Coalitions of labor unions and NGOs: The room for maneuver of the German Clean Clothes Campaign
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Abstract
Labor unions are experimenting with new forms of struggle to secure labor standards. Transnational coalition building with NGOs offers a range of possible actions and targets. As can be derived from NGO and social movement research as well as from the approach of social movement unionism, union/NGO coalitions use a mix of actions. Empirically evident are movement actions, or public pressure from the outside, as well as interest group actions, or negotiations and mechanisms from the inside. When it comes to the demands of union/NGO coalitions, a variety of targets is possible, taking into account the mechanism of private governance established since the 1990s as findings of governance research and sociology of markets show. Cooperation efforts between labor unions and NGOs strive to protect labor standards not only with regard to public regulation through (supranational) state actors, but also through voluntary business instruments like codes of conduct. In this regard labor unions are traditionally ascribed to the political sphere and NGOs to the business sphere. An illustrative example, the German branch of the Clean Clothes Campaign (Kampagne für Saubere Kleidung) shows how union/NGO coalitions use both movement actions and interest group actions after an intensive co-operation is built. A longitudinal analysis of the coalition’s demands demonstrates how the CCC-G shifts its strategy from the establishment of a code of conduct and independent monitoring mechanisms to a hybrid approach of also targeting state actors. This is explained by the problems with voluntary self-regulation and rising political options. This hybrid approach of targeting private and state actors might be a more effective way of business regulation.

Introduction
“Killer Jeans still being made” (CCC 2012) is the title of a current online action of the Clean Clothes Campaign (CCC) which strives to secure a ban on sandblasting in the jeans production industry. The term Killer Jeans dramatically refers to a dangerous technique in the production process of jeans, specifically the use of sandblasting to fabricate fashionably worn-out-look jeans, which harms workers by causing lung diseases. “[G]arment workers are still being asked to risk their lives for fashion” (CCC 2012) judges the CCC referring
to unhealthy labor conditions. How does the CCC, a transnational network of labor unions and Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), fight for the improvement of labor conditions? In this case, the CCC set up a campaign in 2010 targeting well-known brands like Dolce & Gabbana to stop the use of sandblasting during the production process. Trying to raise public attention, the CCC asks consumers to send protest letters to the selected corporations. It also has pleaded with national governments and the European Union (EU) to reach a ban of sandblasting products. This initiative is one of many examples where labor unions and NGOs use diverse paths to secure labor standards. Labor unions in co-operation with NGOs experiment with new forms of struggle that go beyond participation in industrial relations institutions and the spirit of an interest group fighting for the interest of their members. Instead they also include instruments of private governance and show actions characteristic of social movements. Thus, the room for maneuver for union/NGO coalitions is broad; however, the chosen strategies of union/NGO coalitions are understudied.

The importance of coalition building is widely acknowledged in research on social movements (Raschke 1988, Rucht 1994, Staggenborg 2010). The literature on Social Movement Unionism also discusses coalition building with social movement organizations (Fairbrother 2008, Waterman 2008). Coalition building is among other things meant to be a revitalization strategy of labor unions to tackle increasing problems of eroding mobilization capacity (Frege and Kelly 2003). Finally, research exists that deals explicitly with coalitions of labor unions and NGOs with regard to labor regulation (Altvater 1999, Anner 2000, Gallin 2000, Krüger 2002, Scherrer 2002, Anner and Evans 2004, Connor 2004, Eade 2004, Hale 2004, Huyer 2004, Povey 2004, Spooner 2004, Arenas, Lozano and Albreda 2009, Ford 2009, Sluiter 2009). So far the findings are mainly focused on the emergence of coalitions, but not on joint efforts to protect labor standards. However, the studies are instructive for the analysis of the coalition’s strategic choices by showing similarities and differences between the actors as well as conflicts or strengthening factors; for example, long-term established ties, a common threat or opportunity, the demands based on the same ideology or comparative advantages such as the stance of labor unions in industrial relations institutions or the media affinity of NGOs. While the process of coalition building has been subject to some research, so far only a little attention has been devoted to the actions of these coalitions once they are established. Several studies, though, point to different possible strategic decisions within union/NGO coalitions regarding how labor standards should be implemented between the political and the economic

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1 In the past, unions and NGOs often had a conflictual relationship, particularly with regard to questions of ecological sustainability, and efforts of co-operation often stopped at the level of common statements. Some investigations are conducted within the policy areas of environment and energy politics (Krüger 2002: 38f., Obach 2004, Mayer 2009, Frundt 2010) and in the health sector (Lethbridge 2004, 2009). During the 1990s, long-term coalitions also became visible in the field of labor regulation.
sphere (Braun and Gearhart 2004, Compa 2004, Egels-Zandén and Hyllman 2006, 2011). The strategies of union/NGO coalitions are therefore the focus of this study. What are the joint options for coalitions of labor unions and NGOs and how do they use them? This study conceptualizes different strategies of union/NGO coalitions to regulate labor standards by mapping the room for maneuver of these coalitions. Furthermore, it illustrates in a longitudinal case study how these coalitions can take advantage of these different options.

To map the room for maneuver of union/NGO coalitions, I differentiate various actions and targets. As can be derived from NGO or social movement research and the approach of social movement unionism, union/NGO coalitions use a mix of actions. Empirically evident are both movement actions, as public pressure from the outside, and interest group actions, namely negotiations and mechanisms from the inside (Krüger 2002, Fairbrother and Webster 2008). When it comes to the demands of union/NGO coalitions, a variety of targets is possible, taking into account the mechanism of private governance established since the 1990s as findings of governance research and sociology of markets show (Bartley 2003, King and Pearce 2010). Co-operation efforts of labor unions and NGOs strive for protection of labor standards not only with regard to public regulation through (supranational) state actors, but also through voluntary business instruments like codes of conduct. As findings of union/NGO coalition research show labor unions are traditionally ascribed to the political sphere and NGOs to the business sphere of global labor governance, even though they are not limited to one dimension (Egels-Zandén and Hyllman 2011). Thus, the coalition’s options for action range between public and private governance attempts, as well as their interplay.

In the following section, after a definition of coalitions of labor unions and NGOs, I provide an overview of possible actions and targets of union/NGO coalitions. Later in the article, the German branch of the CCC, the Kampagne für Saubere Kleidung (CCC-G), serves as an illustrative case for the use of different actions and targets. The investigated coalition has existed for some years, meaning that a potential development is visible. As a result, a mix of movement and interest group actions is visible, based on an intensive co-operation. In addition to the mobilization for private governance, the CCC-G developed an attempt to public regulation respectively a hybrid strategy, due to the lack of successful voluntary self-regulation of corporations and upcoming political options.

Coalitions of labor unions and NGOs

Defining union/NGO coalitions

Within the context of changing patterns of transnational regulation of labor standards new coalitions have been established between labor unions and NGOs. A coalition is defined as a coordinated co-operation of independent but convergent political forces. Important elements are the autonomy of the actors, the link of the co-operation to a purpose and at least a partial harmonization
A broad definition of coalition allows several motives of coalition building such as strategic interests as well as common norms and values or shared beliefs (Dobusch and Quack 2010: 8).

Coalitions of labor unions and NGOs can be diverse. A helpful starting point to organize empirical findings is the definition of ideal types of union/NGO networks classified from the highest to the lowest intensity of co-operation (Krüger 2002). Rhodes and Heclo make a first differentiation between so-called policy communities and less intensive co-operations referred to as issue networks (Rhodes and Heclo in Krüger 2002: 226ff.). Additionally, through the research of NGO networks Walk and Brunnengräber develop a temporary network type so-called ad hoc network (Walk and Brunnengräber 2000: 247f.). Krüger presents a weaker type, the so-called discursive network and the precursor presentation, based on the empirical examination of union/NGO coalitions (Krüger 2002: 219ff.). Accordingly, co-operation efforts can range from only non-binding declarations, joint conferences and temporary projects, to long-term campaigns, a common secretariat, joint problem definition and planning processes or even to a continuous exchange and joint proposals for the policy process. For example, as the following case study shows, a coalition might also develop in longitudinal section towards a more intensive co-operation form. Since the organizational structure lays the foundation for any further actions, it can also hinder or facilitate certain forms of action (Jones et al. 2001). For union/NGO coalitions this applies to the engagement in interest group politics which seem to need an intensive form of co-operation (Krüger 2002: 226ff.).

**A mix of social movement and interest group actions**

How does a union/NGO coalition act? On the one side, labor unions represent the interest of their members in the political decision-making process and are actors of self-regulation in the field of labor regulation (Koch-Baumgarten 2006). This applies to political systems where labor unions are able to take part in collective bargaining, as is the case in this study, but has also in mind other labor unions that try to reach this status. On the other side of the co-operation are NGOs, defined as voluntary organizations, which build the structure of social movements and rely on supporters (Walk and Brunnengräber 2000). Since the range of NGOs is broad, in this study only NGOs that explicitly deal with labor standards, elsewhere referred to as labor-NGOs (Ford 2009), are taken into account because no additional conflict lines shall be examined, for instance conflicts over environmental issues (Obach 2004). As social movement and NGO as well as labor union research shows, the line between NGOs and labor unions blur with regard to the actions carried out. The joint actions of the...
coalition will be differentiated in social movement actions and interest group actions.

To begin with, social movement research and NGO research looks for the development of interest group characteristics within social movements. NGOs experiment with diverse forms of collective practice as well as with informal and non-hierarchical organization structures. NGOs rely on a pool of supporters that they need to mobilize. However, to reach an influential position in politics, NGOs build more and more centralized structures and mechanisms for negotiation (Lahusen 1996, Walk and Brunnengräber 2000: 194ff.). To capture these characteristics, adopted from social movement research, Krüger makes a difference between the logic of problematization and the logic of effectiveness (Hjelmar in Krüger 2002: 35f.). The former describes strategies that build up pressure through agenda setting, whereby the state is not addressed exclusively. Actions with high publicity draw attention to an issue and help to raise public awareness. Alternatively, the latter actions aim to reach influence through lobbying, legal proceedings, negotiations and collaboration with others. At best, the result is effective interest politics. One can broaden this approach to market actors, where a distinction of NGO-actions can be made between public confrontation and dialogue far from the media (Reiß 2007).

Additionally, this difference in the characteristics of actions can be expounded through labor unions research. Unions first of all represent the material interest of workers; the elected representatives are committed to a definite number of members. Even though strikes are a main confrontational instrument of unions, the work of labor unions is shaped by bureaucratization and centralization of power, where they are established actors in the national context of interest group politics and lobby aside from the media. However, new types of actions, such as online campaigns, also make up a part of the instruments used by unions (Gallin 2000, Della Porta 2006, Koch-Baumgarten 2006: 211ff.). The social movement unionism approach shows the movement character of labor unions. Social Movement Unionism describes and in part argues for the coalition of the old labor movement with new social movements or community organizations (Fairbrother 2008, Fairbrother and Webster 2008, Waterman 2008). This approach not only shows a broadened selection of issues and coalitions of labor unions, but also identifies new ways of protests, which are similar to those of new social movements (Lethbridge 2009). Fairbrother and Webster also differentiate between a movement dimension of unions, or mobilization, and an institutional dimension, namely the participation in industrial relations institutions (2008: 311).

In sum, these logics of action in the following sections will be referred to as social movement and interest group action. Both groups of actors might show characteristics of these logics; in this regard the borders between the two actors blur. Therefore it can be assumed that in coalitions both logics of actions are empirically evident. Furthermore, a change within the coalition between movement and interest group action is possible over time.
Targets of public and private governance instruments

Who are the coalitions targeting with their demands? Working conditions with regard to working hours, salaries, health security, labor union rights, environmental consequences and others are points of conflict not only in (supra-)national political decision-making processes and collective negotiations, but also in street protests, online campaigns, stakeholder meetings, the consumption of labeled products and in many other arenas. As already mentioned, the targets of the coalitions’ actions can be diverse. Several instruments from public to private governance can be favored to secure labor standards.

On the one hand, transnational non-state networks address state actors (Keck and Sikkink 1998), such as governments and government organizations, as well as international organizations. However, nation states are confronted with regulation problems due to cross-border economic interdependencies and they act upon the maxim of international competition (Streeck 1996: 180ff.). On a supranational level an effective regulation through, amongst others, the International Labour Organization (ILO) or social clauses in trade agreements by the World Trade Organization (WTO) seems unlikely (Koch-Baumgarten 2006: 206ff.). Additionally, national industrial relations are becoming weaker and national labor unions loose bargaining power (Avdagić and Crouch 2006: 206). Cross-border interdependencies, liberalization, new exit options of transnational corporations and growing national competitiveness characterizes the macroeconomic situation (Altvater and Mahnkopf 1993: 80ff., Young 2000) and are challenges for labor unions and social movements which try to reduce the worldwide currency of workers (Bieler and Lindberg 2011). The problem of labor unions to build global working structures is well known (Koch-Baumgarten 1999: 11ff.).

Therefore, new options of transnational governance arise through various instruments of (self-)regulation which range from campaigns of blaming and shaming (Lahusen 1997: 175) to seals of quality and codes of conduct (Greven 2001: 178), or even to international framework agreements (Koch-Baumgarten 2006: 211ff.). Even political consumerism (Stolle and Micheletti 2005), carried out on an individual basis, is an effort to regulate labor standards, and is visible through increasing label and certification systems. Campaigns by labor unions and NGOs can provide information for political consumerism and can give political meaning to this activity (Balsiger 2010: 315).

This complex struggle regarding the regulation of labor, or the formulation and enforcement of rules of labor conditions (Ehmke and Simon and Simon 2009: 13), is discussed with regard to the private or public governance of labor. Thus, there is evidence of a possible shift from public to private regulation, and from the traditional influence of interest groups towards instruments of consumer power (Altvater 1999: 329ff., Koch-Baumgarten 2006: 205ff., 2011, Bartley 2007, Hassel 2008, Vogel 2008, Ehmke/Simon/Simon 2009: 14). In this regard it makes sense to use approaches that treat market actors as political actors (O’Rourke 2008, Dobusch/Quack 2010, King/Pearce 2010), so that all relevant
actors, instruments and arenas are taken into account. Furthermore, instruments of private governance and public regulation can interact and build up a complementary governance structure (Weil/Mallo 2007, Amengual 2010, Overdevest 2010).

This study concentrates on how the coalitions react to these opportunities and difficulties. As the findings of union/NGO coalition research show, labor unions are traditionally ascribed to the political sphere and NGOs to the business sphere of global labor regulation, even though they are not limited to one dimension (Braun/Gearhart 2004, Compa 2004, Egels-Zandén/Hyllman 2006, 2011). The coalitions’ actions can therefore be related to state actors and/or market actors, whereas a change in strategies is possible. In sum, the functioning of union/NGO coalitions can be mapped in the context of the ongoing changes in the public and/or private regulation of labor on a global level. This can be done by analyzing next to the movement or interest group characteristic of the chosen actions, also the targets. In the next section, the Clean Clothes Campaign is analyzed based on these concepts.

**The Clean Clothes Campaign in Germany**

The beginning of a transnational union/NGO network

The *Clean Clothes Campaign* (CCC) is a transnational network of labor unions and NGOs that has existed since 1990 and strives for labor (and environmental) standards in the textile and garment industry. From its start the coalition expanded its membership and presently consists of a European network of national campaigns or contact points in 16 countries as well as a European secretariat based in Amsterdam. The European organizations work together with national organizations in the main countries of textile production, namely in Asia and Latin America.

In the following paragraphs, the German branch of the CCC, *Kampagne für Saubere Kleidung* (CCC-G) is analyzed (detailed in Kryst 2010, shorter version in German language in Kryst 2012 submitted). First, I will shortly outline the beginning of the CCC-G. Then, the structure of the coalition is analyzed which lay the foundation for the actions of the coalition which are shown afterwards in detail. While throughout the actions both movement and interest group characteristics are mixed, the targets change over time. Originally, the strategy focuses on the establishment of a code of conduct for which the coalition pushes through consumer protest and negotiations with corporations. Later this strategy is complemented with actions that address legal regulations and the state as consumer. Thus, the coalition’s demands provide evidence for a hybrid strategy of public and private governance.

Therefore, a qualitative case study of the long-lasting coalition is carried out using internal documents and materials of the CCC-G. A structured analysis of documents is supplemented by interviews with the coordinators of the CCC-G secretariat and the urgent appeals co-ordinator of the CCC-G as well as with one representative of an NGO and a labor union that are part of the network. Of
particular importance for the document analysis are, on the one hand, minutes of internal meetings of the CCC-G and meetings on European level as well as formal papers within which the coalition defines its form of organization. On the other hand, the regularly released newsletters of the CCC-G are subject to analysis. The actions are amongst others apparent through the newsletter of the CCC-G (CCC-G 1999b – CCC-G 2012a). Additionally, other existing investigations of the CCC are taken into account (Altvater 1999, Ascoly/Zeldenrust 1999, Rimml 2003, Hale/Wills 2007, Krüger 2002: 139ff., Sluiter 2009, Balsiger 2010, Egels-Zandén/Hyllmann 2006, 2011, Merk 2009).

The roots of the CCC can be traced back to street protests in solidarity with Filipino textile workers in the Netherlands in 1989. In a so-called Free Exporting Zone in the Philippines, women occupied the entrance of a textile manufactory which had been shut down after the workers claimed they were not getting paid the statutory minimum wage. After protests in front of textile sellers in the Netherlands, Dutch NGOs carried out continuative public actions and research of labor conditions in the sector. Finally, the CCC was officially founded in 1990 (Altvater 1999, Ascoly/Zeldenrust 1999: 14, Hale/Wills 2007, Krüger 2002: 139ff., Sluiter 2009: 9ff.).

Originating in the Netherlands the concept of the CCC was transferred, amongst others, to some German NGOs, which became involved in the CCC in 1995 and brought in one by one other NGOs and labor unions. In co-operation with other European organizations they compiled publications, carried out workshops and made contacts with non-European groups. Already at an early stage, the CCCs first contact with groups from Asia led to the organization of public tours of Asian textile workers through Europe. The period until 1998 can be described as the booster phase, in which the CCC-G developed its organization, strategy and course of action (CCC-G 1996a). In the beginning, the CCC-G existed as a loose structure of member organizations (CCC-G 1996a). In June 1996, five organizations built the so-called core group, which dealt with the financial and strategic aspects. Members of this core group were four moderate NGOs with a churchy background that are engaged amongst others in human rights issues and development issues, namely the Christliche Initiative Romero, the Südwind Institut für Ökonomie und Ökumene, the Ökumenisches Netz Rhein-Mosel-Saar and the group Evangelische Frauenarbeit in Deutschland, the last explicitly works on women rights. Additionally, the Bildungswerk/Nord-Süd-Netz, a branch of the German labor unions’ umbrella organization Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund (DGB) which deals with labor rights on a global level was part of this core group. Initially, the planning was laid out for three years, but it was not explicitly restricted to this time (CCC-G 1996a). Already in the booster phase, it was obvious that the co-operations taking place on a working level and the coalition was planned for a long-term co-operation and more action-

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3 The material was generously provided by the union IG Metall in Frankfurt/Main, the NGO Katholische Landjugendbewegung in Bad Honnef and the International Secretariat of the CCC in Amsterdam.
orientated than for discursive exchange. Hence, the coalition goes beyond the above mentioned types of presentation and discursive network.

**The working structure of the CCC-G**

The network lays the foundation for any joint actions carried out by the coalition. When it comes to the internal cooperation of the CCC-G, the formal paper of structure (CCC-G 1998 – CCC-G 2010a) shows that the working structure of the CCC-G is a staggered organization structure (CCC-G 1996b), which consists of a central core surrounded by other groups in a loose network. In the center is a group of support organizations, which are the actors that hold the main responsibility in terms of programmatic, strategic and financial planning as well as the campaigning. At the moment it consists of 22 organizations (Table 1). Besides the DGB, three sector unions are members of the CCC-G. Since 1998 the IG Metall, which covers amongst others workers of the textile industry, and the service sector labor union *ver.di* have taken part in the campaign. In 2012, the Gewerkschaft Erziehung und Wissenschaft, a labor union from the education sector, joined the group of support organizations. Most of the other active member organizations have a churchy background, which is occasionally also highlighted by the expression of a One World-idea stemming from Christian development co-operation. They advocate for human rights and women rights issues and deal with development politics, sometimes with a specific regional focus. Some assign themselves to the global justice movement, like the INKOTA-Netzwerk. Others, such as FEMNET and Terre des Femmes, are NGOs that fight for worldwide women rights. Also, TIE Global is a transnational network of workers initiatives.
Table 1: Member organizations and organizational structure of the CCC-G (CCC-G 1999b, CCC-G 2012a).

Alongside the group of support organizations, the coalition established a managing committee that is in charge of the campaign work in between the support group meetings. The duties of the managing committee include the preparation of the support organizations’ meetings, the operative control and urgent decision-making related to public relations work. The managing committee consists of five members from the support organizations group that are designated in the beginning for one year and later for two years. The coalition decides on a well-balanced composition of labor unions, church-linked and other NGOs within the managing committee. Also at least half of the members need to be women. The executive institution of the CCC-G is the coordinating secretariat (CCC-G 2010b). This is where meetings of the network will be organized and actions are co-ordinated. The co-ordinating secretariat answers questions directed at the CCC-G and is responsible for the acquisition of finances. Since 2004, the coordinator also has taken care of its own thematic
focus, the public procurement. Besides, the thematic work takes place in several working groups. The co-ordinator of the secretariat stresses the fact that the CCC-G is a horizontal network, where member organizations try to decide in a consensual manner. Consensual decision-making is a guideline written down in the formal paper of structure. If this is not possible to realize, the organizations take decisions with a two-thirds majority (CCC-G 2010b). However, due to the short resources of some member organizations, the involvement of NGOs and unions in the network differs greatly; thus a core of member organizations works together more intensively than others (CCC-G 2010b).

Members of the coalition engage according to their specific thematic or regional foci, and they support the coalition voluntarily on an ideally political and financial basis (CCC-G 1998 – CCC-G 2010a). According to the CCC-G, withdrawals from the network took place due to a lack of resources, and because the coalition itself is struggling with financial problems from time to time (CCC-G 2010b). The CCC-G is financed by membership fees, donations and project funds. In the beginning the EU played an important role; later, the foundation Stiftung Umwelt und Entwicklung Nordrhein-Westfalen became important for the thematic area of the public procurement. The coalition strictly declines financial support from corporations of the garment sector. Finally, next to the core of member organizations, a so-called group of active people exists, which are loosely connected to the CCC-G and support actions on a local or regional level. Sometimes local CCC groups are established. These action groups are involved in the annual meeting of action as well. Thus, around the core of the coalition some loosely connected groups assert themselves, and they co-operate sporadically and the co-operation is limited in time and topics.

The case of the CCC-G depicts the functioning of an intensive co-operation between labor unions and NGOs on the basis of a common definition of problems and the joint elaboration of strategies for action. In addition, certain constraints in the work of the CCC-G, such as the lack of resources came to light. The coalition works on the basis of a division of labor and some member organizations collaborate on a regular and binding basis. Krüger identifies the CCC as an issue network (Krüger 2002: 229), while this case study shows that by now a differentiation according to the members of the coalition is necessary. Parts of the coalition are understood as an ad hoc network due to their temporary co-operation which is also limited in thematic scope. Regarding the core of the CCC-G, one can see a broadening of the thematic spectrum as well as an orientation towards the logic of interest group action combined with a more intensive co-operation. This is indicative of a development into the direction of a policy community.

A code of conduct to secure labor standards

The main goal of the CCC-G is the improvement of working conditions in the global garment industry with special attention to young women workers rights (CCC-G 1996a, 1996b). This goal is pursued through public awareness
campaigns. In particular, the retail business within the textile sector – which the
CCC describes as powerful in the global value chain – should move to be in
compliance with labor standards in the whole production process, including
their contractors, sub-contractors, suppliers and license holders. Controls
should be made by an independent observer. The CCC-G wants to establish a
code of conduct on a voluntary basis through which they can hold corporations
accountable (CCC-G 1996a, 1996b). As Merk points out, this accountability
politics, a strategy that has already been identified by Keck and Sikkink (1998: 24f.),
can be used by the CCC also with regard to other codes of conduct that
corporations have already accepted (Merk 2009: 609). For the CCC-G, using a
code of conduct is seen to complement, but not replace national laws, collective
bargaining and the collaboration with governments (CCC-G 1996a, 1996b). This
way, the code of conduct is acceptable for labor unions as well. However, this
agreement is not self-evident. The example of the Swedish CCC shows how labor
unions and NGOs take up different stances regarding codes of conducts (Egels-
Zandén/Hyllmann 2006, 2011). In this case, labor unions rejected the
instrument because they favored binding global collective agreements and
negotiation on the ground through local and national unions in developing
countries (Egels-Zandén/Hyllmann 2006: 307). As will be shown later, as it also
occurred within the CCC-G, the member organizations put codes of conduct as
an effective instrument for labor regulation at question.

The CCC-G took over the code of conduct of the European CCC (CCC-G 2012f).
This collection of behavioral patterns consists of general regulations regarding
the purpose and range of application of the code, the definition of labor
standards, assignments of the corporations’ accountability and of the
monitoring system. The labor standards are based upon the core labor
standards of the ILO and are defined in detail with regard to the following
aspects: voluntary employment, no discrimination in terms of employment, no
child labor, the respect for freedom of association and the right for collective
bargaining, an adequate salary, no overlong working times, humane working
conditions and a constant employment relationship (CCC-G 2012f: paragraph
II). In sum, the objective of the CCC-G is connected to the standards of a
supranational organization and the CCC refers to these norms. Nevertheless, the
CCC originally planned to establish a code of conduct, thus, it relies on an
instrument of the private governance of labor standards.

Using protests and consumer power to target corporations

The actions of the CCC-G are apparent from the newsletter of the CCC-G (CCC-
G 1999b – CCC-G 2012a). Strategically, the CCC-G tries to secure labor
standards through the power of consumers (CCC-G 1996a). Through public
pressure, using the media, interest groups or politicians, the CCC-G tries to take
advantage of the impending loss of image for corporations and the loss of
consumer demand. Single German corporations from textile trade or textile
production are exemplarily put into the focus of attention. The CCC-G criticizes
labor rights violations of corporations that take advantage of worldwide
Concurrency of labor and it claims a code of conduct in order to achieve more justice in the global economy:

The brand companies are using the competition between the large numbers of manufacturers to procure cheaper. [...] There is probably room for a little global redistribution, says the Clean Clothes Campaign. We propose a ‘code of labor practice’ as a model for the enforcement and independent monitoring of a ‘social charter for trade with clothes’ (CCC-G 1999c, translated).

They take advantage from the vulnerability of brands:

With the action Fit for Fair we want to touch the clean image of sports goods. In Germany, we focus on adidas. And our chances are not bad: Adidas & Co. fear nothing so much as to lose its positive reputation: Bad image - poor revenue... (CCC-G 2000, translated).

However, a request for a boycott is explicitly not planned (CCC-G 1996b). The CCC-G informs consumers about labor conditions in the specific corporations and distributes information on other labels or codes of conducts. Balsiger shows in the case of the Swiss CCC how the campaign can take the role of a watchdog and become a recognized expert that gains ownership: “[T]he CCC has achieved a position where it can speak in the name of political consumers nationwide” (Balsiger 2010: 317). The case of the CCC-G also shows that the coalition does not only want corporations to take care of the labor conditions in the production process, but also aims at raising awareness about labor conditions amongst consumers, so they act accordingly as political consumers. In consequence, the idea of consumerism as such is not criticized in general. As Balsiger sums up: “[T]he campaign’s framing suggest that it is all right to rely on market mechanism in order to achieve political goals. [...] The general ideological framework is not one of rejection of consumer society” (Balsiger 2010: 324).

Thus, confrontational campaign work faces dialogue-oriented collaboration with corporations. The objective to build up consumer power is ranked first, and is followed by negotiations with corporations in order to achieve the commitment to the CCCs code of conduct. Subsequently, the building of control institutions is written in the agenda. That is why the coalition first tends to use diverse instruments of mobilization, such as seminars, collections of signatures, postcard actions, street actions in front of shops, speeches within the annual stockholders meetings or in the context of main events like the international Women’s Day (CCC-G 1996a). On a regular basis, the member organizations evaluate the process of the campaign and adapt strategies according to changed conditions or perceived success. Thereby, the CCC-G notices that the necessary public pressure to start negotiations with corporations takes longer than
expected (CCC-G 1999a). Thus, for the time being, the CCC-G has intensified its public relations work.

In the case of labor rights violations the CCC-G starts so-called urgent actions in co-operation with other CCCs (Rimml 2003, Merk 2006). Since the beginning of the CCC, there have been hundreds of cases; from 2000 to 2007 there was around 30 and possibly even more (Merk 2006: 607). The evaluation of cases between 1999 and 2003, shows that more than half of the appeals dealt with complaints about freedom of association and the right to organize or with respect to collective bargaining (Merk 2006: 608). Again, this is an incentive for labor unions to take part in the work of the CCC since it complements what they do within industrial relations institutions. These urgent appeals are understood as a call for solidarity and address consumers with the appeal to complain to companies about labor rights violations. Therefore, prepared (online) letters are sent to the corporation agents in the places of production or to their customers in Germany, for instance to Adidas:

A recent Urgent Action urges Adidas to work for laid-off union members. [...] Adidas has to act in accordance with its code of conduct for freedom of association and prevent discrimination against union members at their suppliers. Participate in the current Urgent Action under www.saubere-kleidung.de (CCC-G 2009, translated).

Some appeals also target governments or governmental organizations in selected states in the Global South to get them involved in order to secure labor standards (Rimml 2003). This depends on the responsibility in the specific case of a labor right violation, which can be reported from many organizations within the urgent appeal network: “The network consists in total of over 250 organizations and [...] any organization can, in principle, transport into the network a case of labor violation that occurs or that they hear about” (CCC-G 2012c). Regional focal points are Asia and Latin America. Protest letters are the main protest form of the CCC-G. They are usually centrally collected and then distributed to the targeted actor in good publicity.

Additionally, the CCC-G initiates so called days of action including panel discussions, information desks, learning opportunities, speeches, (street) theatre, fashion shows or movie screenings – coming from the hope of a bigger media exposure. Furthermore, members hold critical speeches at stockholder meetings as a means of protest. Actions take place in different contexts, for example on labor unions or church days. Thus, external events are used for their own publicity. Finally, a regularly used form of action is travelling guests who talk about their personal experiences with production conditions in the textile and garment industry. Balsiger, who concentrates mainly on these public actions in the case of the Swiss CCC, differentiates these actions into protests, conventional and consumer tactics (Balsiger 2010: 319f.), which can all be assigned to the confrontational style of movement actions.
Negotiations with corporations

For the duration of the coalition, the actions that are oriented towards collaboration and dialogue grow, but they are still flanked by actions with publicity effect. The building of an intensive network builds the foundation for the involvement in negotiations with corporations since a joint problem definition and common strategies are necessary for these activities. Research and contacts to NGOs and labor unions located at the production areas are important for the preparation of negotiations with corporations (CCC-G 1996a).

First, conversations took place with the corporations Otto, Adidas, Puma and C&A in 1996. In 2001 the CCC-G spoke for example with Karstadt:

[A] delegation of the German Kampagne für ‘Saubere’ Kleidung (CCC) met for official talks with Karstadt (now Karstadt Quelle AG) for the second time. The company had reacted with sharp criticism of the veracity of the used sources in publications of the CCC, but also with an offer to talk. The CCC accepted the offer (CCC-G 2001, translated).

Since 2004, the CCC-G has negotiated as well with Tchibo and later, since 2008, with Kik and Lidl. However, for the time being, the coalition has not been able convince one of the corporations to sign the code of conduct. Initially, Adidas and Puma agreed to start a joint pilot project, but both projects failed. A successful project finally came about with the clothing company Hess Natur. In dialogue with the CCC-G subcontracting firms were contacted until 2005, audits through the FWF took place and ensuing meetings of a multi stakeholder committee on a yearly basis were called. Also in the case of sandblasting, the CCC-G states success in the promise of Versace to ban this practice in the production process. Besides the conversations with companies, the CCC-G is active through legal procedures and also targets monitoring institutions. In particular, the CCC-G complained to the Social Accountability International (SAI) about the certification of a certain factory and was successful two years later. After the factory was double checked, the CCC-G was informed that:

this certification should not be awarded because of violations of labor union rights [...] SÜDWIND sees this case as the confirmation of the long-standing criticism of the Clean Clothes Campaign of the outstanding influence of commercial audit companies in the SAI system (CCC-G 2003, translated).

It further took action against unfair advertising practices and complained to the OECD together with the Austrian CCC because of a violation against the OECD-guidelines for multinational companies. In sum, these activities show characteristics of interest group actions and they become more important during the work of the coalition. Additionally, the targeted corporations are not only addressed directly, but the campaign tries to influence monitoring
institutions and they do not rely only on the mechanism of voluntary self-regulation of corporations based on consumer pressure.

Furthermore, the targets with regard to corporations broadened: Starting chronologically in the beginning, the actions concerning the eco-fair production of textiles started with a collection of signatures targeting the companies Otto, adidas and C&A. Since 2000, the activities of the CCC-G have concentrated primarily on the industry of sport textiles in the context of main sporting events. With the slogan *Fit For Fair* the CCC-G carried out a collection of signatures and days of actions to build up consumer pressure on Adidas and Puma. On top of that, the coalition initiated actions with the focus on Karstadt/Quelle and protest actions took place with regard to Triumph and Tchibo during the time. Since 2007, the CCC-G has widened the spectrum of targeted corporations further and carries out activities that address discounters like Aldi, Lidl and Kik. These actions were later integrated into the European campaign *Better bargain*. Besides protest postcards there are actions in front of or inside the stores. A recent development is a growing attention towards corporations selling outdoor clothing, and now several are voluntarily controlled by the multi stakeholder initiative *Fear Wear Foundation* (FWF). Furthermore, the CCC-G brings up the issue of the harmful sandblast practice within the jeans production industry and is targeting corporations like Dolce & Gabbana and others, as already mentioned in the beginning of the article. Recently, the CCC has asked for fire safety in factories, targeting corporations and governments for example in Pakistan. In sum, the coalition broadens the spectrum of topics within the existing areas, focuses additional corporations and aims a sector project (CCC-G 2004). At the moment, the CCC network discusses future strategies of campaigns that go beyond individual cases and might address whole countries where many labor rights violations are reported, as in Turkey (CCC-G 2012c) or even broaden the approach to other sectors (CCC 2011).

**Addressing politicians and the state as consumer**

Since the beginning of the 2000s the CCC-G is increasingly turning towards state actors. Attempts to influence norms and regulations through non-state activities are complemented over time through attempts to influence political decisions and address the state as a consumer in public procurement. A shift in targets of the coalition’s demands can be seen in an overview of the actions that the coalition conducted from its beginning on. As a data basis I used the newsletter of the CCC-G from 1999 until 2012 (CCC-G 1999b – CCC-G 2012a) and analyzed the targets of the mentioned actions by the coalition (Table 2). Even though these mentioned actions are not all activities that the CCC-G carried out, it provides a good overview of the actions since the coalition itself portrays a representative overview of its current work. One article within the newsletter counts as one entry, due to the fact that the setup of the articles describes one action or several activities that belong to the same campaign. Only articles that mention actions of the CCC-G are taken into account while articles that describe for instance a new publication, the joining of a new member
organization or contain a call for donations are not part of the analysis. Finally, the mentioned demands within the articles are differentiated between demands on corporations only, demands on corporations and state actors, and demands on state actors only. Therefore within each article the actor(s) that is (are) hold responsible for reported problems and therefore asked by the CCC-G to adopt possible solutions to this problem is identified.

Table 2: Demands of the actions mentioned in the Newsletter of the CCC-G (CCC-G 1999b, CCC-G 2012a).

The table shows that actions which address only corporations dominate the beginning of the coalition’s work. In the beginning governments and governmental organizations from the Global South are addressed in several cases, and from 20002 onwards, the German government and EU politicians are targeted increasingly by the CCC-G-campaigns. With some fluctuations, the overall picture provides evidence for the rise of actions that address state actors. In 2004 the CCC-G agreed on the decision that the coalition will orientate itself towards state regulation as a new pillar of their work (CCC-G 2004). Since then, activities concerning state regulation of labor and social rights have been a new working area of the CCC-G. Merk reports for the CCC in general as well that it is “exploring legal initiatives for improving working conditions [...] or to pressure public authorities to make them procure the goods they consume ethically” (Merk 2009: 607).
This tendency points towards the question of effective regulation through voluntary self-regulation of corporations in contrast to state influence on compliance of social and ecological standards. The coalition notices problems with voluntary self-regulation through codes of conduct, which are widely acknowledged in the literature (Braun/Gearhart 2004). The shift in strategies is due to the fact that during the years since its conception, the CCC-G has seen problems with voluntary self-regulation of corporations, as mentioned by all interview partners and reported in the newsletter:

Past experiences show that companies act on a voluntary basis only on pressure, and make concessions only selectively. The situation of workers from the suppliers can be influenced only by long-term structural changes, which is why binding political regulations are more important than ever (CCC-G 2007, translated).

Problems that are mentioned are for example the potential green-washing of companies and the problem that consumers are only a minority and therefore not able to have a great impact. Furthermore, actors of the CCC-G do not want the results only be temporary, but they rather aim at sustainable change in work regulations. A campaign, however, would not have the power to effectively regulate financially strong corporations as states could via control instances. Next to these practical reasons, the NGO representative mentions the state as the responsible actor to implement workers’ rights next to corporations:

The Clean Clothes Campaign in total followed this voluntary approach, that through codes of conduct companies should meet certain social standards, and I think we think that is certainly a path one should tread, but it may not remain at the voluntariness. [...] That is why we turned to government regulation and also because we believe that these are also state functions that the state cares about where labor and human rights are respected and that the instruments are much broader. So, a state can establish bodies of supervision. We work as a campaign in voluntary structures after all (CCC-G 2012d, translated).

The representative of a labor union points to the responsibility of the state and to the need of binding agreements, too. At the same time, the mechanism of voluntary-self regulation are seen very critical and other mechanisms of implementing labor standards are understood as a better strategy with regard to the regulation of labor standards in general, not solely with respect to the CCC-G: “A code of conduct that is signed by the company and whomsoever cannot work. So, all these agencies which cavort there on the field, I think they are not credible” (CCC-G 2012 e, translated). The representative of a labor union sees the CCC as “politically important” (CCC-G 2012e, translated). From a labor unions point of view the representative stresses legislations and social clauses in trade agreements at the favored strategy of labor unions, and International
Framework Agreements at the second best solution. The representative says in this regard unions go kind of their “own way” (CCC-G 2012e, translated):

We have International Framework Agreements, which we try quasi as second-best way [...]. But of course we continue to try to influence legislative initiatives, or bilateral trade agreements that we finally get social clauses there. [...] We think the legislative authority has the responsibility (CCC-G 2012e, translated).

When it comes to International Framework Agreements, the representative emphasizes that unions are politically and financially independent and legitimated to negotiate in the name of workers, and therefore binding agreements can only be signed with labor unions.

We can agree to such a framework agreement only because we are present in the workplace. One failed at the problem of monitoring at the latest, if there is no one who controls it, so no one who is independent, let’s say, financially and politically independent, and those are only the unions, those are not the NGOs. That needs to be said in plain language. And no NGO can sign any contracts or framework agreements. It is just not possible. (CCC-G 2012e, translated).

Thus, this indicates a difference of labor unions and NGOs to tend to different governance mechanism. The coalition CCC-G in total, has acted towards private governance as well as towards public regulation since the beginning of the 2000s.

The CCC-G’s collaboration with state actors in Germany started in a round table of codes of conduct (Runder Tische Verhaltenskodizes) in 2002, in which members of the government, and representatives from NGOs, labor unions and corporations were involved. The goals of the round table were the exchange on specific topics and pilot projects dealing with codes of conducts. In 2003 the CCC-G pulled itself back from the round table after the group failed to agree on a pilot project. Furthermore, the CCC-G carried out activities that were related to the political action of the European Parliament concerning the social responsibility of corporations. Additionally, the CCC’s focus was on German politicians who were active in the area of consumer protection. The CCC reacted to guidelines of a possible new consumer information law in Germany, and asked for further action:

The German CCC considers that such a step can be an important part alongside other actions on the concrete implementation of a policy of corporate social responsibility [...] we need a) the legal obligation of a public company for regular reporting, [...] and b) the establishment of a state body for independent monitoring of compliance with the above mentioned labor standards (CCC-G 2002, translated).
Lately, the so called Ruggie-Framework especially serves as point of reference for the CCC. The Council of the EU expressed its support for the framework of John Ruggie, the UN Special Representative on Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises, which names both the state’s duty to protect against human rights violations and the responsibility of corporations to respect human and not only workers’ rights. Currently, the CCC-G specifically demands the German government not to hinder the adoption of an EU directive that imposes higher transparency standards on enterprises, namely to report regularly on their actions’ effects on the environment and human-beings in the whole value chain.

It is noteworthy that state function owners are not only activated in their role as lawmakers, but also in their position as consumers – not as individuals, but as actors responsible for the management of public procurements. Even though sometimes governments in the global south or in Europe are also targeted by the campaign, the introduction of the issue of public procurement is a stimulus for this direction of the campaign (CCC-G 2012b). The EU regulation on public procurement that needs to be implemented in national law, becomes a new options for the coalition, and other CCC-groups and government throughout Europe to engage in public procurement as well, thus transnational diffusion plays an important role.

Regarding the aim of an ecological-fair public procurement, the CCC-G negotiates together with local authorities, federal state governments and textile corporations like Bierbaum & Proenen. Additionally, citizens should put pressure on a local level, so that the public authorities consider social and ecological criteria in terms of acceptance of tender. Keeping in mind the enormous amount of money that is spent by the state authorities, this is meant to have a great impact. In the beginning the coalition set a focus on the federal state Nordrhein-Westfalen. At the same time several local authorities and federal states included social and ecological criteria in their laws regarding the awarding of contracts. Since 2007 the CCC-G has been a member of the Netzwerk Corporate Accountability (CorA), a group of civil society organizations that works for ecological-fair public procurement. Thus, amongst others governments are held responsible:

But without public pressure, the government does not seem to be ready to meet this responsibility. Therefore, the Corporate Accountability (CorA) network for corporate responsibility was founded [...] The CCC is actively involved in this work. [...] Help us: In order to exert pressure on the public debate and the decision of the Bundestag, we urge the chairmen of the parliamentary groups connected to the government [...] to vote for the inclusion of social and environmental criteria into the German public procurement law (CCC-G 2007, translated).

Put it in a nutshell, the ongoing balancing act between confrontation and collaboration with regard to corporations is extended by the orientation towards
state actors due to problems with instruments of voluntary self-regulation and rising political options.

**A more effective hybrid strategy?**

The development of the CCC-G’s actions show that they push for both, on the one side for private governance by corporations, but here additionally monitoring institutions are addressed and on the other side for public regulation through state actors on national and supranational level, whereas these are not only addressed in their function as lawmakers but also as a potentially political consumer. In sum, the CCC-G has developed a hybrid strategy between public and private governance. The approach of voluntary self-regulation of corporations is still used, but complemented with a new pillar.

As research on business governance shows, governance without the state is limited in its capabilities and results. Private governance instruments can function in interplay with state regulations and some results point to the effectiveness of complementary regulation instruments: Private governance can support state regulation and the state can serve as legitimizer, public monitor and influential buyer with regard private standard setting attempts (Weil/Mallo 2007, Amengual 2010, Overdevest 2010). Similarly, the hybrid strategy of the CCC-G, especially the connection of promoting transnational private standards with targeting the state as consumer, might be an effective approach. Of course, the success of the coalition is difficult to estimate in general. Even though several initiatives made a visible impact, the coalition helped to solve concrete labor condition issues through urgent actions (Rimml 2003) and works as an important influencing factor of political consumerism (Balsiger 2010), the results might be short-lived, activities might lead to a reaction at a later point in time or to learning and self-assurance effects within the activist groups themselves (Merk 2009: 610). Nevertheless, from the CCC-Gs point of view, the orientation towards state actors, particularly through the focus on public procurement, seems to make a growing impact on the national and local level, as the interview partners report. Thus, the possible shift of the coalition’s strategy between public and private governance arenas and their interplay opens up a broad room for maneuver of coalitions of labor unions and NGOs where they can take advantage from.

**Conclusion**

Coalitions of labor unions and NGOs that try to secure labor standards in a globalized economy have been on the rise since the 1990s. For a better understanding of the room for maneuver of labor unions and NGOs in the worldwide struggle for labor regulation it is important to illustrate the possible coalition’s strategies. So far, social movement and labor unions research, as well as research of union/NGO coalitions, mainly report findings on the emergence of coalitions, while the actions of these coalitions once they are established have been only scarcely conceptualized. Different ideal types of networks can provide
a heuristic to put empirical findings into order. The distinction between social movement actions and interest group actions helps to characterize the actions of union/NGO coalitions while at the same time the borders between the actors blur. Using the perspectives of business governance and the sociology of markets, diverse forms of regulation in the public and private arena can be taken into account when it comes to the targets of the coalitions.

The case study of the Clean Clothes Campaign in Germany, a network of labor unions and NGOs fighting for labor standards in the garment industry since 1998, shows the possible development of these coalitions in the context of global labor regulation. By now, the CCC-G shows a stable and intensive co-operation. This study presents in longitudinal form how unions and NGOs build up an intensive co-operation. The core members of the coalition are defined as an issue network with tendencies towards a policy community. The objective of the CCC-G was originally to establish a code of conduct for corporations. CCC-G states political consumerism as an appropriate instrument to secure labor standards. Thus, the union/NGO coalition regards private governance of labor as a possible addition to public regulation. In the beginning, the CCC-G mainly carried out movement actions like protests with the purpose of agenda setting. Now, these actions remain important activities for the coalition, but negotiations and collaboration with corporations and state function owners have become more relevant. Concerning the targets of the CCC-Gs actions, a shift is visible towards a hybrid strategy that addresses corporations and likewise state actors. This strategy originates from the limited success in endeavors that focused solely on private regulations and the rise of new political options within the EU. It is noteworthy that state actors are particularly addressed as consumers with regard to public procurement. Public regulation and originally private political consumerism are connected in this example.

The efforts of the CCC to secure labor standards is one of many non-state initiatives that deal with instruments of voluntary self-regulation of transnational corporations, but it also shows orientation towards public regulation. Hence, different strategies for non-state actors to integrate labor (and environmental) standards into a globalized economy exist and can be combined. As research on business governance shows, the interplay of public and private governance might also be a more effective strategy for these coalitions. For future research, additional case studies, preferably as comparisons, can help to gain insight into further drivers of different coalitions’ strategies. This study for instance points at the need for further attention to learning aspects from other transnational non-state actors in order to understand how labor unions and NGOs take advantage from different strategies in the struggle about transnational labor regulation.
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About the author

**Melanie Kryst** is a doctoral student at Philipps-University of Marburg in Germany. Her background of political science and international relations has influenced her perspective on social movements. She is particularly interested in the global interplay of the current labor, environmental and women’s rights movement. Her current research deals with several transnational networks of labor unions and NGOs that try to protect labor standards in a globalized economy. Amongst others she studies intensively the Clean Clothes Campaign, in the beginning with a focus on the network in Germany (Kryst, Melanie 2012. “Gewerkschaften und NGOs gemeinsam für soziologische und ökologische Nachhaltigkeit. Ein Analyserahmen zur Untersuchung des Bündnisses Kampagne für Saubere Kleidung” in Proceedings Nachwuchsgruppe Umweltsoziologie 7th-8th October 2011, Lüneburg, submitted). She dealt with struggles of European labor unions in transnational co-operation (Kryst, Melanie 2010. “Wenn sie doch schritten Seit’ an Seit’. Europäische Gewerkschaften zwischen Standortwettbewerb und Integration.“ 360°. Das studentische Journal für Politik und Gesellschaft 1/10: 101-111.) and is interested in the broader question of how non-state actors have an impact on institution building on a global level. Her doctoral studies are financed by the Heinrich Böll Foundation. She can be contacted at melanie.kryst AT gmx.de.