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6 A typical example of selection bias in the US media is provided by the example of the the FTAA (Free Trade Area of the Americas) Ministerial meeting in 2003 in Quito, Ecuador and the accompanying demonstrations. Fairness and Accuracy In Reporting (FAIR) observed ‘according to a search of the Nexis database, no major national broadcast television or cable news program in the US did a single story focussed on the protests or the Quito ministerial. Nor did National Public Radio national news programs, or the three major news weeklies *Time*, *Newsweek* and *US News and World Report*. *USA Today*, the country’s largest circulation newspaper, ignored the story as well’ (Coen 2003). This was not due to negligence on the part of reporters: *New York Times* and *Miami Times* reporters did extensive interviews with protest leaders but these did not appear in print.

7 These problems of selection and description bias are important, not only for media studies, but also for the wide range of social movement studies that have utilised newspaper data. (Earl et al 2004).
This quantitative analysis, emphasising the number of hits/amount of coverage needs to be balanced by examination of the quality, bias and framing of coverage. (see Gorringe and Rosie’s methodological critique of MPH cited in the Gleneagles 2005 G8 section below).

Thus the analysis of selection bias needs to be supplemented by the analysis of description bias. The main concept in relation to description bias is framing: researchers examine how the media frame a subject —what’s included and excluded, emphasised and ignored, as well as the tone of coverage, and whether coverage is ‘thematic’ (looks at issues) or ‘episodic’ (concentrates on events). As already noted, in general the media frame social movements as marginal and criminal. Classic studies of media treatment of protest, such as those of Murdock (1973) and Gitlin (1980), show, in the first case, how a predominantly peaceful demonstration was transformed through use of a ‘riot frame’ into a violent demonstration and, in the second, how media marginalise and trivialize a social movement through selective framing. Much recent work on the media treatment of social movements has concentrated on the analysis of framing, with both qualitative and quantitative methods used by scholars investigating the issue.

Recent work has also shown that selection bias operates transnationally, as do aspects of description bias such as gender bias. As part of empirical research examining the use of international data sets (gleaned from English-language newspapers) Herkenrath and Knoll (2011) examined reporting in these sources of protests in three Latin American countries –Argentina, Mexico and Paraguay. They found ‘a mere 5.3 percent of the protest events in Argentina, Mexico and Paraguay recorded in the OSAL archive for the period January to December 2006 obtained coverage in the roughly 2500 English-language newspapers archived by Lexis-Nexis.’ (Herkenrath and Knoll 2011:171) They also found significant national differences, with 14.3% of protests in Mexico, 2.7% of protests in Argentina and only 0.8% of protests in Paraguay receiving coverage, concluding ‘[o]ne of the most important factors affecting the likelihood of international coverage is the location of the protest.’ (Herkenrath and Knoll 2011:176)

A similar study of gender issues in English-language newspaper coverage of protest (for the period August 27, 2007 to August 27, 2009 in 13 newspapers) found ‘men appeared more frequently than women as subjects of stories, as sources in stories, and in bylines’ and ‘gender portrayals in protest coverage differ based on the region of the world where the newspaper is located as well as the tactics of the protest group’ (Armstrong Boyle and MacLeod 2012:10)

8 OSAL (Observatorio Social de America Latina) appears to be a superb database of protests in Latin America maintained by the Latin American Council of Social Sciences (CLASCO), beginning in June 2000 with number 1 (http://bibliotecac.clacso.edu.ar/ar/libros/osal/osal1/) and the most recent appearing to be number 29 in May 2011 (http://biblioteca.clacso.edu.ar/ar/libros/osal/osal29/osal29/pdf)
leading these analysts to suggest ‘the consistent finding that gender disparities occur in both US and international settings suggests that the journalistic patterns and norms that underlie gender disparities cut across cultures and geographic regions’ (Armstrong Boyle and MacLeod 2012).

Other work has shown national differences in how media treat protest. A comparison of Canadian and US television networks’ treatment of protest found ‘Canadian news did treat protest more seriously than US news did... protesters on CBC were more likely to be quoted and for longer segments of time.’ (Wittebols 1996:358). In comparison, ‘with the exception of stories on protests in Eastern Europe during the break-up of the Soviet bloc, US networks emphasized conflict and violence rather than the issues in protest’ (Wittebols 1996:358).

This finding intersects with findings that location is a determining factor in media coverage of protest activity: we should expect to find obvious differences in the level and angle of coverage depending on the geographical location of the protest and the ideological orientation of the newspaper. Thus a paper is more liable to report on a protest in its own country or one that borders on it than one that occurs in another continent. Here we can see a dichotomy between the coverage of the AGM and summit protests as both a global and a local issue. When a summit comes to ground in a particular city in a particular country (with the attendant manifestation locally of an AGM) a global issue becomes a local event which obtains in the local media the coverage of a local event (Seaton n.d). Similarly local concerns can dominate protest against summit meetings, as when anti-US base protests were a major feature of protests at the G8 2001 meeting in Osaka, Japan.

In the following essay we will see vivid examples of the framing of the AGM as a deviant, violent social movement. We shall see the formation of this frame in coverage of summit protests, first at Seattle, followed by the gradual application of the frame to further summits. We shall also see an example of selection bias in the way that social fora have generally hardly been reported on, which also involves an example of description bias, with the media routinely ignoring the boring alternative summits for the more exciting street reporting. But before turning to this literature, we should briefly note the three actors who have strategies to influence the media presentation of summits and summit protests—the summit organisers and organisations, the police and the AGM.

**Media facilitation by summit organisers**

Official organisers of summits attempt to capture media attention through time-honoured methods of facilitating journalists. Press attendees at official media centres will be fed, watered, provided with free access to information technology and internet and, on some occasions, a variety of bribes. Stad (2007) notes the latter in relation to the 1997 European Union (EU) Amsterdam Summit: ‘When the 1997 Summit had ended, we witnessed journalists all over the city logging
wheeled suitcases – part of the press package – stuffed with presents from the EU (bottles of wine, computers...).’ However, once embedded, journalists can have difficulty extracting themselves from the clutches of the organisers: ‘the media village is set up in such a way that once the journalists are inside they do not want (or dare) to leave again to places where they could meet normal people or even encounter activists’ (Stad 2007). According to this author in Europe this tactic reached its climax at Amsterdam in 1997 ‘when the media village was set up in such a way that once entered it was almost impossible to leave’. (ibid). In further examples ‘at Gleneagles 2005 G8...[i]nside the summit security zone, media centres provide workspaces with internet connections, edit suites, radio booths, and space for private conferences given by authorities and summit officials. Including catering provided for journalists, the British government spent £3,852,000 on media facilities and £1,454,000 on transportation for journalists’ (Starr, Fernandez and Scholl 2011: 54-55) while for the Heligendamm summit the German government spent 15 million Euro to construct a press centre. (Starr, Fernandez and Scholl 2011: 55).

**Police treatment of media**

An influence on media treatment of protest not often alluded to in the literature is the police, in particular police treatment of media workers. Recent examples of police management and treatment of media include embedding journalists with the police forces in Miami during the FTAA protests in 2003, restriction and expulsion of journalists from scenes of protest, surveillance of journalists in England and attacks on media workers at various protests. We need to see specific media strategies being followed by the police in an attempt to influence media framing. As Greer and MacLaughlin (2010:1044) note ‘Police forces now have well resourced communications officers to ensure that ‘brand’ image and message are accurately and/or positively represented to key stakeholder audiences’, while Starr, Fernandez and Scholl (2011:54) note ‘media strategies are an increasingly important dimension of the social control of dissent’. In the case of the London G20 protests, the police ‘released a barrage of press statements before the protests which served to pre-emptively quell criticism of their actions on the day’ (Younis 2009).

One particular police practice has been the adoption of the practice of embedding reporters with police, a practice previously adopted by American troops in Iraq. (Pfau et al 2004, 2005) This became particularly obvious in the case of the Miami model, where embedding of reporters was one aspect of the model.9 The effects of embedding are obvious: ‘by occupying police space, the

9 An even more extreme example of embedding is given by Greer and McLaughlin (2010:1060) who report how, in the case of the media treatment of the protests at G20 (Group of 20) London 2009, ‘the police perspective... was further reinforced when, on 3 April, journalists were allowed to join follow-up police raids on squats used by alleged ‘ring leaders’ of the groups accused of orchestrating the violence [at the protests]’. 
embedded journalists experienced the protest from the subject position of the police’ (Mihal n.d.: 18). Similarly in relation to photographers ‘since visual images from embedded protesters (sic) are framed from the police’s line of sight, it would be expected that most images of protesters would be produced from the police’s subject position’ (Mihal n.d.: 19) While the resulting coverage was sympathetic to the police, some embedded journalists admitted it was lacking in depth and diversity, due to their inability to move between police and protesters. (Pacenti 2004). Embedding journalists ensures the situation is seen from the point of view of the force in which the reported is embedded: which side of the police line reporters and photographers are on can have a major impact on reportage. Thus one of the few stories in the mainstream coverage of Seattle that conveyed the reality of police brutality was provided by the coverage of his own arrest by Keri Murakami of The Seattle Post-Intelligencer (2/12/99, quoted in Ackerman 2000): ‘Three Seattle police officers slammed me to the pavement, handcuffed me and threw me into the van. I was charged with failing to disperse even though I showed them reporter’s credentials and repeatedly said I was just covering a story’.

One obvious reason for police interference with journalists is the desire to prevent police behaviour being recorded. In relation to Heiligendamm, the Committee for Fundamental Rights and Democracy reported

On Thursday, media representatives who were present on the field next to the West Gate were asked to leave the area. The police announced they had one last chance to leave through police cordons, otherwise they would endanger themselves and the police’s work. Such a blatant threat— which borders on coercion— towards journalists who want to carry out their job of reporting highlights how openly and (sic) the police attempted to prevent any public scrutiny of their actions. (Steven 2007).

Sometimes police also attack accompanying mainstream media when attacking protesters, either by chance or to prevent recording and reporting of police violence. In Melbourne at the S11 WEF (World Economic Forum) protests in September 2000, Barrett (2000:15-16) reports:

Police had waited for darkness before launching the evening baton-charge. When TV camera crews turned on their lights for filming, a police officer is heard on one crew’s soundtrack ordering them to “turn those lights off”. The police targeted people who were holding cameras. SBS-TV’s script reported “Police attacked indiscriminately. TV crews appear to have been targeted. SBS cameraman Luke Roche was attacked [by police] from behind [by batons]. Roche’s footage showed the police advancing on him, then threatening him, before assaulting him, as his camera fell to the ground, still filming. Channel Seven News reported “Several officers turned on a Seven News camera crew”. And a Reuters cameraman from Sydney, Simon Mossman, was bashed by the police.
Similar reports of police attacks on media come from Genoa (O’Carroll 2001, Niwot 2011:69) and Gothenburg (Vigil 2003:28).

Police surveillance of the AGM can also extend to surveillance of journalists covering the movement as well. In May 2008 the NUJ (National Union of Journalists) wrote to the British Home Secretary protesting against surveillance of journalists and photographers by police, specifically the Forward Intelligence Team (FIT) of the London Metropolitan Police (LMP), calling for an end to intimidation and harassment of journalists and photographers doing their jobs. A statement by Bob Broadhurst, in charge of public order policing at the LMP, said ‘Metropolitan Police FIT officers do not target legitimate photographers. FIT officers are deployed in an intelligence and evidence gathering capacity at public order events. This may include interaction with photographers who, on production of a valid form of accreditation, will be able to continue with their work’. (Incisive Media 2008) The implications of this statement are worth noting. First we see the blatant distance between the police statement and the truth: the NUJ letter cited a recent demonstration at which journalists were catalogued by FIT officers, while also referring to Freedom of Information requests which confirmed the inclusion of journalists on the FIT database. The other implication lies in the existence of illegitimate photographers, who presumably will be targeted by the police, as will illegitimate journalists. This leads from the police perspective to the division of the media into ‘our media’ and ‘their media’. This seems to imply the creation of new offences: felonious photography and felonious journalism. Joking aside, we need to note the generally antagonistic attitude of police to alternative, independent and non-corporate media, exposed at the extreme in raids on Indymedia premises. A useful example of this is provided by a complaint filed with the Seattle Police Department by two students from the Art Institute of Seattle: ‘they claim (and had video evidence to back up their complaint) that a police officers (sic) came up to their car, knocked on the window, and once the window was open sprayed both women with pepper-spray apparently then telling the women “Tape that, bitch”.’ (Dickson 2002:14).

**Movement strategies**

Here we may note the increasingly visual and spectacular nature of AGM protests: ‘the recent anti-global capitalism protests are characterised by their increasingly theatrical nature, oriented not only to their political opponents but more importantly to the media and the public gaze’ (Craig 2002:48). Indeed even traditional leftists have begun to embrace innovative demonstrating

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80 Similarly, following the 2009 G20 protests in London, the NUJ ‘received multiple complaints about alleged police assaults on reporters, the use of cordons and refusals to release journalists from areas in which demonstrators were being contained. Police officers also used public order and counter-terror legislation to stop reporters taking photographs’ (Greer and MacLaughlin 2010:1055)
techniques in AGM protests. ‘At Genoa for example many traditional leftists, including reformists associated with ATTAC [Association for the Taxation of financial Transactions for the Aid of Citizens] and Trotskyists with the SWP [Socialist Workers Party], planned a theatrical action on the southern edge of the red zone, where activists would playfully send thousands of paper planes across the fence’ (Juris 2005: 418). It is possible therefore to view the contest at international summits as being between two spectacles: the spectacle of the powerful enshrined in the summit (with added celebrity when the likes of Bill Gates and Bono attend) compared, confronted and contrasted with the spectacle of the streets. One major area for this struggle is in the media: thus Shumate, Bryant and Monge (2005) can write about media coverage of Seattle as comprising ‘narrative netwar’ in the ‘global mediascape’.

Meade (2008) argues that you have to analyse the framing of the summit along with the framing of the anti-summit movement, presenting the European Union (EU) Accession Summit in Dublin in 2004 as involving ‘a contest over the meaning, relevance and justice of the European project’. We can see from Meade’s account two different results from the media coverage: while protest was delegitimised and policing placed beyond question, on the ideological level the summit was framed in common sense terms as good, beneficial and immune from criticism. She examines in particular the coverage in The Irish Independent which ‘uncritically defended the European project, presented protest as little more than a security problem, demeaned anarchist and foreign protesters and reduced culture to the lowly status of money-spinner’ (Meade 2008: 333). Ideologically coverage in The Irish Independent effectively framed the EU in non-political terms. Indeed its coverage focused on the two most superficial aspects of the accession process, the merry-making planned for Dublin and provincial towns and the high-scale security operation. Reports consistently evoked terms such as ‘party’, ‘fiestas’, ‘celebrations’ and ‘festivities’ to define the authoritative character of the ‘Day of the Welcomes’. (Meade 2008: 337). Thus this was not a political gathering of the elite solemnising and solidifying a political project, but a party and a celebration that the spoilsport protesters were opposed to.

While much of the literature portrays the media construction of the AGM as something done to the movement, in certain ways the movement has also been involved in this construction, sometimes wittingly, sometimes unwittingly. Thus obviously NGO campaigns like Make Poverty History (MPH) and Jubilee 2000 will develop their own media strategies, but parts of the more nebulous anti-summit movement also organise to influence media images. This can be seen in the creation of increasingly complex props such as puppets, effigies, etc. and the adoption of highly visual styles of dress: in the case of the white overalls of Ya

11 For the media coverage of the protests themselves, Browne (2004:140) characterises it as ‘the distortion of what was actually a Garda [Irish police force] riot-control operation without a riot into a dangerous outbreak of anarchist violence’ and the ‘virtual erasure’ of the protesters and their reasons for protesting.
Basta and the Black Block, a highly uniform visual style is adopted, while in the pink and silver blocs, enthusiasts of tactical frivolity, highly individualistic costumes provide ready-made photo opportunities. Other examples would include the Radical Cheerleaders and the Clowns’ Army. Wall (2003) is a useful comparative account of the differing communication and media strategies followed by both NGOs and the radical wing of the AGM in Seattle.

However, certain sections of the AGM, principally the more militant, have genuine reason to avoid the attention of the mainstream media. As well as ideological objections to the part media play in capitalist society and their control by major corporations, protesters have pragmatic reasons for limiting media contact, especially photographic and visual: ‘German police use media images to make a comprehensive database of activists’ faces to aid in the prosecution of more militant activists’ (Stad 2007). Thus one section of the movement may take a principled stance against any cooperation with the corporate media. But here movement ambiguity towards corporate and mainstream media must be noted. Schwartz (2002) provides a useful account of relations between activists opposing an animal genetics meeting in Minneapolis in 2000 and the media covering their opposition. The activists’ suspicion of the media preventing them from receiving some of the coverage they desired: ‘the barriers erected by the International Society of Animal Genetics Welcoming Committee (ISAGWC) contributed to the one-dimensional representation produced by the press and hampered the potential for enlightened discourse many organizers said they hope to provoke’ (Schwartz 2002: 34) The contradictions in movement attitudes to the media came when ISAGWC-affiliated activists called a press conference to denounce police search and seizure of computers and records at a house used by some of the protesters: ‘Rather than view the press as it had the day before –as complicit in the social ills the group opposed- residents of the house suddenly chose to use the press as a vehicle to address one of these problems –police brutality’ (Schwartz 2002: 34).

Others have seen fit to engage the media in an attempt to influence the media’s portrayal of the movement. Organisers of some anti-summit protests have reported on their efforts to interact with and influence media coverage (Stad 2007 and Media G8 International Press Group 2007 on Heligendamm; CounterSpin Collective 2005 on Gleneagles). A useful description of the practical difficulties involved is provided by Stad 2007 from which we extract one illustrative anecdote:

With a few hours sleep and a heroic attempt to shower under ice water at 8AM, you have to answer questions with uncombed hair, in between three preparatory meetings for actions whilst your phone continually rings because your Media Bus has just been confiscated by police with the accusation that it is coordinating ‘militant actions’. The agreement to stay in contact the day after fails to take shape because we are all arrested during a blockade and spend the rest of the Thursday in Guantanamo-like cages whilst all telephones and personal belongings have been confiscated.
Some cases of success have been reported. Kutz-Flamenbaum, Staggenberg and Duncan (2012) report that, in the case of Pittsburgh G8 protests, protesters ‘were surprisingly successful in influencing the way in which they were presented in the local print media.’

A further example of movement use of and response to the media space provided by the hype in the run-up to a summit protest is provided by the case of the EU Accession Summit in Dublin in 2004. While the Irish media produced the routine anticipatory coverage in a violence frame the Dublin organisers did not take this frame lying down and actively attempted to insert their own perspective into the space the media hype had created, most effectively on the national television show The Late Late Show (23/4/04) when a female spokesperson ‘managed to trounce verbally (and with her patently unthreatening appearance) two mainstream commentators who were playing up the dangers of violence on May Day’ (Browne 2004: 138).

The essay proceeds as follows. The next section looks at the general trends in media presentation and framing of the AGM. The following section recounts media framing of anti-summit protests from Seattle in 1999 to London in 2009, including a glance at the visual presentation of some summit protests. This is followed by two shorter sections looking at the media treatment of social fora and the AGM in the periphery. The essay finishes by presenting some tentative conclusions on the media presentation of the AGM, the debate over violence and the contributions and limitations of the literature on which this essay has drawn.

Covering the anti-globalisation movement

Much of the literature looks at representation, construction or framing of and discourses about the AGM and its activists in the media, with a large number of case studies of particular anti-summit and other demonstrations. There is a general emphasis on the marginalisation of protesters through framing them as ignorant, violent, young, etc., with specific examples of protesters being framed as ‘Other’ – as foreign or animal, through racialisation and their presentation as folk devils. Studies can be national (eg Canadian television coverage) and transnational: comparisons are made between different media (television and newspapers), as well as between different countries. Many studies report on pre-summit coverage, accompanied by felon-setting and preparation for violence. This specific aspect needs to be seen in the wider context of the policing and repression of the AGM. (Mac Sheoin and Yeates 2009).

One problem with the available studies is their limited geographic spread. Even though the AGM, and AGM protests, have drawn academic attention specifically
due to its and their transnational character, the majority of academic studies deal with the media treatment of AGM protest within a national context, whether by looking at protests in one country or through looking at media in one country. Many are confined to one country or even one newspaper. Most of the media studied are within core western countries (national studies are of Belgium, Canada and the USA while The New York Times gets serious attention, for example), and media studied often tend to be published in world cities. Studies such as Beyeler and Hubutsch (2003) and Ekcrantz (2004), which reach across the divide between core and peripheral countries, are rare. There is little available on non-core country media treatment of the AGM and AGM demonstrations.

The media frame developed at Seattle was reproduced for later summit protests in the US and was also globalised. Coverage of summit protests in the US media after Seattle involved constant references back to Seattle, as the first such protest in the US and therefore the debut of the summit frame. For example, coverage of A16 in Washington DC consistently referred back to Seattle: ‘The extensive police preparation was a perpetual theme in pre-protest articles, which repeatedly noted the similarities with the WTO (World Trade Organisation) protests in Seattle’ (Boykoff 2006: 212), while for reports of the protests themselves ‘more than half of all newspaper accounts (53%) of the A16 protests compared happenings in DC to the violence in Seattle, while more than a third (37%) of television segments did the same’ (Boykoff 2006:213). Rausch et al (2007), in their study of the New York Times from 1999 to 2004, also document continued references to Seattle in half of all stories on AGM protest. (Rausch et al 2007: 140): thus the coverage was consistently framed in reference to Seattle ‘used as a symbolic reference connoting the threat of civic disorder’ (Rausch et al 2007: 141). For US television network coverage of summit protests Rechitsky (2005:) reports ‘The same clip of protesters kicking down a Starbucks window showed up during the introductory segment of nearly half of all reports covering the events in Seattle, Washington D.C., New York and Miami.’

This reference to previous events is not confined to the US media nor is Seattle the only reference point. Berenson found more than a third of articles on summit protests used an explicit memory-based frame for their reporting: this memory-based frame involved ‘negative references to previous protest activities activating cognitive schemas built during the coverage of previous events, maintaining them and associating them with the portrayal of the new event.’ (Berenson 2009: 6-7) Thus the original frame is reactivated for each new protest. The continuation of a frame across/along a series of protests is helped by the use of these memory-based frames/strategies. Lee (2008), for example, reporting from Hong Kong, presents an image of local media replicating an already existing international frame to which local reporting is expected to conform.

What is interesting is that, even with this limited set of studies, the media treatment of the AGM is not monolithic, despite the globalisation of the media.
In the English-speaking core countries (Australia, Canada, England and the USA) Berenson (2009) isolates a startling difference in coverage of summit protests between major US newspapers and papers in other English-speaking nations (see Table 1 for details). Negative coverage of the protests never dropped below 50% in the US, while it reached a height of 88%. For England, Canada and Australia, only once did negative coverage exceed 25%.

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Seattle</td>
<td>55.55</td>
<td>54.5</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>22.22</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>7.14</td>
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<td>Washington</td>
<td>58.3</td>
<td>62.64</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>13.33</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>16.6</td>
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<td>April 2000</td>
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<td>Prague</td>
<td>69.24</td>
<td>88</td>
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<td>12.5</td>
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<td>Genoa</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>66.68</td>
<td>13.33</td>
<td>8.33</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>25</td>
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<td>July 2001</td>
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<td>Canada</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>62.5</td>
<td>16.66</td>
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Table 1: Percentage of negative coverage across newspapers. Based on Berenson (2009: 9-10).

Another survey which extended its reach to English language papers in South East Asia (Malaysia and Singapore) found the AGM portrayed as having four main characteristics: ‘youthful and middle-class, violence-prone, divided and lacking coherent positions’ (Adler and Mittelman 2004: 192).

The most extensive account of differences is found by possibly the only truly transnational study which examines media treatment of the WEF and anti-WEF protest for 1995 and 2000-2003 in six newspapers from Bolivia, France, Germany, Spain, Switzerland and the USA found differences in reporting on the AGM are related to contextual factors such as the ideological position (i.e. left or right) of the newspaper and the national context (i.e. whether a core or peripheral country) in which the paper is published. Some indication of the differences between the national media in their treatment of the AGM can be seen in the proportion of media attention devoted to ‘violence’ on the one hand and to counter-summits and social fora on the other.
In a later publication from the same research project, with extended results from the inclusion of WTO protest and the addition of the Times of India to the papers reviewed, Beyeler and Kriesi (2005) found AGM protests received extensive media coverage, with the proviso that ‘the Seattle protests marked both the beginning and in most countries the peak- of newspaper attention towards the movement.’ (Beyeler and Kriesi 2005:102).

For media in the USA, Berenson’s finding of a negative attitude to AGM protests is reinforced by two studies of editorial comment. James (2002), reporting on editorial page coverage for one month around the Seattle and Quebec City summits, found support for free trade positions and marginalisation of anti-free trade positions increased between the Seattle 1999 and Quebec 2001 protests, the first statistically significant. For the attitude to protesters, at Seattle 57% was negative, 26% neutral and 17% positive; for Quebec this changed to 75%.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>NZZ (SW)</th>
<th>FAZ (GER)</th>
<th>LAM (FR)</th>
<th>NYT (USA)</th>
<th>ED (BOL)</th>
<th>CP (SP)</th>
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<td>V/SF</td>
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<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>25.8/0.0</td>
<td>20.0/0.0</td>
<td>5.0/15.0</td>
<td>16.0/0.0</td>
<td>20.0/0.0</td>
<td>18.8/6.3</td>
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<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>27.7/1.5</td>
<td>35.3/0.0</td>
<td>--/--</td>
<td>100.0/0.0</td>
<td>11.1/33.3</td>
<td>0.0/0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>22.0/24.4</td>
<td>18.5/18.5</td>
<td>--/--</td>
<td>38.3/6.7</td>
<td>28.6/38.1</td>
<td>0.0/50.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>40.8/7.0</td>
<td>223.5/11.8</td>
<td>8.6/22.9</td>
<td>--/--</td>
<td>--/--</td>
<td>--/46.2</td>
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Table 2: Percentage of media attention to ‘violence’ (V) and Social Fora (SF) (‘—’ =Data not coded). Extracted from Tables 3b and 3b, Beyeler and Hubscher (2003:10).

NZZ = Neue Zürcher Zeitung; FAZ = Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung; LAM = Le Monde; NYT = New York Times; ED = El Diario; CP = Cape Times.
negative, 15% neutral and 10% positive. (James 2002:9). It is hard not to agree with James that this indicates a consolidation of elite opinion: ‘while print media attention to trade issues expanded significantly immediately before, during and after Seattle, the spectrum of actual debate narrowed within the forum of newspaper editorial opinion before, during and after Quebec’ (James 2002: 19), which reinforces the point that quantity of coverage needs to be balanced by consideration of the quality of the coverage. For the April 2001 Quebec City protests against the FTAA, the US newspapers maintained a pro-FTAA line in their editorials. For the month of April a search of Nexis found 34 editorials supporting the FTAA, none opposing it and one which was ambivalent. (Coen 2001).

Rausch et al (2007) look at framing of the AGM in *The New York Times* from October 1999 to September 2004, allowing them to look at changes in movement framing over time. Their examination of the amount of coverage the AGM received shows nearly half of the coverage they analysed appeared in the period October 1999 to September 2000: what can be seen is a major decrease in coverage following Seattle, including a drop in the number of photographs of the movement’s activities published. Of particular interest here is that every year the number of photographs exceeded the number of written stories, implying that the visual nature of AGM protest activities ensured photographic coverage while news editors also felt their requirement to document AGM activities could be satisfied through photographic rather than written means. What may be occurring is a routinization of coverage of anti-summit protests, with a drop in novelty value following the Seattle protests. They also note what they call a tabloidization of protest through the increasing interest in style and cultural aspects of the movement over substantive issues, increased use of photographs and increased involvement of celebrity coverage. (Rausch et al 2007: 142).

Bennett et al (2004) looked at treatment of the WEF, protests against it and the WSF in *The New York Times* around the time of the WEF meetings in 2001, 2002 and 2003. Coverage of the WEF far exceeded that of the WSF (see below, social fora section). They report an increase in the coverage of protester issues relating to the WEF from 23% of articles in 2001 to 34% in 2002 and 50% in 2003. However, while 40% of activist issues were sourced to protesters, 53% were sourced to WEF officials (Bennett et al 2004: 447,448). Thus, by referring to issues protesters had placed on the agenda, in a clever recuperative public relations campaign the WEF succeeded in rebranding itself (at least in *The New York Times*) as an organisation concerned with real-life solutions to urgent problems compared with protesters who were framed as anarchists. This was accomplished by the use of the spectre of violence: ‘Protest/violence themes infused 92% of the stories before the meeting, 68% during the meeting, and returned as the most dominant theme (75% of the articles) after the meeting.’ (Bennett et al 2004:448).
Rechitsky (2005)’s qualitative content analysis of the treatment of six AGM protests from 1999 to 2002 on four US television channels found five different discourses – law and order, economy, public sphere, outside agitation and recognition – and ‘no significant differences in discourse across major television news networks’. Discourses of law and order emphasised policing and dichotomised peaceful and violent demonstration tactics: ‘marches and rallies were framed as legitimate, while direct action – non-violent or more militant – was framed as illegitimate “violence” ’ (Rechitsky 2005). Discourses of the economy emphasised the economic costs of property damage and the restriction of general economic activity – in a word, shopping – while the protesters’ agenda was characterised as against local and national economic interests which were identified as ‘export-oriented economic growth’. Discourses of the public sphere involved portraying protesters identity in a trivializing manner as another generation of hippies, dividing protesters into hooligans and cheerleaders, denying their political legitimacy and replacing the previous generation’s communist bogeyman with the latest version, the ‘anarchist’, framed as the ‘criminal element’ in the AGM. Discourses of outside agitation portrayed protesters as invaders who have come to cause disruption in the lives of the locals, identifying local commuters as victims of the protesters. Discourses of recognition granted some legitimacy to protest issues, involving reports on the adverse effects of corporate globalisation and including interviews with experts and with rank and file reporters. Rechitsky (2005) concludes that ‘there is a positive relationship between disruptive and contentious tactics – civil disobedience, direct action and symbolic property destruction – and the quantity and even quality of coverage on major television networks’. He attributes the decrease in coverage over time to the absence of spectacle and ‘violence’.

Gunby’s retrospective analysis of coverage of the AGM on five US television channels shows an early spike in coverage, which then significantly decreases over the period of the study (see Graph 1, Gunby 2011:15) and also reports changes in movement framing over time: ‘While the violence frame, amalgam of grievances, and to some extent the disruption frame are all still prevalent, the ignorance and freak frame have almost disappeared entirely from TV news reporting on the global justice movement’ (Gunby 2011:22). She notes for the period 2005 to 2010 the violence frame was most prevalent (Gunby 2011:16). Around a fifth of reports (21.05%) referred to past protest events as comparators and predictors: ‘This was one way that the violence frame was introduced into a lot of stories where peaceful protests were happening. The reporter would say that the current protests were very calm compared to past events, or that past events indicated that the peace would not last for long.’ (Gunby 2011:21).

For comparison, Canadian television coverage of summit protests was found not to marginalise the protesters, with protester statements given more substantive coverage than those of world leaders attending the summits, while the emphasis given to protester violence was small. Their expectations going into the study were that due to television’s visual nature coverage would
concentrate on spectacle, drama and confrontation, summits with the greatest violence would gain most coverage and the actions of protesters would receive attention at the expense of the protesters’ substantive political message. (Miljan and Lee 2003: 8). The amount of coverage of violence was surprisingly small: ‘The use of tear gas and pepper spray, albeit the image that probably comes most readily to mind with regards to activist/police interactions, actually received only 6 percent of CBC and 15 percent of CTV attention to activists’ (Miljan and Lee 2003: 14). In the context of the general coverage of the protests, less than 1% of CBC’s and 3% of CTV’s coverage of the meetings concentrated on violence. (Miljan and Lee 2003: 14). Duggan (2011), examining treatment of the G8/G20 protests in Ontario in 2010 in Canada’s foremost national paper of record, the Globe and Mail found 43.5% of articles marginalized protesters, primarily through an emphasis on violence, property destruction and civic disruption, 20.9% of articles trivialized protesters, with negative portrayals of movement diversity seven times more common than positive ones, while 14.5% of articles featured frames that dissented from official or authoritative accounts by looking at police brutality and civil rights violations.

The only non-English language media studies available relate to Belgium. Van den Bulk and Bedoyan’s study of Belgian television and newspapers in relation to WTO Doha (Nov 2001) and the EU Laeken Summit (December 2001) found most coverage to be around Laeken (due to physical proximity) rather than Doha (partly due to lack of contestation due to security measures). Generally ‘40 to 50% of all movement news shows or mentions violence, sometimes real violence, sometimes the lack or possibility of violence. The latter clearly implies that the movement and violence are framed as going hand in hand: the absence of violence is seen as strange and riots are to be expected’ (Van den Bulk and Bedoyan 2004:10). A study of mainstream Belgian media reporting on trade and globalisation issues from 1999 to 2002 found little coverage of issues outside coverage of the Seattle, Genoa, Doha and Johannesburg summits. Analysis of the content of this media coverage—categorised as information on the summit itself, background information on globalisation, and coverage of riots and demonstrations—found stark differences by type of media. The quality newspaper has a fairly equally balanced distribution across the three categories, with 40% on the summit, 31% on background information and 30% on the riots and demonstrations. However, the popular press pays hardly any attention to the background information (7%), has 21% coverage of the summit, and focuses the vast majority of its coverage on riots and demonstrations. Remarkably, the news on the self-proclaimed quality television station is quite similar to the popular press in its disproportionate coverage of riots and demonstrations (63%). (Swinnen and Francken 2006: 648) ‘These analysts calculated a ‘riot index’ and demonstrated ‘a significant positive relationship between the riot index and media coverage’ (ibid), a relationship which was especially strong in the popular media, where 86% of coverage of the Genoa summit covered ‘riot-related issues’, which summit also received two-thirds of all coverage of summits in the popular media, which also reported nothing on violence-free
Doha. Again, they observe this concern with violence ‘does not only seem to hold for the tabloids, but for all the media: all media pay most attention to the Genoa summit and least to the Doha summit’ (ibid).

The violence frame

We may note to begin with some peculiarities of media concern with violence. First the media shows an immense preference for protester violence over any other kind: police violence is of little interest. Indeed in some cases where the only evidence available and shown (in highly monitored and photographed protests) is of police violence, media still describe the situation as involving protester violence (see coverage of S11 2000 in Australia below). There is also consistent exaggeration of the amount of violence with small violent incidents presented as typical or defining media images of protests. Even when the police admit that they were responsible for the violence, as in the case of May Day 2007 in Los Angeles, the media can still cling to the riot script. (Santa Ana 2009). In general police methods remain unquestioned, when they are not being encouraged. Fairness and Accuracy in Reporting (FAIR) notes that, while the three US networks reported on the killing of Carlo Giuliani by police at Genoa, ‘none raised questions about the use of live ammunition for crowd control’ (FAIR 2001). Finally we should note the variations in the meaning of the term violence: while police violence is generally expressed through assaults on protesters, protester violence does not require a person as victim: they can be violent towards a shop or bank window or towards other inanimate objects such as cars or statues of Winston Churchill.

In Belgian media coverage of the EU Laeken summit protests in December 2001 ‘almost half of the news about the movement contained references to violence, be it in writing about violence, expected violence or the absence of violence, or in pictures showing intimidating protesters, their effective violence and the consequences thereof’ (Bedoyan, Van Aeist and Walgrove 2003: 14) Similarly, Jiminez, reporting on Spanish coverage of the AGM, noted ‘the AGM media coverage has been bound to the issue of violence’ (Jiminez 2003: 15) while in relation to Gothenburg (Sweden) ‘The frame of violence is already present in the beginning of the week, way before the ‘actual’ violence, which indicates that the media have decided how they will represent the events before they ‘actually’ occur’ (Hultman 2003: 8). The media’s treatment of violence often involves exaggeration and hyperbole, partly as a result of the media’s unquestioning acceptance of official police stories. Thus for the rioting at Rostock before the Heiligendamm G8 protests in 2007, media ran police-sourced stories of thousands injured, including 433 police officers, with 18 officers from Berlin alone reported to be in hospital with serious injuries. Magically, two days later, according to the right-wing weekly Focus ‘no-one was in hospital anymore. This kind of rectification however never makes the front page.’ (Anon n.d.). US television coverage of the Seattle and Washington D.C. protests emphasised violence with ‘nearly 70% of television segments focused on the ostensibly
violent protests’ (Boykoff 2006: 225). This was most visible in relation to Seattle, where 63% of news stories featuring the violence frame, ‘more than half of all newspaper accounts and almost three quarters of every television segment focusing on violent protestors’ (Boykoff 2006: 211). Even when violence did not occur, the frame remained in place ‘as journalists remarked on the lack of destruction, the absence of violence or the potential for violence’ (Boykoff 2006: 211). If the majority of studies on media framing of the AGM emphasis the dominance of the violence frame, we should note a dissenting opinion in a study of The New York Times from 1999 to 2004: ‘Although attractive to news values, democratic-globalization protests with high levels of arrests, injuries and property damage – such as Quebec City and Genoa – did not seem to enjoy high visibility in our analysis. In fact some violent protests received lower media attention and more sympathetic framing, while some events with relatively prominent coverage and favourable frames featured little violence’ (Rausch et al 2007: 142).

**Anticipating violence**

The media has not only reported AGM protests within a frame that delegitimises the protests and vilifies the protesters, but has also been instrumental in building an expectation of violence at AGM protests, thereby justifying and legitimising police actions in limiting and repressing protest. Whether actively participating in a strategy of tension, or simply playing to its own worst instincts, the media has hyped the possibility of violence and thus contributed to state attempts to criminalise the AGM. Anderson (2004) reports a ‘sad but familiar pattern’ in relation to six different AGM protests between 2000 and 2003 in the US which showed ‘the same pattern of police exaggeration, governmental fear mongering and media gullibility’:

> Police officials, aided by a hype-hungry mainstream media, exaggerate the possible dangers posed by consistently non-violent protesters. Using the climate of fear created by this hype to justify their actions, the police consistently engage in extra-constitutional and illegal behaviour, such as mass pre-emptive arrests, the [sic] interference with media outlets, and brutal protest behaviour. Inevitably the mainstream press realizes the hype once the protests are safely over and sheepishly admits its mistakes. (Anderson 2004)

The point has been made more succinctly by another analyst: ‘the media did not just report on the space of terror in Genoa, they helped produce it’. (Juris quoted in Gorringe and Rosie 2005: 4). Even the police occasionally have considered pre-summit coverage to be excessive: in Miami, the Miami Police Department (MPD) considered the anticipation of violence in the media coverage prior to the FTAA to be excessive: ‘The level of alarm in these stories increased as the FTAA Summit approached and it reached a point of near
hysteria in the weeks and days prior (sic)' (MPD 2004). Similar anticipatory coverage is detailed in the case studies below.

For the WEF protests in New York in 2002 a Nexis search of pre-protest coverage found much of the coverage was dominated by 'unsubstantiated commentaries that portray activists as thugs', with a minority comparing protest with terrorism. These articles also referred back to the overwhelmingly peaceful protests in Seattle, Washington DC, Los Angeles and Philadelphia as ‘window-smashing, flame-tossing spectacles’ (New York Daily News 24/1/02), ‘violent mayhem’ (New York Post 20/1/02), ‘radical protesters rampage[ing] through the streets...clashing with police’ (Daily News 18/1/02), ‘wild protest melees’ (New York Times 25/1/02) and ‘violent’ (Newsday 18/1/02) (All quoted in FAIR 2002).

**Other frames**

While predominant the violent frame is not the only frame to which the AGM was fitted: while the possible frame of the justified protester does not seem to be particularly popular, though it does occasionally appear, most of the other frames tend to marginalise the protesters. Boykoff’s analysis of US media coverage of Seattle and Washington, DC. (Boykoff 2006: 209) identified five predominant frames in that coverage – the violence frame, the disruption frame, the freak frame, the ignorance frame and the amalgam of grievances frame (frames which are not mutually exclusive) concluding that ‘the Violence Frame is the most dominant of the five, as it appears in 59% of all mass-media accounts. In other words, the Global Justice Movement was portrayed as violent in nearly three of every five segments’ (Boykoff 2006: 224), compared with 39% for the Freak Frame, 26% for the Amalgam of Grievances frame and 19% for the Ignorance Frame.

I have already detailed the violence frame. The disruption frame (similar to Di Cicco’s (2012) identification of the ‘nuisance paradigm’) combined a focus on protesters’ intention to disrupt the summits with the disruption to residents’ everyday lives and to business as usual caused by the protests. This frame turns local residents into victims of the protesters. (Boykoff 2006: 214,215). The freak frame concentrates on what divides some protesters from the mainstream of society – not just their opinions and values, but their age, dress and appearance. Here ‘the more radical elements of the global justice movement – in terms of both outward appearance and ideology- are transformed into a synecdoche for the entire movement’ (Boykoff 2006: 216). The ignorance frame described activists as uninformed or ignorant: the tactic here is to interview suitably ignorant protesters who are then ‘held up, if tacitly, as representative of the movement’ (Boykoff 2006: 220) As well as being ignorant, however, activists are also protesting for too many causes, leading to the amalgam of grievances frame: ‘negative portrayals of movement diversity were seven times more common than positive representations’ (Boykoff 2006: 221).
Generally the frame operates to marginalise the demonstrators. One tactic is trivialization, a particularly fine example of which is provided by Wall’s analysis of wire service reporting of the dismantling of a MacDonalds restaurant in France by the Confédération Paysanne which shows how this episode in the AGM’s history was reduced from a global to a national and even local story (Wall 2005: 110), while the authors of the action were reduced to a single person, who was then portrayed as ‘likeable yet comical’ (Wall 2005: 106). The wire services presented the action as an individual action by Jose Bove, rather than a collective action. By emphasising Bove’s facial hair and comparing him to a cartoon character like Asterix, Bove was cast as a crazy French folk hero on a Quixotic quest to preserve the purity of French produce. The background of the story –its position as part of a struggle over trade- was lost, with the WTO against whose activities the Confederation Paysanne was protesting remaining invisible in the coverage. Thus ‘the coverage fails to provide any sort of thematic frame that would convey the bigger picture’ (Wall 2005:109).

A further tactic involves invoking the ‘threatening other’ or constructing the demonstrators as ‘folk devils’. For an example of invoking the threatening other, in advance of the March 2002 EU Summit in Barcelona conservative People’s Party spokespeople attempted to pre-emptively link protesters with Basque street fighters (Juris 2008: 87). Coverage of the AGM has also included animalisation and racialization of the protesters, both in the US (Lawless 2001) and Gothenburg, Sweden (Hultman 2003), with the addition, in the latter case, of a metaphor of sexual violence. We turn now to look at the construction of AGM activists as a new folk devil.

**Constructing the folk devil**

Another method of delegitimising the AGM is through the construction of anti-capitalist activists as a new form of folk devil. In the sociology of deviance a folk devil is a class or group of people who have been constructed through media coverage and expert commentary as the personification of evil, a group with no redeeming characteristics. Media production of the folk devil proceeds through exaggeration (including distortion of events reported to increase numbers, violence and destruction involved), prediction (that similar events involving the folk devil will become more violent and destructive) and symbolisation (which sees a word (such as anarchist) become symbolic of status (deviance); objects (such as black clothes and masks/bandanas) symbolise the word. In the process the objects become symbols of the status (and the emotions of fear and hate that accompany the status). When fear within general society of the folk devil has been created, it is expected by the public that the powers that be will take strong action against the folk devil. Donson shows the folk devil being constructed in relation to the May Day protests in London. ‘The ease with which activists are now publicly connected with extreme violence and criminality can be seen in relation to the ritual protest actions of May Day in London. ...in the context of anti-capitalist activists we have the creation of suspicion and fear in the mind of
the public, and the expectation on the part of the police that activists are anarchist thugs. The obvious conclusion to be drawn by the authorities and the media, and therefore to be passed on to the public is that there will almost certainly be trouble.’ (Donson et al 2002:11)

In the run-up to the 2001 protests the media, fed by police ‘intelligence’ and briefings, created through anticipatory coverage ‘a context whereby peaceful protesters were discouraged from attending, and public opinion was prepared for the nature of police tactics on May Day itself’ (Atkinson 2001:147). While *The London Evening Standard* warned ‘Anarchists to loot Oxford Street’, *The Sunday Telegraph* reported Special Branch fears that the WOMBLES (White Overalls Movement Building Libertarian Effective Struggles) were ‘drilling...about 500 rioters in preparation for attacks on the police during the protests’ (quoted in Atkinson 2001:145-146). In a prime example of felon-setting ‘Photographs of suspected ringleaders were circulated to the press during April 2001, despite none having been [32] identified as offenders. Rather they were described in newspaper reports as people ‘suspected’ by police of ‘intending’ to cause violence’ (Donson et al 2004:17). Exaggeration was the tune of the day: ‘Newspaper accounts intoned that anarchists were thousands strong, would carry samurai swords, had links with the Real IRA (Irish Republican Army), had been to training camps in USA, and were ‘battle hard’ from Seattle’ (ibid). As Wahl-Jorgensen (2003:135) notes this coverage involved ‘metaphors of war, invasion, and terrorism’.

Donson et al’s (2004:20) analysis of Prague shows not only ‘how the construction of antiglobalisation activists as folk devils is transmitted across national boundaries’ but also movement attempts to respond to this. While the Czech press, police and police authorities happily adopted the international frame with the usual anticipatory coverage stressing violence and the threat of foreign protesters, strong security measures and political support for repressive action, the actual protests in Prague, with the division of protesters into different coloured columns, and Ya Basta using the traditional white/good, black/bad trope to their advantage by dressing all in white in contrast to black-coloured riot police, showed the difference between the traditional conception of folk devils and AGM members, who reflexively responded in an attempt to undermine their marginalization and construction as mindless thugs.
Framing the summit protests: from Seattle to London

Starting in Seattle: WTO November 1999

The most studied anti-summit protest understandably was that at Seattle. Given that this was the first anti-summit demonstration that received sustained and intense media attention globally it was where the media frame or template for coverage of future demos was first laid down; it also occurred in the USA. The vast majority of available studies concentrate on the framing of Seattle in the US media. I begin with a comparison between traditional and activist media, continue with a speedy review of a variety of studies of Seattle framing in the US media, move on to a detailed analysis of Seattle framing in The Australian newspaper, before concluding by looking at three studies which make substantial contributions to the study of framing at Seattle as well as to wider debates on media treatment of protest.

I begin by looking at a research programme comparing coverage by local, US national and international press coverage of Seattle-related protests with that of activist internet sources. Choosing The Seattle Times as the local, The New York Times for the US national and LexisNexis and Global Newsbank as international sources, the researchers obtained 232 articles from the Seattle Times, 49 from the New York Times, 29 from Global Newsbank and 629 from LexisNexis. (No number was given for the activist sites, but 20 websites were examined). Of the final 54-page chronology of local, national and international protests compiled by Almeida and Lichbach, 83% were reported in activist sites, 33% in LexisNexis, 28.4% in The Seattle Times, 17.3% in Global Newsbank and 10.5% in The New York Times. For coverage of protests in cities outside Seattle in the USA and in other nations, activist sources described protests in 27 US cities and 55 cities outside the USA; LexisNexis 7 US cities and 21 other cities; The Seattle Times 3 US cities and 3 cities outside the USA; The New York Times 2 US cities and two outside the USA; Global Newsbank no other US cities and two cities outside the USA; Global Newsbank no other US cities and two cities outside the USA. (Almeida and Lichbach 2003: 262). For identification of protest groups and NGOs involved in anti-WTO protests, for protests in Seattle, LexisNexis identified the greatest number, followed by The Seattle Times (74 social movement organisations [SMOs]), The New York Times (43), activist sources (40) and Global Newsbank (25). For outside Seattle, activist web sources identified 77 SMOs, LexisNexis 14, The New York Times 5, Global Newsbank 2 and The Seattle Times none. (Almeida and Lichbach 2003: 260-262).

Almeida and Lichbach’s findings are unequivocal: ‘internet sources report the most transnational protest events at local, national and international levels...[they] also reported more SMOs participating in contention nationally and internationally than conventional media sources. However for SMOs protesting locally in Seattle LexisNexis reported the greatest number followed by The Seattle Times.’ (Almeida and Lichbach 2003: 262-263).
This study is useful in reminding us that Seattle was one of a set of transnational protests against the WTO: as Almeida and Lichbach warn ‘If analysts focus solely on the core city of the protests, they obviously miss much of the “transnationalness” that distinguishes this ascendant form of collective action’ (Almeida and Lichbach 2003: 252). Yet this is precisely what occurs in the mass media with successive summits: attention is mainly focussed on the protests in the summit city itself, while the accompanying transnational protests are neglected or ignored. The one case where this is not so is reporting on May Day which often takes the form of a comparative compilation of protests in different cities, when it is actually reported on at all. Thus Almeida and Lichbach note Prague was accompanied by 82 protests in other cities, while protests in at least 50 cities outside Canada accompanied the April 2001 Quebec City anti-FTAA protests (Almeida and Lichbach 2003: 252).

Solomon found coverage of Seattle by The New York Times and The LA Times disparaged protesters as marginal figures (according to New York Times editorial Dec 1, 1999, p.A23, they were ‘a Noah’s Ark of flat-earth advocates’) who failed to understand free trade and its benefits, trivializing and misrepresenting their concerns, while violence (‘defined solely as social unrest and damage to private property, not as environmental damage and human suffering’ [Solomon 2000]) was emphasised. Solomon compared The New York Times and The LA Times coverage (22 reports and editorials) with coverage in the British Guardian and Observer (67 reports and editorials) noting the US papers estimated protester numbers at 30,000 while the Guardian/Observer said 100,000, with the British papers noting the international nature of the protests (both in terms of international protesters in Seattle and simultaneous protests around the globe), an aspect the US papers ignored.

Undrakhbuyan’s analysis of US metropolitan newspapers’ coverage of Seattle found reports emphasised violence, with portrayals of protesters as violent increasing from 14.3% of all articles mentioning protesters two weeks before the protest to 39% during the protest and 48.1% two weeks after the protest (Undrakhbuyan 2009:16). He also found that ‘a significant change took place in the frames of major city newspapers…as a result of the protest’ with the media agenda shifting from the WTO’s official agenda to that of the protesters, at both the level of articles and paragraphs. For the latter he notes: ‘The number of paragraphs devoted to the agendas of the WTO declined by almost half, whereas the number of paragraphs devoted to the agendas of the protesters doubled and remained at the high level even two weeks after the protest’ (Undrakhbuyan 2009:17), with this change being statistically significant. Undrakhbuyan concludes that his findings ‘confirm the theoretical stance that claims that the more the protest is portrayed as deviant the more the message of the protest is heard’ (Undrakhbuyan 2009: 21).

Goeddertz and Kraidy report three frames from their analysis of The Washington Post’s coverage. One frame represented free trade as the engine of democracy, equating US corporate interests with democratic representations of
the US, while another divided the First and Third Worlds, representing the WTO as an opportunity for Third World countries to embrace political and financial freedom. The third frame represents protesters as misguided, at least partly due to the paper’s failure to adequately explain the reasons for the demonstration: ‘The coverage left the average reader without adequate explanation of the reasons behind the demonstrations, leading to the conclusion that the demonstrations were nothing more than an unnecessary disturbance to important global affairs.’ (Goeddertz and Kraidy 2003: 83). The Post did this by a simple stratagem, silencing the demonstrators: ‘we could not find, in our research of all The Washington Post articles on the ‘Battle of Seattle’, any interviews of the demonstrators, nor were their concerns made clear in any detailed positive fashion’ (Goeddertz and Kraidy 2003: 89). This silencing of protesters was confirmed by the impressionistic study by Ackermann (2000) which found protesters were mischaracterised as anti-trade and seldom quoted, while media treatment of police and protester violence lacked balance and neutrality.

Houston (2004: 15,27) finds violence to be the focus of most texts on Seattle he analysed. He identifies the following frames regarding Seattle: the confused protester; protesters hurting those they claim to help; a few bad seeds (the violent protesters) and the no-win police (too liberal or too repressive in their response to protest, either way the poor dears get criticised). The ignorant protester frame also shades into the confused protester frame (as found in Seattle coverage by Houston 2004: 18-19), which is often seen as the result of the diversity of causes united in AGM protests, thus allowing reader to dismiss the protester. Houston (2004: 13-14) also finds a disproportionate reliance on official and police sources in his discourse analysis of newspaper texts relating to Seattle.

This finding of disproportionate reliance on official sources was placed in a historical context by Nambiar, who in a comparison of media coverage of Seattle with the march on the Pentagon found journalists at Seattle cited official and authoritative sources more than did journalists covering the anti-Vietnam war demonstration Nambiar (2004: 61). This represents ‘a growing and almost reflexive dependence on “the official” as the dominant and primary sources’ (Jha 2007: 49). Thus ‘increasing the media’s reliance on sources such as the police, fire officials, owners of damaged property, and other such official sources once again points to a pattern of protest coverage with templates of delegitimisation built into reporters’ coverage decisions’. (Jha 2007: 50).
We now turn to look at the one study of framing of Seattle in a non-US medium. McFarlane and Hay (2003) look at the way ‘protester voices were delegitimized, marginalized and demonized’ through the ‘protest paradigm’ *The Australian* newspaper used to report on the Seattle protests over a two-week period. *The Australian*, owned by Rupert Murdoch, is the only national Australian paper and has an elite readership. Using a mix of qualitative and quantitative methods of content analysis they examined all items (except letters to the editor) that mentioned Seattle over a two-week period (Nov 26 to Dec 10) around the WTO summit, a total of 27 items. They identify five marginalizing frames used by *The Australian*: the first, that of protest as carnival performance – emphasising the circus and carnival atmosphere– ‘obliterated or rendered less visible the protests’ undeniable political content’ (McFarlane and Hay 2003: 219); the second frame, the freak show, emphasised that protesters were marginal to mainstream society by describing protesters’ appearance (clothes, piercings, etc.): ‘Approx 33% of the space given to protesters in The Australian was dedicated to descriptions of their appearance, identity, personal attributes and even their diets’ (McFarlane and Hay 2003: 219), while for WTO supporters no such detail was provided: ‘Attention was focussed clearly on their opinions and statements, not on their dress-sense, hairstyles or diet’ (ibid); the next frame, ‘the battle of Seattle’, utilized the violent crime and property crime frames to situate the protests within an ‘anarchy and violence’ structure which ‘portrayed protesters as being involved in violent conflict with police rather than engaged in intellectual debate with the WTO’ (McFarlane and Hay 2003: 222); another frame linked the protesters both to the 1960s (civil rights, anti-Vietnam war) protests and the grunge generation, presenting Seattle as ‘the latest incarnation of a protest ideology’ (quoted in McFarlane and Hay 2003: 223); the final frame, the ‘idiots at large’ frame, depicted protesters as ignorant and stupid, with little understanding of what they were protesting against while they also succumbed

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<th>Supportive of protesters</th>
<th>Supportive of protesters’ targets</th>
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<tr>
<td>Seattle</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>103</td>
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<tr>
<td>Pentagon</td>
<td>65</td>
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*Table 3: Story valences, Seattle and March on the Pentagon. Derived from Jha (2007: 46).*
to ‘conspiracy theories, leftist mythology, urban legends and childish fantasies’ (McFarlane and Hay 2003: 224). McFarlane and Hay’s five frames have similarities with the five frames Boykoff (2006) discerned in coverage of Seattle and Washington DC A16 in the USA media.

McFarlane and Hay make two other useful observations on The Australian’s coverage: first, the weight of opinion in The Australian was pro-WTO: of the twelve opinion pieces printed during the period only one was supportive of the protesters and critical of the WTO. Similarly sources quoted in the stories were ‘overwhelmingly protest-critical/WTO-supportive’ (McFarlane and Hay 2003: 225), with protest-critical quotes receiving 139 lines compared with 78 lines for protester-supportive quotes. Finally more space was dedicated to descriptions of violence and conflicts with the police (form of protest events) than to protester views (content/context of events) (McFarlane and Hay 2003: 227).

Our final three studies make substantial contributions to arguments over the media framing of Seattle. Shumate, Bryant and Monge present Seattle as a case study of competing frames, both in the national and international media, DeLuca and Peeples argue that, rather than distracting attention from the protesters’ case, the violence in Seattle was the means by which increasing attention was paid in the media to the protest and Rojecki argues that the media, instead of marginalising protesters, became increasingly sympathetic to them over the period of the coverage.

Shumate, Bryant and Monge (2005) look at the coverage of Seattle in the context of attempts by two competing organisations – the Direct Action Network (DAN) and the WTO- to tell their stories or have their frame accepted in what they term ‘narrative netwar’. They outline four frames – three for DAN and one for the WTO- showing ‘how multiple stories can compete with one another on the global mediacape’ (Shumate, Bryant and Monge 2005: 82). They note that ‘three competing DAN identity narratives emerged in the media, while the WTO identity narrative remained unchallenged’ (ibid), attributing this to DAN’s lack of identified spokespeople or leadership, leading to journalists creating identity narratives for DAN based on their own observations (and no doubt sympathies). The WTO frame is characterised by Shumate, Bryant and Monge as ’a vision of the WTO as a beneficient global body that struggles to support the same people and ideals held by the protesters’ (Shumate, Bryant and Monge 2005: 81) with elements of ‘a martyred international governing body’ (ibid).

For DAN the first story framed it as a 1960s throwback, with emphasis on performance, costume and party, thus resembling the Carnival/Spectacle frame. This frame was most obvious in coverage of the early protest (with The Seattle Times noting ‘a crowd that could have been mistaken for that of a Grateful Dead concert and an atmosphere more Mardi Gras than mayhem’) (quoted in Shumate, Bryant and Monge 2005: 78) but also continued through and after the violent frame. They summarise the effects of this frame: ‘Whether nostalgic or indulgent, the stories of the Seattle protesters reliving the 1960s painted the
protests as at best naive... Their protests were merely child’s play or a party’ (Shumate, Bryant and Monge 2005: 78).

The second story, DAN as non-violent heroes with a legitimate cause, most closely resembled the story DAN’s own press package promoted. This story had two elements – first, the largely peaceful protesters and second, police violence. (As they note ‘without police force reported throughout Seattle, this story would not have been possible’ Shumate, Bryant and Monge (2005: 79) ). Noting this was an international story – reported in The New Straits Times (Malaysia), The Business Times (Singapore), The New Zealand Herald and Il Sole (Italy) – they conclude – with significant exceptions like the Australian (Murdoch-owned) and The South China Morning Post ‘the vast majority of English-language international newspapers reported the story of the peaceful protesters with legitimate issues being abused by an oppressive US police force’ (Shumate, Bryant and Monge 2005: 80).

The third story is one we will return to again and again throughout this essay, with DAN framed as violent and irresponsible rioters engaged in the ‘Battle of Seattle’. Major sources for this story were of course police, with the (soon to become usual) anticipatory coverage in The Guardian quoting a City of London Police source claiming ‘the violence was pre-planned’ and Seattle PD Assistant Chief stating in the December 7 Seattle Times ‘These were not peaceful protesters...They were rioters trying to take over the city of Seattle’ (quote in Shumate, Bryant and Monge 2005: 81). This frame emerges as ‘one of the dominant identity narratives’ (Shumate, Bryant and Monge 2005: 80) and was widely reproduced.

DeLuca and Peeples’s research emphasises the influence of protester violence on media coverage: crassly put, more violence means more coverage, less violence means less coverage and no violence means no coverage. For US television networks (CNN, ABC, NBS, NBC) the Sunday and Monday night of Seattle received 10.40 and 13.10 minutes of airtime; on Tuesday, the first day of the protests and the ‘violence’, saw coverage increase to 17 minutes and the story moved to the first or second position on all networks; on Wednesday coverage increased to 28.30 minutes while the story led on all networks; on Thursday the WTO remained the top story on three of four networks and received 16.40 minutes airtime. This coverage of the violence included the voices of the demonstrators both in the opening story, where quotes from demonstrators were interleaved with images of the violence and in the background stories where reasons for the protesters’ actions were covered. They compare this with coverage of the WB/IMF Washington DC protests, where ‘the coverage pattern was almost the reverse of that in Seattle’: on Saturday and Sunday before the meeting opening, the protests were the lead on six of seven news broadcasts, receiving 10 and 13.20 minutes coverage respectively; coverage peaked on Monday with 17.30 minutes but the story led on no network; on Tuesday, though protests continued, there was no coverage; they comment ‘Apparently, without violence or the threat of violence, the protests
were not even worthy of coverage’. The message is confirmed by the experience with Doha, where there were few protests and no violence: ‘Consequently, there was absolutely no TV evening news coverage by the four major networks’ (DeLuca and Peeples 2002:140). They drive the point home: ‘When dramatic violence did not occur in DC, coverage disappeared. In Quatar, where violence was ruled out a priori by the choice of venue, television coverage was nonexistent. Clearly, then, the symbolic violence and police violence did not detract from more substantive coverage of the protesters’ issues. On the contrary, without such violence or its threat, TV news coverage quickly evaporated.’ (DeLuca and Peeples 2002: 141).

They find a similar pattern in coverage by US newspapers (*The New York Times*, *The Washington Post*, *The LA Times* and *USA Today*), where the image of violence was central: ‘As was true for television, images played a dominant role in the print media coverage of the WTO protests. Headline stories were accompanied by quarter-page images (some as large as ten and a half inches across) of police and protesters facing off in teargas-fogged streets’ (DeLuca and Peeples 2002: 141) Of 65 images of the WTO and its accompanying protests printed in these papers from November 28 to December 2, 41 were of ‘uncivil disobedience’, 8 were of peaceful protest, and 10 related to WTO and elite proceedings. The violence led to the front-page appearance of the protests, just as newspapers’ interest had begun to sag:

For the first time, on December 1st all four newspapers ran front-page images of the convention, each opting to display pictures of the violent interaction between police and protesters. Fifteen of the images that accompanied the eighteen articles covering the WTO were of acts of uncivil disobedience or of the violent police response. Two images were of the anarchists and their actions. Two images were of the convention proceedings. Although violence was a focus of the photographs and the lead stories, the papers reported critically claims of the WTO and the predominantly peaceful character of the protests was emphasized. This trend continued on December 2nd, with the four newspapers running a noteworthy sixteen images of uncivil disobedience. (DeLuca and Peeples 2002: 141-142).

The protests increased overall coverage (see Table 10) leading to the conclusion ‘Far from stealing the limelight from the legitimate protesters, the compelling images of violence and disruption increased the news hole and drew more attention to the issues’ (DeLuca and Peeples 2002: 142). The coverage of the violence-less protests at Washington (see Table 4) showed no comparable major spike in coverage, while Doha received less coverage overall (13 documents) than did December 2 in Seattle. (DeLuca and Peeples 2002: 141-143)

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<td>Washington</td>
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As the protests spread to other US cities, the presentation of the protesters in the popular press and broadcast news shifted. Rojecki observes a trend of increasing sympathy to movement positions (Rojecki 2002: 159). Initially, the protesters were framed as frivolous through emphasis on their costumes and actions, and their opinions were trivialized. However, Rojecki notes that "What was noteworthy in USA Today’s coverage was not its initial reflexive *ad hominem* attack on the protesters themselves – their ignorance, disorganisation and violence - but its gradual engagement with movement issues and eventual retreat from blanket characterization of movement participants. Over the course of a week, representatives of movement organizations were invited to make reasoned arguments on behalf of their causes, and reporters and officials distinguished the peaceful majority from a small group of window-smashing “anarchists”. Increasingly sympathetic coverage permitted the protesters to develop a coherent political critique" (Rojecki 2002:161).

Furthermore, the broadcast news carefully distinguished between the mainstream of the movement and the violent minority, while also reporting the protests had become violent "because of police overreaction" (Rojecki 2002: 161, emphasis in original). In its coverage of the day when the Mayor declared a state of civil emergency,

Instead of blaming demonstrators, broadcast media highlighted examples of “out of control” police. Accompanying video footage showed police officers chasing demonstrators into neighbourhoods beyond the Convention Center, and, in one scene
repeated in several network newscasts, a protester being kicked in the groin and then fired on at point blank range with rubber bullets. The movement was not to blame for the city having lost its pride; rather, broadcast coverage pointed to police overreaction and the implied intransigence of the WTO, described as “undemocratic”, “cloaked in secrecy”, and “pandering to business interests” (Rojecki 2002: 162).

Rojecki’s analysis of op-ed contributions to the USA’s three most influential papers – *The New York Times*, *The LA Times* and *The Washington Post* - is also surprising: these ‘reveal anything but a monolithic approach to economic globalization or to its antagonists... Even more remarkable is the continued breadth and depth of the critiques, the majority of which are in sympathy with the protesters’ (Rojecki 2002: 166). Of 16 contributions to *The LA Times* ‘none were antagonistic... and only four... could even be characterized as ambivalent’ (Rojecki 2002: 163). With the noted exception of Thomas Friedman, *New York Times* commentators were ‘as sympathetic to the movement as those in the LA Times’ (Rojecki 2002:165), while some of the material in *The Washington Post* was positive (Rojecki 2002: 164). Rojecki thus presents the media as having played a positive role in presenting the concerns of those protesting against the WTO; indeed he believes ‘the mass media may play a constructive role in building democratically responsive institutions’ (Rojecki 2002: 167).

**S11 Australia WEF September 2000**

To begin with it’s useful to note Passonen’s 1995 research which found the Australian media’s construction of protests to be inevitably violent, with editorial texts setting up a dichotomy between ‘we’ (the police) and ‘them’ (the protesters), with frequent use of ‘battle’ and ‘assault’ metaphors, and the construction of the ‘thin blue line’ as a dividing line between ‘us’ and ‘them’, protecting ‘us’ from ‘them’, often written off on the base of appearance and dress as ‘weird’ or non-serious. (Maynard 1996)

Protesters against the 2000 WEF meeting were denounced with nationalist discourse as unAustralian (Luckman and Redden 2001; Fleischmann 2003): ‘S11 was not an Australian protest. It was a nasty, foreign idea unimaginatively imported from Davos, Seattle and elsewhere, out to ruin Australia’s chance to take its “rightful place” in the global economy with the help of its nice friends in the WEF’ (Luckman and Redden 2001: 27) As Craig (2002:42) notes ‘the WEF protesters not only received negative media coverage, but were often demonised’.

Lacey and Grenfell (2000) trace two main themes in the coverage, one focussed on violence, the other on the diversity (read as incoherence) of the protesters. For an example of the latter, the variety of protesters at S11 was

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Fleischmann (2003:2) notes a foreign hand’s involvement in this demonisation but unfortunately doesn’t identify the culprit: ‘Aided by an American corporate think-tank, mainstream media in Australia started to create an image of the planned S11 protests as definitely violent and a disgrace for the nation in the eyes of the world’. 

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emphasised by Australian paper The Age (12/9/00, p.6 quoted in Craig 2002:41) which noted protesters comprised ‘Friends of the Earth, ferals, socialists, feminists, freaks, schoolkids, clowns, anti-nuke and anti-logging types, thespians, angry young men and women from interstate, even opponents of the regime in Burma and China’s repression of the Falun Gong sect.’ This is what Boykoff refers to as the Amalgam of Grievances frame.14

For the violence frame Barrett (2000) provides a superb day-by-day comparison of TV images and newspaper and television reporting. This reports the expected anticipatory coverage of the protests: ‘the Melbourne media built up the expectation of violence…the protest was labelled as ‘violent’ long before it took place’ (Barrett 2000: 3) By September 9th The Herald Sun was raising the threat from protesters to possibly include ‘arson and chemical attacks’ (Barrett 2000: 4) while a commentator for The Sydney Morning Herald speculated on August 28 whether protesters ‘may choose to spray the police with their own urine, as their comrades did in Seattle last November’ (Barrett 2000: 14). Barrett reports The Herald Sun as most vituperative and most divorced from reality in its depiction of protesters and the protest. On September 15th, for example, it described protesters’ ‘disgusting and violent tactics, including attacking cars, spraying urine on officers, spitting or hurling rocks, marbles, ball bearings, metal nuts and glass’ (quoted in Barrett 2000: 20), with the following day a report of the opinion that ‘the ratbag army of red militants, fiery ferals and clueless snipers asked for any war they may have received at the hands of a dedicated police contingent this week’ (quoted in Barrett 2000: 21).

As Barrett points out continuous verbal denouncements and descriptions of protester violence were undermined by the inconvenient fact that all available television coverage depicted police rather than protester violence: ‘After analysing all the stories and TV footage of September 11-13, I find that the media’s written claims about assaults committed by citizens were, in fact, not supported by (and were, in some cases, contradicted by) the TV coverage. I am not saying that no member of the public committed any violence around the Crown Casino during the three days…My point is that, during the three days, the television coverage showed footage of punches and beatings being committed by police and none being committed by civilians.’ (Barrett 2000:22). Thus, even when evidence contradicts the violence frame, the media can still continue to use the frame.

Gothenburg, Sweden EU June 2001

The major frame or metaphor for reports on the Gothenburg protests in Sweden was war (Hultman 2003: 6). ‘During the summit there was a constant mentioning of a “feeling of war”, “the battle of Gothenburg”, “besieged city”, “guerrilla warfare” or “regular street combats”, while the accompanying photographs were charged with visual references to war aesthetics like people hunching down in the streets or frightened faces taking protection in a smoky environment’ (Fridolfsson 2005: 17). By the end of the week’s coverage the metaphor changes to one of rape, with Gothenburg presented as a raped and violated city:

Many headlines talk about rape and being raped at the end of the week that I have studied. GP\textsuperscript{15} writes for example “Raped Gothenburg” and GT construct the headline “They succeeded in raping the town.” As well as in the headlines as in the article this metaphor is constructed. When DN describes how the police worked on Saturday it is presented as a consequent of a rape. “Lines of containers were placed at strategic places in centre. The police did all it could to prevent a new rape.” The rape is described by the media as a fact, and as a ‘objective’ description of the events. GT writes in a headline “They raped Gothenburg. With masked faces and fist with stones they succeeded in raping Gothenburg”. The newspapers present the reader with a clear active subject and an object for its actions. The description of Gothenburg as a raped object, and thereby feminised object, that was invaded by rapists is also constructed and represented with words as “outrage, ravaged and eliminated” (Hultman 2003:6, emphasis in original).\textsuperscript{16}

If the city had been raped, it is obvious that the rapists are the demonstrators, who are no longer political activists but barbarous and animals, the other, who is also consistently described as black, with the demonstrators ‘reduced to their clothes and its imaginary symbolic of blackness. Blackness is thereby used in the newspaper representation as connecting the demonstrators to an already constructed imaginary of sexuality and anarchy’ (Hultman 2003:7). The demonstrators then are animals, rapists and blacks. Hultman summarises his study of over 800 texts and pictures from six of the leading Swedish newspapers as ‘an example of how included people, white, Swedish and political, might become racialised as a specific other... [which] has the function of reformulating a political struggle for global equity into an animalised biologism’ (Hedkvist 2004: 2,3) Another analysis of three days of visual coverage in the Gothenburg press reports a ‘dramatic overrepresentation of photos of violence. Twelve of a

\textsuperscript{15} GP, DN and GT are acronyms for newspapers whose full names Hultman does not give. From Vigil (2003:14) they can be identified as Expressen, Gothenburg (GT), Dagens Nyheter (DN) and Göteborgsposten (GP).

\textsuperscript{16} The image of the wounded city was also reported for Seattle, which was left with ‘wounds that city leaders say will not heal soon’ (Washington Post 5 December 1999, A02, quoted in Goeddertz and Kraidy 2003: 83)
total of 144 newspaper photographs portray peaceful demonstrators’ (Vigil 2003:23).

In this situation the police became Gothenburg’s defenders against foreign rapists. Thus in a study of Goteborgs-Posten between June 11 and 18 Patrik Hagggqvist notes strong sympathy for police officers, no doubt connected with his observation that the police were persistently used as the main source for the newspaper articles. (Hedkvist 2004: 23). In keeping with the pro-police coverage of Gothenburg in the Swedish press, the use of live ammunition against protesters does not appear to have been controversial for the local press, despite no demonstrator being shot in Sweden since 1931: ‘the shootings of three demonstrators were portrayed as acts of self-defence, and criticism of the police actions that arguably triggered the riots was extremely muted’ (Mueller 2004:143).

Finally Mueller reports decided differences between reporting in Swedish and British papers regarding the protests: while Swedish media was overwhelmingly negative, if not vicious, ‘British newspapers from left (Guardian) to right (Daily Telegraph) tended to sympathise with, or at least understand, them as signs of growing resistance within ‘the people’ of Europe to an ever-more centralised EU-project’ (Mueller 2004:144 citing Enbom 2003).

Genoa, Italy G8 July 2001

Juris sees the media framing of Genoa as passing through three phases similar to those identified by Anderson (2004) in the US. In the first phase –the run-up to the protest- reporting helped spread fear and tension about the protest. For the second phase, immediately after the protest, the newspapers were full of images and accounts of violence and war. The third phase saw the media frame change to a critical view of the behaviour of the Italian police as undeniable accounts and images of police misbehaviour and abuse became available. For the second phase, the coverage of the events of July 20th were embodied in two images: the death of Carlo Giuliani and ‘the appearance of a ravaged, war-torn city’ (Juris 2005:424): ‘the Italian and international press coverage on 21 July was filled with images of burning cars, masked protesters dressed in black hurling stones at Italian police, armoured carabinieri firing tear gas and brandishing shields, and the occasional shot of a bludgeoned protester receiving first-aid.’ (Juris 2005:425).

For the Italian coverage, a useful taste is provided by a second-page article from Il Secolo XIX worth quoting at length:

Black sweatshirts and pants, black ski masks, and red handkerchiefs wrapped around them. Molotov cocktails, sticks, stones and crowbars. The classic image of the violent squatters, which the Genoa Social Forum has spent months working against, descended on the city of the G8, reducing it to a battlefield of car skeletons, burning barricades, and devastated stores. The Black Bloc had a free hand in Genoa for four hours...It unleashed
the most disastrous urban guerrilla warfare ever seen around a summit’ (quoted in Juris 2005: 425).

We should note here as well as the ascription of the violence solely to the anarchists, the ‘vocabulary creep’ involved in the application of the term ‘urban guerrilla warfare’ to the protesters’ violence.

Juris reports the Spanish newspapers were less sensational in their reporting, while also attending to police violence. By July 23rd the frame was already beginning to shift, especially in the international press, with the Spanish paper *El País*, for example, describing the police raid on the Genoa Social Forum media centre in terms that draw on experiences with the Latin American dictatorships: ‘in the middle of a generalized panic, journalists and members of the organization were obliged to lay down on the floor, face down with their hands in the air, in a scene reminiscent of “those experienced in Latin America during the 70s”, as the President of the Genoa Social Forum later pointed out.’ (quoted in Juris 2005: 426), while the same paper also recounted the experiences of a Spanish activist ‘tortured in a police van’ (Juris 2005: 426).

Here the foreign papers were able to report on a local connection by drawing on the experiences of their nationals at the hands of a foreign (Italian) police force.

An exception to the press trend on Genoa is given by Atton who characterises coverage by the English liberal paper *The Guardian* as sympathetic to, and in part reliant on, the voices of the demonstrators, with for example a story of 27 July 2001 ‘using its interview with the two activists to fill almost half the feature’ (Atton 2002:501). While recognising that this inclusion of activist voices is still limited by professional journalism’s ‘routinised insistence that ‘ordinary people’ ... may only speak on matters of which they know’ (Atton 2002:502) Atton nevertheless praises the reporting of *The Guardian* on Genoa:

throughout his reports from Genoa [Guardian reporter John] Vidal constantly explores the complex picture of the G8 protests: the brutality of police raids; the violence of some black block anarchists and evidence for their role as agents provocateurs; the debates between violence against property and violence against the person; the ‘parallel summit’ organised by demonstrators and taking place at the same time as the street violence (Atton 2002: 501).

17 Similar local interest was noted by Luckman and Redden in the case of Australian television reportage on S26 in Prague, which framed Prague in terms of S11 in Melbourne, including coverage of an Australian protester from Melbourne at the Prague protests. (Luckman and Redden 2001: 30).
Hong Kong WTO 2005

Early coverage (October 2004 to September 2005) tended to concentrate on security and protest policing (including concentration on ‘worst case scenarios’), at least partly due to the assignment of security correspondents to the story. In this period, there was a strongly pro-establishment bias: police preparations were rarely challenged and anti-WTO sources seldom mentioned, much less quoted. L. Leung (2009: 255-256) confirms pre-conference coverage as anticipating violence and concentrating on police strategies and tactics to maintain order: ‘the reports confirmed a binary characterization of protesters versus government/police which also served to imprint the dualities of law/lawless, good/evil, orderly/unruly, security/danger’ (Leung, L. 2009: 256).

Lee’s paper traces the coverage of the WTO protests in one elite newspaper, *Ming Pao*: while early coverage maintained pro-establishment and pro-police bias, expansion of reporting (through assigning two reporters to the story in May 2005) led to expansion of coverage, including coverage of protesters’ position. There was a major concentration of media interest on Korean farmers, at least partly ‘because they were identified as likely to engage in “violent protests”. They therefore fit into the pre-conference framing of the anti-WTO protests’ (Lee 2008: 65). For the Hong Kong press, the Korean farmers functioned as the foreign threatening other.

When protests began ‘some Hong Kong media continued to sensationalise the coverage’ - one extreme example being ‘a TV reporter wearing a helmet to do on-site, live coverage when no physical or dangerous conflict was occurring’ (Lee 2008: 66). *Ming Pao*’s presentation of the protests framed them as ‘carefully scripted dramas’ with some positive coverage of the Korean farmers and a relaxation of the ‘law and order’ frame to accept minor police/protester scuffles and pushing and shoving, allowing the protests to be seen as largely peaceful. (Partly this was due to the stationing of reporters both inside the conference centre (three reporters) and with the protesters (two reporters)). Another important factor was a change in tactics by the Korean farmers who, at a midnight emergency meeting ‘noticing the negative news coverage in Hong Kong they received on that first day, they spontaneously changed their tactics.’ (Leung, L.Y.M. 2009: 60). The adoption of the ‘three steps, one bow’ tactic was so powerful that it changed ‘the tone overnight from ‘Korean protesters as violent’ to ‘Korean protesters as hapless victims’ (Leung, L.Y.M. 2009: 58). The protesters also mobilised the cultural resources of highly popular Korean media exports: ‘On the second day of the conference, a fresh array of female farmer protesters took the lead, when they incorporated into their protest strategies the theme-song of the Korean television blockbuster *Daejanggeum*’ (Leung, L.Y.M. 2009: 57). However Lee cautions that, while the law and order frame was loosened, it remained in place, with anarchists substituting for the Koreans as the ‘irrational other’ and an expectation of heightened violence on December 17th, the eve of the last day. Then the coverage changed to the ‘riot script’ when the protesters went beyond what was locally acceptable as protest behaviour.
Here Lee makes the important point that ‘the protests were only somewhat more violent than the protests in the first few days’, shown by an injury count of only 70, 10 being police and only 3 being hospitalised for observation, ‘not a single case of serious injury, and no property damage’ (Lee 2008: 68-69). Lee’s study shows how in particular conditions newspaper reporting can extend beyond the ‘riot script’ in reporting transnational summit protests and ‘news can become much more open to alternative voices normally marginalised in daily news’ (Lee 2008: 71).

Leung also confirms local media focussed on protests over conference proceedings, with less than 20% of coverage in Ming Pao devoted to the conference proceedings and 23 articles in Apple Daily on the protests, while less than 10 were devoted to the conference itself. (Leung, L. 2009: 256-257). The exaggerated reporting of violence was not unconnected with the sensationalist orientation of the Hong Kong media in a highly-competitive market: as one reporter told her ‘we can’t really defy editors’ orders: we were literally told to focus on the violent clashes between the police and the protesters’ (Leung, L. 2009: 260).

Leung presents a more cynical interpretation of violence at Hong Kong as a co-production of state, protesters and media, which emphasises the performance and spectacular nature of the protests: ‘For the government, the staged violence (and the quelling of it) served as proof of government competence and determination, as well as police strength. For the anti-establishment protesters, violence became a tool to attract concern for their plight. For the mainstream media, it became a money-making opportunity.’ (Leung, L. 2009: 266). Leung characterises Hong Kong media coverage of WTO 2005 as involving ‘sensationalized reporting, the almost excessive focus on the ‘violent’ protest instead of the conference as well as the focus on the Korean farmers as the only ‘culprit’ ‘ (Leung, L. 2009: 263) which she contrasts with the British Guardian coverage where the protests ‘were a minor issue compared with the contents of the conference’ (Leung 2009:261).

Gleneagles, Scotland G8 July 2005

Opposition to the G8 (Group of 8) meeting in Gleneagles, Scotland in July 2005 involved a variety of different groups and protests. On the reformist side of the AGM Make Poverty History (MPH) united a wide variety of English NGOs, charities and church groups, while the radical wing organised under the aegis of the Dissent network. MPH operated a major campaign for the year before the summit, including the sale of white armbands and photo opportunities such as a visit by 600 female clergy to the Downing Street residence of the British Prime Minister, culminating in a ‘human wristband’ encircling Edinburgh the weekend before the summit. Loosely associated with MPH was Live8, a musical event organised by Bob Geldof.
Gorringe and Rosie begin their consideration of media coverage of the anti-G8 campaign by looking at MPH’s own evaluation of their media ‘success’. This report, analysing a sample of 1200 press, magazine and online items, acclaimed this sample as generating ‘over 1 billion opportunities to see with an advertising value equivalence of £136.5m’ (MPH 2006 quoted in Rosie and Gorringe 2009a: 5) while at least one of MPH’s three demands –trade justice, debt cancellation and ‘more and better aid’– was mentioned in 50% of these cases. Rosie and Gorringe used the same methodology to draw a different picture of the media coverage of the G8 campaign in the six months before the summit. Their results found that, in terms of ‘media hits’, key words such as violence/violent (504 uses), riot (314 uses) anarchist/anarchy (301 uses) exceeded trade justice (269 uses), drop the debt (298 uses) and ‘more and better aid’ (270 uses), while celebrity Bob Geldof received almost as many mentions (1473) as MPH itself (1516). (Rosie and Gorringe 2009a: 44).

Rosie and Gorringe thus suggest that MPH’s celebration of the number of media hits is not a satisfactory method for the analysis of the media success of the G8 campaign: ‘it is not enough, however, simply to show that certain terms were used…it is imperative to see just how these terms were used’ (Rosie and Gorringe 2009a:44), emphasising the quality of the coverage as well as its quantity. They then proceed to show how media coverage leading up to the summit framed the protests in negative terms, emphasising spectacular possibilities of violence, while marginalising, if not altogether ignoring, the reasons behind the protests: ‘violence and disorder were, from the outset, central themes in the press imagination’ (Rosie and Gorringe 2009a: 43).

Analysis of media coverage in the six months prior to the Gleneagles G8 summit found ‘anticipations of violence and disorder were central themes in the press imagination (Rosie and Gorringe 2007: 8), while the proposed protests were situated largely within media accounts of Genoa 2001, rather than other previous summits (Kananaskis, Canada, Okinawa Japan, Sea Island, USA) where protests were non-violent. Even regarding Genoa itself, they note how media accounts involved a ‘simplistic portrayal of the Genoa protests as violent–even though most protestors were peaceful and that much of the violence involved police authorities’ (Rosie and Gorringe 2007: 4). Reportage focussed on the anarchist and direct action fractions, describing what were open and publicised preparatory events and meetings in conspiratorial tones as ‘secret meetings’, while also presenting these preparatory activities in militaristic terms. A quote from The Times gives a taste of the coverage:

A remote farm in the Lanarkshire countryside was transformed...into a city of well-laid out army tents and marquees resembling a military encampment. The military aspect was no accident. This was a “war summit” where about 300 anarchists –some dressed in urban guerrilla garb in freezing temperatures- had gathered to draw up plans to paralyse Scotland during the G8. (quoted in Rosie and Gorringe 2007: 13).
In pursuit of this theme journalists ‘infiltrated’ ‘secret’ meetings, attended ‘training camps’ and quoted anonymous ‘leaders’ as to their plans for ‘total disruption’ of the summit, while their reports were accompanied by violent images from the clashes at Genoa. The news they brought back with them was frightening indeed. The Scottish Sun (24/6/05, p. 4 quoted in Rosie and Gorringe 2009a:45) warned:

Scotland could become a battleground as protesters finalise their plans to wreck the G8 summit. Previous summits have ended in bloody –and deadly- clashes with police. Anti-capitalist websites give a shocking insight into their plans, which include flaming barricades and the storming of banks.

This treatment was not limited to the tabloids. A brave reporter for The Sunday Times ‘spent six months posing as an anarchist to discover a sinister plan to unleash chaos on Scotland during the G8 summit.’ (The Sunday Times 29/5/05, pp.1.4, quoted in Rosie and Gorringe 2009a: 46).

This mode of reporting conjured up the ‘folk devil’ of the secretive, violent anarchist to create a ‘moral panic’ regarding the planned protests, even the mild-mannered reformist plans of MPH, with the fear that crazed anarchists would succeed in hijacking the protests, ‘threatening to infect legitimate protest, turning ‘law-abiding citizens’ into criminal deviants’ (Rosie and Gorringe 2009a: 48). Thus, despite the attempt by some newspapers to separate ‘legitimate’ and ‘extremist’ protests and ‘good’ from ‘bad’ protesters, the protests as a whole were framed in violent terms. This emphasis on violent means of protest (how) drowned out the reasons for protest (why): ‘more articles contained references to riots, violence and/or anarchists than to Make Poverty History’s key aims’ (Rosie and Gorringe 2007: 9). This violent frame was extended even to the highly respectable MPH: ‘the constant invoking of ‘Genoa’ and ‘chaos’ also characterized coverage of ‘mainstream’ organisations including MPH’ (Rosie and Gorringe 2007: 14). Given that it would be difficult even for the British tabloids to present MPH’s plans in this light, much coverage was devoted to the possibility that militants would hijack MPH’s activities to create disorder. Finally we should note that this violence-obsessed coverage was most pronounced in the local Scottish media: ‘Premonitions of impending violence were most pronounced in Edinburgh’s Scotsman Group titles (The Scotsman, The Evening News, and Scotland on Sunday) –to the point that they constituted a virulent, if localised moral panic.’ (Rosie and Gorringe 2007: 15).

By June the local media were ‘questioning the motives (and sanity) of even the most respectable protesters’ (Rosie and Gorringe 2007: 15).

The MPH march passed off peacefully and without arrests. But MPH’s ‘media-friendly ‘spectacle’, the symbolic ringing of Edinburgh’s city centre by hundreds of thousands of white-clad demonstrators’ (Rosie and Gorringe 2009a: 50) did not provide the main frame or focus for reports of that Saturday in Edinburgh, with competing accounts of the Live8 concert and ‘clashes’, ‘battles’ and
'anarchists storm riot police barricades' dominating media reporting. The latter violent frame was built on an extremely thin empirical foundation: ‘at one point, 60 anti-capitalist protesters were said to have acted “aggressively” and confronted the police in the city centre but there were no arrests’ (The Sunday Express 3/7/05, quoted in Rosie and Gorringe 2009a: 50). Still, why let the facts get in the way of a good story?

London G20 2009

The media treatment of protest at the G20 in London in 2009 is exceptional in that the accepted frame of protester violence changed to one of ‘police violence’ following the death of a London man, Ian Tomlinson: as one set of authors comment ‘what a difference a death makes’ (Rosie and Gorringe 2009b). In the latest of their series of excellent papers on the policing of summit protests in England and Scotland, these authors used LexisNexis to search for articles within 149 newspapers in Britain between January and April 2009. This research found the normal pattern of anticipatory coverage framing the expected protests in terms of the dangerous anarchist folk devil, with a useful example from the liberal, left-leaning Observer reporting ‘growing fears for the safety of people going to work’ along with entertaining tactical suggestions including ‘speculation that protesters will drive a tank to the Excel conference centre on London’s Docklands, where the G20 are meeting’ (Rosie and Gorringe 2009b), including only as an afterthought mention of the major rally planned by the Trades Union Congress and NGOs. As the authors note: ‘it may seem surprising that the Observer declare Government of the Dead as a “leading protest group” whilst largely ignoring Put People First (a broad coalition of trade unions, faith groups, NGOs and charities) but ‘anarchists’ make better copy than trade unionists’ (Rosie and Gorringe 2009b). The point is further emphasised by their analysis of coverage in the Sunday Times of the entirely peaceful Put People First march of 35,000: ‘the march received almost no coverage: a short (300 word) piece’ (Rosie and Gorringe 2009). They concluded press coverage ‘highlighted themes of conspiratorial, secretive and dangerous protesters and a concomitant para-militarization of the policing. Lost in the coverage were ‘legitimate’ and ‘peaceful’ protest organisations, their motivation and policies’ (Rosie and Gorringe 2009b).

These authors note a shift in the tone of coverage in some papers from anticipated protester violence to police tactics, partly due to reporters’

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18 This was echoed in the coverage of the radical protesters’ attempt to march on the summit site at Gleneagles the following Wednesday. Here again an incident where ‘a small group of protesters...left the march and entered a field next to the security fencing’ leading to ‘a minor breach in a fence’ (McKiggan n.d.) was blown up into the ‘Battle of Gleneagles’, even in supposedly responsible and sympathetic newspapers like The Guardian. Needless to say whatever political causes motivated these protesters were not reported on.
experience within the police ‘kettles’ and protesters’ complaints, but mainly due to Ian Tomlinson’s death: what is particularly interesting is that ‘the shift in tone occurred when Tomlinson’s death was still seen as accidental’ (Rosie and Gorringe 2009b). Their work can be seen to have established their contention that ‘culpability for police tactics and their consequences lie, at least in part, with the self-same media who so convincingly damned them after the event’ (Rosie and Gorringe 2009b).

Greer and McLaughlin (2010) look at the same subject based on news reports from 1 March 2009 to 25 April 2009, accessed both in hard copy and through LexisNexis, supplemented by television and Youtube coverage, as well as analysis of the official reports subsequently produced. They agree with Rosie and Gorringe that ‘early press coverage reflected and reinforced an explicit inferential structure built around the default news frame of ‘protester violence’ that prioritised the police perspective on the events of the G20’ (Greer and McLaughlin 2010:1049) and demonstrate this in convincing detail. They then note the change in focus from protester violence to police violence, which they attribute to citizen journalism. Here they note ‘the sheer density and variety of recording devices being used by professional and citizen journalists, private businesses, demonstrators, the police and passers-by’ (Greer and McLaughlin 2010:1050). The decisive moment in the shift in frames came on April 7 when the ‘Guardian’ website broadcast mobile phone footage that appeared to provide clear evidence of police violence against Tomlinson minutes before he collapsed (Greer and McLaughlin 2010:1050-1051) recorded by an American fund manager passing by. As these authors note, citizen journalism did more than simply undermine the news frame of protester violence: ‘it also resulted in numerous official inquiries... and raised wider questions about public order policing and the news media in the twenty-first century’ (Greer and McLaughlin 2010:1053). These authors give a resounding summation of the success of citizen journalism in this case: ‘Were it not for the incendiary ‘visual evidence’ handed to the news media by citizen journalists, the ‘story’ of Ian Tomlinson may never have taken off, the MPS [Metropolitan Police Service] may well have succeeded in denying or defusing allegations of police violence and the policing of G20 may have ended up in MPS ‘Greatest Hits’ portfolio of how to police public order events in the capital. Because of citizen journalism, the operational integrity and institutional authority of MPS were first of all questioned and then successfully challenged’ (Greer and McLaughlin 2010:1054).

As well as more general cultural explanations for the transition from protester to police violence, these authors note two contributing factors: press dissatisfaction with police treatment of reporters working at protests meant that the press, on the basis of their personal experience, were ‘receptive to information that challenged the MPS version of events’ (Greer and McLaughlin 2010:1055) while in recent scandals that undermined ‘the MPS position in the news media ‘hierarchy of credibility’ the ‘official truth’ disseminated by MPS statements had been found to be incorrect and/or misleading’ (Greer and McLaughlin 2010:1056). Later work by the same authors reports how ‘what
began as an *event-oriented* news frame of ‘police violence’ – the activities of an unidentified rogue officer – evolved into an inferential structure that highlighted problems of a *systemic* nature – how the MPS police public protest’ (Greer and McLaughlin 2012:288) with ‘the inferential structure of ‘police violence’ … co-joined in this time period by the additional frame of an ‘institutional culture’ of ‘cover-up and impunity’ in cases of police misconduct’ (Greer and McLaughlin 2012:282).

**Framing the movement in images**

I have already noted the important role photographs have come to play in the media presentation of the AGM. Higgins (2003), Vigil (2003) on Gothenburg and Perlmutter and Wagner (2004) are the only work I found which undertake detailed analysis of photographs published on the subject of anti-summit protests.  


A striking example of description bias is shown by the photographic treatment of the killing of Carlo Giuliani by police during the Genoa G8 protest in July 2001. As Perlmutter and Wagner (2004) note, the photographic icon chosen

is the fourth in a series of 11 images taken in sequence by Dylan Martinez before, during and after Giuliani’s shooting. Rather than feature the scene where Giuliani lies contorted on the ground in a pool of his blood or even an image where the police jeep has backed over his body, the mainstream press selected the suggestive image of Giuliani lifting the fire extinguisher and the police officer pointing the gun out of the back of the vehicle…the content of this image…was selected by mainstream media to assert a simple narrative of protester violence, not police violence. (Perlmutter and Wagner 2004: 102)

Nor was this the only choice made in photographic constructions of Genoa: as an example of selection bias, available photographic evidence of collusion between police and ‘Black Bloc’ activists was ignored by the mass media. The violence in Genoa was dismissed by many protesters as the work of agents provocateurs. These claims were supported when ‘Italian newspapers printed a photograph that showed people dressed as Black Bloc protesters, their faces covered, standing at the gates of a local *carabinieri* barracks. The men in the photo clutched what appeared to be metal rods as a smiling uniformed officer

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9 While Vigil (2003) is exceptional in the amount of visual material it reprints from the press, the orientation of the analysis of that material is tangential to this essay and so will not be engaged with here.
stood nearby. Other pictures showed presumed Black Bloc members engaging in what appeared to be a friendly chatter with police before starting a riot' (Philipps and Trofimov 2001: 10). Needless to say, these photographs did not grace the pages of the international media. Finally,

More revealingly, as a cue to a process of purposive framing at work, many mainstream media sources discontinued their coverage of the G8 by the Monday following Giuliani’s death. It was almost as if once the metonym of ‘anarchist violence provokes police response’ had been shown and written up, the work of these press agencies was complete. (Perlmutter and Wagner 2004: 103)

Thus they conclude that the image ‘served less to show what happened than to direct public gaze and interpretations to framed meanings that, in this instance, marginalised a strike against authority by establishing ‘protester violence’ as the news lead. (Perlmutter and Wagner 2004: 91)

Higgins collected newspaper material from nine English newspapers from July 16 to July 24 2000, yielding 65 texts and 49 visuals, mainly photographs, but also cartoons. Of these visuals, nine dealt with the protests, four portraying a human chain protest at Kadena air base, two portraying marches and one portraying Jubilee 2000’s protests. Higgins gives a detailed analysis of two photographs, one of the human chain (reproduced in the *Daily Telegraph*, *Financial Times* and the *Times*) and another of a student protest (reproduced in the *Daily Telegraph*), as well as the textual context (the headlines, articles and captions accompanying the photographs) noting that, while the human chain photograph presents a confrontational or oppositional action interaction between the protesters and the fence surrounding the US airbase, the demonstration is obviously peaceful and non-violent. Higgins notes that the headline (‘Protesters hijack G8 summit’) and caption used in the *Daily Telegraph* differs from those in the other newspapers, invoking a script of violence. The second *Daily Telegraph* photograph caption refers to helmeted and masked Japanese students: ‘The words helmeted and masked once again invoke images of violence and terrorism. They reiterate the hijack image from the previous day’ with the result that ‘The promise of violence rather than peace is the message we are left with’, leading her to conclude ‘These two photos combine to produce a reportage of expected violence as an introduction to the G8 summit in this paper’ (Higgins 2003:8).

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20 A similar example of police infiltrators dressing as Black Bloc in Gothenburg was reported in a small article in the independent social democratic newspaper *Aftonbladet* (Vigil 2003:28) but the issue of police infiltration and agents provocateurs was ignored in the wholesale coverage of Black Bloc violence by the Swedish press.
Ignoring the Social Fora

Before examining the media treatment of the social fora we should note complaints (mainly by the NGO wing of the AGM) that social fora, alternative summits and similar events organised to coincide with major mainstream summits are routinely ignored by the media in favour of coverage of (preferably violent) anti-summit protests. The following complaint is reasonably typical: ‘Organisers of the G8 Alternative Summit have been very frustrated with the German press’ focus on the images of disturbances on the margins of Saturday’s largely peaceful rally and its lack of coverage of the issues relating to global justice that are being discussed in the week-long affair that is timed with the G8 meeting in Heiligendamm’ (Focus on the Global South 2007). When the choice comes down to the movement in its meetings and the movement in the streets, the media go with the streets. Given this, we should not be surprised if the media did not prove enthusiastic in their coverage of the social fora. Set up as an opposition to the WEF in Davos, the World Social Forum (WSF) initially presented a simple oppositional or comparative frame to the media, a frame that the media used immediately. However the media framed both fora differently, with the WEF being portrayed as sober and businesslike, while the WSF was carnivalistic, utopian and out of control, and thus impractical, often with the use of religious metaphors presenting the WSF as a site of pilgrimage. (Ekecrantz 2004:126).

The treatment of social fora in the media can be examined in terms of the amount of coverage and the comparative coverage of WEF versus WSF – selection bias- and also in terms of the content of coverage –description bias. For selection bias, when we turn to mainstream media coverage of the various Social Fora we are struck by how conspicuous it is in its absence. Thus, in the regularly-produced reports on the WSF by the Swiss group the Centre for Applied Studies in Negotiation (CASIN) noting the limitations of mainstream media coverage becomes an annual ritual. For WSF Mumbai ‘The fourth WSF went largely unnoticed by most of the international mass media.’ (Simonson 2004:47). For 2005 ‘there was widespread criticism among WSF participants this year that, of the little mainstream news coverage of the WSF, the majority of it centred on the Brazilian President’. (Simonson 2005:32). For the Nairobi WSF ‘mainstream media coverage...was fairly limited.’ (Simonson 2007:23). However we should note important national differences. Beyeler and Hubscher (2003: 10) report a comparatively high attention to AGM counter-summits, especially the WSF, in Le Monde and the Bolivian El Diario compared with other European and US newspapers. Contextual factors can explain this: Le Monde is a leftist paper and French activists were strongly involved in the preparation for and development of the WSF, while Brazil is nearer to Bolivia than any of the other countries whose papers Beyeler and Hubscher studied: thus the WSF represented a local or regional news issue to El Diario.

This can be compared with the situation in the USA. Solomon (2001) noted the first WSF went almost unnoticed in the US media, with a search of the Nexis

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The large number of articles on the WEF in 2002 is due to the WEF being held in New York: as a ‘local story’ the Forum received increased coverage.

The American national media’s disdain for social fora is not confined to foreign fora. The first US Social Forum in 2007 ‘drew some 12,000 activists and not a single major newspaper or television reporter outside its host city of Atlanta’ (Hollar 2010). A similar blackout affected the second US Social Forum in Detroit in 2010 (attended by 15,000 to 20,000), which Hollar compares with the Tea Party Convention (attended by 600): ‘Across ten major national outlets in the two weeks surrounding each event, the Tea Party got 177 mentions to the Social Forum’s three’ (Hollar 2010).

Ekecrantz (2004) compares press coverage of the WSF in four countries – Brazil, China, Russia and Sweden. Ekecrantz cites Maia and Castro (2004) as discerning three major discourses (or frames) in the wide and very mixed coverage in the Brazilian media: in one the ‘carnival’ or ‘spectacle’ aspect of the WSF was emphasised, especially in images and visual material; another framed the WSF as ‘utopian’ (to be read as ‘unrealistic’) and emphasised ‘useless verbosity’; the third recognised and analysed the forum as an expression of left politics. In Russia there was very little coverage of the WSF except for some neutral material in business weeklies and some local internet sites. A systematic search for coverage of the 2002 WSF found only reports from news agencies and some translations from foreign media. For China, Ekecrantz reports on a recent trip to Beijing and Shanghai where he interviewed news editors, journalists and staff and students of university communication departments:

The WSF was largely unknown. In fact not one researcher or student answered that she or he had heard about it and a few journalists only vaguely, if at all (although all of them were heavy web users). The sampling is of course highly unrepresentative, but it indicates that the WSF is not simply an issue in China. (Ekecrantz 2004:130)
In Sweden Ekecrantz reports that despite relatively broad coverage, which has increased over the years, the WSF has been reported as utopian and unrealistic, with less attention paid to the sober meetings and workshops that are the political content of the WSF: ‘the dominant discourse on the WSF is strikingly similar to that of the Carnivalistic and Utopian frame in the Brazilian press. The photographic material strongly underlines this perspective on the WSF.’ (Ekecrantz 2004: 127). In conclusion Ekecrantz notes similarities across his four chosen countries: ‘their national media do not endorse the basic ideas at the WSF, either by being silent about them or by patronizing them, sometimes comparing them with the more sober expression of the WEFs’ (Ekecrantz 2004:132).

For WSF Mumbai Taghioff (2005) identifies five strands to its treatment in English-language newspapers in India. The first, emphasising the size and colourful nature of the Forum, treats it as a spectacle. The second related the Forum to debates on globalisation with critics –mainly in the business and conservative press- deriding it as utopian and irrational, and supporters –mainly in the liberal press- producing a varied debate giving ‘a sense of contradictory discussions within the elite groups of the Indian polity’ (Taghioff 2005: 6). The third theme was provided by a rape case at the Forum, while the fourth consisted of profiles of star attendees like Joseph Stiglitz and Arundhati Roy. The final theme was one of local interest, with reports on Indian activists and the organisation of a more traditional left rally, Mumbai Resistance. Taghioff stresses those articles which treat of the Forum as unrealistic, irrational and unproductive, with comparisons being drawn between the WSF and a religious event, the attendees thus becoming ‘true believers’ who are, by definition, irrational. (Taghioff 2005).

This study is complemented by research in regional and local language newspapers. CDL (Communication for Development and Learning) compiled news coverage in Karnataka state over the five days of the Forum, covering four English-language nationals circulating in the state and four local language papers published in Bangalore. When of the latter four only one was found to cover the WSF, coverage in an English-language newspaper circulating in Karnataka was added to the study. For the nationals The Hindu’s coverage was the highest, with 21 items: it also published Arundhati Roy’s plenary speech in the main paper. The local English language paper was next with 18 items (2 on the front page), while the only local language paper that covered the WSF ran 11 items, 6 on the front page. Much of the coverage was visually lavish, in keeping with Taghioff’s identification of the spectacle frame. The most important evidence provided by the study was the non-coverage in non-English language media, which of course have wider and deeper reach –especially among the poorer elements– than English-language media. (Das Gupta 2004).

For the European Social Forum (ESF), Rucht and Teune examined coverage in paired elite conservative and liberal papers in four host countries (Italy, France,
Britain and Greece) and two other countries (Germany and Spain). The pattern shows coverage starts at a reasonable level (190 articles) for Florence (2002), rises to 222 for Paris (2003), before dropping precipitously for London (2004) (58) and Athens (2006) (61). For the first ESF, there were (disappointed) expectations that the violence from Genoa would spill over to Florence, with several press correspondents interviewed mentioning ‘the pressure exerted by their directors or editorial staff to report negatively on the event’ (Rucht and Teune 2007: 15). Thus the papers attempted to frame the Florence ESF as a sequel to Genoa and showed no interest (during press conferences, etc.) in any issue other than demonstrations and possible violence. The second ESF in Paris received greater coverage than any other ESF, partly through coverage in the French left-wing press and distribution of coverage on the AFP wire service, while the right-wing papers paid much attention to the presence of Islamic scholar Tariq Ramadan, subject of half the 54 articles published in Le Figaro in relation to the Paris ESF (Rucht and Teune 2007: 16). Excepting coverage in The Guardian (official media partner of ESF London) Rucht and Teune (2007: 16) found little coverage of ESF London, a finding confirmed by CASIN (Lee 2004: 12). For the Athens ESF, the accompanying demonstration finally fulfilled the media’s desire to use its violence frame: ‘the violence attracted most space in the media coverage for the entire ESF. In Germany, the majority of newspapers reduced their coverage to this particular incident, while the forum as such was of secondary importance only’ (Rucht and Teune 2007: 17). The conclusions of these researchers are as follows: ‘three trends are obvious: proximity is the key explanatory factor for the amount of press coverage; the media interest in the event decreases over time; and liberal and conservative media differ widely in their coverage.’ (Rucht and Teune 2007: 17). Later work (Teune 2009) reiterated these conclusions.

The movement in the periphery

Mirroring the paucity of literature reported on policing of the AGM in peripheral countries (Mac Sheoin and Yeates 2009) regrettably there are no full-length articles on media treatment of the AGM in peripheral countries. What we can do here is simply cite such sources as can be found. In preparation for the APEC summit in November 2004 in Santiago, Chile, the usual media demonization campaign began in September 2004. According to Alvaro Ranis of ATTAC Chile, who was organizing the Chilean Social Forum parallel to the APEC Summit, ‘the most powerful media outlets’ were waging a campaign to ‘demonize, ahead of time, the demonstrations to be held by citizens who express Chilean civil society’s dissent regarding neo-liberal globalisation policies.’ Alarmist press reports included alleged preparations for ‘terrorist’ acts against the summit as well as traditional reports on meetings of the coordinating committee in a ‘dimly lit’ trade union office, where the committee meets to plot violent action. According to conservative daily El Mercurio (2 October 2004) the APEC security operation could be threatened by the committee, which
linked ‘around 30 ultra-left and anarchist groups’ and ‘black-clad punks’. (Mac Sheoin and Yeates 2009:229). This example can be supplemented by analyses of two peripheral social movements that are part of the AGM.

Hammond reports five different frames for the organisation of the rural landless, the MST (Movimento dos Trabalhadores Sem Terra), in the Brazilian media: the MST as a militant revolutionary organisation, as ‘solution to a national problem’ (that of idle land, unemployed rural workers and rural to urban migration), as pathetic creatures who symbolise an archaic rural Brazil out of tune with contemporary Brazilian reality, as guerrilla capitalists and as ‘a law-breaker and provocer of violence’, the ‘demonization’ frame. ‘Of the five, the demonization frame appears most frequently, probably accounting for more newspaper reports than the other four combined. It is also, evidently, the most clearly hostile to the movement.’ (Hammond 2004: 80). The predominance of negative frames is confirmed by an analysis of four major Brazilian dailies between April and August 1999 which leads Maisa Mendoca to conclude:

A large part of these articles characterise the landless as aggressive, potential guerrilla fighters, obsessed with the seizure of power or violent. On the other hand, the police are presented as defenders of order, although statistics of violence in the countryside demonstrate the opposite (Mendoca 2000 quoted in Hammond 2004: 84).

This negative frame is shown by the use of the explicitly condemnatory term ‘land invasions’ for land occupations by the MST, while Hammond also cites the work of Berger as showing the importance of violence in the framing of the MST. ‘It is violence, or the possibility of violence, that dominates coverage of the movement, Berger claims, especially if the occupiers can be described as “armed” – which, as Berger shows, usually means that they have armed themselves with shovels and sickles, adopting a “defensive-provocative” stance (Hammond 2004: 73).

Hammond tempers this negative view by noting the coverage is ‘in reality, more complex’ (Hammond 2004: 84) as shown by the existence of the other four competing, if minor, frames. He also makes the useful point that framing of a social movement involves framing both the movement itself and the issue that the movement raises. On the latter, MST ‘can reasonably claim that it has won the battle to frame its main issues, the land question, in the Brazilian media. The media (even, sometimes, the provincial press owned by local elites) generally portray agrarian reform as a necessity and the struggle for it as just’ (Hammond 2004: 75). Finally it is notable that the occasions where it moves outside the land question that the MST gets most negative framing. These include its involvement in indigenous protests and the World Social Forum.

A similar concern over violence can be seen in some press framing of Thailand’s Assembly of the Poor (AOP). Founded in Bangkok in 1995, the AOP received favourable media treatment for its initial marathon demonstrations in 1996 and
1997 but after the Asian financial crisis in 1997 coverage in some papers became unfavourable as ‘editors feared that protest would create a negative image of Thailand and scare away foreign investment’ (Chalermsripinyorat 2004:545). AOP protests at Pak Mun dam in 2000 led to increased coverage when the possibility of conflict and violence piqued media interest: in the words of the general news editor of Thai tabloid newspaper Thairath ‘We sent a reporter to monitor the situation there when the prospect of violence was looming. We waited until the situation returned to normalcy and when there was no more sign of violence, we [then] asked the reporter to come back.’ (quoted in Chalermsripinyorat 2004: 550). As protests continued without conflict media interest waned: in response the AOP staged protests with strong visual impacts to maintain media interest and in recognition of media covering the protest more with photographs than with news reports. Finally it should be noted that media concern over and dislike for violence also applied to violence involved in state repression. When the AOP invaded the premises of Government House in Bangkok in July 2000 ‘Despite public debates about whether or not the protesters were justified in trespassing into the government compound, the media actually devoted more attention to the state’s heavy-handed response to the action. The widespread condemnation turned the tables on the government as the press began to take a more sympathetic stance towards the AOP.’ (Chalermsripinyorat 2004:557).

Some (tentative) conclusions

While Cottle (2008: 855) is correct in claiming ‘much has changed since earlier studies documented how the mainstream news media invariably reports protests and demonstrations through a dominant law and (dis)order frame, labelling protesters as deviant and de-legitimising their aims and politics by emphasizing drama, spectacle and violence’, in some ways little has changed. The majority of the data this essay has examined supports a view that insurgent social movements are still framed primarily within a deviant and violent frame, marginalizing and trivializing the movement and its adherents. The emphasis remains on spectacle, drama, confrontation, violence and deviance. We have seen classic media tactics of marginalisation, the reappearance of the folk devil and the threatening outsider (whether in the form of foreign agitators, anarchists, Korean farmers or German terrorists) and the use of racialised and sexualised frames to ‘other’ protesters. We have come across little evidence of the ‘possibility for a ... more complex range of media responses to protests and demonstrations than in the past’ (Cottle 2008: 857), though we should note the more optimistic conclusions of Lee (2008) on Hong Kong and Rojecki (2002) on Seattle.

What we have also seen is, once the violence frame had made its debut in Seattle, a reproduction of that frame over the following years as it was applied to the succeeding summit sieges and reproduced internationally –at least in the English-language press- with the creation of a series of media events that local
media expect to shoe-horn into the available frame. A particular media treatment of the AGM was reproduced internationally with the emphasis on protest and riot over deliberation and forum and an emphasis on violent over peaceful protest, and on spectacle. Similar tactics were seem worldwide – othering, marginalization, etc., as was anticipatory coverage. We appear to have here the global spread and adoption for local use of a frame made in Seattle.

This broad conclusion needs qualifying. Having accepted that the most popular frame is one which continues to marginalise movements through emphasis on their deviant and violent nature, we must note the minority of data and analyses that dissent from this position. Rojecki’s (2002) analysis claims media moved beyond this frame over the period it covered Seattle. On the issue of the dominance of violence in the frame, data from Canada (Miljan and Lee 2003), the USA (Rausch et al 2007 and Boykoff 2006) and Bolivia and France (Beyeler and Hubscher 2003) contradicted the emphasis on violence as the most popular frame. Similarly, while much coverage was negative, a reasonable amount of positive coverage was also found. Even in US, there was positive coverage of some constituent parts of the AGM, for example, the student sweatshop campaign. (Opel n.d.).

Despite many commonalities in the media treatment of the AGM, there has been international variation also: the coverage in the US was much more negative than that in Canada, for example. We have seen decided national differences in media treatment of the AGM. Thus once again when globalisation is in question national contexts, forces and ideologies are decisive. Furthermore traditional explanatory factors (such as whether a newspaper is of the left or of the right, liberal or conservative) and journalistic routines and organisational factors (such as to which correspondents a story is entrusted and what sources – governmental, security forces- are called on) continue to be of basic importance in explaining media behaviour. As no doubt does the question of ownership. It is not my purpose here to do so, but it appears possible to make an initial characterisation of some of the globe’s major English-language newspapers/media from the different ways they reported, framed and constructed the activities of the AGM. A useful analysis might perhaps lie in the field of media ownership, such as comparisons among media owned by News Corporation and others.

This essay confirms Mac Sheoin and Yeates (2009)’s conclusion in relation to policing of AGM protests, that national, regional and local issues and conditions are important factors which have not been washed away by the tidal wave of globalisation. Thus, a variety of traditional explanatory factors –such as the political orientation of the newspaper and the national political context on one side or newsroom organisation and procedures (such as whether the story is assigned to security correspondents) on the other- are of prime importance to how the media treat antiglobalisation protesters. We also see issues such as the geographical nearness of protest are of importance in coverage decisions, while
we can also see that summits are—and are reported as—local as well as global events.

The violence debate

There has been much debate in the literature as to whether the ‘symbolic’ ‘performative’ violence at the protests has been advantageous or disadvantageous for the AGM. Juris’ position is straightforward: the militants’ embrace of symbolic/performative violence as a means of expressing both subcultural identities and rejection of capitalism was used by the state and the media to legitimise police repression and portray the protesters as violent hooligans, while dismissing the politics behind the symbolic violence: ‘Performative violence thus provides an important tool for resource-poor actors in their struggle for visibility, but only at the substantial cost of reinforcing the media frames and repressive strategies promoted by police and government authorities’ (Juris 2005: 428). Thus while violence ensnares and ensures media attention and widespread dissemination of coverage of protests, it is also used to dismiss and demonise the protesters.

While some research suggests protests without arrests and violence have a higher chance of receiving ‘thematic’ (‘message’-related) as opposed to ‘episodic’ (‘event’-related) coverage (Mueller 2004: 143 citing Smith et al 2001: 1412) there is also the chance that these protests will not be reported at all, especially in the international press. Mueller (2004: 143) notes relating to Gothenburg ‘the riots were covered in detail by the international press—something that did not occur after the much-larger anti-EU protests in Brussels and Barcelona.’ Again, from the point of view of the militants who wish to convey the message that there is resistance to the status quo ‘a picture of a black-hooded rioter throwing stones at riot police is likely to communicate that there is militant dissent, no matter how the media spin it.’ (Mueller 2004: 144). Mueller’s note that the violence frame satisfactorily propagates the message of the radical wing that resistance is possible returns us to the realisation that we are dealing with an alliance (often unhappy) of widely diverging forces in the AGM, a point further emphasised by evidence on the divergent forms and means of communication undertaken by different forces in the movement.

A major criticism made of media coverage by some elements in the AGM was that attention was focussed on the streets rather than reporting on the (allegedly more positive) proceedings at the movement’s alternative or counter-summits organised in parallel with the IFI summits and at which positive policy solutions were put forward. (In this they echoed complaints by IFI apparatchiks that the street stole coverage from the official summits also). This dismissive attitude on the part of the media was to continue with the arrival of the WSF and other social fora.
Contributions and limitations of the literature surveyed

The literature reviewed in this essay represents some steps forward in the study of media and protest. First the literature on summit protests has added a new dimension to framing of protests by drawing attention to the importance of anticipatory coverage of protests. Thus methodologically it is no longer enough to look at the framing of protests during and immediately after the protests: for an accurate picture, preliminary and anticipatory coverage must also be included. The analysis of anticipatory coverage emphasises the importance of media to social movements, not simply in relation to obtaining coverage for social movement claims and issues (i.e. agenda-building) but also in terms of its impact of the practical activity of protest itself. The coverage proves again the implications of the folk devil model, as anticipatory coverage was used to justify increased repression, chilling dissent and reducing the available space for protest.

Another useful contribution suggests protest needs to be analysed in a dialectical relationship with the summit or event being protested. Meade (2008) argues successfully for analysis of the presentation by the media of the summit as part of a process in which summit and protesters are framed together and in opposition to each other. Thus ideally a study should look both at the framing of the protest and the framing of the summit and the organisation involved. Shumate, Bryant and Monge’s (2005) analysis of DAN and the WTO at Seattle is another useful example of the benefits of this perspective.

This also suggests it is insufficient to confine oneself to the analysis of the media: it is necessary also to attend to the position of the police and the varied security forces and forces of repression, as their protest management plans and strategies include media strategies which are highly influential in framing protests.

Related to this, and a definite move forward in scholarship in this area, is the increasing attention that is being paid to movement strategies in relation to media, both in relation to corporate mass media (including the new social media) and to the development of their own alternative media. The appearance of such academic analyses (Mattoni 2012, McCurdy 2010, Rucht 2004, Teune 2006, Wall 2003) as well as analyses by movement participants (CounterSpin Collective 2005, Media G8 International Press Group 2007, Stad 2007 ) is a welcome development, though one I have not engaged with, for reasons of space. Related to this is also Donson’s pointing out the difference between the AGM and the traditional folk devil, due to the reflexive nature of the AGM. Thus the movement can change its activities to undermine some media framing. Here we may cite with Donson et al (2004) changes in movement activity in Prague, as well as the Tute Bianchi’s reversal of the traditional black/white dichotomy, while analyses of Korean protesters’ changed tactics in Hong Kong are also relevant, as well as their mobilisation of themes and motifs from the Korean popular culture that was washing over Asia at the time of the protests.
This change, and other changes in what Cottle calls the media ecology, implies future study of this issue must broaden from traditional media studies of newspaper and television coverage. It’s noticeable that the vast majority of the studies brought together in this review concentrated on newspaper coverage; only a minority look at television coverage, which is generally accepted to be the major means of popular access to news. Furthermore in the newspaper analyses, the vast majority of newspapers chosen were elite newspapers, rather than tabloid, popular newspapers. There is also a need to broaden analyses from words to images. The small number of analyses dedicated to pictorial representation are a welcome addition to the literature and a step in the right direction.

One of the major lacunae in the literature is information on media coming from peripheral countries. Finally we might note how little the coverage and its analyses has grappled with the transnational nature of AGM protest. Despite the heavy emphasis in the literature on the novelty of this transnational aspect of the AGM, neither the media nor academic analyses have extensively engaged with this aspect of the movement. This is an important contribution to the existing debate over the limitations of media sources for the study of social movements and protests. What has been disappointing has been the lack of suitably global analyses of a global phenomenon. The prevalence of methodological nationalism shown in the proliferation of national studies leads one to appreciate even more those few internationally or globally comparative studies that exist. By bringing together evidence from the various national and international studies I hope I have made a useful contribution to this necessary global analysis.
Much of the literature looks at representation, construction or framing of and discourses about the AGM and its activists in the media, with a large number of case studies of particular anti-summit and other demonstrations. There is a general emphasis on the marginalisation of protesters through framing them as ignorant, violent, young, etc., with specific examples of protesters being framed as ‘Other’ – as foreign or animal, through racialisation and their presentation as folk devils. Studies can be national (e.g. Canadian television coverage) and transnational: comparisons are made between different media (television and newspapers), as well as between different countries. Many studies report on pre-summit coverage, accompanied by felon-setting and preparation for violence. This specific aspect needs to be seen in the wider context of the policing and repression of the AGM. (Mac Sheoin and Yeates 2009).

One problem with the available studies is their limited geographic spread. Even though the AGM, and AGM protests, have drawn academic attention specifically due to its and their transnational character, the majority of academic studies deal with the media treatment of AGM protest within a national context, whether by looking at protests in one country or through looking at media in one country. Many are confined to one country or even one newspaper. Most of the media studied are within core western countries (The New York Times gets serious attention, for example), and media studied often tend to be published in world cities. Studies such as Beyeler and Hubscher (2003) and Ekcrantz (2004), which reach across the divide between core and peripheral countries, are rare. There is little available on non-core country media treatment of the AGM and AGM demonstrations. This echoes the lack of studies of the policing of the AGM in peripheral countries (Mac Sheoin and Yeates 2009). Such work as exists concentrates on single movements such as the MST in Brazil (Hammond 2004) or the Assembly of the Poor in Thailand (Chalermsripayorat 2004).

The media frame developed at Seattle was reproduced for later summit protests in the US and was also globalised. Coverage of summit protests in the US media after Seattle involved constant references back to Seattle, as the first such protest in the US and therefore the debut of the summit frame. For example, coverage of A16 in Washington DC consistently referred back to Seattle: ‘The extensive police preparation was a perpetual theme in pre-protest articles, which repeatedly noted the similarities with the WTO protests in Seattle’ (Boykoff 2006: 212), while for reports of the protests themselves ‘more than half of all newspaper accounts (53%) of the A16 protests compared happenings in DC to the violence in Seattle, while more than a third (37%) of television segments did the same’ (Boykoff 2006:213). Rausch et al (2007), in their study of the New York Times from October 1999 to September 2004, also document continued references to Seattle in half of all stories on AGM protest, except in the period October 2002 to September 2003, when movement activities mainly involved anti-war protests with little parallel to Seattle. (Rausch et al 2007: 330)
140). Thus the coverage was consistently framed in reference to Seattle ‘used as a symbolic reference connoting the threat of civic disorder’ (Rausch et al 2007: 141). For US television networks coverage of summit protests Rechitsky (2005) reports ‘The same clip of protesters kicking down a Starbucks window showed up during the introductory segment of nearly half of all reports covering the events in Seattle, Washington D.C., New York and Miami.’

This reference to previous events is not confined to the US media nor is Seattle the only reference point. Berenson’s study of six different newspapers found more than a third of articles on summit protests used an explicit memory-based frame for their reporting: this memory-based frame involved ‘negative references to previous protest activities activating cognitive schemas built during the coverage of previous events, maintaining them and associating them with the portrayal of the new event.’ (Berenson 2009: 6-7) Thus the original frame is reactivated for each new protest. The continuation of a frame across/along a series of protests is helped by the use of memory-based frames/strategies. Lee (2008), for example, reporting from Hong Kong, presents an image of local media replicating an already existing international frame to which local reporting is expected to conform.

There are a variety of possible ways to approach this literature. One method might be to examine the findings of the literature on a national basis, attempting to lay out a history of media presentation of the AGM in the US, Canada and elsewhere, comparing and contrasting national experiences. Another might involve looking at the treatment of the AGM by the type of medium (television, quality paper, tabloid paper). I will look first at longitudinal surveys of media treatment of the AGM before examining the framing of the AGM’s two major manifestations, summit protests and social fora.

International coverage

Certain differences have been reported between coverage of the AGM in the media of the English-speaking core countries: Berenson (2009), (who studied coverage from April 2000 to June 2002 for five AGM protests, for 3 months – one month before and two months after the protests), isolates a startling difference in coverage of summit protests between major US newspapers and papers in other English-speaking nations (see Table 1 above for details). Negative coverage of the protests never dropped below 50% in the US, while it reached a height of 88%. For England, Canada and Australia, only once did negative coverage exceed 25% in coverage in The Toronto Star of Seattle when 40% of coverage was negative. Houston (2004:23-24) using The Guardian as his English newspaper, also found differences between US and British papers in reporting on Seattle.

Another series of differences have been reported in possibly the only truly transnational study, Beyeler and Hubscher look at media treatment of the WEF
and anti-WEF protest for 1995 and 2000-2003 in six newspapers from Switzerland, France, Germany, USA, Spain and Bolivia for four weeks around the WEF in a paper which provides preliminary results from a research project. They note no articles on protest against the WEF before 1998 but following Seattle report increased attention to both the WEF and anti-WEF protest.

This important extension of the (geographical) range of analysis outside core countries (and extension linguistically outside Anglophone media) is undertaken in a paper which looks at media coverage of anti-WEF protests from 1994 to 2003 in Neue Zürcher (NZZ -Swiss newspaper) and for 1995 and 2000 to 2003 in the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (FAZ -Germany) The New York Times (US), El Diario (Bolivia), Le Monde (France) and The Cape Times (South Africa). They demonstrate differences in reporting on the AGM are related to contextual factors such as the ideological position (ie left or right) of the newspaper and the national context (ie whether a core or peripheral country) in which the paper is published:

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Table 7: Coverage of anti-WEF protest in 6 newspapers, number of articles. Extracted from Beyeler and Hubscher 2003:9, Table 2. '-' = data not coded.
Some indication of the differences between the national media in their treatment of the AGM can be seen in the proportion of media attention devoted to ‘violence’ on the one hand and to counter-summits and social fora on the other.

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>NZZ</th>
<th>FAZ</th>
<th>LAM</th>
<th>NYT</th>
<th>ED</th>
<th>CP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>V/SF</td>
<td>V/SF</td>
<td>V/SF</td>
<td>V/SF</td>
<td>V/SF</td>
<td>V/SF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>25.8/0.0</td>
<td>20.0/0.0</td>
<td>5.0/15.0</td>
<td>16.0/0.0</td>
<td>20.0/0.0</td>
<td>18.8/6.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>27.7/1.5</td>
<td>35.3/0.0</td>
<td>--/--</td>
<td>100.0/0.0</td>
<td>11.1/33.3</td>
<td>0.0/0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>22.0/24.4</td>
<td>18.5/18.5</td>
<td>--/--</td>
<td>38.3/6.7</td>
<td>28.6/38.1</td>
<td>0.0/50.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>40.8/7.0</td>
<td>223.5/11.8</td>
<td>8.6/22.9</td>
<td>--/--</td>
<td>--/--</td>
<td>--/46.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 8: Percentage of media attention to ‘violence’ (V) and social fora (SF). (‘--’ =Data not coded) - Source: extracted from Tables 3b and 3b (Beyeler and Hubscher 2003:10).

Le Monde, El Diario and the Cape Times are the papers which pay most attention to movement counter-summits, in particular the WSF. The French paper’s attention can be explained by the fact that the WSF was in part a French initiative; that of El Diario can be attributed to the proximity of the WSF in Brazil. The New York Times, Neue Zürcher Zeitung and Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung pay the highest attention to the issue of ‘violence’: for the Neue Zürcher Zeitung the proximity effect is the obvious explanation; for the New York Times and the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung the explanation must lie in their ideological orientation. These authors also report a more critical attitude to the AGM in more liberal western media.
In a later publication from the same research project, with extended results from the inclusion of WTO protest and the addition of the *Times of India* to the papers reviewed, Beyeler and Kriesi (2005) found AGM protests received extensive media coverage, with the proviso (?) that ‘the Seattle protests marked both the beginning and – in most countries- the peak of newspaper attention towards the movement.’ (Beyeler and Kriesi 2005 102) Exceptions were the Swiss paper *Neue Zürcher Zeitung* (due to the proximity effect of the protests taking place in Davos in Switzerland) and *El Diario* (due to the proximity of the WSF in Brazil). The US paper ‘exhibited what might be called a “big-country perspective” in that it was apparently disinterested in events not taking place on “its territory”’ (Beyeler and Kriesi 2005:102) ; another phrase for this might be American isolationism.

In their evaluation of the AGM by both journalists and other quoted sources they found *Le Monde* more supportive of the movement than other country papers. On the issue of violence ‘the NZZ and NYT, both newspapers published in countries directly confronted with protests, not only paid more attention to security issues and violence in their reporting, but their journalists were also quite critical of the movement actors and, on the average, reported more critically about the movement’s issues’ (Beyeler and Kriesi 2005: 104). For the peripheral country papers ‘there are some indications that they took a more positive attitude... there was no clear pattern for the *Times of India*, while the *Cape Times* and *El Diario* in particular seemed to take a more positive attitude (Beyeler and Kriesi 2005: 105). For their general conclusion ‘[w]hile direct support for the global social-justice movement primarily comes from industrialized countries, newspapers published in these countries tend to give priority to critical evaluations. Only in France do we find supportive governments and publics as well as a very supportive stance of the newspaper we analyzed. Newspapers published in the South were more supportive of the movement, while their elite frequently evaluated it negatively’ (Beyeler and Kriesi 2005:106).


21 Adler and Mittelman’s research compares this media representation with the results of a survey of protesters in Washington DC on 19-22 April 2002. For their conclusions see Adler and Mittelman 2004: 207-208.
National coverage – the USA

An early examination of 200 stories by major US news outlets (broadcasting and print) on Prague (September 2000), Quebec (April 2001), Gothenburg (June 2001) and Genoa (July 2001) protests concludes the main problem with the coverage is not the emphasis on protest violence but the lack of context provided in the coverage (Guiffo 2001). Hall and Bettig (2003), citing mainly US papers and news agencies, argued the media treatment of protest from Seattle to the WEF 2002 protests presented protesters as a motley crew disturbing the peace, emphasised the spectre of violence and treated police as highly trained professionals, while focusing on property damage.

Rausch et al (2007) look at framing of the AGM in The New York Times from October 1999 to September 2004, allowing them to look at changes in movement framing over time. Their examination of the amount of coverage the AGM received shows nearly half of the coverage they analysed appeared in the period October 1999 to September 2000, with some 101 stories (or 48% of a total of 210 stories) appearing in that time frame, dropping to 38 stories (18%) in 2000/2001, rising again to 52 stories (25%) in 2001/2002, dropping precipitously to 7 stories (3%) in 2002/2003 and rising slightly to 12 stories (6%) in 2003/2004. Attributing the one case of a rise in story numbers to a local factor (the WEF protests in New York in 2002), what can be seen is a major decrease in coverage following Seattle. Of relevance is a similar drop in the number of photographs of the movement’s activities published (from 106 in 1999/2000 to 69 in 2000/2001, 64 in 2001/2002, 17 in 2002/2003 and 19 in 2003/2004). Of particular interest here is that every year the number of photographs exceeded the number of written stories, implying that the visual nature of AGM protest activities ensured photographic coverage while news editors also felt their requirement to document AGM activities could be satisfied through photographic rather than written means.

They note a significant increase in the use of non-official sources over the period, with 56% of sources in 1999/2000 being unofficial, dropping to 55% (2000/2001) and 53% (2001/2002) which they attribute to the 9/11 factor, before increasing again to 63% (2002/2003) and 64% (2003/2004). While the increase in unofficial sources is significant, so is the overall high level of unofficial sources, which never drops below 50%. They also note an important shift away from establishment sources like the AFL-CIO and the Sierra Club to less-established protest figures and also to sympathetic celebrities. Particularly interesting is their finding of a rise in the use of both delegitimising and legitimising terms over the period studied with delegitimising terms increasing 41% while legitimising terms more than trebled. (Rausch et al 2007: 138), while also noting variations attributable to September 11. Particularly useful is their point that use of these terms in not mutually exclusive: ‘Journalists could use an increasing number of terms to describe movement supporters and goals while also writing more about violence and deviance at protests’ (Rausch et al 2007: 138). This allows a nuanced version of framing practices, as does their emphasis
on changes and variations in frames over the period studied. However the brute reality of their data also shows, after a major explosion of coverage at Seattle, a drop in coverage of the movement over the period. We may note their observation that ‘the striking and prolonged drop in stories about the movement a year after Seattle suggests either that protests declined in frequency or that journalists perceived these events as offering lower news value over time’ (Rausch et al 2007: 141). Given that they have not undertaken research to discover whether protests declined in frequency (an unfortunate omission) and noting their attribution of editorial decisions to journalists, what may be occurring is a routinization of coverage of anti-summit protests, with a drop in novelty value following the Seattle protests. They also note what they call a tabloidization of protest through the increasing interest in style and cultural aspects of the movement over substantive issues, increased use of photographs and increased involvement of celebrity coverage. (Rausch et al 2007: 142).

Bennett et al (2004) looked at treatment of the WEF, protests against it and the WSF in *The New York Times* around the time of the WEF meetings in 2001, 2002 and 2003. Coverage of the WEF far exceeded that of the WSF (see below, social fora section). They report an increase in the coverage of protester issues relating to the WEF from 23% of articles in 2001 to 34% in 2002 and 50% in 2003. However, while 40% of activist issues were sourced to protesters, 53% were sourced to WEF officials (Bennett et al 2004: 447,448). Thus, by referring to issues protesters had placed on the agenda, in a clever recuperative public relations campaign the WEF succeeded in rebranding itself (at least in *The New York Times*) as an organisation concerned with real-life solutions to urgent problems compared with protesters who were framed as anarchists. This was accomplished by the use of the spectre of violence: ‘Protest/violence themes infused 92% of the stories before the meeting, 68% during the meeting, and returned as the most dominant theme (75% of the articles) after the meeting.’ (Bennett et al 2004:448).

James (2002), reporting on editorial page coverage of free trade and the AGM in 35 major US newspapers for one month around the Seattle and Quebec City summits, found that support for free trade positions and marginalisation of anti-free trade positions increased between the Seattle 1999 and Quebec 2001 protests, the first statistically significant. For op-ed coverage of Seattle giving a position on free trade 58% was positive, 36% neutral and 6% negative (all by guest op-ed writers); for Quebec, 82% was positive, 16% was neutral and 2% was negative (again by guest op-ed writers). For the attitude to protesters, at Seattle 57% was negative, 26% neutral and 17% positive; for Quebec this changed to 75% negative, 15% neutral and 10% positive (again no positive item was written by newspaper staff: in both cases positive material was from guest op-ed writers) (James 2002:9). It is hard not to agree with James that this indicates a consolidation of elite opinion: ‘while print media attention to trade issues expanded significantly immediately before, during and after Seattle, the spectrum of actual debate narrowed within the forum of newspaper editorial
opinion before, during and after Quebec’ (James 2002: 19), which reinforces the point that quantity of coverage needs to be balanced by consideration of the quality of the coverage.

For the April 2001 Quebec City protests against the FTAA, the US newspapers maintained a pro-FTAA line in their editorials. For the month of April a search of Nexis found 34 editorials supporting the FTAA, none opposing it and one which was ambivalent. Several editorials worried about the integration of minimum labour and environmental standards in the FTAA ‘but none of the 34 suggested that the agreement would not be fundamentally beneficial for the people of the Americas’ (Coen 2001). The papers’ op-ed pages were less convinced of this: ‘the same Nexis search found 25 opinion pieces essentially in favour of the FTAA vs nine opposing it, with four others with a more mixed analysis’ (Coen 2001).

Rechitsky (2005) provides a qualitative content analysis of the treatment of the AGM from 1999 to 2002 on four US television channels – CBS, CNN, ABC and NBC- by looking at coverage from three days before to three days after selected summit protests – Seattle, IMF/World Bank (Washington, D.C. 2000) WEF (New York 2002) and Miami (2003). He found five different discourses – law and order, economy, public sphere, outside agitation and recognition – and ‘no significant differences in discourse across major television news networks’. Discourses of law and order emphasised policing and dichotomised peaceful and violent demonstration tactics: ‘marches and rallies were framed as legitimate, while direct action – non-violent or more militant - was framed as illegitimate “violence”’ (Rechitsky 2005: X). Discourses of the economy emphasised the economic costs of property damage and the restriction of general economic activity – in a word, shopping – while the protesters’ agenda was characterised as against local and national economic interests which were identified as ‘export-oriented economic growth’. Discourses of the public sphere involved portraying protester identity in a trivializing manner as another generation of hippies, dividing protesters into hooligans and cheerleaders, denying their political legitimacy and replacing the previous generation’s communist bogeyman with the latest version, the ‘anarchist’, framed as the ‘criminal element’ in the AGM. Discourses of outside agitation ‘portrayed protesters as invaders who have come to cause disruption in the lives of the locals’, identifying local commuters as victims of the protesters. Discourses of recognition granted some legitimacy to protest issues, involving reports on the adverse effects of corporate globalisation and including interviews with experts and with rank and file reporters. Rechitsky concludes that ‘there is a positive relationship between disruptive and contentious tactics – civil disobedience, direct action and symbolic property destruction- and the quantity and even quality of coverage on major television networks’. He attributes the decrease in coverage over time – Seattle had 24 stories, Washington D.C. 13, New York 7 and Miami 4 - to the absence of spectacle and ‘violence’.

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Kate Gunby is undertaking a retrospective analysis of coverage of the AGM on five US television channels which shows an early spike in coverage, which has significantly decreased over the period of the study (see Graph 1, Gunby 2011:15). She identified 349 television segments, with CNN leading the pack with 210 stories, followed by ABC with 54, Fox with 28, CBS with 25, NBC with 18 and PBS with 14. (Gunby 2011:15). Possibly CNN’s nature as an international network explains its higher coverage than that of those news channels confined to the US. Gunby reports changes in television framing of the movement over time: ‘While the violence frame, amalgam of grievances, and to some extent the disruption fame are all still prevalent, the ignorance and freak frame have almost disappeared entirely from TV news reporting on the global justice movement’ (Gunby 2011:22). She notes for the period 2005 to 2010 the violence frame was most prevalent (Gunby 2011:16) while also noting ‘the police were never reported as the initiators of violence. Instead 42.11% of the reports explained how the police were responding to the protesters’ (Gunby 2011:21). Around a fifth of reports (21.05%) referred to past protest events as comparators and predictors: ‘This was one way that the violence frame was introduced into a lot of stories where peaceful protests were happening. The reporter would say that the current protests were very calm compared to past events, or that past events indicated that the peace would not last for long.’ (Gunby 2011:21).

Finally we should note a study of framing of a constituent element of the US AGM, the student anti-sweatshop movement. An examination of coverage of this movement in The New York Times, The L.A. Times and The Washington Post from 1995 to 2002 involved positive framing of the protesters and their case. Opel identified two major frames relating to the protesters who were, in the first frame, identified as smart, informed students concerned over a labour issue but, in the second frame, were dissimilar to the student protesters of the 1960s. As Opel (n.d.: 8) notes ‘these frames intersected throughout the coverage, creating a positive depiction of the student activists and noting a historic break with the activism of the 1960s’.

**National coverage - Canada**

Canadian TV coverage of three summit protests –APEC (1997) G8 (Knanaskis) and Summit of the Americas (Quebec City)- was found not to marginalise the protesters, with protester statements given more substantive coverage than those of world leaders attending the summits, while the emphasis given to protester violence was small. Their expectations going into the study were that due to TV’s visual nature coverage would concentrate on spectacle, drama and confrontation, summits with the greatest violence would gain most coverage and the actions of protesters would receive attention at the expense of the protesters’ substantive political message. (Miljan and Lee 2003: 8). The actual coverage was as follows
For source statements (excluding journalists) in these stories, on one channel citizen groups provided the most statements, while on the other the federal government held that position: on both channels citizen groups provided more source statements than foreign governments attending the international meeting:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>APEC</th>
<th>Summit of the Americas</th>
<th>G8</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CBC</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CTV</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Table 9: Coverage of summits, Canadian TV broadcast news, by number of stories. Compiled from Miljan and Lee (2003:10).*

Table 10: Sources for television coverage, various summits. Extracted from Table 1 in Miljan and Lee (2003: 11).

Nor did the actual content of the coverage conform to the expectation that movement messages would be marginalised in the mass media, as shown by the following table:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Fed gov</th>
<th>Citizen group</th>
<th>Foreign gov</th>
<th>Streeter</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CBC</td>
<td>25.4%</td>
<td>28.2%</td>
<td>9.5%</td>
<td>8.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CTV</td>
<td>33.5%</td>
<td>29.5%</td>
<td>15.9%</td>
<td>1.7%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Table 10: Sources for television coverage, various summits. Extracted from Table 1 in Miljan and Lee (2003: 11).*
The amount of coverage of violence was surprisingly small: ‘The use of tear gas and pepper spray, albeit the image that probably comes most readily to mind with regards to activist/police interactions, actually received only 6 percent of CBC and 15 percent of CTV attention to activists’ (Miljan and Lee 2003: 14) In the context of the general coverage of the protests, less than 1% of CBC’s and 3% of CTV’s coverage of the meetings concentrated on violence. (Miljan and Lee 2003: 14) Finally, they note that, for CBC at least, the Quebec Summit of the Americas—the summit with the most clashes between police and activists—received the least coverage. (Miljan and Lee 2003: 19) Their general conclusion on violence and summit coverage reiterates that their expectation of increased media attention to violence did not appear in the data:

The least violent event, the G-8 summit had the most media attention. Moreover activists’ messages were presented slightly more often than description of tactics. For the other two meetings, the least violent event received the least attention. The APEC meeting where the extent of clashes with police involved arrests and pepper spray had more attention than the Summit of the Americas meeting where there were far more arrests and tear gas blanketed sections of the city. (Miljan and Lee 2003: 19)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Newspaper</th>
<th>Number of articles</th>
<th>Protesters</th>
<th>Politics</th>
<th>Economics</th>
<th>Security measures</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Montreal Gazette</td>
<td>289</td>
<td>30.4%</td>
<td>21.8%</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Post</td>
<td>135</td>
<td>39.3%</td>
<td>20.7%</td>
<td>14.1%</td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 11: Number of articles, subject of coverage, Canadian papers. Source: Hamel (n.d.: 19, 21).

Duggan (2011) examined treatment of the G8/G20 protests in Ontario in 2010 in Canada’s foremost national paper of record, the *Globe and Mail*: coverage involved 62 articles published between 24 June 2010 and 1 July 2010. He found 32% of the articles had as primary source official or authoritative sources such as police, government officials or businesspeople; 43.5% of articles marginalized protesters, primarily through an emphasis on violence, property destruction and civic disruption, 20.9% of articles trivialized protesters, with negative portrayals of movement diversity seven times more common than positive ones, while 14.5% of articles featured frames that dissented from official or authoritative accounts by looking at police brutality and civil rights violations, including an article by the paper’s design editor on his own and his children’s experience of police tactics. On the outside agitator theme, it’s worth noting the reports that many of those arrested spoke French: as Duggan (2011:34) notes this can be read as ‘from elsewhere’.

**National coverage - Belgium**

Van den Bulk and Bedoyan’s study of the depiction of the AGM in Belgian television and newspapers in relation to WTO Doha (Nov 2001) and the EU Laeken Summit (December 2001) found most coverage to be around Laeken (due to physical proximity) than Doha (partly due to lack of contestation due to security measures). Generally ’40 to 50% of all movement news shows or mentions violence, sometimes real violence, sometimes the lack or possibility of violence. The latter clearly implies that the movement and violence are framed as going hand in hand: the absence of violence is seen as strange and riots are to be expected’ (Van den Bulk and Bedoyan 2004:10)
A study of mainstream Belgian media (one quality paper, one popular paper and the main television news on a quality television station) reporting on trade and globalisation issues from 1999 to 2002 found little coverage of issues outside coverage of the Seattle (US, 1999), Genoa (Italy, 2001), Doha (Qatar, 2001) and Johannesburg (South Africa, 2002) summits. Analysis of the content of this media coverage collected from two weeks before until six weeks after the start of the summit – categorised as information on the summit itself, background information on globalisation etc., and coverage of riots and demonstrations - found stark differences by type of media.

The quality newspaper has a fairly equally balanced distribution across the three categories, with 40% on the summit, 31% on background information and 30% on the riots and demonstrations. However, the popular press pays hardly any attention to the background information (7%), has 21% coverage of the summit, and focuses the vast majority of its coverage on riots and demonstrations. Remarkably, the news on the self-proclaimed quality TV station is quite similar to the popular press in its disproportionate coverage of riots and demonstrations (63%). (Swinnen and Francken 2006: 648)

These analysts calculated a ‘riot index’ and demonstrated ‘a significant positive relationship between the riot index and media coverage’ (ibid), a relationship which was especially strong in the popular media, where 86% of coverage of the Genoa summit covered ‘riot-related issues’, which summit also received two-thirds of all coverage of summits in the popular media, which also reported nothing on violence-free Doha. Again, they observe this concern with violence ‘does not only seem to hold for the tabloids, but for all the media: all media pay most attention to the Genoa summit and least to the Doha summit’ (ibid).

**Framing the summit protests**

*The violence frame*

We may note to begin with some peculiarities of media concern with violence. First the media shows an immense preference for protester violence over any other kind. For example, the violence involved in and underlying free trade agreements is never mentioned (for one example of this, in relation to the Halifax 2007 Atlantica protests, see Martinez 2007). Similarly police violence is of little interest. Indeed in some cases where the only evidence available and shown (in highly monitored and photographed protests) is of police violence, media still describe the situation as involving protester violence (see coverage of S11 2000 in Australia below). Media concentrate on protester violence, even when they acknowledge that only a minority of protesters are violent (as noted by Houston (2004: 22) in the case of Seattle). There is also consistent exaggeration of the amount of violence with small violent incidents presented as typical or defining media images of protests. The media, especially television, can take one particular incident, which may be totally exceptional in terms of
the protest, and, by presenting only that incident, frame the protest through that incident. An example here we could cite is the repetition of a two-minute clip of police water cannon in use at the EU Day of the Welcomes in Dublin/Accession Summit in 2004, thus presenting the protest through an exceptional incident.

When media do attend to police violence it is generally seen as a reaction to protester violence, even if the former precedes the latter. In Seattle police violence, including use of tear gas, pepper spray and rubber bullets against non-violent protesters was explained as a response to the trashing of shops by anarchists, despite The Seattle Times noting the first use of pepper spray and rubber bullets as taking place at 10AM on November 30th, nearly two hours before any window was broken (de Mause 2000). A similar inversion of reality through a failure to attend to chronology can be found in media accounts of the G20 demonstrations in London on April 1, 2009, where the press ‘narrative... precisely reverses the events of the day’ (Younis 2009). Thus The Guardian’s live blog confirms a kettle at the Bank of England at 11.57, half an hour before any mention of ‘clashes’, with window-smashing first reported at 1.30, yet accounts in The Times, The Guardian and on BBC report the clashes and protester violence and then report on police control and containment measures, placing the cart squarely before the horse. Here again the demonstrators were presented as violent and confrontational while ‘eyewitness accounts of both days state that virtually all of the violence came from police’ (Younis 2009).

Even when the police admit that they were responsible for the violence, as in the case of May Day 2007 in LA, the media can still cling to the riot script. (Santa Ana 2009). Finally we should note the variations in the meaning of the term violence: while police violence is generally expressed through assaults on protesters, protester violence does not require a person as victim: they can be violent towards a shop or bank window or towards other inanimate objects such as cars or statues of Winston Churchill.

In general police methods remain unquestioned, when they are not being encouraged. Fairness and Accuracy in Reporting (FAIR) notes that, while the three US networks reported on the killing of Carlo Giuliani by police at Genoa, ‘none raised questions about the use of live ammunition for crowd control’ (FAIR 2001). Indeed the coverage of Genoa was at times so indulgent to police behaviour that the BBC 9 o’clock news even excused an attack on their own camera operator: ‘As the day went on the police response was increasingly harsh, in their frustration they also turned on a BBC cameraman’ (quoted in O’Carroll 2001).

**Violently framing the protests**

In coverage by Belgian TV and newspapers of the EU Laeken summit protests in December 2001 ‘almost half of the news about the movement contained references to violence, be it in writing about violence, expected violence or the absence of violence, or in pictures showing intimidating protesters, their
effective violence and the consequences thereof’ (Bedoyan, Van Aeist and Walgrove 2003: 14) Similarly, Jiminez, reporting on Spanish coverage of the AGM, noted ‘the AGM media coverage has been bound to the issue of violence’ (Jiminez 2003: 15) while in relation to Gothenburg (Sweden) ‘The frame of violence is already present in the beginning of the week, way before the ‘actual’ violence, which indicates that the media have decided how they will represent the events before they ‘actually’ occur’ (Hultman 2003: 8).

The media’s treatment of violence often involves exaggeration and hyperbole. Partly the problem is the media is reporting in the middle of chaotic and complex situations of public disorder in which it is difficult to cross-check and confirm stories and sources; partly it is a question of the media’s unquestioning acceptance of official police stories. Thus for the rioting at Rostock before the Heiligendamm G8 protests in 2007, media ran police-sourced stories of thousands injured, including 433 police officers, with 18 officers from Berlin alone reported to be in hospital with serious injuries. Magically, two days later, according to the right-wing weekly Focus ‘no-one was in hospital anymore. This kind of rectification however never makes the front page.’ (Anon n.d.) A similar example can be given of the allegation that Walden Bello incited Rostock demonstrators to riot, based on mistranslation of his speech by German news agency DPA. In English Bello said ‘We must bring the war into the discussion because without peace there can be no justice’; he was reported as saying ‘We have to bring war to this demonstration’, thus allegedly inciting those attending to riot, a calumny repeated ‘in hundreds of newspapers throughout Germany and Europe [that] contributed to the perception that violence had been deliberately fanned by the organisers of the largely peaceful but spirited rally.’ (Focus on the Global South 2007)

The media’s emphasis on violence can mean violence becomes the whole story and other aspects of the protests remain un- or under-reported. This is a major complaint made by the NGO wing of the AGM, which denounces media attention to violence at the expense of ‘thematic’ coverage of the reasons for the protests. For an example of violence taking over the story, Nambier (2004: 49) quotes a political correspondent on a Seattle daily:

> All our energy was taken covering the protest...there was little discussion of what they were protesting about...we missed a story...there was a huge labour march of 50,000 people...barely got a mention in our paper because we were so busy focusing on what was happening downtown with people breaking windows, throwing things.

TV coverage of the Seattle and Washington D.C. protests emphasised violence with ‘nearly 70% of television segments focused on the ostensibly violent protests’ (Boykoff 2006: 225). This was most visible in relation to Seattle, where 63% of news stories featuring the violence frame, ‘more than half of all newspaper accounts and almost three quarters of every television segment focusing on violent protestors’ (Boykoff 2006: 211). Even when violence did not
occur, the frame remained in place ‘as journalists remarked on the lack of destruction, the absence of violence or the potential for violence’ (Boykoff 2006: 211). Boykoff also notes the frequent application of war vocabulary to the protestors, as in the Washington Post story with the lead ‘A guerrilla army of anti-trade protestors took control of downtown Seattle today’ (cited in Boykoff 2006: 212). This framing ‘advances the impression that violence dominates the protest terrain when, in fact, it is the exception rather than the rule’ (Boykoff 2006: 213).

If the majority of studies on media framing of the AGM emphasis the dominance of the violence frame, we should note a dissenting opinion on the dominance of the violence frame in AGM coverage in a study of The New York Times from 1999 to 2004: ‘Although attractive to news values, democratic-globalization protests with high levels of arrests, injuries and property damage – such as Quebec City and Genoa- did not seem to enjoy high visibility in our analysis. In fact some violent protests received lower media attention and more sympathetic framing, while some events with relatively prominent coverage and favourable frames featured little violence’ (Rausch et al 2007: 142). Boykoff responds to DeLuca and Peeples’ claim that symbolic violence resulted in substantive coverage of protest issues by checking all stories utilising the violence frame to see if they contain five sentences that explained the reasons for the protests. The results were meagre: 14% of newspaper articles and 7.3% of television reports using the violence frame in Seattle devoted five or more sentences to issues; for Washington DC this reduced further to 6.3% of newspaper articles and 4.9% of television reports. His conclusion: ‘this study did not come up with convincing empirical evidence to support the claim that violence in the streets – if “symbolic violence” or vandalism- was a step on the road to deeper, broader coverage of the issues and ideas that galvanise the global justice movement.’ (Boykoff 2006: 226)

22 We can note here a peculiar similarity between mainstream and alternative media. In the words of Schwartz (2002: 36) in relation to the International Society of Animal genetics conference (Minneapolis, July 2000) ‘Both corporate and independent media represented the Counter Conference using images of the same violent confrontation’. We may mention here also feminist critiques of predominantly male and violent representations of anti-summit protests: an example is the problem of representation of women and gender in Indymedia texts and posts, with a recent analysis reporting ‘much of the IMC’s mediated text still generated through the perpetuation of patriarchal and ethnocentric images’ (Brooten, 2004: 2) Similarly in response to observations that mass media concentration on spectacle and violence at protests distracts from coverage of protest issues, Poell and Borra (2011:15) note ‘precisely the same observation can be made about the activist social media protest accounts’. They were analysing social media use at the Toronto G20 protests, concluding ‘it is clear that violence, arrests and the overwhelming police presence, as well as the anger about this, completely dominated the #g20report account on all three social media platforms. Eventually these issues became the protesters’ main focus, overshadowing the original reasons for the G20 protests’ (Poell and Borra 2011:14)
Here again it’s worth referring to Beyeler and Hubschler’s wide-ranging study which also reports variations in newspapers’ obsession with the violence frame, with The New York Times showing the highest concern (35.4% of all mentions of the movement), the right-wing European papers Neue Zurich Zeitschrift (30.8%) and Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (28%) following closely behind, while Bolivian paper El Diario’s concern is also high (22.5%). Comparatively The Cape Times (10.5%) and Le Monde (7.3%) pay little attention to the question of violence. (Beyeler and Hubschler 2003:10) while the study of Canadian television reportage cited about also denied the central place of violence in the frame. (Miljan and Lee 2003).

Anticipating violence

The media has not only reported AGM protests within a frame that delegitimises the protests and vilifies the protesters, but has also been instrumental in building an expectation of violence at AGM protests, thereby justifying and legitimising police actions in limiting and repressing protest. Whether actively participating in a strategy of tension, or simply playing to its own worst interests, the media has hyped the possibility of violence and thus contributed to state attempts to criminalise the AGM. Anderson (2004) reports a ‘sad but familiar pattern’ in relation to six different AGM protests between 2000 and 2003 in the US which showed ‘the same pattern of police exaggeration, governmental fear mongering and media gullibility’: drawing from mainstream media reports he documents the climate of fear created before the protests, media descriptions of arrests during the protests and (often revised) media accounts of the same arrests after the protests were over and cases which came to court were dismissed while the media belatedly realised the damage done to civil liberties. Anderson summarises the process as follows

Police officials, aided by a hype-hungry mainstream media, exaggerate the possible dangers posed by consistently non-violent protesters. Using the climate of fear created by this hype to justify their actions, the police consistently engage in extra-constitutional and illegal behaviour, such as mass pre-emptive arrests, the [sic] interference with media outlets, and brutal protest behaviour. Inevitably the mainstream press realizes the hype once the protests are safely over and sheepishly admits its mistakes. (Anderson 2004)

The point has been made more succinctly by another analyst: ‘the media did not just report on the space of terror in Genoa, they helped produce it’. (Juris quoted in Gorringe and Rosie 2007: 4) Even the police occasionally have considered pre-summit coverage to be excessive: in Miami, the Miami Police Department considered the anticipation of violence in the media coverage prior

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to the FTAA to be excessive: ‘The level of alarm in these stories increased as the FTAA Summit approached and it reached a point of near hysteria in the weeks and days prior (sic)’ (MPD 2004). Similar anticipatory coverage is detailed in the case studies below.

For the WEF protests in New York in 2002 a Nexis search of pre-protest coverage (1 December 2001 to 28 January 2002) ‘found that most articles in the New York Daily News, New York Post, New York Times and Newsday mentioning the WEF have focussed on police preparations for the protests. As a result, the political debate over the WEF has been obscured, as have concerns about police brutality and civil liberties’ (FAIR 2002). Much of the coverage was dominated by ‘unsubstantiated commentaries that portray activists as thugs’, with a minority comparing protest with terrorism. These articles also referred back to the overwhelmingly peaceful protests in Seattle, Washington DC, Los Angeles and Philadelphia as ‘window-smashing, flame-tossing spectacles’ (New York Daily News 24/1/02), ‘violent mayhem’ (New York Post 20/1/02), ‘radical protesters rampage[ing] through the streets...clashing with police’ (Daily News 18/1/02), ‘wild protest melees’ (New York Times 25/1/02) and ‘violent’ (Newsday 18/1/02) (All quoted in FAIR 2002). Some of the anticipatory coverage is little short of felonsetting. A cover story of The New York Daily News a few days before the Republican Party’s National Convention in New York in August 2004 reported Jaggi Singh, a Canadian anti-free trade activist, to be a dangerous anarchist who had received firearms training from a member of the Black Panther Party (a completely bogus fact), while a competing paper The New York Post ‘published a photo of Jaggi shooting off a handgun. A friend of his who saw the picture notes ‘it is some brown guy with high cheekbones and a Harry Potter haircut, but it’s not Jaggi’” (Sarracini 2005), the photo just as bogus then as the claims of firearms training.

Other frames
While predominant the violent frame is not the only frame to which the AGM was fitted: while the possible frame of the justified protestor does not seem to be particularly popular, (though it does occasionally appear) most of the other frames tend to marginalise the protesters. Covering the period 28 November to 7 December 1999 for Seattle and 11-20 April 2000 for Washington DC, Boykoff investigated coverage in six newspapers, The New York Times, The LA Times, The Washington Post, The Wall Street Journal, USA Today and The Boston Globe, and five television networks –ABC,CBS, NBC, CNN, FOX- examining 111 newspaper articles and 110 television segments for Seattle and 69 newspaper articles and 68 television segments for Washington, DC. (Boykoff 2006: 209) Analysis of framing practices in this material identified five predominant frames in that coverage –the violence frame, the disruption frame, the freak frame, the ignorance frame and the amalgam of grievances frame (frames which are not
mutually exclusive) concluding that ‘the Violence Frame is the most dominant of the five, as it appears in 59% of all mass-media accounts. In other words, the Global Justice Movement was portrayed as violent in nearly three of every five segments’ (Boykoff 2006: 224), compared with 39% for the Freak Frame, 26% for the Amalgam of Grievances frame and 19% for the Ignorance Frame.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Frame</th>
<th>Seattle</th>
<th>Washington DC</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Violence frame</td>
<td>62.9</td>
<td>53.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disruption frame</td>
<td>38.0</td>
<td>60.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Freak frame</td>
<td>36.2</td>
<td>42.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ignorance frame</td>
<td>19.0</td>
<td>19.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amalgam of grievances frame</td>
<td>23.5</td>
<td>29.9</td>
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We have already detailed the violence frame. The disruption frame (similar to Di Cicco’s (2012) identification of the ‘nuisance paradigm’) combined a focus on protesters’ intention to disrupt the summits with the disruption to residents’ everyday lives and to business as usual caused by the protests. This frame turns local residents into victims of the protesters: for Seattle 17% of all news accounts framed residents in this way, while for Washington DC 31% did. (Boykoff 2006: 214,215). The freak frame concentrates on what divides some protesters from the mainstream of society—not just their opinions and values, but their age, dress and appearance, often deriding them as young and immature. Here ‘the more radical elements of the global justice movement—in terms of both outward appearance and ideology—are transformed into a synecdoche for the entire movement’ (Boykoff 2006: 216). The ignorance frame described activists as uninformed or ignorant: the tactic here is to interview suitably ignorant protesters who are then ‘held up, if tacitly, as representative of the movement’ (Boykoff 2006: 220) As well as being ignorant, however, activists are also protesting for too many causes, leading to the amalgam of grievances frame, found in roughly a quarter of all accounts. This is, in some ways, an accurate representation of a movement which is a coalition of varied and various groups and movements. While this movement diversity is held to be a virtue by movement activists and some analysts, for the media while 47.3% of articles saw this diversity in a neutral light and 6.5% saw this as positive, 46.2% saw it as a negative trait in the movement. Thus ‘negative portrayals of movement diversity
were seven times more common than positive representations’ (Boykoff 2006: 221).

There is sometimes a very crude division of demonstrators into good and bad. Juris (2008:85-86) reports on Spanish press division of protesters at Prague into ‘good’ (NGO) and ‘bad’ (radical) protesters, also reported in relation to Gleneagles (McKiggan n.d.). The media reports provide a strange version of the AGM which describes it as both diverse and uniform at the same time. The media also simplifies the movement. Thus while the diversity of the movement is sometimes stressed (in an incoherence frame) on other occasions the demonstrators are characterised en mass, mainly as anarchists. Thus demonstrators carrying Maoist flags and other Marxist signs become anarchists, as do traditional communists, while the characterisation of black block as uniformly anarchist ignores the presence, for example, of radical nationalists such as Basques and Kurds. Militants at Prague were described by Spanish paper El País (29 Sept, p.70 quoted in Juris 2008: 86) as ‘rioters with coloured hair and gas masks, radicals for the sake of being radical, with no more ideological foundation than trashing windows and luxury cars, and punks with pierced penises urinating all over the streets’

Generally the frame operates to marginalise the demonstrators. One tactic is trivialization. A particularly fine example of trivialization is provided by Wall’s analysis of AP and AFP reporting of the dismantling of a McDonalds restaurant in France by the Confederation Paysanne which shows how this episode in the AGM’s history was reduced from a global to a national and even local story (Wall 2005: 110), while the authors of the action were reduced to a single person, who was then portrayed as ‘likeable yet comical’ (Wall 2005: 106). The wire services presented the act6ion as an individual action by Jose Bove, rather than a collective action by the Confederation Paysanne, a farmers’ union with a ‘high-profile role in the global justice movement’ (Wall 2005: 106). By emphasising Bove’s facial hair and comparing him to a cartoon character like Asterix, Bove was cast as a crazy French folk hero on a Quixotic quest to preserve the purity of French produce. The background of the story – its position as part of a struggle over trade- was lost, with the WTO – against whose activities the Confederation Paysanne was protesting- remaining invisible in the coverage. Thus ‘the coverage fails to provide any sort of thematic frame that would convey the bigger picture’ (Wall 2005:109). Particularly interesting is Wall’s finding that the coverage of the two news agencies is remarkably similar, with none of the expected national differences between an American and a French wire service. (Wall 2005: 112)

A further tactic involves invoking the ‘threatening other’ or constructing the demonstrators as ‘folk devils’. For an example of invoking the threatening other in advance of the March 2002 EU Summit in Barcelona conservative People’s Party (PP) attempted to pre-emptively link protesters with Basque street fighters, with El País (March 10th) reporting ‘Aznar (PP president) warns demonstrators of the risk of joining Batasuna’ and El Mundo (14 March, p.3)
headlining ‘More than a thousand Basque radicals will go to Barcelona’ (quoted in Juris 2008: 87) Coverage of the AGM has also included animalisation and racialization of the protesters, both in the US (Lawless 2001) and Gothenburg, Sweden (Hultman 2003), with the addition, in the latter case, of a metaphor of sexual violence. We turn now to look at the construction of AGM activists as a new folk devil.

Constructing the folk devil

One method of delegitimising the AGM is through the construction of anti-capitalist activists as a new form of folk devil. In the sociology of deviance a folk devil is a class or group of people who have become constructed through media coverage and expert commentary as the personification of evil, a group with no redeeming characteristics. The state and the media co-produce the folk devil:

News stories are often led by the press releases issued by government and the police as the establishment engages in its own efforts to control the debate particularly where the folk devil is a person or group who is a challenge to the established order of society. They will report on events and behaviour, habitually in a way that initiates, reinforces and embeds the public's suspicion and fear. (Donson et al 2002: 5)

Media production of the folk devil proceeds through exaggeration (including distortion of events reported to increase numbers, violence and destruction involved), prediction (that similar events involving the folk devil will become more violent and destructive) and symbolisation (which sees a word (such as anarchist) become symbolic of status (deviance); objects (such as black clothes and masks/bandanas) symbolise the word. In the process the objects become symbols of the status (and the emotions of fear and hate that accompany the status). When fear within general society of the folk devil has been created, it is expected by the public that the powers that be will take strong action against the folk devil. This allows those who exploit the folk devil by censuring it and taking action against it to make gains –

more resources and greater powers for the police, the press sells papers, politicians reinforce their authority and can be seen to be strong in the face of attacks upon society which can improve electability. However, gains can be seen in ideological and symbolic terms –reinforcement of the credibility and support for the police, silencing of diverse voices which offer difficult challenges to the status quo and resulting reinforcement of the established order of things. (Donson et al 2004: 5)

Donson shows the folk devil being constructed in relation to the May Day protests in London.
The ease with which activists are now publicly connected with extreme violence and criminality can be seen in relation to the ritual protest actions of May Day in London. ...in the context of anti-capitalist activists we have the creation of suspicion and fear in the mind of the public, and the expectation on the part of the police that activists are anarchist thugs. The obvious conclusion to be drawn by the authorities and the media, and therefore to be passed on to the public is that there will almost certainly be trouble. (Donson et al 2002:11)

Donson and her co-workers look first at the guerrilla gardening May Day 2000 protest in Parliament Square in London: explicitly organised by activists to be non-violent it passed off peacefully until riot police blocked all exits from the square, until at one exit the police line was miraculously broken and police allowed demonstrators to move to a street with an empty and unguarded McDonalds, when, according to an eyewitness ‘for a full quarter of an hour those who wished to had a free hand to smash up the restaurant. It was only when surrounding shops were started on that the police miraculously reappeared and swiftly and easily corralled everyone in that section of Whitehall into the secured pen of Trafalgar Square’ (quoted in Donson et al 2004:15). Thus, by sleight of hand and police tactics, a peaceful day’s protest was transformed into a riot.

Building on the image of May Day 2000, in the run-up to the 2001 protests the media, fed by police ‘intelligence’ and briefings, created through anticipatory coverage a context whereby peaceful protesters were discouraged from attending, and public opinion was prepared for the nature of police tactics on May Day itself (Atkinson 2001:147). While The London Evening Standard warned ‘Anarchists to loot Oxford Street’, The Sunday Telegraph reported Special Branch fears that the WOMBLES were ‘drilling...about 500 rioters in preparation for attacks on the police during the protests’ (quoted in Atkinson 2001:145-146). In a prime example of felon-setting ‘Photographs of suspected ringleaders were circulated to the press during April 2001, despite none having been identified as offenders. Rather they were described in newspaper reports as people ‘suspected’ by police of ‘intending’ to cause violence’ (Donson et al 2004:17). Exaggeration was the tune of the day: ‘Newspaper accounts intoned that anarchists were thousands strong, would carry samurai swords, had links with the Real IRA, had been to training camps in USA, and were ‘battle hard’ from Seattle’ (ibid). As Wahl-Jorgensen (2003:135) notes this coverage involved ‘metaphors of war, invasion, and terrorism’. 24

24 Wahl-Jorgensen’s analysis of British press material (reporting, editorials, letters) between January 1 2001 and January 1 2002 on the subject of May Day 2001 found four frames dominating the coverage: the ‘law and order’ frame comprised 59% of the material, depoliticising the protests and constructing them as spurious and a threat to public safety; ‘discourses of the economy’ comprised 9% of the coverage, mainly appearing after the protests and framing the protests as a form of costly economic disruption; ‘discourse of the spectacle’, covering 7% of the material, invited readers to laugh at the protesters who were portrayed as irrational and amusing, though a portion of this coverage also laughed at the authorities; the
Donson et al’s (2004:20) analysis of Prague shows ‘how the construction of anti-globalisation activists as folk devils is transmitted across national boundaries’. While the Czech press, police and police authorities happily adopted the international frame with the usual anticipatory coverage stressing violence and the threat of foreign protesters, strong security measures and political support for repressive action, the actual protests in Prague—with the division of protesters into different coloured columns, and Ya Basta using the traditional white/good, black/bad trope to their advantage by dressing all in white in contrast to black-coloured riot police, showed the difference between the traditional conception of folk devils and AGM members, who reflexively responded in an attempt to undermine their marginalization and construction as mindless thugs. Similarly, while Czech media presented Prague in the usual ‘battleground’ terms, as one dissident (under the former Communist regime) noted in an interview with Donson et al (2004:23) ‘at the end it was 26 shop windows broken. The next morning all major dailies used the word war in their, uh headlines on the front page so hell for Czech’s 26 shop windows equals war’. Donson points to changes in this example from the traditional view of the folk devil, the main difference being that the AGM folk devil is not accompanied by a moral panic, as this would require expert commentary discussing the folk devil’s deviancy: as one of the main aims of making the AGM into a folk devil is to

final frame, ‘discourses of recognition’, involved 18% of the coverage and involved substantive recognition of the reasons for the protest and often involved sympathy for the protestor: this final discourse only rarely appeared in the hard news reporting (when it did, it involved quoting the protesters) but appeared in the editorial, opinion and letters pages, generally seen as less authoritative than straight news reports. Wahl-Jorgensen concludes the media coverage ‘took place in a context that provided an incitement to silence about globalisation … by speaking of the protests in terms of their damaging effects on law and order and on the economy, and by making a spectacle out of the protesters’ incompetence’ (Wahl-Jorgensen 2003:144); however she also notes the success of the protests in interrupting the silence about globalisation through the more sympathetic material the papers also published.

Rucht (2005) presents an interesting sidelight on the British papers’ coverage of Mayday 2000 in a comparison with German media attention to Mayday 2002 in Berlin. For London ‘the papers clearly devoted their main attention to the violence, and especially the desecration of the national monuments—an aspect of the protests emphasized by three out of five major tabloids. The extent of press coverage was stunning… The tone of the reports is demonstrated by the labels used for the protesters… terms such as “ragbag mob”, “ramping anarchists”, “thugs”, “mindless yobs”, “unreconstructed Stalinists” and “riot crusties” (Rucht 2005: 170) shows the British tabloids in full cry in pursuit of the folk devil. In comparison the German press response to Berlin 202 was relatively modest, with a dichotomy in treatment possibly attributable to the proximity effect: ‘The Berlin papers devoted more attention to the violence and related aspects such as police strategy, whereas nationwide papers concentrated more on the (peaceful) trade union demonstrations’ (Rucht 2005: 172). Rucht attributes the differences in coverage to the consistent rioting on Mayday in Berlin annually since 1987, as a result of which ‘the German public was not exactly shocked. In a perverse sense, the violence in Berlin was perceived as “business as usual”’ (Rucht 2005: 178). The British public and their papers were less accustomed to such violence and the ‘desecration’ of national monuments was the cause and occasion for the tabloid pack’s rabid denunciation of the anarchist folk devil.
silence its activists, commentary is not welcome as it would suggest the AGM has politics, while constructing the AGM as a folk devil makes the AGM simply violent and thuggish and thus without any politics worth commenting on.
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