Crises and turning points in revolutionary development: emotion, organization and strategy in Solidarnosc, 1980-81

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Abstract

This paper examines two critical moments in the history of Polish Solidarity 1980-81. It looks at [a] some working assumptions on revolutions, turning points and emotions, [b] the 'structure of feeling' from which Solidarity emerged; [c] how the initial mobilization and its contradictions produced both an internal crisis and the creation of a new more expansive organizational form; [d] Solidarity's burgeoning and further contradictions; [e] the crisis of March 31st 1981 and its aftermath; [f] some implications of movement failure. This whole paper rests on a controversial assumption, namely that Solidarity in Poland was (at least potentially) a social-revolutionary movement. I have elaborated this argument elsewhere (Barker 1982, 1984, 1986, 1987b, 1990a, b; Barker and Weber 1982). In the most recent of these, I explored the way in which Solidarity's social-revolutionary potential was increasingly buried, after 1981, in favour of a purely political 'democratic transition' in which the movement's original working-class concerns were forgotten in favour of a (remarkably peaceful and uninvolving) makeover to parliamentary democracy along with a shift from 'bureaucratic state capitalism' to 'liberal-market capitalism'. The peaceable character of the 'democratic transition' was enhanced by the fact that both government and opposition had converged by the late 1980s in a shared admiration for 'markets'.

[a] Some working assumptions

1. In understanding revolutions, not just 'structural causes' but processes internal to their development are crucially important. Outcomes of potentially revolutionary process can't be read off from their starting-points. Matters shaping movement paths from outset to conclusion include movements' own inner transformations. Thus, the 'data-set' for studying revolutions should include cases of 'failed', 'deflected' and other outcomes than actual revolution.

Initially, we can analytically distinguish social from purely political revolutions. The latter include most military coups, the 1989 revolutions in Eastern Europe, and other 'negotiated transitions' including Spain, Latin America in the 1980s, or South Africa. All these, however, pose interesting questions about how

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1 My thanks to Andrejs Berdnikovs for detailed comments on an earlier draft. The paper was originally presented at the International Conference on Alternative Futures and Popular Protest at Manchester Metropolitan University in April 2006.
potential 'social' content came to be contained or failed to manifest. No Chinese wall separates 'social' from 'political' revolutionary movements. The Portuguese revolution of 1974-5, for instance, began as a military coup, but rapidly developed all manner of social-revolutionary potentials (Harman 1988; Robinson 1987).

2. We can grasp processes of 'revolutionary development' by considering them as sequences of 'crises' or 'turning points', relatively compressed 'moments' when movements face challenges about how to develop next. Contrary to 'natural history' or some 'protest cycle' theories, movements follow no inevitable sequence of stages. The 'crises' and 'turning points' in their development challenge existing practices, relations, understandings and feelings, demanding re-evaluation and creativity of response. Indeed, innovation and creativity, achieved through dialogical practice by movement activists, are at a premium at such moments.2 Because revolutionary developmental trajectories are contingent and 'event-ful', they require narrative forms of understanding, that catch both 'flows' and 'crystallizations', and their internal contradictions.

David Harvey offers a general conceptualization, in which 'moments' (which may be long or short) consist of both internal relations and contradictions. The end of one 'moment' and another's beginning is a 'transition' when these processes become somehow discontinuous. New forms of individual and collective action develop, involving both new explorations and contestations over possibilities, directions and associated understandings. New moments 'crystallize' out of these fluidities, with their own internal relations and contradictions (Harvey 1996). There is a degree of kinship between these ideas and Andrew Abbott's thoughts on 'turning points' (Abott 1997, 2001). Harvey cites Coles on Adorno: 'For Adorno the world is thoroughly relational. Each thing is a "crystallization" of its relation with others. Yet the language of "crystallization" is as important here as that of "relation". The relational world is not one of pure fluidity and harmony, but one where things crystallize into highly dense, infinitely specific, and often very recalcitrant entities that resist the surrounding world in which they are born. One could say that for Adorno, the first movement toward a dialogical understanding of freedom lies in a recognition of both this dialectical quality and this recalcitrance.' (Coles 1993, cit. Harvey 1996). Thinking in these terms, my immediate concern in this paper is with the process by which one 'crystallization' is again subjected to 'flow' and 'relation', in such a way that a necessary new 'crystallization' is required. That is,

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2 Here the work of 'cultural-historical activity theory' (CHAT), and notably Yrjo Engeström's idea of 'expansive learning', is potentially highly relevant (Engeström 1987). There are potentially fruitful marriages to be made between CHAT and social movement theory, but as yet the two appear not to have made any meetings or engagements. CHAT's insights, emerging out of Vygotsky, have been chiefly limited to studies of education and work, and have - like social movement theory until recently - rather ignored the emotional; CHAT, despite nods to Marx, also suffers from an 'over-consensual' account of 'activity systems' (Barker 2007a, b).
one set of relations, procedures, cultural assumptions, hopes and fears, aspirations and emotional accents is partly broken up, demanding to be replaced by another. At each such transition, moreover, problems of the adequacy of the relevant 'crystallization' are more or less sharply posed.

Two aspects of movements condition this pattern. First, movements develop in interaction with others, most notably with their opponents. In these interactions, all sides strategize: they attempt to assess concrete situations, including themselves and their antagonists, and act in relation to the other. Their developing interactions conform to no finite set of 'game rules': 'players' are prone to innovate and launch 'surprises' of various kinds, including interventions in the others' ideas, activities and organizations.  

Second, movements themselves are complex assemblages, 'networks' of groups and individuals with different histories, powers, social ties (including ties to existing power setups), pre-existing patterns of organization, cultural assumptions and traditions. Participants' initial mobilization into movements is uneven, both as regards time and mode of entry. Once mobilized, their patterns of development are uneven and combined: latecomers may move to the fore, bringing new impulses to a movement, just as 'early risers' may be displaced from their initially central role. Far from being fixed entities with allotted roles and statuses, movements more closely resemble tumultuous ongoing practical activities and conversations, focused on broadly shared concerns, between changing numbers and groupings of participants who are always threatening to fissure and re-shape. Charles Tilly offers a series of analogies: a loosely choreographed dance, a fund-raising pancake breakfast, a quilting bee, a street-corner debate, a jam session with changing players, a pickup basketball game, a citywide festival. All are 'structured' yet none is a straightforward 'group' (Tilly 1993 / 4). Any 'unity' they develop is both impermanent, and a practical accomplishment.  

3. Recently, social movement students have paid increased attention to emotions. Growing interest in 'framing' and 'identity' - and more recently in 'dialogics' and 'activity' - has re-opened the way to considerations of emotion, no longer as an element of irrationality, but as a normal feature of all action and social relations. Three recent collections exemplify the trend. (Aminzade and
McAdam 2002b; Flam and King 2005; Goodwin 2001). I offer a few summary remarks about where I situate myself within this complex field.

First, the emotional is an ever-present feature of the active, practical relationships among humans and between them and the material and symbolic world. There are no 'unemotional' actions and relations.

Second, emotionality is not something opposed to 'rationality', nor to cognition or perception. Each presupposes and is an aspect of the others.

Third, 'emotions' are not 'entities in themselves', open to consideration in isolation from other aspects of active, practical and symbolic relations. In grammatical terms, they make sense not as 'nouns' but as adjectival or adverbial qualities of such relational activity. We should avoid a 'faculty psychology' (Harré 1986; Sarbin 1986). Emotion, like cognition, is always about something, and toward something, an aspect of our active relations with persons, places, meanings and events, and with material things and processes (Armon-Jones 1986; Emirbayer and Mische 1998): 'Emotions are referential; they are always directed toward some real (or perceived-as-real) object' (Cadena-Roa 2002). More fruitful than treating emotion separately is exploring what Lev Vygotsky termed the 'dynamic unity of functions', viewing different aspects of human action and mind as practically inter-related with each other (Vygotsky 1986). Thanks to this dynamic unity of functions, we can learn both to change our emotional stance towards a situation and to manage our feelings, combining emotional with other cognitive, evaluational and motivational aspects of our responses. (Otherwise almost all forms of talk-based 'therapy' would be utterly incredible.)

Fourth, the emotional is 'embodied', manifest in bodily states, gestures and expressions.

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5 '... even rational activity has a necessary basis in particular emotions' (Barbalet 2002); 'cognitions typically come bundled with emotions, and are meaningful or powerful to people for precisely this reason.... Rather than viewing emotions and cognitions in zero-sum terms ... we need to grapple with their interactions and combinations.' (Goodwin 2001; Goodwin, Jasper and Polletta 2001) Likewise Craig Calhoun: 'While we may have good reason analytically to distinguish emotions from cognitions and perception, we also have good reason to see each influencing the other' (Calhoun 2001). On rational emotions more generally, see Crossley (2006).

6 We can only understand human activity when we grasp its 'affective-motivational basis' (Vygotsky 1986). Real thinking, Vygotsky insists, partakes of the 'full vitality of life.' Remember, too, Gramsci: '...strong passions are necessary to sharpen the intellect and help make intuition more penetrating.... Only the man [sic] who wills something strongly can identify the elements which are necessary to the realization of his will' (Gramsci 1971).

7 Deborah Gould writes of ACT UP's 'emotion work' that it was 'inseparable from its interpretive work, and the two working in tandem were vital factors in ACT UP's ability to sustain itself.... the emotional and interpretive work of social movements are indissociable.' (Gould 2001)
Fifth, the emotional qualities of action and relationship vary in intensity. Prosaic, routine, action is as 'emotional' as highly dramatic moments, even if we often don't notice this. As Craig Calhoun (2001) notes, ‘... we have huge emotional investments in the everyday status quo. It may look like we are relatively unemotional as we go about our tasks, but disrupt the social structure in which we work, and our emotional investments in it will become evident'. (Garfinkel's' experiments in disrupting the everyday reveal something of this.) But we should also note that 'calm' is an emotional state. 'If we see emotions only in connection with disruptions in social life, we shall exaggerate the importance of certain emotional dynamics and miss others.' (Calhoun 2001)

Sixth, being relational, the emotional is thoroughly 'social', indeed is an inherent aspect of human interaction. The emotional is not reducible to internal individual psychology, mind or body, or to social structure, or to discourse: rather, it implicates them all at once (Burkitt 1997). Thus the emotional is [a] socially communicable and shareable and [b] itself subject to forms of cultural and power-related forms of social control concerning its 'proper' and 'improper' expression. Here Hochschild's 'feeling rules' (Hochschild 1979 – 80, 1983) and Flam's political-emotional economy of domination and resistance (2005) are highly relevant.

Seventh, like other aspects of human inter-relation and inter-action, the emotional is complex and dialogical in form: like the 'ideological' (Barker 2006), or the 'attitudes' Billig dissects, feelings are dilemmic, rather than simple and obvious. This is sometimes recognized in references to emotions being 'ambivalent' (Aminzade and McAdam 2002a), or to emotions having 'different preference effects' (Kim 2002); see also Calhoun: '...people not only have emotions but have many emotions with dynamic relations among them' (Calhoun 2001). Emotions are not stable and permanent states of being, but conflict and change. Being an aspect of what we think, say and do in changing contexts, what we 'feel' is open to rapid alteration as different aspects of a total situation move to front of stage or retire to the wings, shifting their prominence in the hierarchies of relative attention and relevance. As the arguments and contexts in which we find ourselves alter, so emotional feelings and displays are open to being explored, debated, transformed. Likewise, our 'affective ties' (and indeed 'affective antagonisms') to others, whether individuals or groups, exist in the context of ongoing cognitive judgments, always subject to being weighed and reevaluated according to situational context. Whole cognitive-affective

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8 Mustafa Emirbayer and Chad Goldberg see fit to attribute to myself a view that emotions are purely individual (Emirbayer and Goldberg 2005). They appear to read very inattentively, since the whole thrust of the article they cite (Barker 2001) suggests quite otherwise. Their not-reading extends also to Lenin, whose arguments they appear to make up as they go. Still, why bother about evidence?
configurations, 'interfunctional complexes', can change quite rapidly, enabling or constraining different possibilities for action.⁹

Eighth, emotional aspects are especially significant in human intercommunication, in the ongoing 'dialogue' through which humans continually seek to make sense of the world and each other and thus of their own individual and collective selves. The concrete meaning of human 'utterances' (spoken, gestural, written) is conveyed, not simply by the selection of words from a shared dictionary, but by the 'evaluative accent' imparted to them in the moment of their expression, an accent which conveys a speaker's practical stance (Vološinov 1976, 1986). Equally, since dialogics places as much stress on the active, preparatory response of the 'listener' (Bakhtin 1986), the act of 'listening' itself conveys meaning, again in good measure by the evaluative accent of the listener (focus and intensity of attention, physical stance, facial expression, etc.). To focus only on the purely verbal content of intercommunication is to miss the significance of such matters as laughter, applause, silence, ironic smiles and frowns, inattention, rituals and so forth, but also seemingly mundane material practices, as means by which meanings are formed, adjusted, transformed by emotional intercommunication.

Ninth, we can distinguish between emotions involved in relatively short-term and longer-term actions, stances and relations (Goodwin, Jasper and Polletta 2001; Jasper 1998). The distinction invites discussion of the dialectical interplay between these two temporal registers, offering a further window on processes of ongoing change. A similar dialectic is required to explore the relation between longer-term 'ideologies' or 'attitudes' or 'values' and immediate processes of everyday speech, between the general and the particular. These matters exercised the Russian dialogicians Vološinov and Bakhtin; see also Billig (1995, 1996).

In the above light, it is potentially fruitful to attune ourselves to issues and moments of 'transformation', grasped in narrative terms. Theodore Sarbin

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⁹ Anne Kane offers an additional perspective on these matters, discussing the metaphorical character of human symbolization. Metaphors and symbols are, even if often strong and enduring, also ambiguous and opaque. There is a kind of slippage between symbolic representations and experience, or more than one way of 'thinking' and 'feeling a situation or event by symbolizing it in terms of something else. In unfamiliar situations, as in crises, there is a potential for creativity and contestation about both how to symbolize the new condition and - thus - how to respond practically to it. As Kane suggests, a structure of emotion is changeable: 'Encountering a new or different paradigm scenario of an emotion - for example, a narrative of humiliation in which the response is resistance and the outcome regeneration, instead of cowering and helplessness - may transform how an individual or collective conceptualizes that emotion, and, possibly more importantly, the appropriate response of action. Again, it is the metaphor and polysemy of the symbols in these narratives of emotion that allow transformation; the possibility for change is opened up through social interaction in which different narratives are shared.' (Kane 2001)
suggests we only understand emotions as part of narratives (Sarbin 1986). Equally, we can only comprehend narratives of human interaction if we can sense the emotional changes through which identities, organizations and purposes are seen in their 'becoming', as processes in transformation.

[b] Polish society before Solidarity

During the autumn of 1980, Solidarity grew at an extraordinary speed. It recruited the great majority of the Polish working class in just four months. It offered, it seems, a powerful articulation of already partly-formed ideas and aspirations among Polish workers, and indeed the mass of Polish citizens, who developed parallel civic organizations.

Helena Flam, seeing emotions as more than purely micro-level phenomena, proposes that we examine the 'emotional-institutional context' in which movements arise, and ask, what combination of 'cementing emotions' ties people to an existing regime? (Flam 2005). Among such 'cementing emotions' she mentions both gratitude and loyalty, but also fear, anger and shame. While Flam's emphasis on the emotional aspect of social structure - what we might term 'political-emotional economy' - is welcome, we need to grasp its inherently contradictory character. What Gramsci saw as the contradictory character of everyday thinking also has its 'affective' side. Firstly, 'cementing emotions' (positive or negative) are combined in real-world contexts with their opposites, that is with critical feeling-patterns which may be 'submerged' or 'hidden' (Scott 1990) for whole periods, or variably open to public expression by different individuals or groups. Secondly, emotions are not an autonomous realm of experience, being only one of a number of motile aspects of how people think and act, indissolubly tied to ongoing cognitive judgments of their own and others' powers and capabilities, and thus to their practical confidence in the possibilities of oppositional speech and action.

Useful here is Raymond Williams' concept of a 'structure of feeling' (Williams 1977, 1979). This refers to a shared but inchoate sense of 'unease' or 'displacement' which has not yet found a satisfactory 'figure' for its practical-cultural expression. V.N. Vološinov (1976, 1986) provides a similar idea with his notion of the 'ideologeme', a half-formed thought which requires 'choral support' from others to achieve satisfactory articulation; likewise Deborah

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10 See also Kane (2001: 253-4). Randall Collins, who discusses 'tipping points', suggests their dynamic is 'primarily emotional; individuals "decide" which coalition they will give a show of support to, insurgent or status quo, not so much by calculation of costs and benefits (which is impossible at this stage of extreme uncertainty), but by collective emotional flow' (Collins 2001). This narrows our choice to cost-benefit and emotion as alternative causes. What of perceptions, what of ideological convictions, what of strategic judgments of possibility, what of loyalties and other affective-cognitive matters, and what of new discoveries about self and society? Collins' work bears witness to the continued vitality of a theoretical opposition between 'rationality' and 'emotion' which I find unconvincing, not least in its impoverished understanding of both sides of the assumed distinction.
Gould (2001) applies the related notion of 'ambivalence' to AIDS activism in the USA during the 1980s. Polish opinion studies in the later 1970s revealed popular majorities placing 'trust' and locating moral authenticity in family and friendship, but little in official institutions, other than the regime-tolerated Catholic Church (Mason 1985; Nowak 1980, 1981; Vale 1981). A widespread 'unofficial consciousness' developed, transmitted in conversation and a plethora of popular jokes about official corruption, privilege and injustice. This was a political-emotional economy mixing cautious defiance with outright fearfulness, combining memories of both previous repression and previous oppositional achievements, not least the occupation-strikes and inter-factory strike committees of 1970-71 (Laba 1991). This mixture of contradictory impulses and perceptions was partly expressed in a differential readiness to act among different groups within the Polish working class and beyond. As yet, however, this structure of feeling had found no expressive 'figure' that might crystallize into a movement.

Rod Eyerman refers to 'structure of feeling' as 'those deeply rooted dispositions and sensibilities which organize and define a way of life' (Eyerman 2005). This seems not quite to catch Williams's sense of a structure of feeling as an inchoate sense of unease, involving contradictory impulses arising from experiences which have not achieved a clear articulation in ideas and shared practice. On the other hand, if a structure of feeling is lacking in clear definition and articulation, and thus open to a variety of modes of concrete expression, it is not infinitely open. In the Polish case, the structure of feeling that was widespread among people in the 1970s ruled out strong popular identification with or enthusiasm for the regime. It was thus, if only in statu nascendi, an 'oppositional' structure of feeling.

David Harvey offers what I think is a mis-reading of Raymond Williams, treating his conception of a 'community' characterized by a 'structure of feeling' as verging on organicism, as a 'total way of life' that is necessarily 'exclusionary' and oppressive to outsiders (Harvey 1996). The Williams I read treats a 'structure of feeling' as essentially inchoate, containing various potentials for development and crystallization in different directions. Williams, who acknowledges the influence of Vološinov, seems to me to treat a 'community' as a centre of dialogue, and not a closed world. The question that Harvey raises, of 'exclusion', is however worth pursuing further. There is a case to be made that when such a structure of feeling does find a more or less adequate 'crystallization' - as in a powerful social movement with which a community identifies - then, indeed, it does become in a sense more 'exclusionary'. Mining communities, once trade unionism took firm hold,

11 Eyerman's treatment verges on assimilating 'structure of feeling' to Bourdieu's concept of 'habitus', a notion with less of Williams's sense of contradictoriness and thus of multiple potentialities.

12 Harvey's criticisms might better fit the concept of 'habitus' in Bourdieu.
were indeed 'exclusionary' and 'hostile' - towards strike-breakers. When those
who possess loose and contradictory structures of feelings do find more focused
'crystallizations' of their ideas and activity-patterns, they also tend to define
stricter boundaries, and to impose a kind of 'discipline' on themselves and those
around them. However, for many, this process is also liberatory - insofar as they
replace an externally imposed discipline which is often associated with
exploitation, oppression and humiliation, with one that is more self-chosen,
more open to their own determination, and more expressive of their felt needs.
(I say 'more' because these are relative matters.) Helena Flam (2005) suggests
that social movements 'detach' people from established institutions,
organizations, and cognitive and normative patterns; in so doing, we can add,
they also 'attach' them to other such institutions and patterns. Unless we hold
to the most extreme liberal-individualism, where freedom consists in an a-social
rejection of all forms of obligation and 'social constraint', there are positive
qualities to 'exclusion' and 'hostility', arising out of popular struggle, which
Harvey perhaps misses.

We can thus see movements as providing a kind of emergent shape or definition
to a structure of feeling. Movements themselves, as specific articulations of
conflicting impulses, are themselves also inwardly contradictory, both liberating
and constraining, and subject to inner contestation (Zirakzadeh 1997) as well as
development through conflict with opponents. Evaluating them necessarily
involves political judgment.

In the later 1970s the Polish economy manifested deepening economic
difficulties (Barker and Weber 1982; Harman 1976 – 7), and the government
was cautious about overt repression of dissent: A secret police colonel remarked
ruefully about the opposition, 'We know all the addresses, we could destroy
everything in one night, but the high-ups won’t allow us to' (Garton Ash 1983)13.
Against this background, overtly oppositional groups began to agitate for
political change, and particularly for 'free trade unions'. In the coastal cities,
especially, they could draw on a strong recent tradition of militant workplace
organization, allied to bitter memories of murderous coercion in December
1970.

The Gdansk activists publicly announced a Founding Committee of Free Trade
Unions, publicizing their demands through underground newspapers and
leaflets, and rehearsing their own leadership in small local strikes. Their key
practical problem resembled that of the nascent Civil Rights Movement in
Montgomery in late 1955: they needed a suitable issue around which to risk a
wider mobilization. Sharp rises in food prices from 1st July 1980 set off an
immediate wave of strikes across much of Poland's industrial centres, with
government weakness revealed by its rush to negotiate. As yet, Gdansk and
Szczecin workers were relatively untouched by this militancy, but in August the
Gdansk activists were given their moment. One of their number, Anna

13 See also the evidence of secret policeman Sucharski in Bloom (forthcoming).
Walentynowicz, a 50-year old crane driver at the huge Lenin Shipyard, was sacked for her oppositional activity. The activists - uncertain whether they could carry it off - decided to risk a strike-call.

[c] The birth of Solidarity

The story of how the Gdansk activists succeeded in winning the shipyard workers to an occupation strike on Thursday 14th August has been often told (Barker 2001; Persky 1981; Potel 1982). It’s a narrative full of dramatic incident: young activists smuggling strike posters into the shipyard and putting them up in their departments; sharp arguments with foremen and party loyalists and then walk-outs; a swelling march round the site, pulling out other departments; a halt at the shipyard gates, scene of several workers' deaths in 1970, for a minute's silence followed by singing of the Polish national song; direct confrontation with management; Anna Walentynowicz returning to the shipyard in the manager's car as a condition for negotiations; the immediate election of a strike committee in which management succeeded in including some allies; two days of occupation and talks, ending on Saturday afternoon with an apparent major victory in the shipyard.

A gamut of individual and collective emotions was on display, as the strike moved through crises and moments of celebration: tension, argument and then the activists’ relief as workers marched out of their departments; solemn silence and mass singing; a stormy mass meeting, with heckling, applause, and the sudden dramatic appearance of Lech Walesa, a sacked electrician who climbed into the shipyard to lead the strike; Walentynowicz wiping her tears as the workers cheered her return; tense negotiations for two days as the occupying workers barricaded the shipyard for fear of an attack by the militia; anxious crowds gathering at the gates; urgent messages passing back and forth between the shipyard and other striking workplaces in the region.

On the Saturday afternoon, the shipyard management (and through them the regional government) conceded all the workers’ immediate demands: a large pay rise, the reinstatement of Walentynowicz and Walesa, plus an unprecedented permit for workers to erect a large monument to the dead of 1970 outside the shipyard gates. The shipyard manager, backed by his supporters on the strike committee, demanded that the occupation strike end immediately. Walesa, as chairman, felt he had no choice but to agree, and announced on the loudspeaker system that the strike was over. Workers began to stream home. The apparent victory in the shipyard launched a crisis in the movement.

Walesa was immediately attacked by representatives of other, smaller workplaces, who had also struck in solidarity with the shipyard workers. If the shipyard returned to work, they would be isolated. Krystyna Krzywonoś, the tram workers’ strike leader, told Walesa: 'You can’t fight with tanks with trams - we’ll be crushed like flies.' Some activists were non-plussed. Some, from other
workplaces, marched off angrily. There was confusion, angry shouting, uncertainty. Facing a still fair-sized crowd, Walesa took an instant gamble. 'Who wants to continue the strike?' he asked, and won back a roar of assent. 'The strike continues', he announced.

Walentynowicz and Alina Pienkowska (a nurse from the shipyard hospital) ran to the conference hall to use the microphones. They had been shut off. Outside, they could hear the shipyard director's voice booming from loudspeakers: 'The strike is over; everyone must leave the shipyard by six o'clock, or the agreement will be canceled.' The two women rushed to the walls shared with neighbouring yards, trying to explain that the strike had not been canceled, that a solidarity strike had been declared. The other strike committees angrily said they weren't budging. At Gate 3, the women met a crowd going home. Walentynowicz tried to speak to them, to be faced with an angry worker challenging her right to continue the strike. 'I've got a family, I've got children', he yelled, 'I'm going home.' She burst into tears. Pienkowska, who had never spoken publicly before, took charge, ordering the workers' militia to lock the gates for a few minutes' meeting. 'The strike is still on,' she urged: 'Walesa was out-voted, but the majority of workers want to continue, because there are no guarantees, and no free trade unions. If you leave, the activists will be sacked again. The most important thing is the solidarity of all the factories.' When the gates re-opened, many of her audience stayed.

Estimates vary of the numbers who remained out of the 16,000 workforce. Quite likely there were less than a thousand. The big majority had departed. However, two days of strike activity had now considerably expanded the numbers of the activist minority, for only the most committed stayed. Nonetheless, the strike was now in crisis. Bogdan Lis and Andrzej Gwiazda, feeling betrayed by the ending of the Lenin shipyard strike, had gone back to the Elmor factory, where they delivered bitter speeches, and won agreement to continue the strike. They toured other factories by car, bringing their delegates back to Elmor, to form a new battle-centre. The official media announced the end of the strike. But gradually the situation clarified. Some workers learned at home that the shipyard strike was on again, and returned - a few on their wives' and girlfriends' orders. The Elmor delegates decamped back to the shipyard, and sent out messengers to try to dispel the confusion.

That evening, in the shipyard conference hall, the somewhat battered activists assessed the situation. No compromisers now muddied their debates: all had loyally quit. For good or ill, the activists had full charge, but also a major problem. 21 enterprises were represented, and the strike was holding at all of them. However, the crucial Lenin shipyard workforce was divided between a militant minority and a majority whose feelings and opinions could, since they had dispersed, only be guessed. To continue the strike in these conditions was to face the fearful possibility of overt repression. The security forces might attack at any moment. The tension was considerable. Yet to give up now would be a defeat. If a handful of activists had won over the shipyard workforce once,
could they do it again, especially now that workforce had enjoyed a taste of practical solidarity and the victories it could bring?

Whatever their fears, the activists had committed themselves. That night, they formed a new organization: the Inter-Factory Strike Committee (known by its Polish initials as the MKS). They elected a Praesidium, composed of people prominent in the activist movement. Renewing the workers’ militia with warnings to be extra-vigilant, they drew up a new list of demands. The MKS had a precedent, for such bodies had been formed in both Szczecin and Gdansk in the insurgency of 1970-71 (Baluka and Barker 1977; Laba 1991), but the new organization went beyond anything previously declared. Their demands, 21 in number, were now general, addressing the conditions facing the Polish working class at large. At their head was the call for new, free trade unions, smartly followed by the guaranteed right to strike, release of political prisoners, controls over censorship (including the broadcasting of Sunday Mass on state radio), and a list of specific economic demands about wages, pensions health services and social equality. Speaking now for many different enterprises, they had to generalize their demands, but their list clearly had immense political implications, launching the movement onto a new path that challenged the regime’s very basis.

Their mobilization problem had also shifted. To win, they must spread the strike far beyond the core enterprises around the shipyards. Simultaneously, they must win back the shipyard workforce, or the heart of the scheme would collapse. Having decided on further action, they proceeded energetically and imaginatively. Over the whole weekend, messengers carried news of the MKS and its new demands to workplaces across the region. And, during Saturday evening’s crucial meeting, someone suggested they hold an open-air Mass at the shipyard gates.

Late on Saturday night, they negotiated with the Bishop of Gdansk, who reportedly sought permission from the party authorities. A local priest was found to perform the ceremony. He was so nervous that, before he set out, he made his will (Bloom forthcoming). On Sunday morning, before gates bedecked with flowers, ribbons, flags and a portrait of the Polish pope, the priest began a Field Mass, beside a wooden cross erected at the spot where workers had been killed ten years before. If the Mass had religious significance for many, it also performed a huge mobilizing function. Thousands attended, both from the shipyard and the larger city.

Everything still hung on Monday morning. With the gates flung wide, the main body of the shipyard workforce gathered outside. Over the loudspeakers, the shipyard director could be heard summoning workers back to work. On top of the gate stood Lech Walesa with a bull-horn. ‘Come in’, he urged cheerfully, 'come in and join us. It will be safe.' The large crowd hesitated, uncertain. Then a group of young workers, cheering, marched out of the crowd to rejoin the strike. Others followed, pulling the rest behind them. The strike was secured again.
Now the MKS regained control of the loudspeakers. The hall became a permanent meeting place, all its sessions and discussions broadcast across the shipyard, and outside to the square beyond. Again, with redoubled energy, the whole shipyard was placed under the control of the strike committee. The bond between activists and workforce was rebuilt. Now attention and energy turned outward, towards the rest of the Polish working class and towards the regime.

During the first Monday, delegations from more striking workplaces began arriving at the shipyard gates, to join the MKS. The workers' militia checked their credentials and led them to the hall. Each arrival was announced with great formality like arrivals at some aristocratic ball and offered the microphone. Each explained where they were from, what was happening in their workplace, and why they were joining (Potel 1982). Every arrival enhanced the sense of collective power. By nightfall, 156 workplaces from the Gdansk region had formally affiliated to the Inter-Factory Strike Committee, adding its delegates to the roll of those entitled to vote. The activists had pulled off one of the great feats of working-class organization in history.

If we looked at the activists' behaviour on the crucial Saturday afternoon and evening from afar, unable to decipher the content of their furiously emotional arguments, we might be tempted, using Blumer's account of 'collective behaviour', to describe them as 'milling', a feature of 'crowd behaviour' un-regulated by common norms (Blumer 1969). In effect, we would deny any real 'sense' to their activity, for a focus only on the emotional aspect of their activity misses its intellectual and purposive content. The heightened emotionality of the activists' dealings with each other - cries of betrayal, tears, furious argument, anger, breaking contact - betoken not a lack of shared norms, but uncertainty and argument about how to apply them in a suddenly transformed situation. Heightened emotionality marked the activists' collective, reciprocal struggle for and - in this case, at least - discovery of a new way forward, better fitting their larger objectives, in a process that Yrjö Engeström terms 'expansive learning' (Engeström 1987).

In effect, the shipyard manager and his allies in the first strike committee had unexpectedly disorganized the activists, pushing them into a difficult tactical situation and compelling them to search for a new creative response. However, if their opponents provided the immediate impulse to change, the existing form of organization, the shipyard strike committee, was anyway inadequate to the activists' general goal of 'free trade unions'. A struggle within a single workplace could indeed unite opposition activists with regime-supporters among the workforce in seeking concessions within the existing political frame. A general struggle for 'free trade unions' demanded something different. By Saturday, the limits of the old form were reached. At this juncture, the movement must either halt and disperse, or convulsively re-gather its forces and step onto a different level of activity and organization. Previous experience had not prepared the activists for this emergent contradiction, and they were thrust into uncertainty.
and mistrust of each other before they could, collectively, work out a means to resume their struggle on a higher level.

That, despite bitter words to and about each other, the activists managed to find a way through the dilemmas of the Saturday afternoon depended partly on the sufficient bonds of pre-existing trust amongst themselves (based on two years of previous joint work in conditions of illegality).\footnote{It was more than ’trust’ in the abstract, but rested on a shared orientation to Polish political life. They had concluded together that major institutional change was needed. (They would express those ideas very sharply in the eventual negotiations with the regime.) While their immediate unifying demand was for ’free trade unions’, their shared critique of the regime’s economics, policies and practices always transcended this.} They had, nonetheless, to re-make their relations with each other, and to broaden the leadership.\footnote{Broadening the leadership to include significant figures from other factories also meant the *demotion* of many of the initial activists who had started the shipyard strike. They could not all be on the new Praesidium.} In the process, some enjoyed ’empowering’ individual experiences. Alina Pienkowska, thrust into taking charge at Gate 3, was able to find new resources to master a tense situation, just as her friend Anna broke down in tears. Two previous years of rehearsing leadership and discussing strategy and tactics paid off: Pienkowska, mostly silent in oppositional meetings, had absorbed the key arguments and proved able to articulate them strongly.

**[d] Solidarity’s burgeoning and its contradictions**

Over the next two weeks, the MKS expanded its reach. The number of affiliated workplaces grew to over 600. At Szczecin, a parallel MKS organized 740 workplaces. There was a further MKS at Elblag, then at Wroclaw in Upper Silesia, and finally in the coalmines of Lower Silesia. All adopted the Gdansk 21 demands, centred on free trade unions. Some three million workers joined the occupation strikes.

As numbers expanded, and the MKS activities and demands began to define an emergent crystallization of the ’structure of feeling’, unevenness of consciousness, emotional response and organization still defined the field. The regime and the strike committees battled over communications, with telephones cut off and emissaries arrested and beaten up. The regime attempted divide and rule tactics, but failed. Tension was high, heightened by rumours and counter-rumours, and feeding a contradictory and shifting emotional field.

The strain damaged some people. There were nervous breakdowns, panicky withdrawals of strike committee members, epileptic attacks (Bloom forthcoming; Gajda 1982; Kemp-Welch 1983; Pawelec 1982). Individuals failed the test in other ways too. At the Ustka shipyard occupation, for example:

’Sunday, August 31…. We waited. That last day meant more strain than the whole two weeks. There were some who could not stand that. One member of the strike
committee could not be found since Saturday evening. Finally we learned he was dead drunk in a beer booth, of course with his "Strike Committee" badge on his sleeve. This confirmed the fact that not all the members of the committee had been chosen properly. Of course, the unpleasant measure we had to take was to expel him from the strike committee immediately (Kaszuba 1982).

Others felt exalted by the struggle. In an extraordinary and passionate memoir of the 1980 strikes, Jan Gajda, a Gdynia port worker, described the meaning of the workplace masses:

'To understand the renaissance of the cross in Poland one had to experience the inner rebirth and the days of purification. For the onlookers the cross was merely a relic two thousand years old and nothing more, For us, strikers, it was something much more because of our (unconscious) identification with Christ. We were ready to take the cross on our own shoulders, the cross in the form of the caterpillar tracks of the tanks. To understand that one has to be a mystic or to have experienced that oneself.'

Anything but an obedient son of the church, Gajda sharply criticized the Cardinal for not supporting the strikes:

'I called out in my own mind... how much did they offer you for that? And how much more did they promise you? Good Lord!'

Nor was the 'Polish Pope' immune from his spiritual criticism: basically, this Prince of the Church failed to see that Christ himself returned to Poland in August 1980:

'...when the Word became Flesh, the Vicar or Christ failed to recognize the Messiah under the overalls of the people of the coastal region.... (Christ) deigned to put on a coarse overall, sweaty, dirty, and stinking of alcohol' (Gajda 1982).16

Other workers' memoirs recall time spent fishing in a workplace canal, playing practical jokes, running card schools, reading and writing poetry and songs, organizing sports, and building up souvenir collections of strike memorabilia (Gajda 1982, Kuczma 1982, Pawelec 1982). Andrzej Wajda, the Polish film director, who visited the Gdansk MKS, reported his impression of 'immense calm', in the same period that Walesa recalled when the strike kept 'collapsing all the time'.

However, two weeks of mass occupation strikes altered relations between the workers' movement and the regime, registered in an altering balance away from fear-and-disorganization and towards hope-and-organization. The impulse to organization registered not simply in numbers affiliating to the MKS's, but in the new forms of material-social order the strikers were developing. In the factories, a workers' militia controlled entry, banning alcohol from the occupations and preparing defences in case of attack. Strike committees

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16 A similar idea inspired a series of carvings I saw in a church garden near Warsaw in 1986: an extra 'station of the cross' was added at the end, showing Christ standing triumphant, two fingers raised in a peace sign, with a Solidanosc badge on his breast.
organized the feeding of the occupiers, in some cases in conjunction with local farmers who brought in supplies.

Where the organization of material supplies was poorly developed, there were corresponding tangible effects on morale. At the Predom Metrix factory, a strike committee member recalled, 'I must admit that part of our people were not quite in high spirits. Probably because we had not solved well the problems of sleeping accommodations and food as a sit-down strike required' (Szylak 1982). At Gdynia port, the occupation committee organized policing, trial and punishment of theft from the bonded warehouses (Gajda 1982). Across Gdansk, the MKS took control of trams, taxis and lorries, and a canning factory was re-opened on the committee's instructions to process fish landed by the Baltic fleet. There was nascent 'workers' control'.

The very assembling of a 'solidarity' or crystallizing a 'structure of feeling' into a shared collective stance takes argument, reformulation, the questioning of previous assumptions and stances and the learning of new perspectives and thus the reconfiguring of social relations. It also involves changing the balance of loyalties and antagonisms. There was a symptomatic moment during one of the many meetings in the shipyard hall, when delegates first applauded a personnel manager who urged them to plead with the Party General Secretary to meet them, and then turned on him in fury when Walentynowicz revealed that he was the one who had sacked her (Barker 2001; Garton Ash 1983). What is interesting in the episode is the sharp transition from applause to excoriation. Had the interchange - and others of which we lack a record - not happened, and with the results it did, the MKS could not have stood together for two weeks and achieved what it did. In accepting the new way of looking at both themselves and the powerful, and at the possibilities for transformed relations among themselves that this perspective offered, the workplace representatives were, at the same time, building a new loyalty, a new organization, and accepting a new directive discipline. (The fact that this emerged out of democratic debate, out of arguments and counter-arguments, does not make it any the less disciplinary.)

The organizational form adopted to struggle for 'free trade unions' transcended normal trade-union forms. The MKS was highly open and democratic. Its assemblies debated and voted on ongoing policy. When negotiations finally began, they were conducted, not in closed sessions involving a handful of leaders, but in front of microphones, the proceedings broadcast across the shipyard and into the public square beyond. All workers belonged to the same single organization, without distinction of industry, occupation, or collar-colour; the MKS demands mixed together 'political' and 'economic' issues; and these organizations were taking control of some essential material processes. In form, the MKS's were closer to the 'workers councils' or 'soviets' of Russia and Germany in 1917 and 1918-19 than to western models of trade unionism. In August 1980 they did not mobilize peasants, police or military: those questions would arise later - successfully in the case of farmers, disastrously in the police and army cases.
their critiques of existing society, politics and economy (debated in the MKS assemblies for two weeks and voiced very clearly in the negotiations), in their demands and also in their activities and organizational forms, the MKS’s embodied the outlines of a different societal form from that defended by the regime. Rousseau’s famous sentence, ‘Man is born free but is everywhere in chains’, became a slogan of the movement, published on occupied factory gates, and quoted at the regime during the Gdansk negotiations.

After two weeks of mass strikes, the government signed agreements at the Lenin Shipyard and with the other MKS's. The strike movements' growing strength had compelled the regime to engage in long negotiations, forcing them both to listen to - and in part accept - an extraordinary dossier of grievances that touched on most aspects of Polish political life, from economic mis-management to abuse of the judicial process, and, finally, to accede publicly to every one of the strikers' 21 Points, along with the immediate release of arrested dissidents. The Gdansk agreement was signed on 31st August in front of the world's TV cameras, like the conclusion of a treaty between two sovereign powers (which indeed it resembled). Walesa was carried shoulder-high through cheering crowds.

The MKS had asserted, for Poland's workers, a new collective identity and social status, a claim with considerable affective-attractive power. That the regime was compelled to recognize this, at least publicly, only strengthened its appeal. While small groups of activists had initiated the struggle, the achievements had been the product of three million workers making it their own, identifying with the movement and its demands and transforming their individual and collective identities in a process of communicative social agency. In the course of the strikes, meanings, feelings, social relations, personalities were tested, explored, re-shaped, amplified or muted. As people rooted the ongoing narratives of the strike movement in their individual autobiographies, real processes of both empowerment and disempowerment (especially for the regime and its supporters) occurred, of 'cognitive and emotional liberation.'

The process was always risky, capable of turning out differently. The initiators had to put their orienting perspectives to the practical test of others' judgment, in interaction with more numerous voices. The huge, passionate dialogue (verbal and practical) of August was the mechanism for patterning and cementing new ideas, practices, institutions. This was a process of 'interactive discovery' (Barker 2001). As word of the events spread among the wider population, that audience too was preparing to respond further.

Within days, a meeting of delegates agreed to form a national body, the Self-Governing Independent Trade Union, Solidarity with its now famous logo. They

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18 The entire proceedings at Gdansk were tape-recorded and transcribed. An English translation of the complete transcript is available (Kemp-Welch 1983); I offer some analysis of the proceedings (Barker 2001).
adopted the structure of one big general union, federating of regional bodies, replicating the MKS form.

The new movement grew at an extraordinary pace. Membership rose in a few months to around ten million, some 80% of the total workforce, and a majority of workers in almost every industry and occupation. (Only among school-teachers did Solidarity fail to win a majority - 48% joined (Barker 1987a).) In recruiting them, Solidarity also transformed its members. The very act of participating in a founding meeting, often in defiance of local bosses, meant breaching old habits of submission, forging new bonds of loyalty. What had seemed to millions to be a relatively closed door of 'political opportunities' was rapidly kicked open after the August victory. Andrzej Gwiazda, Solidarity's vice-president, later described his experiences at a meeting of workers in the book trade: 'There I could see with my own eyes how a workers' assembly, divided into groups and grouplets, terrified by the presence of the manager and other official figures, and with absolutely no faith in the possibilities of success, transformed itself into a fighting, democratic organization after four hours of discussion.' (cited in Harman 1983). This had its own emotional valences. When the powerful stutter, we dare look them in the eye, openly expressing previously repressed feelings and ideas. The very fact of starting to make collective demands and take organized action to win them, in turn, opened participants to voices and experiences they could not previously access. 'Dissidents' now came to seem reasonable people, not the 'foreign agents' the Party media had portrayed.

Across Poland, growth came through strikes and conflicts. The August settlement unleashed a surge of demands and sharp local and regional conflicts, mostly ending in Solidarity victories. The union's growth expanded members' horizons and demands, and their willingness to mobilize for them. Their struggles reached into new areas of social and political life. Strike targets included the security police, corrupt officials, the use of public buildings, health service organization, food supplies. During November, the union in Silesia organized searches of warehouses, to check if there was cheating in the rationing system (there was). One commented, 'The Solidarity people in Huta did not stop to consider whether this was in their field of competence. They just did it'. In other spheres, and Polish regions, workers were posing other demands with political implications (Barker 1986).

Even amongst workers, Solidarity had from the start been more than a simple trade union concerned with wages and working conditions. It touched the nerve of Polish independence, it won the Church the right to weekly religious broadcasts, it raised issues about civil and political liberties, Polish justice, and international military alliances, it voiced aspirations to general democratization. Its very existence and its successes challenged the ruling order. As such, Solidarity speedily drew behind its banners all manner of other oppressed and exploited social groups.
Students moved first, with a rash of college occupations and the formation of officially recognized 'independent, self-governing' student unions. Among Poland’s three million small farmers, previously spasmodic agitation bore fruit in a spate of demands for a Peasants' Solidarity. Prisoners in Poland's goals organized and formulated demands. Other movements and organizations were inwardly transformed, including tenants, allotment-holders, ecologists, journalists, artists, actors, writers, even philatelists. 'Independent, self-governing' bodies sprang up everywhere. Even the notorious queues outside shops began to organize. Polish society in the autumn and winter of 1980-81 enjoyed what one writer called 'an orgy of participation'. Through these activities, 'collective identities' were transformed, with powerful emotional consequences. Public happiness grew, along with openly voiced scorn for the regime. Reported alcohol consumption and suicide rates fell. 'For the first time', one participant wrote, 'I feel at home in my own country'.

Michael Young points out that, in a whole series of movements, 'identity transformations or conversions, understood as radical and emotional alterations of the self, are constitutive of radical collective action. Appreciating them as such requires attending to the emotional dynamic of transformative cultural schemas....' (Young 2001). Elizabeth Wood, writing about Salvadorean peasants whose reasons for rebellion included assertion of their own dignity, suggests that exercising agency, under their own control, in the realization of their perceived interests, demonstrated the emergence of a new insurgent political culture based on solidarity, citizenship, equality and entitlement. She comments that the emotional benefits of this were only available to those who actually participated in the rebellion (Wood 2001). What was distinctive in Poland in the autumn of 1981 was that most people participated, and their participation was mutual and inter-communicative.

In parallel, the Polish authorities' power was weakening in all directions. Many officials lost their positions. In 'normal' times, nine of the 49 provincial Party First Secretaries would change each year. There were 22 such changes in the last four months of 1980, and another 31 in the first six months of 1981 (Lewis 1985). Every regime attempt to regain lost ground seemed to set off an avalanche of protest, expanding popular movements and their demands and disorganizing the rulers.

There was a new 'political-emotional balance' in society. Sometimes, Raymond Williams argues, literary works can produce a 'shock of recognition' that helps to focus and crystallize an inchoate and germinal 'structure of feeling'. In Poland, for a period, the 'figure' which produced that shock of recognition was no literary work, but the collective organization of Solidarity itself, giving more definite articulation to popular confidence, hopes and identities. Its capacity to harness and express people's feelings, hopes and wants, to attract their enthusiastic energies, and to provide a new and vibrant sense of shared identity, in turn depended on its successes in surmounting a whole series of difficulties and winning.
We might still talk of a 'structure of feeling', but it was one with very different inner tendencies. By comparison with previously, people were less fearful (or, less people were fearful, or people were fearful for less time...), more detached from the regime and the Party, more attached to Solidarity. More people participated in, and enjoyed, collective action. People became easier with new terms, and new social relations. They felt more collectively empowered, more confident about their own lives and futures. In any emotional dimension, it is a matter of 'more and less', majorities and minorities, never of simple homogeneity.

All such developments find their parallel in the heady early phases of other popular proto-revolutionary movements. 'The beautiful revolution', 'the revolution of flowers', 'the springtime of the peoples', 'moment of madness', 'Bliss was it in that very dawn to be alive' - such phrases catch the early and enthusiastic moments of popular mobilization, when a profound sense of general optimism and, above all, unity arises, a unity of a whole broad movement that rejects an oppressive past and welcomes a bright future. The question is always: What comes next? Marx, writing in the Neue Rheinische Zeitung (29 June 1848) about the June uprising in Paris, suggests that the initial unity and beauty is but temporary:

'The February revolution was the beautiful revolution, the revolution of universal sympathy, because the conflicts which erupted in the revolution against the monarchy slumbered harmoniously side by side, as yet undeveloped, because the social struggle which formed its background had only assumed an airy existence - it existed only as a phrase, only in words. The June revolution is the ugly revolution, the repulsive revolution, because realities have taken the place of words, because the republic has uncovered the head of the monster itself by striking aside the protective, concealing crown.' (Marx 1973)

What was Solidarity, and what might it become? The 'free trade union' demand - unprecedented in its successful assertion across the whole of the 'communist' world - remained deeply ambiguous. What exactly was to be the relationship between Solidarity, with its vastly enhanced attractive power and authority across almost the entire Polish population, and the regime? What exactly was Solidarity, anyway, and what might it become? And what kind of internal regime would Solidarity develop among its own members? Those were matters still to be settled in practice. Touraine and his colleagues explored the ambiguities, seeing Solidarity as at once a trade union, a movement for democracy and a national liberation movement (Touraine 1983). It was all those, and more besides.

If the movement's identity was ambiguous, so was the situation its emergence had created. The closest analogy to political relations in Poland in the winter of 1980-81 was that familiar to students of revolution: 'dual power'. A weakened regime, with a much reduced capacity to form and impose its autonomous will, faced a huge and growing popular insurgency, each side embodying distinct principles and aspirations. It was a situation that could not last: its 'logic' was that one side must crush or deflect the other. And the matter did not lack
urgency, with economic crisis deepening, and the Kremlin pressing the regime to 'restore order'.

Neither side was, however, yet in any position to resolve the situation definitively. The regime would have liked to weaken and break the popular movement, but lacked conviction and means. As for Solidarity, its own leaders and advisers held it back.

Solidarity's existing leadership gave the impression of people who had unleashed tidal forces they could not control. Leading activists expressed worry that Solidarity supporters wanted too much from their movement. For them it was a problem that the movement was drawing around itself all the aroused hopes and expectations of society. Jacek Kuron told an activists’ meeting in December 1980:

'The main difficulty is that people's attitude towards the government ... is characterized by frustration and increased antipathy in all areas. The result is that when any conflict arises between Solidarity and the government, no matter on what question, we always get tremendous support. On the other hand, any understanding, no matter how favourable to the union it may be, arouses dissatisfaction, or - to use perhaps a better word - disappointment among the people.'

And Bogdan Borusewicz, an activist from Gdansk, declared:

'At this moment, people expect more of us than we can possibly do. Normally, society focuses on the Party. In Poland nowadays, however, society gathers around the free trade unions. That's a bad thing. Thus there is an increasing necessity to formulate a political programme. It would be good if the party took the lead and removed people's social expectations from our shoulders. But will it do so now? In the eyes of the people the new trade union should do everything: they should fill the role of trade unions, participate in the administration of the country, be a political party and act as a militia, that is confine drunkards and thieves, they should teach morals - and that's a great problem for us.' (Labour Focus on Eastern Europe, 4:4-6 1981 p 15).

There is a remarkable parallel between the Polish situation and that in Russia after the February Revolution, as Leon Trotsky described it:

'The workers, soldiers and peasants took events seriously. They thought that the soviets which they had created ought to undertake immediately to remove those evils which had caused the revolution. They all ran to the Soviet. Everybody brought his pains there. And who was without pains? They demanded decisions, hoped for help, awaited justice, insisted upon indemnification. Solicitors, complainers, petitioners, exposers, all came assuming that at last they had replaced a hostile power with their own. The people believe in the Soviet, the people are armed, therefore the Soviet is the sovereign power. That was the way they understood it. And were they not indeed right? An uninterrupted flood of soldiers, workers, soldiers' wives, small traders, clerks, mothers, fathers, kept opening and shutting the doors, sought, questioned, wept, demanded, compelled action - sometimes even indicating what action – and converted the Soviet in very truth into a revolutionary government. Sukhanov complained that that was not at
all in the interest of the Soviet, and did not enter at all into its plans....' (Trotsky 1965)

Why did this enthusiasm for Solidarity alarm rather than exhilarate the leaders and advisers? At root, because they were committed to a perspective with a simple central proposition: 'Don't go too far!' In reality, the 'trade union' formula was proving too constricting for the real character of the movement, but no viable alternative was emerging. Sizeable numbers of Solidarity members criticized the leaders for being 'too soft' in relation to specific events, but no one focused these criticisms into an organized opposition within the movement.

The leaders' predominant response was to try to stem the onward rush of their own side. Their initial efforts in this direction, however, were unconvincing. The Solidarity tide continued to sweep all before it through the winter and into the spring, with strikes and other battles erupting all across the country, further undermining the regime's credibility and political resources and enhancing the popular sense of collective empowerment. It thus took a while for Solidarity's inner contradictions to come to a head. The first three months of 1981 witnessed a series of major national and regional strikes, with material conditions slowly worsening and continuing agitation for recognition of a Solidarity-backed peasants' union.

[e] The 31st March crisis and its aftermath

It was out of this last issue that a general crisis emerged. Solidarity members, meeting at Bydgoszcz, on 19th March, to support peasant demands, were seriously beaten by large numbers of police, clearly acting under orders. The Bydgoszcz region erupted into general strike, issuing posters of the victims' battered faces. This was the first time Solidarity had faced serious state violence. The national union, after some argument, called a four-hour national strike on 28th March, to be followed, if that failed, by an unlimited general strike from 31st March.

The four-hour strike was completely solid. Poland simply stopped. Even official TV programmes shut down. If 28th March was a dress rehearsal for the 31st, it seemed the full-scale production would be a considerable success. The atmosphere in Poland was electric. There were active preparations for a major confrontation, including designating strike headquarters in each region, assembly of foodstuffs, sleeping and barricade materials.

When members of the Politburo favoured declaring an immediate emergency, and using force to break the strike, the Prime Minister (and Defence Minister) General Jaruzelski threatened to resign: probably he could not be sure of his troops' loyalty in such a crisis. Jaruzelski, though, had a sharper card to play: he turned to the Catholic Church for aid. Both the Pope and Cardinal Wyszynski

19 Historians of revolution will remember Saint-Just's warning: Those who make a revolution halfway dig their own graves.
called for restraint; Walesa attended a private meeting with Wyszynski, and the Church's advisers to the union leadership also applied pressure. At the last moment, without informing or involving the rest of the union leadership, Walesa and a few advisers negotiated secretly with the regime. He then appeared on TV on 30th March, announcing the cancellation of the general strike.

Responses to this sudden turn-around were, not surprisingly, mixed and confused. Some were doubtless relieved. A considerable minority were very angry, calling the deal 'Walesa's Munich'. The sense of betrayal made some people physically ill. One young woman from Warsaw spoke for many:

'It was the beginning of the end, a breaking of the spirit. I felt physically ill, so depressed I wanted to die. It was such a terrible mistake. I don't think it would actually have come to a strike, the authorities would have backed down. The Russians? They wouldn't have come. It would have meant too bloody a struggle. They knew we'd fight to the end.' (Craig 1986)

The Bydgoszcz activists denounced the deal from their hospital beds. Solidarity's press spokesman resigned, calling Walesa a feudal monarch with flattering courtiers. Walentynowicz's fierce criticisms led to her removal from the Gdańsk branch Praesidium. Andrzej Gwiazda, who felt he'd been duped, published an open letter to Walesa, accusing the chairman of undemocratic practices.

March 31st was a 'turning point' in Solidarity's development (Abbott 1997; Bloom 1999). Suddenly there was an almost complete halt in popular mobilizations and strikes, lasting for three months. While Solidarity membership did not drop, attendance at union meetings fell off rapidly. Among workers, especially, there was disorientation: when elections for Solidarity's forthcoming Congress were held up and down Poland, few workers put themselves forward, as speeches were required, and they did not know what to say. Many election meetings were inquorate (Myant 1981). An opinion poll in June-July found that 70 per cent of Polish workers felt they had no influence on social life (Staniszkis 1984).

The Bydgoszcz crisis illuminated the degree to which, at a key moment, the previous internal democracy of Solidarity had been replaced by bureaucratized decision-making by a few leaders and advisers. The crisis also brought to the fore the question, what exactly was Solidarity, and what should it become? The term 'trade union' became ever less adequate. Zbigniew Bujak, chair of the Warsaw regional branch, told his factory: 'If we consider ourselves merely as a trade union, as the government expects us to, then we must think of ourselves as a trade union of seamen on a sinking ship.' (Barker 1987a)

After Bydgoszcz, argument would grow within Solidarity, practically and theoretically, about what course the sinking ship should now take. What should Solidarity do? How should it struggle, and for what? Who should lead, and with what policies? The arguments would be about the movement's very life and death.
Solidarity's internal debates had some limited time and space to develop, for the regime could not take full advantage of the sudden popular demobilization. The ruling Party was deeply divided: its working-class members had mostly broken discipline and joined Solidarity's 28th March strike, and an unprecedented 'horizontal' discussion movement developed within its own ranks demanding more openness and Party democracy. It took some months for the core regime leadership to restore some semblance of control in a shrinking Party - and, eventually, to decide privately to bypass the Party in favour of direct military rule.

Inside Solidarity itself, there was a dual movement. On one hand, the de-activation of the rank-and-file membership continued for several months. On the other hand, more radical ideas began to spread among the activists, notably about economic self-management - both to contest Party management in workplaces, and to handle the deepening economic crisis. However, these discussions happened mostly in small circles of activists and intellectuals, relatively cut off from the mass of members, little involved in these developments. Zbigniew Bujak reported that, when he raised the issue of self-management in his own factory, workers didn't understand him: not anyway, until, he said it would lead to taking of power. But that was off the agenda (Barker 1986). Zbigniew Kowalewski quotes the Polish sociologist, Jadwiga Staniszkis: 'I fear that the language of the leaders is not very convincing for the rank and file.... Even the slogans of socialization and self-management sat little to the imagination of the masses. It is no accident that it is easier to promote self-management by talking about seizing economic power, as I do, or by talking about an active strike, as Kowalewski does in Lodz.' (Kowalewski 1982)

The economic crisis deepened, shortages multiplied. Food shortages were becoming desperate, with people queuing all night to get their basic ration entitlements. In the summer meat rations were cut by 20 percent. A senior government official stated, 'One-third of the country's workforce is standing in a queue at any one time'. A Solidarity newspaper claimed that malnutrition was hugely reducing miners' productivity (Hamor 1983). From July onwards, after three months of silence, two new surges of collective action began. First, there were large 'hunger marches' in numbers of cities, organized by local Solidarity branches, but with no national involvement. Second, from July until mid-November, a wave of 'wildcat strikes' contested the worsening economic situation and raised other, broader grievances (Barker 1986, 1987a). The national leadership responded, not by attempting to lead the strikes, but by rushing about the country 'firefighting' - and even backing government calls for an end to the unrest for the sake of 'the country'. Thus, though popular activism recovered for several months, Solidarity nationally refused it any active articulation, indeed sought to defuse it.

Even so, Solidarity was compelled to change its own account of itself. By the time of its autumn National Congress, the 'trade union' formula was replaced with a new self-description: Solidarity now described itself officially as a 'social
movement' aiming at the complete reform of Polish society, and seeking a 'Self-Governing Republic'. There was much to admire in the new Programme, except that it consistently evaded a critical question: how to implement the changes it suggested? No practical arguments were advanced. It proposed goals that were, in the context of Polish politics, revolutionary, shattering the existing framework of political life, but no revolutionary means were suggested. When it won recognition as a 'trade union', Solidarity had accepted 'limitations' on its own activity and scope, recognizing 'the leading role of the Party in the state'.

Now, despite publicly aiming to remake completely Polish social and political institutions, the leadership still sought to remain within existing legal bounds. The tensions of 'self-limitation' had not been removed, only lifted to a higher plane.

A further difficulty: the Congress that decided these matters had quite low working-class representation. The silence of workers in the aftermath of March 31st, noted above, meant that few of the candidates for regional delegates to the Congress were workers. Members of the intelligentsia were less diffident about speaking at the selection meetings, and they dominated the delegations. Half the Congress delegates had degrees; only a quarter were manual workers (Barker 1986). There were less carriers of rank-and-file opinion from the mass membership.

Popular disquiet - at the growing economic crisis, at the growing gap between Solidarity's leadership and its base, at its apparent practical ineffectiveness - did find a kind of partial expression in 'radical' tendencies that emerged within the movement. But none proved able to offer any practical alternative to Solidarity's leadership. Their criticisms of the leadership were often rancorous and personalistic; their general arguments for more radical programmes were not translated into new forms of organization or proposals for alternative forms of activity, hence remained abstract. None, for example, worked to unify or organize active support for the 'wildcat' strikes of summer and autumn, where they might have built a base; none warned of the threat of military takeover, or challenged Solidarity's failure to organize in the restive and mostly conscript military; none organized solidarity demonstrations when large numbers of civil police wanted to form their own 'Solidarity' union.

Andrezj Gwiazda, a key figure in Gdansk, was emblematic of the radicals' weakness. At the Autumn Congress, he was one of three oppositionists who offered themselves as alternative candidates to Walesa for national Chairman of Solidarity. Each candidate was allowed 20 minutes to answer questions from

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20 The complete text of Solidarity’s new Programme was translated in *Labour Focus on Eastern Europe*, 5.1, spring 1982.

21 For accounts of how that formula was smuggled into the final agreement, and the controversy involved, see Barker (1986, 1987), and the invaluable testimony of two of the intellectual delegation from Warsaw that helped with the smuggling (Kowalik 1983; Staniszkis 1981).
delegates. Asked why he was standing, Gwiazda replied only: 'Because the rules allow me to do so.' He and his supporters had developed no alternative project or vision, hence the only matter up for debate and decision was the man and not a distinct way forward. There were good ideas: for example, 'winter aid committees' to ensure that the old did not suffer from food and coal shortages in the approaching winter, but putting that into practice would require a measure of political power, and taking and organizing that power was on no one's agenda. Good ideas without muscle to back them remain empty words.

It had become clear to the regime that purely political means could not defeat Solidarity, and they turned to the military for salvation. Its plans were revealed as early as September, but Solidarity ignored the warning (Barker 1987a). From October, General Jaruzelski combined in his hands three offices: party secretary, prime minister, defence minister. Walesa almost welcomed the news: 'At least it means power is concentrated in one man's hands. What we need is a strong reasonable government we can negotiate with' (The Guardian (London), 20 October 1981). The military began drawing up lists of people to arrest. The regime moved carefully, still camouflaging its plans, but testing the resistance with small local attacks against Solidarity members. In the spring, physical attacks were signals for mass strikes, now they aroused nothing more than scattered local protests.

The strike wave ran on into early November, with the union leadership still calling for an end to 'elemental and unorganized protests'. In the middle of the month, the strike wave petered out, largely through sheer exhaustion and disappointment. Jadwiga Staniszkiw wrote in November, 'Many [ordinary workers] feel alienated, as if they were a mass levy to be raised and later disbanded. Tired of the hardships of everyday life, they are less and less inclined to involve themselves in union activity' (Staniszkiw 1982). Many workers fell back into angry apathy. Modzelewski described the mood on 3rd December: 'The trade union has not become stronger, it has become weaker, and all activists are aware of this. There are several reasons for this: weariness as a result of the crisis, weariness at the end of a line. Some people blame us for the prolongation of this state of affairs' (Washington Post, 20 December 1981).

Some activists began to turn to talk of 'political parties', but never to the idea of party-formation inside Solidarity. The most promising potential development was a hardening militant group, centred on Lublin and Lodz, emphasizing the need for workers' control and 'economic planning from below', and arguing for 'active strikes' in which workers would take actual control over production as part of a 'strategy of struggle for workers' power.' Had their proposals gained support, they might have re-connected the union with its membership in new forms of collective action (Kowalewski 1982, 1985).

In the last days, as the regime further raised the temperature, there were late signs of radical hardening of attitudes among the leadership. On Saturday 12th December, the National Commission met, in its most radical mood, voting to oppose emergency powers legislation with a general strike. But it was too late.
That night they were all arrested and interned. Martial law was declared at 6 a.m. on Sunday.

Cardinal Glemp broadcast an appeal to people not to fight back. There were strikes, but not that many. They were broken by direct military means. Two pits in Lower Silesia held three-week underground occupations. When the miners finally emerged, they were shocked to discover that they were alone in their action, unable to believe the whole of Poland was not on strike with them. In truth, even before the military clampdown, a sense of defeat had already spread among large sections of Solidarity's members. The success of Jaruzelski's coup depended on the de-mobilized condition of Solidarity's rank and file.

[f] Concluding Remarks

The very scale of Solidarity's victories and its subsequent expansion took the movement into uncharted territory, where old conceptual maps no longer sufficed. The simple, expanding unity of the first seven months of Solidarity indicated the movement's immense potentials, but also concealed important contradictions: the insufficient 'free trade union' formula, leadership ambivalence about its own movement's radicalism, the conservatizing influence of 'mediating' forces such as the Catholic Church and the Polish intelligentsia. The 'moral shock' of the March 31st debacle indicated the need for re-thinking.

David Harvey provides a business analogy, where altered economic networks can weaken or destroy capitalist concerns who fail to adapt: 'The identity of the players and the culture of the corporation, acquired under a certain regime of spatio-temporality, prevents doing what obviously ought to be done in order to survive under another' (Harvey 1996). Solidarity, to survive the growing threats to its very existence, needed new identities and culture, and ways to overcome resistances to change. Its goals and its stance towards the regime required revision, along with its own internal rules, procedures and social relations. Existing loyalties and social ties must necessarily come under scrutiny, if it was to develop some new 'crystallization' of its own character more or less adequate to the new situation.

Perhaps the most critical question was whether Solidarity could draw a new map of the situation it both found itself in and constituted. That required clearly formulating and finding sufficient answers to some important questions. What kind of opponent was the regime after Solidarity's 'recognition', and how might it develop? Was 'partnership' with the regime desirable, even possible? Could the regime solve the economic crisis, which was sapping Solidarity's own support as much as the regime's? Or must Solidarity alter its stance, and seek to substitute itself and its own power-potential for the regime? What should it offer its disappointed and fragmenting membership? Were Solidarity's current forms of organization and ideas a barrier to change?

The crisis in the movement after 31st March could, and did, have a variety of effects on how people felt. A 'turning point' can provide excitement, provoking
curiosity and potential creativity, energizing people towards new ways of looking at the world and themselves, and fostering new projects. It can equally depress and de-energize, promoting negativity, withdrawal, cynicism, disappointed hopes. It can gain hearings for people and ideas, previously more marginal and ignored. It can also provoke a conservative response, blaming previous radicalism for current difficulties and seeking to contain new impulses.

As Marshall Ganz suggests, the pattern of formation of leadership circles can play a significant role. Leadership that draw on diverse constituencies and experiences have access to a wider range of options, enhancing potential creativity in conditions of uncertainty (Ganz 2000). Where voices are excluded, the potential for creative transcendence of inherited patterns of thought and feeling is reduced. Exclusions - they were part of Solidarity’s culture after March 31st - pose a potential question to the excluded: should they organize some independent space to develop and express their views and feelings? In Solidarity, that would have meant bypassing leadership calls for ‘unity’ in pursuit of democracy, and developing ‘proto-party’ formations, or factions inside the movement. If that did not happen, then dissidents would tend to feel suffocated and either to withdraw or become personalistic in their criticisms.

There was a kind of ‘crystallization’ after March 31st, but it tended to promote uncertainty rather than clarity. Many Solidarity members were disoriented. There was widespread unfocused mistrust, producing division, loss of a sense of collective identity and purpose that, in the end, turned into widespread dissociation, angry withdrawal, and sometimes hostile individualism. In the last weeks, there were reports of people fighting in queues, where previously they had organized to make things fairer. Loss of belief, paralysis of will, and a festering angry disappointment marked Solidarity’s final period.

Literature on other movements offers some insights into the dilemmas of Solidarity’s final months. In a rare discussion of movements facing theoreti-co-practical impasses, Kim Voss’s account of the decline of the Knights of Labor offers the concept of ‘cognitive encumbrance’ (Voss 1996). The opposite of McAdam’s ‘cognitive liberation’, this signifies that existing strategic formulations feel inadequate, offering no apparent way forward. It has, of course, important emotional aspects: loss of confidence in the movement, a sense of aimlessness, pointlessness, defeatism, diffuse anger, bewilderment. ‘Encumbrance’ is a cognitive-affective complex, a condition of stalled mutual learning. Debra King refers to ‘emotional dissonance created through changing ideological frames’ (King 2005). The Solidarity case suggests a particular kind of ‘emotional dissonance’ when the need to change ideological frames arises, through crises in a movement’s development. What till now has seemed effective no longer appears certain, and a watchful, questioning, stance emerges which - whether uncomfortable or enjoyable - requires some kind of resolution.

Goodwin, Jasper and Polletta propose a distinction between reciprocal and shared emotions. The former refers to activists’ feelings for each other, the close
affective ties of friendship, love, solidarity etc within a movement, while the latter are shared among group members, but their objects are outside the group, like outrage at the government. They comment, 'Reciprocal and shared emotions, although distinct, reinforce each other, thereby building a movement's culture' (Goodwin, Jasper and Polletta 2001). One has to say, it all depends! In crises, such bonds are tested severely. Shared emotions towards the regime started to differentiate within Solidarity, with mutual charges of 'softness' and 'extremism' echoing in discussions, matching more or less articulated differences in stances towards the regime. Reciprocal feelings were complexified by mistrust, antagonism and division.\(^{22}\)

These and other schemas\(^{23}\) suffer from being too static: they capture 'conditions' but not narrative. Discussing the 1917 revolution, Trotsky suggests that the popular movement proceeded by 'the method of successive approximations' towards shared acceptance of 'all power to the soviets' as a solution to their difficulties.\(^{24}\) Solidarity's evolution in its last months also reveals 'successive approximations' occurring, but no group was, in a sense, 'pointing the way' and giving dialogic direction to a radicalization of the activist layers. And matters of timing of development became critical, as the regime itself was using the same 'method' to work out how it might strike Solidarity down. Prolonged disorientation without decisive resolution is liable to promote loss of confidence and mutuality, as dialogue is partially stalled and contained.

There was a 'missing link' within Solidarity, in the shape of an emerging 'left current' that pointed to the threat from the regime, and the need to undermine it and work to directly substitute Solidarity's own power for it. To explain that absence, we would need to review the history of the Left in the West as much as in the East in that period.\(^ {25}\)

\(^{22}\) Part of the difficulty is that Goodwin et al only discuss situations of movement emergence, when their observations apply quite well. Matters are more complex in movement crises.

\(^{23}\) Gould (2001) discusses 'ambivalence', but her focus is more on feelings about one's situation in society than about the movement that challenges that situation. Jochen Kleres invokes 'shame' as the predominant explanatory emotion to account for the decline of gay activism in post-Wende East Germany (Kleres 2005). That mechanism seems to offer little purchase on the Solidarity experience. Colin Barker and Michael Lavalette explore the implications of a sense of constricted possibility on the Liverpool dockers' struggle in the 1990s (Barker and Lavalette 2002). Relevant comparisons might also be drawn with the later history of SNCC, whose members began to 'eat on each other' (Barker and Cox 2002).

\(^{24}\) The passage reads: 'The fundamental political process of the revolution ... consists in the gradual comprehension by a class of the problems arising from the social crisis - the active orientation of the masses by a method of successive approximations. The different stages of a revolutionary process, certified by a change of parties in which the more extreme always supersedes the less, express the growing pressure to the left of the masses - so long as the swing of the movement does not run into objective obstacles. When it does, there appears a reaction: disappointment of the different layers of the revolutionary class, growth of indifferentism, and therewith a strengthening of the counter-revolutionary forces.' (Trotsky 1965)

\(^{25}\) I offered some remarks on the question in Barker and Weber (1982).
Solidarity's defeat was immensely consequential. The regime's turn to sheer military power to crush Solidarity, proved fateful for 'communism'. Dispensing with politics and The Party, Jaruzelski and his collaborators widened the road to 1989. On the other hand, after its defeat, while Solidarity was never crushed, its working-class base declined further. Increasingly intelligentsia-based, it gave up on dreams of economic self-management in favour of neo-liberalism (Barker 1990b). As such, it helped shape the 'purely political' 1989 revolutions across Eastern Europe (Barker and Mooers 1997), providing ammunition to the liberal triumphalism of Fukuyama and others.

The history remains relevant today. If nothing else, the Polish movement tested to destruction the suicidal proposition that mass movements should seek to 'change the world without taking power.'

Appendix: a note on emotions in crises and rituals

There is, perhaps, an interesting contrast, in terms of the forms of collective activity and their associated emotional dimensions, between those we see during crises and those we see in collective rituals.

In an earlier essay (Barker 2001), I offered some remarks on emotions and ritual, drawing on work by Strathern and Stewart (1998). I summarise the argument. During collective rituals, people use their bodies to personify [a] who they are and [b] what they intend to become within a given social setting. Rituals, collective performances in which bodies are sensuously active together, are (like other forms of action) emotion-laden, but the emotional aspect is not separable from other aspects of its content. Engaging in ritual action is a way of communicating whole complexes of meaning. It is a 'shorthand' form of communication, capable of unifying different actors who may have a variety of specific ideas around a particular shared experience. Ritual action is a sign both to oneself and to others, taking 'choral' or 'multivocal' form. Being public, it has a binding quality, expressing a 'promise to align with others'. Enhancing solidarity around a particular issue or event, it affirms by communicating affirmation.

Such a position seems to fit quite well with a dialogical approach. Rituals only 'work' if those participating are expressing a sufficiently shared perspective on a

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27 It might be thought that dialogics focuses only on disputatious talk, but both Vološinov and Bakhtin suggest not: ‘...any real utterance, in one way or another or to one degree or another, makes a statement of agreement with or a negation of something' (Vološinov 1986); 'The narrow understanding of dialogism as argument, polemics, or parody. These are the externally most obvious, but crude, forms of dialogism. Confidence in another's word, reverential reception (the authoritative word), apprenticeship, the search for and mandatory nature of deep meaning, agreement, its infinite gradations and shadings (but not its logical limitations and not purely referential reservations), the layering of meaning upon meaning, voice upon
similar object. Otherwise, they can seem empty and formalistic, have depressive effects, promoting dissociation. 'Successful' rituals are means of expressing 'agreement', indeed they are means of amplifying such agreement.28

The narrative of Solidarity's history – and especially of its first seven months – is full of examples of collective ritual action. There were obvious forms like the shipyard Field Mass or the national ceremony in Gdansk in December 1980 to dedicate the workers' memorial to the dead of 1970, but the history also records mass singing, clapping, cheering, booing, whistling, ceremonial speech, solemn silences, the decoration of factory gates with pictures and flowers, poetry readings and musical recitals. However, as my earlier essay suggested, these forms 'punctuate' the narrative in an almost grammatical sense, marking transitions between situations. There were occasions for ritual action, and other times when different kinds of communication occurred, with very different emotional valences.

In 'crises of development', ritual action plays little part. What marks crises is disagreement and cognitive-emotional turmoil. Crises are moments of 'pain' and 'vulnerability', when circumstances no longer permit 'seamless performances' (Summers-Effler 2005). Crises are moments of challenge, perhaps created by an unexpected alteration in the behaviour of opponents or other interactants, or by a questioning initiated within a group of movement of existing ways of acting or thinking. In a crisis, existing perspectives are thrown into doubt, along with the social relations and learned expectations that sustain them. Commonly they reveal previously covert contradictions in existing social relations, goals and understandings. Such conditions demand improvised responses, a casting about for new solutions. They may involve division emerging within a previously assumed unity, posing the possibilities of fission or re-formation on a changed basis. It is 'misalignment' of movement members that characterizes a crisis, not the 'alignment' of ritual action. They are moments of tension and danger and also of new possibilities.

Ritual action draws on known repertoires, deploying components from the stock of a shared culture. It uses familiar forms to achieve its effects. But what marks crises is that the familiar, the already known, is no longer adequate. Crises disorientate, they overturn expectations, their resolution requires

voice, strengthening through merging (but not identification), the combination of many voices (a corridor of voices) that augments understanding, departure beyond the limits of the understood, and so forth.' One cannot... understand dialogic relations simplistically and unilaterally, reducing them to contradiction, conflict, polemics, or disagreement. Agreement is very rich in varieties and shadings. Two utterances that are identical in all respects ... if they are really two utterances belonging to different voices and not one are linked by dialogic relations of agreement.' (Bakhtin 1986)

28 Randall Collins (2001) explores the effect of 'successful' social rituals, but does not consider 'unsuccessful' ones, which is a pity, for further consideration might suggest their relevance to movement decline.
innovation based on some form of practical criticism of previous assumptions and limits.

Where, through the rigours of crisis interactions, groups succeed in resolving a situation in a new and at least partially adequate way, capable of attracting significant agreement, new forms of understanding are born, and new kinds of bonds are formed. These are the moments when 'ritual action' and its attendant particular forms of emotional interaction are most appropriate. Solving problems leaves people feeling empowered. What ritual action can offer at such moments is a collective affirmation of the new direction, the new understanding, the new goals and the new social relations and shared discipline that these imply.

If, as suggested earlier, we need to understand emotions as both shared and dilemmic, it may be that each apparently contradictory aspect comes more to the fore in one kind of event-setting than another, providing a kind of narrative sequencing of forms of emotional communication.

Finally, there are situations – of the kind that characterized Solidarity after 31st March, 1981, where a crisis in movement development is revealed but no adequate answer is found. In such a condition, cognitive-emotional turmoil finds no solution, there is less and less to celebrate ritually, and the bonds of previous solidarity weaken. There is less to 'affirm'.

The implication is that, here too, we cannot consider the emotional aspects of human action, individual or collective, apart from the cognitive and materially active content, the understandings and purposes of which they are an inherent part.

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29 I am reminded of Gramsci's characterization of a period in which the old is dying but the new cannot yet be born, and when 'morbid symptoms appear'.

30 Collins, followed by both Eyerman and Summers-Effler, attempt to catch the nature of different moments with the concept of 'emotional energy' (Collins 2001; Eyerman 2005; Summers-Effler 2005). The difficulty with this concept is that it is treated in simply quantitative terms, as something that rises and falls, is gained or spent. Consideration of moments of movement failure suggests another possibility; that 'emotional energy' may, like attention, be focused or dispersed. If Solidarity members in the latter part of 1981 were disoriented, anxious, bewildered, quarrelsome, their emotions were not necessarily less energetic. What they lacked was a shared vision of a way forward, and that was a cognitive-practical matter as much as an emotional one.


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